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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines what the management of crises can reveal about the type and the 
nature of regional security systems in Southeast Asia. It seeks to evaluate whether or 
not crisis management conducted by the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) 
member countries helps to provide ways of conceptualising regional security systems, 
namely a security community, a balance of power, or a classical concert of powers. 
While there is a growing body of literature examining the relevance of the first two 
concepts for explaining the type of regional security system in Southeast Asia, there is a 
very limited literature that explores whether or not a regional classical concert of 
powers can provide a relevant explanation. Given that historically the notion of crisis 
management has been a useful indicator that sheds light the international system, this 
thesis specifically examines a possible connection between crisis management and 
security systems in Southeast Asia. The study approaches this task by investigating 
three case studies: the 1978-1991 Cambodian crisis, the 1999-2002 East Timor crisis 
and the 2008-2010 Cyclone Nargis crisis. 
The thesis has two key arguments. First, whether or not the three conceptualisations of 
regional security systems examined and their variations in the thesis have explanatory 
value depends on at least two conditions, namely the pha_se of the crisis -whether it is 
in an escalating, acute, or de-escalating period- and the nature of the crisis -whether 
it is traditional or non traditional. Second, the thesis argues that under the same 
conditions, there are times when the regional security system can best be 
conceptualised as a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers'. The introduction of this 
concept contributes to ongoing debate within academic literature about the nature of 
the regional security systems that operate in Southeast Asia. 
These two arguments also have additional implications for policy development in 
Southeast Asia. The first is that the management of crises in Southeast Asia needs to be 
reviewed and ways found to establish more robust policies and structures for managing 
crises. ASEAN member states need to set up formal dispute settlement and crisis 
management mechanisms and the role of the Secretary-General of ASEAN should be 
strengthened with monitoring and evaluation. The second policy direction that the 
findings point to is that the burdens of the crisis management should be shared by the 
regional leading powers and all ASEAN member states. Regional security requires 
dedicated effort by every Southeast Asian country. 
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1.1. Introduction 
CHAPTER1 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines whether the management of crises which have arisen in Southeast 
Asia by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states helps to 
provide an understanding of the type of security systems1 operating in that region. The 
thesis is prompted by a longstanding debate about the nature of the security system in 
Southeast Asia. Some scholars consider that the security system in Southeast Asia is 
best explained as involving balance of power dynamics. 2 These scholars argue that 
regional cooperation in ASEAN has a limited role in building the security architecture. 
Accordingly, external great powers3 such as the United States (US) and China have 
greater influence than Southeast Asian countries in crafting the security architecture in 
Southeast Asia. Ralf Emmers, for example, highlights the importance of the balance of 
power factor in examining ASEAN. He argues that in ASEAN, the concepts of 'balance 
of power' and 'cooperative security' can coexist. 4 The balance of power within 
cooperative security, according to Emmers, works in Southeast Asia and aims to restrict 
a disposition towards hegemony on the part of a member by entangling it within a rule-
based regime that includes sufficient motivation to constrain hegemony. 5 ASEAN 
member states have tried to reduce the influence of external great powers by 
introducing their own norms, such as those constituting the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC) and the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). 6 
Michael Leifer, who is recognised as the 'Dean of Southeast Asia' is sceptical about the 
ability of multilateral security dialogues to deal with the problem of power in an 
'ungoverned world'.? Even though doubting the efficiency of ASEAN, he argues that 
ASEAN is best understood as an institutionalised, albeit relatively informal, expression 
of 'cooperative security' which serves as both a complement and an alternative to 
1 The term 'system' in sociology inYolves a 'set of units and their interrelationships'. See Frank Harary and 
Mark F. Ba tell, 'What is System', Social Network, No. 3, 1981, pp. 29-40, p.30. In this thesis, 'system' refers 
to a collection of units (regional states) that interact with each other on matters of security " ·hile a 'regional 
security system' refers to a single or combination of security arrangements pursued by regional states that 
focus on one or more security issues. 
2 See Michael Leifer's ,-vorks on Southeast Asia in Chin Kin Wah and Leo Suryadinata, eds, Michael Leifer 
Selected Works on Southeast Asia, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2005. See also RalfEmmers, Cooperative 
Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 
3 The term 'great powers' that I use, unless othernise indicated, refers to external great powers outside 
Southeast Asia, such as the US, China and the former Soviet Union. 
4 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, pp. 51-52. 
5 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF. 
6 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF. 
7 Michael Leifer, 'North America and the Asia Pacific Region in the 21st Century: Changing Rules of 
Engagement', in K.S. Nathan ed., North American and the Asia Pacific in the 21 st Century: Challenges and 
Prospects for Cooperative Security and Prosperity, London: ASEAN Academic Press, 1999, p. 70. 
balance of power practice. 8 Leifer also argues that ASEAN is best identified as a 
'diplomatic community'.9 Emmers claims that Leifer's understanding of the balance of 
power concept combines a realist and neo-Grotian perspectives. 10 
Other scholars view ASEAN as a 'nascent security community'.11 This phase in the 
development of a security community12 is marked by common threat perceptions, an 
expectation of mutual trade benefits and some degree of shared identity. 13 The 
argument is based on the constructivist approach that goes beyond the Deutschian 
classical approach to security communities. Indeed, there is no definition of a security 
community in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, the first Declaration where 
ASEAN stipulated its willingness to build a community, nor in the Plan of Action of 
ASEAN Security Community (ASC), a guideline for security community building. 14 One 
of the main proponents of the argument that ASEAN is a nascent security community is 
Amitav Acharya. Contrary to Leifer's and Emmers' arguments, Acharya contends that 
ASEAN relies more on promoting standard international norms, principles and codes 
of conduct among regional partners to decrease regional tensions. 1s From his 
perspective, ASEAN regionalism is a process of interaction and socialisation and it 
focuses on the norms that underpin this process. 16 According to Acharya, the absence of 
war among ASEAN members since its establishment shows that ASEAN is a 'non-war 
community' where a pluralistic security community, in the words of Deutsch, requires 
that 'the keeping of the peace among the participating units was the main political goal 
8 Michael Leifer, 'The ASEA.1'\l Peace Process: A Category Mistake', The Pacific Review, 12:1, 1999, pp. 25-
38. 
9 Michael Leifer,ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, 1989, p. 83. 
10 See Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p. 6. While a true 
Grotian sees the interna tional system as an 'organized state community' "ith an emphasis on common 
interests , the de,·elopment of common Yalues, and the crea tion of common institutions, a Neo-Grotian 
emphasises the importance of institutions. In this case, Leifer Yalues forums such the A.RF, for example, 
" ·hich he ,iews as a modest contribution to the distribution of a balance of po"·er. 
11 The tem1 'nascent security community' " ·as introduced by .Arnita\" Acharya in his book, Constructing a 
Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order, London: Routledge, 
2009, pp. 36-38 and 297-298. 
12 In this thesis, the term 'security community' refers to a 'pluralistic security community', " ·hich can be 
defined as a s ituation " ·here some sta tes become in tegrated to the point "·here they ha,·e a sense of 
community, \l·hich in tum crea tes the assurances that they \\ill settle their differences \\ithout war. See 
Karl Deutsh , Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, International Organisation in the Light of 
Historical Experience, Ne\\· Jersey: Princeton Uniwrsity Press, 1957, p. 5. 
13 Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge UniYersity Press, 
1998, p. 30. 
14 See ASEAl , 'Declaration of A.SEAN Concord II', aYailable at http: //w\\·w.asean .org/ asean/ asean-
summit/ item/ declaration-of-asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii (accessed on 3 NoYember 2012).See also 
A.SEAN, 'A.SEAN Security Community Plan of Action ', aYailable at http://\\,,·w.aseansec.org/16826 .htm 
(accessed on 29 January 2010). As of December 2012 , the .-\SEAN Secretariat's website has been 
reconstructed. Some of the links cited in this thesis may haYe been changed. The main link for the 
Secretariat's website is ,n,11·.aseansec.org. 
15 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional 
Order, p. 7. 
16 Acha rya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. 
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overshadowing all others'. 17 Acharya thus implies that ASEAN has fulfilled some 
criteria of Deutsch's definition of a security community. 
Acharya's argument is supported by scholars such as Kusuma Snitwongse, 18 Muthiah 
Alagappa 19 and Donald Emmerson 20 who share his idea that ASEAN is already in the 
early phase of a security community. Snitwongse, for example, claims that while 
ASEAN might not have realised its goal of security self-reliance, 'its most notable 
achievement has been community building'. 21 Alagappa postulates that the six original 
members of ASEAN already comprise a nascent, quasi, semi or partial security 
community. 22 Emmerson argues that ASEAN has been a 'thin and pluralistic security 
community'. 2 3 Estrella Solid um further claims that ASEAN is already a security 
community. 2 4 
However, another group of scholars involved in the debate is sceptical about the idea 
that ASEAN is a security community. They argue that ASEAN does not yet constitute a 
stage in the development of a security community, and that ASEAN does not meet 
Deutsch's prerequisites of a security community. While the absence of inter-state threat 
perceptions is one of the most important criteria of a security community, Southeast 
Asia is still peppered with inter-state threat perceptions. Accordingly, even though 
Acharya points out that ASEAN norms and the ASEAN Way have 'played a central role 
in the development of a nascent regional identity sought by ASEAN', he also concedes 
that 'the norms of ASEAN, including those associated with the ASEAN Way are not 
always upheld in practice'. 2s For this reason, David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. 
Smith term ASEAN an 'imitation community'. 26 They argue that ASEAN suffers from a 
gap between rhetorical aspiration and regional reality. 2 7 Criticism has also come from 
Andrew Chau, who investigated the threat of terrorism in the Southeast Asian region; 
17 Acharya , Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, p. 7. 
18 Kusuma Snitwongse, 'Meeting the Challenges of Changing Southeast Asia', in Robert Scala pi no, Sijabura 
Sato and Sung-Joo Han, eds, Regional Dynamics: Security, Political and Economic Issues in the Asia 
Pacific Region , Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1990. 
19 Muthiah Alagappa , ed. , Asian Security Order: Instrum ental and Normative Features, Stanford: 
Standford UniYersity Press, 2003. See a lso Muthiah Alagappa , 'Regional Arrangements and International 
Security in Southeast Asia: Going Beyond ZOPFAN' Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12A, 1991, pp. 269-
305. 
20 Donald K. Emmerson, 'Security, Community, and Democracy: Analyzing ASEAN', Japan ese Journal of 
Political Science, 6:2, 2005 , pp. 165-185. 
2 1 Snitwongse, 'Meeting the Challenges of Changing Southeast Asia ' , p. 40. 
22 Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order, p. 8 . See also Alagappa, 'Regional Arrangements and International 
Security in Southeast Asia ', p. 298 and p. 301. 
23 Emmerson, 'Security, Community, and Democracy: Analyzing ASEAN', pp. 165-185, p. 180. 
24 Estrella Solidum, Towards a Southeast Asian Community, Quezon City: University of the Philippines 
Press, 1974. 
25 David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith , 'ASEAN Imitation Community' , Orbis , 46:1, 2002, pp. 93-
109, p. 93. 
26 Jones and Smith, 'ASEAN Imita tion Community', p . 93. 
2 7 Jones and Smith, 'ASEAN Imitation Community'. 
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he argues that the prospect of successful community building in Southeast Asia still 
remains far in the future. 28 
This brief review shows that the debate about the nature of the security system m 
Southeast Asia is vigorous. The regional security system that characterises ASEAN 
therefore is still unclear. Among possible explanations, one that is rarely invoked is that 
ASEAN is based on dynamics that reflect an intra-regional concert of powers. The 
possibility of a concert of powers in the Asia Pacific more generally has been 
investigated by Acharya, Robert Ayson and Nicholas Khoo. They consider that it is 
debatable whether the notion of a concert of powers applies to the Asia Pacific region. 29 
Ayson, for example, examines the Six Party Talks (SPT) as a concert of powers in the 
Asia Pacific. He points out that the SPT may offer the best chance of a bridge to an 
Asian concert of powers but that it is only embryonic. One of the reasons for this, he 
claims, is that the only real great powers within the SPT are the US and China.3° He 
concludes that 'while the Talks may contribute to the Concert, the Concert is not the Six 
Party Talks'.31 He further argues that a concert of Asia Pacific powers might well prove 
ineffective because of the differences in strategic interests between its members. 32 
Neither Ayson nor his colleagues investigate the possibility of a concert of powers, or 
some variation of it, within Southeast Asia. 
At the official level, ASEAN is attempting to establish a co_mmunity by 2015. Indonesia 
proposed the formation of an ASEAN Security Community at the 36 th ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting in Cambodia in June 2003. This proposal was formalised at the 
Bali Summit in October 2003 through the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II, when 
ASEAN member states agreed to develop three community pillars: the ASEAN Security 
Community, the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
Community. Furthermore, ASEAN member states had high expectations of the launch 
of the 'ASEAN Security Community (ASC) Plan of Action' at the 10th ASEAN Summit in 
Laos, 29 November 2004. Without being labelled as such, the ASC Plan of Action not 
only provides the basic guidelines for ASEAN's security arrangement, but it is also 
assumed to be a new set of socio-political values for further cooperation in the area of 
political development and security. In general, the ASC - now called the ASEAN 
28 Andrew Chau, 'Security Community and Southeast Asia: Australia , the U.S., and ASEAN's Counter-
Terror Strategy', Asian Survey, 48A, 2008, pp. 626-649 . 
29 See Amitav Acharya, 'A Concert of Asia? ', Survival, 41 :3, 1999, pp. 84-101 and Nicholas Khoo and 
Michael L. Smith, 'The Future of An1erican hegemony in the Asia Pacific: a Concert of Asia or a Clear 
Pecking Order', Australian Journal of International Affairs, 56:1, 2002, pp. 65-81. 
30 See Robert Ayson, 'The Six Party Talks Process: Towards an Asian Concert? ' in Ron Huisken ed ., The 
Architecture of Security in Asia Pacific, Canberra: ANU E Press 2009, pp. 59-66. Ayson defines a concert 
of puwers as a permanent formal and institution, but it would be a non permanent, non formal and non 
institutionalised process of great power collaboration wh ich creates such stabilising and convergen t 
expectations that when major problems arise, the major powers can sit down and seek to manage their 
differences. 
31 Ayson, 'The Six Party Talks Process: Towards an Asian Concert?', p. 63. 
32 Ayson, 'The Six Party Talks Process: Towards an Asian Concert?'. 
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Political Security Community (APSC) - Plan of Action consists of six main components: 
political development, shaping and sharing norms, conflict prevention, conflict 
resolution, post-conflict peace building and an implementation mechanism. 33 
An interesting question about the debate discussed above is, how can there be such 
different explanations of the ASEAN security system? A critique of the debate suggests 
several possibilities: scholars examine ASEAN from different theoretical perspectives 
(realists, neo-liberal institutionalist and constructivists); during different periods of 
history; and use different types of case studies. Emmers' argument is based on an 
analysis of several cases, such as the early years of ASEAN, the integration of Brunei 
into ASEAN in 1984, ASEAN's response to the Third Indochina Conflict, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN's involvement in the South China Sea dispute. Both 
Emmers and Leifer combine realism and a neo-Grotian perspective. Acharya bases his 
argument on some of the cases that used by Emmers but also others. He examines the 
Cambodian conflict, constructive engagement with Myanmar, the Spratly Island 
dispute, the ARF, and the recent ratification of the ASEAN Charter. He uses the tenets 
of constructivism as a framework for his study.34 In short, these scholars reach their 
conclusions through analysing different cases and using different theoretical 
perspectives to develop their arguments. 
Although some scholars such as Melly Caballero-Anthony _do examine case studies that 
suggest how ASEAN manages crisis or conflict situations, few examine whether 
ASEAN's crisis management informs understanding of the regional security system in 
Southeast Asia. Even though Caballero-Anthony explains crisis management using 
ASEAN's unique mechanism, known as 'the ASEAN Way', she does not suggest what 
this might imply for the type of security system that operates in Southeast Asia. Rather, 
she focuses on the linkages between conflict management and the security approach 
being taken by ASEAN.3s 
This thesis argues that investigating cns1s management provides a useful way to 
understand the security system in Southeast Asia. The foundation for such a 
proposition can be found in the history of international relations where crises or 
conflict and their subsequent management helped shed light on the international 
security system operating during the crises, namely a concert of powers, a balance of 
power and a security community. Three examples support this contention. First, the 
Napoleonic Wars disturbed the existing structure of Europe, at the domestic, social and 
33 ASEAN, ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint, available at 
http: //www.aseansec.org/2233?.pdf (accessed on 26 July 2010 ). 
34 The tenets of contructivism and other perspectives will be discussed in Section 2.2.1. 
35 See Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the Asian Way, Singapore: 
ISEAS Publishing, 2005. 
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political levels and the relationships of power among the existing states. The making of 
the anti -French coalition is of special interest from the standpoint of the Concert of 
Europe. 36 Hence, the management of Napoleonic Wars indicated a security system 
which was the Concert of Europe. Second, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis provides 
insight into how the international system at that time v,ras characterised by the 
dominance of the bipolar balance of power in which two ri\·al superpowers, the US and 
the Soviet Union, dominated global affairs . It demonstrates that the world was divided 
into two hostile camps aligned with the US and Soviet Union, epitomising bipolar 
international politics. 37 Third, the process by which Western Europe has become a 
security community is also an interesting example. The 1961 Berlin \Vall crisis has 
provided insight into 'status quo detente'.38 Pierre Hassner describes the period from 
1961 to 1968 as a period of 'selective detente'. 39 Furthermore, the 1965-1966 
'constitutional crisis ' when France relinquished its chair in the European Community 
(EC) prompted the v\Testern European countries to consider whether EC integration 
was a threat to state sovereignty. 4° However, the effect of the crisis reinforced processes 
of moderate and controlled integration, and thereby reinforced the establishment of a 
security community in Europe. These are three examples of how examining crisis 
management prmides an explanation of the security system at both an international 
and a regional le\·el. 
In sum, crisis management in Southeast Asia has not been thoroughly examined as a 
,my of understanding the security system in that region, and the three examples just 
described indicate this is a plausible v,'ay to proceed. This thesis aims to fill this gap by 
asking, first , does an examination of how ASEAN states manage crises provide a way 
of understanding the type of security systems that operate in Southeast Asia?; and 
second, if it does, what type of security systems are they? 
To ans\,·er the abo\·e research questions , this thesis "ill examine three major crises in 
Southeast Asia - the 1978-1991 Cambodian crisis, 41 the 1999-2002 East Timor crisis, 
30 Rene .-\lbrecht-Carrie, The Concert of Europe 1815-1914, New York: Harper Touchbooks. 1968. The 
concept of·concert ofpm,·ers· a a regional security system "ill be discussed in Section 2.5. 
3
- Graham T . . -\llison , and Phillip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: &plaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2 nd 
edn. Kew York: Longma n. 1999. 
30 Pierre Hassner The Politics of \\·estern Europe and East-\\·est Relations· , in :\"ils Andren and Karl 
Birbaum. eds. Beyond Detente: Prospects for East-West Cooperation and Security in Europe. Leiden: A.\\". 
ijthoff, 1976, pp. 15-37. 
39 Hassner, The Politics of Western Europe and East-\\·est Relations·. A. securit:· communit:· as part of 
regional ecurit:· system is explained in Section 2.3 " ·hile a balance of po,,·er is elaborated in Section 2-4. 
40 Ole WaeYer, ·insecurity, Securit:· and .-\securit:· in the \,\·est European Non-War Communit:·', in 
Emanuel .-\dler and Michael Barnett. ecurity Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge UniYersit:· Press, 1998, 
pp. 6-8 . 
41 EYen though orne scholars refer to the Vietnamese inYasion of Cambodia as a conflict, I will refer to it as 
a crisi . This is because I define a crisi a an important set of ewnts "-hich marks a turning point of 
tran fom1ation in a pattern of relation hips or a s:, tern (see Section 2.2_-\), the Cambodian case created a 
continou set of eYents that produced the transformation in a relationship pattern among the conflicting 
parties ASE.-\.1 member states and external great powers . . -\s a cri is can take the form of milita ry, political, 
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and the 2008-2010 Cyclone Nargis crisis in Myanmar42 • Following the above rationale 
for the thesis and the resulting research questions, the remainder of Chapter 1 will 
discuss the arguments of the study, the aims and focus of the study, the potential 
contribution the thesis will make, the methodology adopted, the limitations and 
challenges, and the structure. 
1.2. Arguments of the Study 
The main argument of this thesis is that whether or not the three conceptualisations of 
regional security system examined (a security community, a balance of power and a 
classical concert of powers) and their variations have explanatory value depends on at 
least two conditions, the phase of the crisis ( whether it is in an escalating, acute, or de-
escalating period) and the nature of the crisis (whether it is traditional or non 
traditional). The second argument is that the management of the Cambodian crisis and 
the Cyclone Nargis crisis during the acute period is best conceptualised as a 'quasi-
concert of regional leading powers', which is a modification of the classical concept of a 
concert of powers. On the one hand, the novel concept shares some indicators with the 
classical concept and on the other hand, has several unique characteristics. 
The thesis draws out the policy implications of these arguments. First, the management 
of crises in Southeast Asia needs to be reviewed to establish a more robust structure 
and policies related the management of crises. ASEAN member states need to improve 
dispute settlement and crisis management mechanisms and the role of the Secretary-
General of ASEAN needs to be further empowered. Second, there is a necessity to share 
the burden of the regional leading powers with the rest of the ASEAN member states on 
traditional security issues. 
1.3. Aims and Focus of the Study 
To investigate the two central research questions, the thesis suggests three explanatory 
concepts for analysing the regional security systems in Southeast Asia and examines the 
relationship between crisis management by ASEAN member states and regional 
security systems in Southeast Asia. The key objectives are three-fold: first, to explore 
the correlation between crisis management by ASEAN member states and regional 
security systems in Southeast Asia; second, to examine the possibility of other security 
systems operating during crises in Southeast Asia other than what have been debated 
economic, emironmental, humanitarian and other aspects, the Cambodian case can be characterised as a 
military, political, economic and also humanitarian crisis. 
-P The State, La"· and Order Restoration (SLORC) goYemment changed the name of Burma to the Union of 
Myanmar in June 1989 through the 'Adaptation of Expression Law', See Alan Collins, Security and 
Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional and Global Issues, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2003. In this thesis, 
I use the short Yersion of the official name given by the authority goYemment of Myanmar, which is 
'Myanmar'. ASEAN member countries haw also used the term 'Myanmar', instead of 'Burma'. 
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by scholars; finally, to explore the possibility of a concert of powers dynamic existing in 
Southeast Asia. To these ends, the study establishes indicators of three explanatory 
concepts: 'security community', 'balance of power', and 'concert of powers'. It further 
analyses the application of these indicators in the process of crisis management by 
ASEAN member states. 
The focus of the study is the possible connection between crisis management by ASEAN 
member states and regional security systems in Southeast Asia during three crises, 
namely the 1978-1991 Cambodian crisis, the 1999-2002 East Timor crisis, and the 
2008-2010 Cyclone Nargis crisis. The study focuses on ASEAN member states instead 
of ASEAN as an organisation for two reasons.43 First, in some crises, ASEAN did not 
work as an organisation, but particular ASEAN member states contributed to the 
management of the crisis. Second, ASEAN membership increased over the period 1978 
to 2010. During the Cambodian crisis, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) 
countries were not yet members of ASEAN and Brunei Darussalam only joined in 1984, 
whereas, during the East Timor crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis, ASEAN consisted 
of ten members. Therefore, reference to ASEAN member states is more practical in the 
analysis . 
The three crises haYe been selected as case studies for four reasons. First, the three 
crises represent big challenges to ASEAN member states. The Cambodian crisis 
represented political and military challenges; the East Timor crisis posed political, 
military as well as economic challenges to some member countries, and; the Cyclone 
Nargis crisis created humanitarian, environmental, political, and economic challenges. 
Second, the crises co\·er some 30 years (the 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s) and will indicate 
"·hether crisis management by ASEAN member states has changed over this time. 
Third, each of these crises should demonstrate strengths and weaknesses in terms of 
management. Some scholars argue that ASEAN's crisis management of the Cambodian 
crisis can be regarded internationally as successful, while others claim that ASEAN 
failed to manage this crisis. ASEAN's response to the invasion of Cambodia benefited 
from the dynamics of the external great powers' beha\iours. Both criticism and praise 
came when ASE.AN tried to settle the 1999 East Timor Crisis. Finally, the 2008 Cyclone 
Nargis crisis in yanmar was selected to examine recent management of a crisis by 
.-\SE.-\i"\J member states after the signing of the A.SEAN Charter in December 2007. 
Finally, the selection of these three crises is also based on the observation that hvo of 
the crises (the 1978 Vietnamese inYasion of Cambodia and the 1999 East Timor crisis) 
represent traditional security threats to the region, whereas the 2008 Cyclone Nargis 
43 The thesis is mainly about .-\SE..\.."i" member states. Howe..-er, sometimes it is about the .-\S~ · 
orga nisation " ·here it is re!eYant. 
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crisis represents a non-traditional security threat. This allows for observing two types of 
crises, traditional and non traditional. 
The first case study has its origins in the mid 1970s. ASEAN confronted its first crisis 
when Vietnam announced an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1975. Following this, 
Vietnam's refusal to sign the TAC in 1976 and its invasion of Cambodia in December 
1978 created a severe crisis. From the start, ASEAN rejected Vietnam's occupation of 
Cambodia, insisting that the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), 
which was installed by Vietnam and headed by Heng Samrin, was illegitimate and 
illegal. ASEAN's position was that Vietnam had violated Cambodia's sovereignty and 
self determination. For the next twelve years, ASEAN member states tried to manage 
the situation by forcing Vietnam to leave Cambodia. To many scholars, including 
Samuel Sharpe, ASEAN's achievement in responding to an external threat to regional 
security was demonstrated in the decade following the 1978 invasion.44 ASEAN was 
generally successful and effective in mobilising sustained support from the 
international community by involving the United Nations (UN). Furthermore, ASEAN 
also gained diplomatic support from its official dialogue partners like Australia, Canada, 
the European Union, Japan and the US. It urged its partners to impose economic 
sanctions on Vietnam. 45 Emmers, in contrast to Sharpe, concludes that it was the role 
of external great powers and the external factors at the time that helped the crisis to be 
-
solved, instead of effective management of the crisis by ASEAN. 46 
The second case study in this thesis is the 1999-2002 East Timor cns1s. ASEAN's 
response to the East Timor crisis was a major test of the organisation's ability to 
ameliorate and manage regional crisis. The issue of East Timor historically posed a 
foreign policy dilemma for ASEAN. Open criticism of Jakarta, it was feared, would 
achieve an adverse outcome. ASEAN's collective focus on East Timor had always been 
to maintain good relations with Indonesia but this was changed by the 1999 crisis.47 
ASEAN was criticised by the international community for failing to act to resolve a 
crisis in its own backyard. Security analysts hit out at the 22-member ARF, saying that 
ASEAN made no contribution to resolving the East Timor crisis in the past, and had 
little to offer. 48 Although ASEAN was criticised by Western communities, Alan Dupont 
supports ASEAN by claiming that ASEAN nevertheless demonstrated a preparedness to 
44 Samuel Sharpe, 'An ASEAN Way to Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia ', The Pacific Review, 16:2, 
June 2003, pp. 231-250. 
45 Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the Asian Way. 
46 Emmers, Cooperatice Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF. 
47 Alan Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis', Australian Journal of International Affairs, 
54:2, 2000, pp. 163-170. 
48 Sonny Inbaraj , 'ASEAN's commitment to East Timor faces tough test', aYailable at 
http: //\nvw.atimes.com /se-asia/BB01Aeo1.html (accessed on 7 NO\·ember 2011). 
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play a significant political and military role m the management of the East Timor 
crisis . 49 
The final case study examines the crisis caused by Cyclone argis. Myanmar was struck 
by Cyclone argis on 2 May 2008. Nargis was the worst natural disaster m the 
recorded history of Myanmar, causing catastrophic destruction, particularly m the 
Ayayenvady Delta. Almost 2-4 million people are believed to have been severely 
affected by the cyclone.so Around 800,000 people were displaced by the Cyclone. Some 
450,000 homes were destroyed and 350,000 were damaged and three quarters of all 
health facilities were damaged, as were 4,000 schools.s1 Up to 600,000 hectares of 
farmland were destroyed, having a huge impact on agriculture supply to the rest of the 
country.52 The financial cost of the cyclone is estimated to be four billion US dollars, 
,vith 2. per cent of the country's projected GDP in 2008 destroyed. s3 
In the aftermath of Cyclone argis, a diplomatic disagreement betvveen Myanmar and 
the international community arose when the junta not only delayed international relief 
worker from accessing the devastated delta, but also rejected the use of American, 
French and British naval assets to expedite the relief effort.54 The UN and other relief 
agencie were concerned about the possibility of a second large-scale wave. The 
difficultie in pro,iding a sistance led to a debate about a possible humanitarian 
intervention on the basis of the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P). ss The Myanmar 
0 overnment wa per uaded to allow entry for the deployment of the ASEAN Emergency 
Rapid As e ment Team (ERAT) a embled by the ASEAN Secretariat in coordination 
v,ith the A EAN Committee on Di aster Management (ACDM). Finally, the Myanmar 
0 overnment allowed the ASE.AN ecretary-General, Surin Pitsuwan, to lead the ASEAN 
Humanitarian Ta k Force which in turn gave rise to the establishment of a Tripartite 
Core Group (TCG) to coordinate the relief effort invohing ASEAN, the l.JN and the 
Myanmar ooyernment itself. s6 
~q Dupon , · . .\SE..\.:-·s Response to the East Timor Cri is'. 
5° \\1.lliam Sabandar, 'Cyclone .·argis and ASE..\:. A Window for fore . 1eaningful DeYe)opment 
Coopera ion in .1~·anmar· in . ·ic · Cheesman, .1onique S "dmore and TreYor \\-ilson, eds, Ruling 
. 1 a a : F o Cyclone l\·a gis o National Elections, Singapore: lSE..\S Publishing, 2010. 
51 Sabandar, ·cyclone . ·argis and ASE.-\1 A Window for More Meaningful DeYelopment Cooperation in 
.1yanmar·. 
52 Centre for Peace and Conflict tudies, Listeni g to Voices from Inside: Myanmar Ci.vii Society 's 
Respo se to Cyclone Na gis, Phnom Penh: CPCS, 2009. 
53 Al.nap, ·cyclone Nargis: Lessons for operational agencies 
htt_p: //www.alnap.org/pool/files /ALNAPLessonsCvcloneNargis.pdf (accessed on 19 December 2009). See 
als Cen e for Peace and Conflict Studies, Lis ening to Voices from Inside: Myanmar Ci.vii Society's 
Respo e to Cyclo e Na gis, Phnom Penh: CPCS, 2009. 
54 Jurgen Haa ·e, "ASE..\1- and Poli ·cal Chan<>e in Myanma : Towards a Regional lni iati,·e?', 
Co empo a o heast Asia. 30:3, 200 , pp. 351-37 . 
55 Asia-Pacific Ceo e for the Re-ponsibility o Pro ect, ·cyclone . ·argis and the Responsibility to Pro ec ·, 
M a ma Bu a Bri~ g, . ·o. 2 , 16 May oo , . 1- o. 
50 Haa ·e, "ASE..\N and Political Chan e in M~·anmar: Towards a Regional InitiatiYe?'. 
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1.4. Potential Contributions 
This study seeks to contribute to the debate about the nature of the security system in 
Southeast Asia by examining how crises are managed by ASEAN member states. Crisis 
management is used as an indicator of the region's security system, thus providing a 
different approach from the literature to analyse Southeast Asia's security systems. 
Crisis management as an indicator of the security system in Southeast Asia is under-
investigated by scholars, and the historical crises canvassed earlier suggest that crisis 
management can be adopted as an indicator. However, the scholarly literature on crisis 
management and on security systems rarely investigates the proposed link between the 
two, particularly within the Southeast Asian context. 
Therefore, this study has the potential to contribute broadly to the literature on 
international relations, strategic studies, diplomacy, crisis management, and 
particularly to the literature that debates the nature of the security systems in 
Southeast Asia. More specifically, the study will contribute to the literature on ASEAN 
and its member states as crisis managers. 
The study is important for two major reasons. First, in the empirical world, it seeks to 
suggest a better policy for ASEAN member states as crisis managers. It also aims to 
provide insights for ASEAN dialogue partners with regard to ASEAN's crisis 
management and ASEAN's role in building the regional ar~hitecture. The thesis will not 
only examine the character of ASEAN member states' crisis management operations 
but also offer some suggestions about their efforts to define themselves as a community. 
It may also provide inputs for how the ASEAN member countries might reform the 
organisation. 
Possible policy directions from this research will provide useful inputs for ASEAN's 
dialogue partners as ASEAN is increasingly regarded as important by the international 
community. ASEAN now has 11 dialogue partners: China, Japan, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK), the US, Canada, the European Union (EU), the UN, Russia, Australia, New 
Zealand and India. Other states wish to join ASEAN. Timor Leste and Papua New 
Guinea are now knocking on ASEAN's door to become members of ASEAN. Pakistan, a 
sectoral partner, has been seeking dialogue status for several years now, although such 
status has not been granted because cooperation between ASEAN and Pakistan has not 
developed substantially. Russia and the US have been members of the East Asia 
Summit (EAS) since 2011. Significantly, 33 countries including Australia, China, India, 
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Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia and the US have acceded to the 
TAC,s7 demonstrating that ASEAN norms are now accepted. 
Second, this study seeks to contribute to the academic literature. Research on a concert 
of powers in the Asia Pacific region, including in the Southeast Asian region is under-
investigated by scholars. This may be because none of the ASEAN member states is 
regarded by scholars as a great power. Although the concept is certainly used to explain 
how great powers constitute a particular security system, this thesis argues it can be 
adopted and applied to situations where the meaning of great powers is relative. 
Therefore, the thesis suggests a way of classifying regional powers, using Lemke's 
theory of multiple power hierarchy, enabling the concept of a concert of powers to be 
applied to an examination of ASEAN.s8 
The thesis also seeks to contribute to the literature on crisis management in Southeast 
Asia. Much of the literature on ASEAN focuses on the 'ASEAN Way' as the mechanisms 
employed in ASEAN's day-to-day life. However, it is not always clear if these 
mechanisms are routinely applied during a crisis. The thesis thus aims to show whether 
during a crisis ASEAN still utilises the 'ASEAN way' as it does for day-to-day operations 
or applies other mechanisms. 
1.5. Methodology 
A qualitative interpretive approach is the methodology adopted in this thesis. Because 
the research engages in a dialectic process between the questions asked and data 
observed rather than testing a hypothesis, a qualitative approach is considered to be 
more appropriate. Information gathered in this process of research shapes the 
questions. A qualitative approach is appropriate for this reseach because: (i) as an 
Indonesian diplomat, I served in the field as a participant-observer during my service 
in the ASEAN Directorate General for ASEAN Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Indonesia from 2004-2006 and 2007-2008 and in the ASEAN Canberra 
Committee from 2008-2012; (ii) I conducted in-depth interviews with policy actors, 
officials, practitioners and academics; and (iii) unlike a quantitative approach which 
emphasises large-n research, I focus more on processing words and phrases from data 
collection and interviews into comparative case studies. It is an interpretive approach 
because: (i) I interpreted my data; (ii) the method was a word-based method, from data 
collection instruments to data analysis tools, and (iii) it is ontologically constructivist 
and epistemologically interpretivist. I constructed the study based on observing the 
57 ASEAN, 'Norway Enhances Engagement with ASEAN" available at http: //www.asean.org/ news/asea n-
secretariat-news/item/norway-enhances-engagement-v,rith-asean (accessed on 29 September 2013). See 
also ASEAN, 'Instrument of Accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia by 
Australia ', available at http: / /www.asean.org/news/item/instrument-of-accession-to-the-trea ty-of-amity-
and-coopera tion-in-southeast-asia-by-a ustralia (accessed on 29 September 2013). 
ss The theory will be discussed on Section 2.5. 
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nature of reality. Epistomology can be defined as the relationship between the 
researcher and reality. An interpretivist approach is based on the principle that there 
can be more than one reality and more than a single structured way of accessing such 
realites. The knowledge generated was perceived through socially constructed and 
subjective interpretations. 59 
Following Hendrik's and Yanow's phases of interpretive methods, 60 I conducted the 
research in four phases, namely: observing, close reading of topic-relevant documents, 
interviewing, and analysing data. 
Phase 1: Observing 
I have been an active participant-observer as a staff member of the Directorate General 
of ASEAN Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia and a member of 
the ASEAN Canberra Committee in Canberra. The latter grouping has regular meetings 
with the Ambassadors of ASEAN member countries and with Ministers in the 
Australian cabinet. These activities have helped me to understand the events from 
within the officials' frame of reference and their sense-making of the situation. On the 
basis of these observations, I generated my research questions. 
Phase 2: Collecting and Reading Relevant Documents 
The data were collected from archival and secondary sources. For the archival research, 
I collected: 
1. Official documents of ASEAN member countries, papers, agreements, speeches, 
press releases; 
2. Official ASEAN documents such as treaties, communiques, declarations, 
agreements, speeches, and minutes of meetings; 
3. Publications from think-tanks, journalists, centres of studies m Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
The secondary sources for this study consist mostly of: 
1. Books and periodicals on related issues; 
2. International and local newspapers and magazines; and 
3. Working papers, policy papers and occasional papers from related research 
institutes and universities. 
59 See Laurel Anderson Hudson and Julie L. Ozanne, 'Alternative Ways of Seeking Knowledge in Consumer 
Research', Chicago Journals, 14:4, 1988, pp. 508-521. 
60 See Carolyn M. Hendriks, 'Praxis Stories: Experiencing Interpretive Policy Research ', Critical Policy 
Analysis, 1:3, 2007, pp. 278-300 and Dvora Yanow, 'Qualitative-Interpretive Methods in Policy Research ', 
in Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. Sidney, eds, Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, 
Politics and Methods, Boca Raton : CRC/ Taylor & Francis, 2007. pp. 405-415. 
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After collecting this data, I did my reading and focused on meaning-making. This is 
how I was able to analyse the officials', practitioners' and experts' ideas about ASEAN's 
crisis management. Reading was an important part of my research because reading 
equipped me with the necessary background information when I moved to the next 
phase, which was interviewing. 
Phase III Fieldwork and In-depth Interviews 
After undertaking an ANU Ethical Protocol Clearance (Record No: 4088; Protocol 
Type: Expedited Ethical Review E2, and Protocol No. 2010/576), I conducted fieldtrips 
to four ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand from February 
to April 2011. Interviews in these four countries were conducted with 44 interviewees 
who included members of government, academia, the press and international and non-
governmental organisations. The interviews were continued in Canberra where I 
interviewed six respondents including academics, diplomats, and Australian officials. I 
interviewed 50 sources in total. The selection of countries for fieldwork was based on 
the observation that these countries represent 'regional leading powers' in Southeast 
Asia and both interviews and data collection were feasible . The target of interviews for 
my research was officials at both the national and regional levels. At the national level , I 
conducted interviews with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of member 
states of ASEAN, particularly the Ministers and the Directors General of the ASEAN 
Divisions. At the regional level, I interviewed officials from the ASEAN Secretariat. In 
order to identify appropriate interviewees among relevant academics, journalists and 
researchers, I used academic references and recommendations. 
While sets of standardised questions were individually designed for each interview and 
were subsequently asked, the interview was conducted in a non-standardised manner 
focusing on the particular areas of specialisation and knowledge indicated by each 
interviewee's background. The questions in the set schedule are listed in Appendix 2. 
Given some interviewees are high-level officials, a non-standardised format was the 
most appropriate. Most of the interviews were voice-recorded. Some of the interviewees 
asked that the conversation not to be recorded. In these situations, I took notes during 
the interview. An estimated eighty percent of the relevant commentary \\"aS recorded 
via voice-recorder. 
If interviewees believed that their answer to any of the questions might compromise 
them personally or have negative consequence from a national security or legal 
perspective, they could of course refuse to answer vvithout any need to explain the 
reason. These interviewees asked the researcher for all or part of the information 
provided to the researcher to be treated as confidential by indicating that the statement 
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was 'off the record' (in such cases, I discarded the information as research data) . 
Participation in the project was entirely voluntary, and any informant could withdraw 
at any stage. However, no participants withdrew at anytime during the process. One 
participant withdrew before the interview because the person thought it was not 
necessary to be interviewed after I interviewed that person's supervisor. Any 
participant requesting anonymity was de-identified at either the data storage or 
submission phase of the project according to their preference. 
Phase IV: Interpreting and Analysing Data 
After finishing the interviews, the next phase of my research project was synthesising 
the material from both the data collection and interviews. I transcribed the interviews 
and then started writing in order to refine and communicate my interpretations. I 
sought feedback on my interpretations from colleagues and my supervisors and tried to 
be open to rethinking my interpretations and willing to shift my perspective in view of 
the arguments of others. 
1.6. Limitations and Challenges 
I faced several challenges during the research. First, the key concepts in the study -
security community, balance of power and concert of powers - are difficult to define 
and measure with any great precision. One solution is to identify indicators from the 
literature for these concepts and then to investigate in relation to individual states and 
regional policies whether the indicators are meaningful in terms of collective action, 
such as a joint approach. Second, the formalisation of a security community in ASEAN 
is relatively recent and is still developing (even as I finish writing the thesis). Third, 
because the Cambodian crisis started in 1978, I had problems finding key 
actors/ decision-makers/negotiators who were involved in the crisis. Some had passed 
away. Fourth, limited funding prohibited me from travelling to all Southeast Asian 
member countries. I believe that had I travelled to all ASEAN member states, I would 
have obtained more and deeper interviews related to my case studies. Fifth, all 
interviewees were aware that I am a serving diplomat and at the same time also a 
researcher. This might have impacted on their answers to my questions in the 
interviews. Finally, despite being a working diplomat , I faced the obstacle of not being 
able to join formal ASEAt"\l Meetings because they are restricted to the relevant officials 
only. For example, I was denied permission to join or listen to the Special Foreign 
Minister Meeting convened to discuss Thai-Cambodian border issue in February 2011. 
Listening to such meetings could have helped me better understand whether crisis 
management really is indicative of the operating regional security system. 
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1. 7. Structure 
The thesis is organised around the central theme of crisis management during the 
Cambodian, East Timor and Cyclone Nargis crises and what this may indicate about the 
type of security systems that operate in Southeast Asia. Chapter 2 examines the 
conceptual frameworks adopted in the thesis by scrutinising the literature regarding 
regional security systems, particularly 'security community', 'balance of power' and 
'concert of powers' and the literature regarding crisis management. The chapter 
develops a synthesised conceptual framework on the possible connections between the 
concept of crisis management and the regional security systems in Southeast Asia. It 
argues that there is a gap in the connection between the literature on crisis 
management and regional security systems. Therefore, the chapter develops a 
synthesised conceptual framework on the possible connections between the concept of 
crisis management and the regional security systems in Southeast Asia. 
Chapter 3 is the first empirical case study. The chapter begins with the historical 
background to the 1978-1991 Cambodian Crisis. It then elaborates ASEAN members' 
perception of threat pertaining to the crisis. The chapter examines whether the crisis 
management conducted by ASEAN member states fits the indicators of a security 
community, a balance of power or a classical concert of powers. The main argument in 
this chapter is that during the acute period, the management of the Cambodian crisis 
can be characterised by a modification of the classical concert of powers, and during the 
de-escalation period it can be explained by the indicators associated with a balance of 
external great power influence. However, none of the possible security systems is 
indicated fully. The challenge is to understand whether another system might provide a 
better explanation of the management of crises. 
Chapter 4 first elaborates the nature of the 1999 East Timor crisis. It then investigates 
the ASEAN member states' perceptions of threats. The period of the East Tim or crisis is 
divided into three periods, the escalation, the acute and the de-escalation period. It 
examines ASEAN's response to and management of this crisis. This chapter analyses 
whether or not crisis management by ASEAN member states during the East Timor 
crisis fits into a particular regional security system. It argues that during the acute 
period, the management of the East Timor crisis demonstrated the importance of the 
external great powers' influence, and during the de-escalation period, the management 
can be characterised as a partial security community among dominant members. None 
of the security systems operated fully. 
Chapter 5 is the final empirical case study. Similar to the two prev10us chapters, 
Chapter 5 provides background to the 2008 Cyclone N argis in Myanmar. This chapter 
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explores ASEAN member states' roles in the crisis during the period 2008-2010. The 
duration of the crisis is divided into two periods, the acute and the de-escalation period. 
The year 2010 was chosen to mark the end of the crisis because the ASEAN Post-Nargis 
humanitarian effort in Myanmar came to an end on 31 July 2010 with the closure of the 
Coordinating Office of the AHTF in Yangon. This chapter argues that during the 
escalation and the acute periods, the crisis management by ASEAN member states can 
be characterised as a variation of a classical concert of powers. During the de-escalation 
period, it indicated an embryonic security community. It argues that different security 
systems operated at different stages of the crisis and at certain times. Again, none of the 
security systems operated fully. This means that there is a need to review the 
conceptualisation of regional security systems. 
Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the ASEAN crisis management derived from the three 
case studies, in order to answer the research questions. The main finding in answer to 
the research questions is that crises in Southeast Asia have been managed according to 
the nature and the phase of the crisis and therefore have indicated different types of 
regional security system. The types of regional security system evident in the 
Cambodian, East Timor and Cyclone Nargis crises were a quasi concert of regional 
leading powers, a partial security community, an embryonic security community, and a 
balance of external great power influence. Furthermore, besides the importance of 
external great powers' influence without the notion of balance being recognised, a 
variation of the classical conceptualisation of a concert of powers has emerged in 
responding to crises. The management of the crises also demonstrates that among 
ASEAN member states, some leading states exert more influence than others and that 
within these leading states, some are consistently influential. 
The conclusion of the thesis sums up the previous chapters and concludes the analysis. 
It provides answers to the research questions and discusses the implications of the 
findings for the debate about the security systems operating in Southeast Asia, their 
contribution to the debate about the security system operating in Southeast Asia and to 
regional policy development. 
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CHAPTER2 
DEVELOPING A POSSIBLE CONNECTION BETWEEN 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND REGIONAL SECURITY 
SYTEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: TOW ARDS A 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Introduction 
To address the research questions posed in the thesis, this chapter constructs a 
conceptual framework for exploring a possible connection between crisis management 
by ASEAN member states and regional security systems in Southeast Asia. From 
reviews of the literature on crisis management and the three explanatory concepts of 
regional security systems - security community, balance of power and concert of 
powers - this chapter develops indicators for these explanatory concepts and classifies 
the regional powers in Southeast Asia. I argue that the literature is largely devoid of any 
vigorous attempt to make a connection between the two conceptualisations of crisis 
management and regional security systems. However, I refer to three historical 
examples which illustrate the value of connecting crisis management to security 
systems. I then suggest that the concept of crisis management can shed light on the 
type of regional security systems operating in Southeast Asia. I further argue that the 
literature review shows that the concert of powers concept has rarely if ever, been 
applied in Southeast Asia, even though a theoretical foundation can be established that 
justifies its application to the region. I also identify a need for a further examination of 
the responsibilities of members of a regional organisation in managing crises. The 
chapter is divided into the following sections: an introduction; a review of the literature 
on crisis management, security communities, balance of power, and concert of powers; 
an explanation of why the connection between crisis management and regional security 
systems in Southeast Asia is valid; and a brief conclusion. 
2.2. Conceptualising Crisis Management 
In this section, I elaborate the concepts of cns1s and cns1s management before 
reviewing the literature on crisis management. The main argument of this section is 
that the concept of crisis management should be adopted as an indicator of a regional 
security system. While there has been research on the linkage between crises and 
international systems and between wars and international systems, I argue that the 
research that examines the possible connections between crisis management and 
regional security systems is no less important. Indeed, there is at least one study that 
examines the causality between economic crisis management and the nature of 
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regionalism. 1 This leads me to contend that crises are multifaceted, and moreover that 
an economic crisis does not represent all aspects of a crisis and is thus insufficient to 
explain regionalism or any regional system. Therefore, this thesis, which investigates 
traditional and non-traditional security crises and their management, can helpfully 
provide an understanding of the operating regional security systems. Because it 
embraces both traditional and non-traditional security aspects, the thesis does not 
define a crisis as a situation characterised by the high risk of war; rather, it emphasises 
that a crisis is more a turning point in a system. 
A second argument pursued in this section is that the literature does not address to 
what extent the burden of managing crises is shared by small and dominant powers in 
Southeast Asia. The literature on crises and the management of crises in Southeast Asia 
does not address the connection between burden sharing in crisis management and the 
classification of powers in the region. The responsibilities shared by members of 
regional organisations depend on a set of complex factors that explain the inequality of 
burden sharing in crisis management among the ASEAN member states. 
A. Concepts of Crisis and Crisis Management 
Crises 
In this sub-section, I argue that because of the multifaceted challenges of a crisis, a 
crisis is best characterised as a turning point situation following a set of events rather 
than being identified by the high risk of war. The evidence reveals the changing 
challenges m international security, where natural disasters , epidemics and 
environmental degradation can also lead to a crisis without any potential of war. 
Specifically, most crises in Southeast Asia, since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, 
have not led to open conflict or war. 
The concept of 'crisis' has been used in a variety of ways by social scientists and 
historians. Most definitions of a crisis contain three elements: threat, urgency and 
uncertainty. Generally, a crisis can be defined as 'a serious threat to the basic structures 
or the fundamental values and norms (of a society), which under time pressure and 
highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions'. 2 This definition 
encompasses many types of crisis : natural disasters , environmental threats, financial 
meltdowns, surprise attacks, hostage takings, epidemics and organisational decline. 
1 Jurgen Ruland, 'A.SEN and .-\sian Crisis: Theoretical Implications and Practical Consequences for 
Southeast Asian Regionalism' , The Pacific Review, 13:3, 2000, pp. 421-451. 
2 Uriel Roshental, Michael T. Charles, and Paul t'Hart , Coping with Crisis: the Management of Disasters, 
Riots and Terrorism, Springfield: Charles Thomas, 1989, p. 10. 
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Scholars working within the field of IR have studied crises and crisis management from 
two different angles. The first adopts a decision-making perspective to study 
international crises. This perspective has revealed much about leadership behaviour in 
times of crisis,3 as well as the dynamic interaction between parties.4 In explaining the 
escalation and outcomes of international crises, IR scholars investigate how pervasive 
perceptions, bureaucracy and small-group dynamics affect the critical decisions made 
during a crisis. s 
A second group of IR scholars conceives of a crisis as part of a growing number of 
problems that threaten national security. Within this category, there are two sets of 
concepts of crisis. The first set defines a crisis as the critical turning point in human 
activities which could threaten national security.6 When understood as a turning point, 
a crisis is associated with rapid or sudden change. Some authors do not emphasise the 
speed of change or the quantity of energy invested in it, but rather the degree of change. 
Eugene Wolfenstein, for example, conceives of a crisis as a situation which threatens to 
transform an existing political and social order.? As another example, Coral Bell defines 
international crises as 'the turning points or decision points in relations between 
states'.8 According to Bell, one of the most successful techniques of crisis management 
is to turn an 'adversary crisis' into an 'intramural crisis'. She defines an 'adversary 
crisis' as a crisis between actors who consider themselves adversaries, while an 
'intramural crisis' is a crisis within the walls of an alliance system or a power sphere.9 
A critical turning point in a crisis often refers to a specific kind of change - that is, 
sudden variations in the level of conflict or in the intensity of hostilities which could 
lead to conflict. For example, A.J. Wiener and H. Kahn describe a crisis as a situation 
involving significant actual or potential international conflict in either a novel form or 
at an abruptly changing level. 10 Wiener and Kahn specify twelve generic dimensions : (i) 
a turning point in an unfolding sequence of events and actions; (ii) a situation in which 
3 See Charles F. Hermann, ed ., International Crises: In sights from Behavioral Research, Ne,\' York: The 
Free Press, 1972; G.A. Craig and A.L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, 
Oxford: Oxford Uni,·ersity Press, 1983 ; and LL. , Janis, G.M . Herek and P. Huth, 'Decision-making during 
international crises : Is quality of process related to outcome', Journal a/Conflict Resolution, 21:2, 1987, pp. 
203-226. 
4 See Michael Brecher, Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993. 
5 See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban M issile Crisis, Boston: Little BrO\rn, 
1971: Robert Jenis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton: Princeton 
Uniwrsity Press , 1976 and R.N. Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis, 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981. 
6 Eugene V. Wolfenstein , 'Some Psychological Aspects of Crisis Leaders', in Charles F. Herman, Crises in 
Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis, New York: The Bobs-Merill Company Inc, 1969. 
7 Wolfenstein, 'Some Psychological Aspects of Crisis Leaders'. 
8 Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A study in Diplomatic Management, London: Oxford UniYersity 
Press for the Royal Institute of Inte rnational Affairs, 1971, pp. 4-5. 
9 Bell , The Conventions of Crisis, pp. 50-72. 
10 A.J. Wiener and H. Kahn, Crisis and Arms Control, Hudson Institute 1962, p.2, quoted in Charles F. 
Herman , Crises in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis. 
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the requirement for action is high in the minds and planning of participants; (iii) a 
threat to the goals and objectives of those involved; (iv) a situation followed by an 
important outcome whose ramifications and effects will shape the future of the parties 
to the crisis; (v) a convergence of events whose combination produces a new set of 
circumstances; (vi) a period in which uncertainties about the assessment of the 
situation and alternatives for dealing with it increase; (vii) a period or situation in 
which control over events and their effects decreases; (viii) a situation characterised by 
a sense of urgency, which often produces stress and anxiety among the actors; (ix) a 
circumstance or set of circumstances in which information available to participants is 
unusually inadequate; (x) a circumstance characterised by increased time pressures for 
those involved; (xi) a situation marked by changes in the relations among participants; 
and (xii) a period includes increased tensions among the actors especially in political 
crises involving nations. 11 
Other scholars who define a crisis as a turning point include James Richardson and 
Oran Young. Richardson argues that an international crisis may be viewed as 'the 
decisive moment in a conflict, the turning point opening a way to an outcome normally 
involving some redistribution of gains and costs among the participants'.12 Similarly, an 
international crisis, according to Young is 'a set of rapidly unfolding events which raises 
the impact of destabilising forces in the general international system or any of its 
subsystems substantially above normal levels and increases the likelihood of violence 
occurring in the system' .13 A systemic definition sees a crisis as a brief phase in which 
the breakdown or transformation of a system (a pattern of relationships) is threatened. 
The second set of concepts related to crisis that IR scholars analysing national security 
refer to, characterises crises with the high risk of war. Glen Snyder and Paul Diesing, 
for example, define an international crisis as a: 
... sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign 
states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of 
dangerously high probability of war. 14 
Another definition proposed by Charles Hermann also looks at the possibility of war 
arising out of a crisis. Hermann defines an international crisis as a situation of limited 
duration between two or more international actors having as one of its potential 
11 Hermann, Crisis in Foreign Policy. 
12 James L. Richardson, 'Crisis Management: A Critical Appraisal' , in Gilbert R. Winham, ed ., New Issues 
in International Crisis Management, London: Westview Press, 1988, p. 15. 
13 Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1967, p. 10. 
14 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System 
Structure in International Crises, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 6. 
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outcomes the occurrence of military conflict or a sharp increase in level or scope of 
violence already existing between parties. 1s 
After the Cold War, scholars turned their attention to what might be called new security 
challenges, ranging from civil or ethnic conflict, resource scarcity, environmental 
degradation, uncontrolled migration, organised crime, international terrorism and 
drug trafficking.16 Scholars in this field studied how security policy elites make a great 
effort to design an effective policy response to these threats, why they become 
subjectively 'securitised' and how governments take into account the prospects of crises 
and 'failed security'. This development contributes to the field of crisis research, where 
the crisis concept encompasses a wide variety of threats. 
This thesis defines crisis as an important set of events which marks a turning point or 
transformation in a pattern of relationships or a system. This definition highlights the 
importance of a crisis as a turning point in a system, not a situation identified by the 
high risk of war for two reasons. The first is that the definitions linked with the 
possibility of war are not in line with the changing challenges in the international 
security where natural disasters, pandemics, and environment degradation can also 
lead to a crisis without any potential of war. The second reason is that most crises 
within ASEAN, since its establishment in 1967, have not led to an open conflict or war. 
The ASEAN member states, most of the time, strictly adhere to the principles of the 
TAC that require member states to avoid the use of force. This principle has helped 
prevent open conflict occurred following crises in Southeast Asia. I refer to, for example, 
the three crises investigated in this thesis. Even though the 1978 Vietnamese 
occupation of Cambodia might have led to an all-out war, and the 1999 East Timor 
crisis might also have opened up the possibility of serious conflict, the 2008 Nargis 
Cyclone crisis in Myanmar was not characterised by any possibility of open conflict 
between the countries/actors involved. Other examples can be seen in the transnational 
smoke haze crisis in 1997-1999 or the ASEAN economic crisis in 1997-1998. Although 
they are not investigated in this thesis, these crises did not lead to any possibility of war. 
Crisis Management 
In the IR literature, realism, liberalism and constructivism have become the most 
prominent perspectives in explaining the concept of crisis management. It could be 
argued that a good explanation of a case can be made by only looking through one 
window (one approach/ perspective). However, I suggest that a better explanation can 
15 Charles F. Hermann, 'Types of Crisis Actors and Their Implica tions for Crisis Management', in Daniel 
Frei, ed., International Crises and Crisis Management, Farnborough: Saxon House, 1978. 
16 See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework/or Analysis, London: Lynne 
Rienner Publisher, Inc, 1998. 
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be constructed by observing events through several windows. This means that each 
perspective has its own focus, strengths, and weaknesses, and it is not prudent to look 
at things only through the eyes of one perspective. In investigating the three case 
studies, I do not adhere to one specific perspective, but I do recognise the importance of 
the most prominent ones in this literature review. 
The concept of cns1s management 1s actually not new in the discipline of IR. 17 
Nonetheless the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 served as a catalyst for the emergence of 
the concept. Some authors explicitly define the term 'management in crises' and some 
prefer to use the term 'coping' or 'diplomacy'. Thomas Milburn, for example uses the 
term 'coping' not 'management'.18 Bell, however, prefers the term 'crisis management' 
and defines management as 'imply[ing] a rational, dispassionate, calculating, well 
considered activity conducted with judgment and even at a leisurely pace'. 19 
Furthermore, Christine Pearson and Judith Clair describe cns1s management as a 
systematic attempt to avoid organisational crises or to manage those crisis events that 
do occur.20 
If a crisis is defined as a situation identified by the high risk of war, crisis management 
is then often defined in terms of restraint such as measures taken to reduce the risk of 
war m a cns1s. Hanspeter Neuhold refers to measures taken in order to isolate and 
mitigate crises: 'a crisis can be regarded as managed if its intensity has so far been 
reduce that major armed hostilities can reasonably be ruled out'. 21 Alexander George, 
David Hall and William Simons define 'crisis management as all those measures 
directed towards restraint and limitation of conflict, against provocation and 
escalation'. 22 Alternatively, Snyder and Diesing propose that the term 'crisis 
management' refers to the whole of the process whereby each of the adversaries seeks 
to reconcile their competing goals. 2 3 Snyder and Diesing also analyse many case studies 
of crisis and demonstrate that there has been a wide variety of circumstances in the 
twentieth century in which the bargaining process during crises has enabled decision-
makers to correct their misperceptions. Hence Snyder and Diesing focus more on the 
bargaining process in a crisis. The main limitation of the application of the realist 
17 The litera ture on crisis management can be traced back to ancient Je\\·ish and Christian texts ,\·hich were 
,ffitten as a direct response to earlier situations of crisis. See Da,id C. Sim and Pauline Allen , eds, Ancient 
Jewish and Christian Texts as Crisis Management Literature, Oxford: T&T Clark International, 2012 . 
18 See Thomas Millburn , 'The Management of Crises', in Hermann, ed., International Crises: Insights from 
Behavioural Research. 
19 Coral Bell, 'Decision-making by governments in crisis situations', in Frei , ed ., International Crises and 
Crisis Management. 
2° Christine M. Pearson & J udith A. Clair , 'Reframing Crisis Management' , Academy of Management 
Review, 23:1, 1998, pp. 59-76. 
2 1 Richardson, 'Crisis Management' , p. 15. 
22 Alexander L. Goerge, David Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba 
and Vietnam , Boston: Little Brmrn, 1971 quoted in Richardson, 'Crisis Management', p. 15. 
2 3 Snyder and Diesing, 'Conflict Among Nations '. 
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perspective in Southeast Asia is that ASEAN states have drawn back from any regional 
defence military arrangements. 24 
A preliminary assessment of contemporary studies on security in Southeast Asia shows 
that realism, liberalism and constructivism have become the most prominent 
perspectives. Some scholars argue that in Southeast Asia, neoliberalism and realism 
remain the two dominant theoretical perspectives, while some contend that realism and 
constructivism are now competing in Southeast Asian security studies. 2 s Realist theory 
holds that in an international environment characterised by anarchy and with no 
overarching authority in the international system, states are preoccupied with their 
survival and always act to seek and maximise benefits. 26 Therefore, crisis management 
by cooperative behaviour is only possible if the relative powers of the state have not 
been subject to continuous change. Crisis management would only be successful within 
a regional organisation if the security dilemma is minimised. 27 
In managing a crisis, realists see the logic of a balance of power politics, such as defence 
ties and alliances with major powers, both within and outside the organisation. By 
doing so, states help themselves to maintain a stable balance of power. The resolution 
or management of a crisis is also related to collective defence, peace-keeping machinery 
or a common military and diplomatic front. The maintenance of the balance and 
distribution of power is thus assured. In Southeast Asia,-any proposal of a regional 
defence military arrangement has never been accepted and is regarded as counter -
productive by the leaders of ASEAN.28 Realist theory was a major focus in Southeast 
Asian studies in the 198os-199os periods. By then, there had been three major wars 
that had affected Southeast Asia ; the First Indo China War (1945-1954), the Second 
Indo-China War (1965-1973) and the Third Indo-China War which is also known as the 
Cambodian conflict (1978-1991) . The perspective continued to be relevant in the 
context of possible conflict with the possibility of conflict because of the South China 
Sea dispute, territory disputes, and terrorism. Jurgen Ruland defends the utility of the 
realist perspective in ASEAN whose 'policy mix is closer to the realist that the 
institutionalist pole'. 2 9 
24 Mely Caballero-Anthony, Reg ional Security in Southeast Asia : Beyond the ASEAN WAY, Singapore: 
ISEAS Publishing, 2005. 
25 For the first argument, see Sheldon W. Simon, 'Realism and Neoliberalism: International Relations 
Theory and Southeast Asian Securi ty', The Pacific Review, 8:1, 1995, pp. 5-24., and Bary Buzan and Gerald 
Segal, 'Rethinking East Asian securi ty' , Survival, 36:2, 1994, pp. 3-21. 
26 Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia. 
27 Hans J . Morgenthau , Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r Power and Peace, New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1938 quoted in Caballero-Anthony, Reg ional Security in Southeast Asia. 
28 Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia. 
2 9 Ruland , 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis', p. 443. 
24 
Other theories, such as the neo-realist perspective, see power and material 
considerations as the main factors leading to states joining regional organisations. The 
neo-liberal approach sees that through cooperation, the effects of anarchy can be 
mitigated.3° International trade and commercial activities become incentives and will 
gradually result in peace. 31 This approach is useful to explain the birth of economic 
cooperation in Southeast Asia such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFfA) and the 
ASEAN Plus Three (APT). The latter grouping, for example, initially aimed at helping 
ASEAN member states to emerge out of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. However, the 
neo-liberal approach has not always been practical in the Southeast Asian region. 
Increased economic cooperation indeed supported increased interdependence, but did 
not necessarily provide a guarantee against political crises. This theory also failed to 
explain the challenges raised by natural disasters and environmental degradation. 
Constructivism has gained its influence in the studies of Southeast Asia since the late 
1980s. In explaining crisis management in ASEAN, it emphasises ideational factors, 
including norms and ideas in helping understand how and why the 'ASEAN Way' 
mechanisms have emerged and were shaped. It provides an understanding of how the 
norms encapsulated in the 'ASEAN way' actually operate in managing crisis. 32 
Constructivism is also useful in explaining how the region's security approaches inform 
the development of certain mechanisms in ASEAN, such as TAC, and helps provide an 
understanding of ASEAN's rationale for leading the establishment of the ARF and other 
multilateral forums in the region. Among the constructivists, Acharya is arguably the 
most prominent. However, Acharya's work is often criticised as having little basis in 
empirical practices and 'run[ning] the risks of trying to explain everything and 
nothing' .33 
B. Looking Outside the Box: Is Crisis Management Connected with 
Regional Security Systems in Southeast Asia? 
The perspectives of the scholars discussed in the prev10us section assist m 
understanding the concept of crisis management. However these scholars do not 
investigate the concept of crisis management as a means to explain a regional security 
system. Some other scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz, have investigated the link 
between crisis and international systems, 34 or between war and international systems, 
as Hedley Bull did. 35 The relationship between crises and international systems and 
vice versa can be seen in Waltz's argument. For Waltz, a crisis will contribute to change 
3o Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia. 
3, Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia. 
32 Caballero-Anthony, Regional Sec11rity in Southeast Asia. 
33 Peou , 'Realism and Constructivism', p. 136. 
34 Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Stability of a Bipolar World', Daedalus, 93:3, 1964, pp. 881-909. 
35 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Stlldy of Order in World Politics, New York: Palgrave, 1977. 
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m the international system while the nature of the international system will also 
influence the frequency with which crises occur. Interactions between actors who seek 
alterations of their international status are more prone to crises than interactions 
between actors who have accepted their positions. Certain international systems are 
better structured to allow policy makers to cope with crises without destroying the 
system. The structures and processes that maintain an international system may be 
more or less subject to the sudden stress imposed by a crisis. 36 
According to Waltz, one 'distinguishing factor' in the bipolar balance is the nearly 
constant presence of pressure and the recurrence of crises. In addition to finding crises 
more frequent in a bipolar system than in a multi polar system, Waltz also claims that in 
a multipolar world a nation's policy makers can create a crisis to further their objectives 
in the hope that opponents of the change will not join together in opposition. In a 
bipolar system, the permanency of opposing polar powers greatly increases the 
probability that any move to initiate a crisis will be countered. Thus, two relevant 
hypotheses from Waltz's study are that the type of international system influences (i) 
the rate at which crisis occurs; and (ii) the probability of direct confrontations between 
actors when any actor attempts to abruptly change a significant systemic variable.37 
Bull in explaining the relationship between war and international systems argues that 
war remains a basic factor in shaping the international system. Among nuclear powers, 
it is the threat of war rather than war itself that determines the relationship. Mutual 
deterrence between the great powers rules out unlimited war as a means of resolving 
disputes between them and this affects the basis of war in the system as a whole. 38 
Other scholars have also found that the effects of crises on the relations within an 
alliance or between two adversaries may be quite different from the effects of that same 
crisis on the overall system. A specific crisis may drastically alter a subsystem without 
having any destabilising consequences for the whole international system. However, 
the linkage between crisis management and regional security systems is not further 
explored by these scholars. 
Some literature, however, causally links economic crises with the nature of regionalism. 
Ruland, for example, argues that the type of regionalism influences how a regional 
organisation manages its crises and how the regional organisation manages crises 
36 Waltz, 'The Stability of a Bipolar World'. 
37 Waltz, 'The Stability of a Bipolar World'. 
38 Bull , The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. 
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affects the type or regionalism. 39 For the former link, he contends firstly that the less 
institutionalised regional organisations, such as ASEAN, are more vulnerable to crisis 
and more prone to failure. Unlike the EU, according to Ruland, ASEAN members who 
opted out of previous agreements would not have to be afraid of any sanctions. Second, 
he argues that the more politically diverse the members of a regional organisation, the 
more difficult it will be to solve a crisis. This is true in the case of ASEAN as it consists 
of both democratic and authoritarian regimes as its members. Third, economically 
advanced regional organisations are better prepared to solve major crises. Ruland cites 
the EC in the 1970s and NATO in 1994 as examples of economically advanced regional 
organisations; he argues they were more prepared to face these economic crises than 
ASEAN was when it dealt with the 1997 Asian crisis.4° 
How a regional organisation manages crises affects the type of regionalism, according 
to Ruland. When a crisis occurs, the nation-states do not respond to it by strengthening 
cooperation but rather prefer to go it alone.41 In the wider arena, a crisis can also create 
a revitalisation of global multilateralism, such as the creation of the G7 /G8.42 Ruland 
comprehensively describes the causality between crisis management and regionalism. 
However, he focuses more on economic crises. Economic crises alone cannot be 
representative of the multifaceted crises that occur in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, his 
conclusion places more emphasis on how the type of regionalism will influence crisis 
management than vice versa.43 Hence, it is difficult to generalise from his study about 
the linkage between crisis management and the security system in Southeast Asia. 
I contend, however, that the arguments of Ruland, Waltz and Bull provide ways of 
thinking about links between crises, particularly crisis management, and the regional 
security system. I focus here on what the crisis management of ASEAN member states 
can reveal about regional security systems in Southeast Asia. The study of regional 
security systems is important when one looks at the examples of dire mismanagement 
in the past. World War II, for example, resulted from a whole series of mismanaged 
crises, including Munich, the Italian attack on Ethiopia and Adolf Hitler's continuing 
preparation to invade Poland even after he realised that this act might lead the United 
Kingdom (UK) and France to oppose him. Similarly, the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor derived, in part, from a failure of Japanese decision-makers to evaluate 
properly the response of the US. 
39 Ruland , 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis'. 
4° Ruland , 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis'. 
41 Ri.iland, 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis'. 
42 Ri.iland, 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis' . 
43 Ri.iland, 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis'. 
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Managing Regional Crises: Whose Responsibility? 
The arguments and concepts elaborated above lead to the questions, whose 
responsibility is it to manage regional crises? Is it the responsibility of all the powers in 
the region, the members of the regional organisation or some members that qualify to 
be referred as to 'regional dominant powers'? The literature on crises and crisis 
management does not address the connection between the two concepts and the 
classification of powers in Southeast Asia. It does not assess the extent of the 
differences in the managing roles conducted by regional dominant powers and small 
powers. Regional organisations such as ASEAN are now placing enhanced importance 
on developing more organised roles in managing crises. If all powers dedicate some 
portions of their sovereignty to a regional organisation, when crises occur they at least 
are facing the threat of jeopardising the international image of their organisation if the 
organisation fails to manage. This leads to a logical assumption that they share equal 
responsibilities for managing the crisis. However, in most cases within Southeast Asia, 
the burden of responsibility is not shared equally. The argument that burden-sharing is 
not equal further supports the classification of great powers in Southeast Asia. This will 
be discussed in Section 2.6.2. 
The three crises case studies (Chapters 3, 4, 5) will examine the responses of each 
member of ASEAN. Even though the chapters are not specifically aimed at measuring 
the role of each member, the regional security systems indicated by the crisis 
management of ASEAN member states in the three crises will imply which countries 
take greater responsibilities in each crisis. The extent of the role of each member of a 
regional organisation in managing regional crises depends on a complex equation that 
includes national interest, the member's understanding of collective responsibility, the 
opportunity cost of action and inaction and the capabilities of each member of a 
regional organisation.44 Based on these complex factors, I argue that smaller powers are 
reluctant to take big responsibilities because of one or more of these possible reasons: (i) 
they consider whether or not the crisis really directly threatens their own national 
interests, not necessarily their regional interests; (ii) they do not feel thus equal 
responsibilities with the greater powers; (iii) they do not have the willingness to 
contribute to the crisis management; (iv) their calculation of the cost of action exceeds 
the cost of inaction, so being inactive gives more benefit to them; and (v) they are 
willing to help but do not have the capability. These factors are involved, to some 
degree, in the unequal sharing of responsibility among ASEAN states. 
44 Charles Van Der Donck, 'Conflict and the Regional Option: A Study on the Role of Regionalism and 
Regional Arrangements in Conflict Management in the early Post Cold War', PhD Dissertation, Canberra : 
ANU, 1999. 
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Two general examples support my arguments above. In the Americas, for example, the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) has been successful in resolving a number of 
minor interstate conflicts.4s However, the most prominent role has been taken by the 
US, resulting in the OAS often being widely regarded as an instrument of US hegemony. 
In Southeast Asia, even though the ASEAN Charter stipulates an equal distribution of 
roles for each member state, some countries assume greater responsibilities than others. 
For instance, a part from the three crises elaborated below, during the recent Thai-
Cambodian border dispute, only some countries devoted their attention and capacities 
to trying to manage the crisis. Besides the disputing parties (Thailand and Cambodia) 
only Indonesia and Singapore out of ten members of ASEAN have expressed their views 
concerning the issue. Countries like Laos, Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar and Vietnam 
have shied away from any involvement. 
2.3. Conceptualising Security Communities 
This section seeks to evaluate the literature on security communities. In this section, I 
argue that another way of understanding the conceptualisation of a security community 
in Southeast Asia is by investigating the crisis management conducted by ASEAN 
member states. However, little, if any, of the literature adopts crisis management as an 
indicator of a security community. Some scholars are too optimistic about Southeast 
Asia's community building without being able to provide substantial evidence to 
support this position. Some are too sceptical and close- their eyes to the positive 
development of community building in the region. Furthermore, some scholars select 
unrepresentative case studies to explain ASEAN as a security community. 
The section is divided into three parts. The first part begins with a brief introduction to 
the typology of security systems and reviews the concept of security. The second part 
assesses the literature on security communities. Finally, the third part evaluates the 
literature on security communities in Southeast Asia. 
A security community can be referred to as one type of security system. Bruce Cronin 
places the concept of a security community alongside seven possible types of security 
system: (i) an international state of nature; (ii) a balance of power system; (iii) a 
pluralistic security community; (iv) a collective security system; (v) a concert system; 
(vi) a common security association; and (vii) an amalgamated security community. 46 
45 Van Der Donck, 'Conflict and the Regional Option: A Study on the Role of Regionalism and Regional 
Arrangements in Conflict Management in the early Post Cold War'. 
46 Bruce Cronin, Community under Anarchy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 
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TABLE 2.1 Typology of Security Systems 
Security Common Constitutive Pattenisof Primary 
Svstem Identity Rules Behaviours Institutions 
International None None War of all against None 
State of all 
Nature. 
Balance of Statism Sovereignty Balancing and Alliances 
Power System and Band wagoning 
Independence 
Concert Great Power Multilateral Consultation/Joint Congresses/Summits 
System Security Action 
Manaj?;ement 
Pluralistic Cognitive Peaceful Demilitarisation Regional 
Security Regionalism Settlements of and Cooperation Organisations and 
Community Disputes Regimes 
Common Institutional Solidarity Mutual Support Transnational 
Security or Ideological Association 
Svstem 
Amalgamated Pan- Collectivity as Political Federal Government 
Security Nationalism Singularity Integration 
Community 
Collective Cosmopolitan Peace is Collective Action International law and 
Security indivisible Organisations 
System 
Source: Bruce Cronin, Community Under Anarchy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, 
p.9. 
Three of the security systems shown in the Table 2.1 - a balance of power system, a 
pluralistic security community and a concert system - will be used in this thesis to 
identify the type of security system that ASEAN employs in.crisis management. I chose 
those three ( out of the seven security systems listed in Table 2.1) because they are the 
security systems most relevant to Southeast Asia. First, an international state of nature 
has no constitutive rules and lacks any social or political institutions, 47 so this type of 
security system is not relevant for Southeast Asia. Second, an amalgamated security 
system is also not relevant to Southeast Asia due to its identity which refers to a pan-
nationalism rather than regionalism. Third, a collective security system is more 
relevant to an International Organisation such as the UN, and not to ASEAN. The idea 
of a collective security system initiated after World War I and aimed at replacing 
balance of power method. 48 Fourth, a common security system is irrelevant for ASEAN 
because a common security system is based on an ideology, such as monarchy, 
communism, or democracy, while ASEAN is not.49 
47 According to Cronin, despite the lack of a central authority at the global level, this system has never 
existed in the modem world. He gives an example of Europe in the early Middle Ages to illustrate the 
system. See Cronin, Community Under Anarchy, p. 4. 
48 Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, Stanford: 
Standford University Press, 2003. 
49 Some examples of a common security system include: the Non Aligned Movement, the Arab League, the 
British Commonwealth of Nations, the Holy Alliance and the Communist International. See Cronin, 
Community Under Anarchy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 5. 
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A. Concepts of Communities and Security Communities 
Communities 
The concepts of community and security community are critically examined in this 
section to create a framework for understanding the type of security systems operating 
in Southeast Asia. I argue that 'equal responsibilities ', similar to 'mutual 
responsiveness' is an important indicator in assessing any security system operating in 
a region. The crisis management in Southeast Asia may be characterised by a security 
community, if all ASEAN member states share equal responsibilities or mutual 
responsiveness in managing the crises. Generally, the concept of a community is used 
to refer to a human collection within the protective walls of national borders. IR 
scholars have borrowed this concept from sociology. 
The literature on the concept of community demonstrates a wide range of focuses on 
community. A German sociologist, Ferdinand Tonnies divided human association into 
two groups, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. He defined Gemeinschaft as: 
an association in which individuals are oriented to the large association as much 
if not more than to their own self interest. Individuals in Gemeinschaft are 
regulated by common mores or beliefs about the appropriate behaviour and 
responsibility on members of the association to each other and to the association 
at large; association marked by unity will.s0 
Meanwhile, the term Gesellschaft was identified by 'Fonnies as civil society or 
association where individual interest is greater than society interest. 51 Another 
sociologist, Joseph Gusfield, observed a community from two dimensions: territorial 
and relational. From the relational dimension, a community is related to the 
characteristic and quality of the relationship inside the community. Some communities 
which are based on relations do not have territorial borders. Gusfield gives examples of 
a community of scientists or community of scholars. From the territorial dimension, a 
community is divided based on territorial agreements.52 
Benedict Anderson then applied the concept of communities to political science. In his 
view, a nation is an 'imagined political community that is imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign'. 53 Anderson added that a nation could be imagined as a 
community because regardless of actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in 
each, the nation is always conceived as a deep and horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, 
5° Ferdinand Toonnies, Community and Civil Society, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni,·ersity Press, 2001, p. 22. 
s1 Toonnies, Community and Civil Society. 
s2 Joseph R. Gusfield, Community: A Critical Response, Oxford: Blaclnvell, 1975. 
53 Benedict Anderson, ed., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
London: Verso, 1991, p. 6. 
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it is this fraternity that has made it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many 
millions of people, to be willing to die for such limited imaginings.54 
In IR, the term community is rarely interpreted as a theoretical concept or a descriptive 
phrase. Realists prefer to use the term 'cooperation' to refer to an alliance as the 
primary form of community. Institutionalists favour the term 'regimes' rather than 
community. Alex Bellamy, for example, defined a community as a 'human collection 
formed by the shared norms and understanding among its members'.ss Meanwhile, 
Acharya suggests three characteristics to define the formation of a community: (i) the 
existence of a collective identity; (ii) a direct interaction among members of the 
community; and (iii) a practice of reciprocity.s6 
Security Communities 
Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s carefully examined the definition of a 
security community by perceiving it as a product of human communication flows. They 
defined a security community as a group of states whose members 'share dependable 
expectations of peaceful change' and rule out 'the use of force as a means of problem 
solving'.s7 With his associates, Deutsch identified two types of security community, 
namely an amalgamated security community and a pluralistic security community.s8 
He argued that it is the building of a security community that can eliminate 'war and 
expectation of war' within the boundaries of participating sfates.s9 
An amalgamated security community was defined by Deutsch as a political and security 
arrangement where previously independent units formed a single unit with a common 
government. He also provided the following conditions for the formation of an 
amalgamated security community: (i) mutual comparability of values; (ii) a distinctive 
way of life; (iii) expectations of joint rewards timed so as to come before the impositions 
of burdens from the amalgamation; (iv) a marked increase in political and 
administrative capabilities of at least some participant units; (v) superior economic 
growth on the part of some participating units and the development of so-called core 
areas around which are grouped comparatively weaker areas; (vi) unbroken link of 
social communication, both geographically and between territories and between social 
54 Interview with Anderson, in Ratna Shofi Inayati, ed., Menuju Komunitas ASEAN 2015: Dari State 
Oriented ke People Oriented, (Towards an ASEAN Community in 2015: From State Oriented to People 
Oriented), Jakarta: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia Pusat Penelitian Politik, 2007. 
55 Alex J . Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global 
Integrators?, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 31. 
56 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of 
regional order, 2nd edn, London: Routledge, 2009. 
57 Karl W. Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in 
the Light of Historical Experience, New York: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1969, p. 34. 
58 Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. 
59 Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 34. 
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strata; (vii) broadening of the political elite; (viii) mobility of persons, at least among 
the politically relevant strata; and (ix) multiplicity of communication and 
transactions. 60 
A pluralistic community, on the other hand is a political and security arrangement 
where participating states or units retain their legal independence. NATO and the 
bilateral security arrangement between the US and Canada are two examples of this 
kind of security community. Deutsch identifies the following conditions for the 
formation of a pluralistic security community: (i) comparability of values among 
decision-makers; (ii) mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers of 
units to be integrated; and (iii) mutual responsiveness of government to the actions and 
communication of other governments.61 
Deutsch's conceptual framework was later refined by Emanuel Adler and Michael 
Barnett. They depicted security communities as evolutionary. They offered a conceptual 
vocabulary and conceptual foundations for the study of security communities. They 
argued that one of the virtues of the study of security communities is also one of its 
vices: it raises a host of important but potentially intractable concepts such as 
community dependable expectations of peaceful change, governance, and institutions. 62 
Their conceptual foundations for the study are related to three tiers. The first tier 
consists of the precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each 
other's direction and coordinate their policies. The second tier consists of the 
'structural' elements of power and ideas and the processes of transactions, international 
organisations and social learning. These lead to the third tier: the development of trust 
and collective identity formation. The causal relationship between these three tiers is 
responsible for the production of peaceful change. 63 They then offered three phases of 
the development of a security community: a nascent, ascendant and mature security 
community.64 
In the security community's nascent form, states establish relationships in order to: 
maximise their mutual security; reduce the transaction costs associated with their 
exchanges; and/or promote further exchanges and interaction. 6s In the community's 
ascendant stage, ties deepen through institutions and organisations, which in turn give 
rise to a sense of trust. This phase is indentified by: increasingly dense networks; new 
60 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. 
61 Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. 
62 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge UniYersity Press, 
1998. 
63 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities. 
fut Adler and Barnett, Security Communities. 
6s Adler and Barnett, Security Communities. 
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institutions and organisations that reflect either tighter military coordination and 
cooperation and/or decreased fear that the other represents a threat ; a cognitive 
structure that promotes 'seeing' and acting together and therefore, the deepening of the 
level of mutual trust and the emergence of collective identities that begin to encourage 
dependable expectation of peaceful change. 66 Finally, in its mature phase, regional 
actors are able to share an identity and therefore, entertain dependable expectations of 
peaceful change.67 
B. Gauging a Security Community in Southeast Asia 
In this section I argue that examining the indicators of the existence of a security 
community in Southeast Asia should be done both empirically and theoretically. I argue 
that the crisis management system adopted in Southeast Asia may provide evidence 
that it is a security community if all member states of ASEAN share equal 
responsibilities in managing the crisis. A partial security community, therefore, is 
indicated if only some rather than all states share the responsibilities. I also argue that 
in Southeast Asia, while a security community is not an 'imaginary' concept, it has not 
yet reached full implementation. 
Deutsch, Adler and Barnett's concept of a security community may be suitable for 
western and developed countries but it is quite challenging for developing countries 
such as those in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia has been examined as a potential 
security community since 1974.68 The first argument of the possibility of an emerging 
security community was introduced by Estrella D. Solidum in her book Towards a 
Southeast Asian Community in 1976.69 Two years later Monte H. Hill examined the 
possibility of a Southeast Asian security community with a focus on Deutsch 's theory of 
transactionalism.7° Several years later, in 1991, Acharya's publication entitled, 'The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defence Community" 
brought substantive application of the concept of 'security community' to the region .71 
This led him to write a major book entitled Constructing a Security Community in 
Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order in 2001 that was revised 
with a second edition published in 2009.72 
66 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities. 
67 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities. 
68 Monte H. Hill, 'Community Formation within ASEAN', International Organisation, 32:2 , 1978, pp. 569-
575. 
69 Estrella D. Solidum, Towards a Southeast Asian Community, Quezon City: UniYersity of the Philippines 
Press, 1974. 
7° Hill , 'Community Formation within ASEAN'. 
71 Amitav Acharya, 'The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: "Security Community" or "Defence 
Community"?' Pacific Affairs, 64:2, 1991, pp. 159-178. 
72 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. 
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The concept of a security community in Southeast Asia has been widely discussed by 
scholars. These scholars can be divided into three groups: those who claim that ASEAN 
is already a security community; those who believe that ASEAN and/or some member 
countries of ASEAN are already at the earlier stage of a security community; and those 
who do not think that ASEAN is a security community at all. Solidum, within the first 
group, is very optimistic about the idea of Southeast Asia as a security community. She 
depicts ASEAN as 'the wave of the future in Southeast Asia'.73 She had been watching 
ASEAN grow into a 'community' based on cooperation. She argues that the ASEAN 
Way is now extended to the grass root level through functional cooperation for 
establishing 'a real community where members share a feeling of identity and 
responsibility' .74 Solid um claims that ASEAN is successful. In her eyes, security is not 
only an ASEAN achievement but also an ASEAN product. Security is 'the enjoyment of 
the ASEAN values of peace, economic, social and cultural development, cooperation, 
political stability and regional stability in progress'.7s 
Acharya and Muthiah Allagapa are among the second group of scholars who view 
ASEAN as developing into a security community. Acharya claims that ASEAN is a 
'nascent security community'.76 Acharya proposes an alternative security community 
framework which he argues is more applicable for developing countries. Examining the 
prospects of building a security community in Southeast Asia, Acharya identifies the 
following basic requirements: (i) a total absence of armed inter-state conflict, or 
prospects for such conflict in the region; (ii) a total absence of a competitive military 
build-up or arms race involving the regional actors; (iii) formal or informal institutions 
and practices; and (iv) a high degree of economic integration as a necessary 
precondition of a peaceful relationship.77 
In Acharya's opinion, a security community describes groups of states which have 
developed a long-term habit of peaceful interaction and ruled out the use of force in 
settling disputes with other members of the group. The concept has twofold 
significance. First, it raises the possibility that through interactions and socialisation, 
states can manage anarchy and even escape the security dilemma. This then challenges 
the assumptions of the realist, nee-realist and nee-liberal perspectives that a security 
dilemma is a permanent feature of international relations. Second, the concept offers a 
theoretical and analytical framework for international (regional) institutions in 
promoting peaceful change in international relations .78 Acharya interprets the fact that 
73 Estrella Solidum, The Politics of ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asian Reg ionalism, Singapore: 
Eastern University Press, 2003, p. vi. 
74 Solid um, The Politics of ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asian Reg ionalism, p. 93. 
75 Solid um, The Politics of ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asian Regionalism, p. 1. 
76 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, p. 298 . 
77 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. 
78 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. 
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there has not been a war between ASEAN member states as a sign that ASEAN has 
been relatively successful in forging a degree of common identity among its members 
and therefore can be regarded as a nascent security community. 
The theory of 'security communities' according to constructivists like Acharya was 
among the first to raise the possibility of non-violent change in international relations. 
It contradicts the concept of 'security dilemma' because 'security community' is integral 
to a perspective that sees international relations as a process of social learning, identity 
formation driven by transactions, interactions and socialisation. 79 It recognises the 
possibility of change being a fundamentally peaceful process with its sources lying in 
the perceptions and identifications among actors. 80 Such a process explains why states 
may develop greater mutual interdependence and responsiveness, develop 'we feelings ', 
and ultimately come to abandon the use of force to settle problems among themselves. 81 
Muthiah Alagappa advocates that explanations of security order draw on both 'material 
and ideational' determinants at the domestic and inter-state levels. 82 Alagappa 
mentions how the ASEAN Six (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Singapore, and Brunei) have been recognised as a nascent security community, and 
recognises that substantive aspects of international order have been studied inter alia 
under security community frameworks. 83 However, he does not explain or critique the 
relationship between his 'security order' framework and that of a 'security community 
framework'. This leads to confusion as to how a 'security order' framework links to a 
'security community' framework. 
A very different view was expressed by David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith in 
2001, who can be categorised as belonging to a third group of scholars: 
ASEAN is neither a security nor an economic community, either in being or in 
prospect. It is in fact , an imitation community (comparable to a fake state whose 
insecure and illegitimate leaders, ensconced through bogus elections or military 
coups, wield unrestrained power over those whom they rule). Such insecurity 
translated at a regional level produces a rhetorical and institutional shell. The 
shell delivers declarations, holds ministerial meetings, and even supports a 
secretariat, but beyond the flatulent musings of aging autocrats or postmodern 
constructivists pontificating in Track Two fora nothing of substance e\·entuates. 
However, because Southeast Asia's political elites along with their academic 
79 Donald J. Puchala , 'The Integration Theorists and the Study of International Relations· , in Charles W. 
Kegley and Eugene M. Wirrkopf, eds, The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives, :\"ew York: Random 
House, 1984. 
Bo Puchala , 'The Integration Theorists and the Study of International Relations'. 
81 Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, 'The Integratiw Process : Guidelines for Analysis' in Philip E. Jacob 
and James V. Toscano, eds, The Integration of Political Communities, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964, p. 4, 
and see Joseph S. ye 'Comparatr,e Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement', International 
Organisation, 22: 4, 1968, pp. Bss - p.880. 
82 A.lagappa, ed.,Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features. 
83 Alagappa , ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features. In Alaggapa, 'Regional 
Arrangement and International Security in Southeast Asia' , pp. 298, A.lagappa refers to ASE.Al -6 members 
as 'semi or partially-security community'. 
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fellow travellers have invested so heavily in ASEAN's alternative security 
discourse, it is regarded as impolite to point out (the Association's) essentially 
ersatz quality.84 
Two years later, Jones expressed clearly his scepticism towards ASEAN's sustainability. 
He argued that it 'increasingly resembled other failed postcolonial Cold War 
organisations like the Non Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity and 
the Arab League'. 8s Writing with Michael L. R. Smith, he rejected the notion of ASEAN 
as a security community. He saw that Southeast Asia itself, as a region, had been and 
remained a fantasy - 'a region that never was'.86 
Long before Jones published his articles, Michel Leifer in 1984 was already sceptical of 
ASEAN. In 1988, Leifer published an important book that contributed to the neo-realist 
camp where again 'the balance of power' remained a key factor. However, in his book, 
he suggested that ASEAN can be best described as a diplomatic community that 
evidences elements of a 'collective-political defence with an extra-mural point of 
reference' . 87 His work also acknowledged the possible existence of a 'sub-regional 
security community'.88 Most of Leifer's works focus on ASEAN's response at the time to 
the Cambodian conflict, which forced the member states to coordinate their policies 
with external factors as their major consideration. Based on ASEAN's response, he 
argued that this 'collective political defence' was 'expressed through diplomatic 
-
solidarity in the face of threat to the premises of regional order and more specifically to 
the security of a member state'. 89 Leifer asserts that because ASEAN's operational 
experience of collective political defence was suited to the realm of political diplomacy, 
ASEAN is best viewed as a diplomatic community rather than a security community. 
Leifer's student, Emmers, in his book Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power 
in ASEAN and the ARF argues the continuing relevance of the 'balance of power' 
approach in Southeast Asia. Instead of being a security community, Southeast Asia is, 
according to Emmers, a playground where the two concepts of 'cooperative security' 
and 'balance of power' coexist.9° Emmers claims that neo-liberalist and constructivist 
theories that embrace concepts like cooperative security at the expense of utilising the 
power balancing theory, provide an incomplete and unrealistic view of Southeast Asia. 
~ Da\id Martin Jones and Mike L. Smith , 'The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia : Globalization, 
ew Terror and the Delusions of Regionalism', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24A, 2001, p. 285. 
Bs Da\id Martin Jones, 'Regional Illusion and its Aftermath ', Policy, 19:3, 2003, p. 43. 
86 Da\id Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith , 'ASEAN's Imitation Community', Orbis, 46:1 , 2002, pp. 93-
99. 
87 Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, 1989, pp.VII & 83. This 
term has continued to be used to this day. 
88 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p. 157. 
89 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p. 152. 
90 Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 
37 
This is because they reject the high potential for tension in the bilateral relations of 
Southeast Asia, such as between Malaysia and Singapore, as well as Thailand and 
Myanmar.91 
From this literature on security communities in Southeast Asia, it can be seen that on 
the one hand, Solidum is a strong supporter of the idea of Southeast Asia as a security 
community, while on the other hand, scholars like David Martin Jones, offer contrary 
arguments. Another group of scholars holds either that the whole of ASEAN is a 
nascent security community (Acharya) or that only the ASEAN Six is already a nascent 
security community (Alagappa). 
Solidum's enthusiasm and Jones' scepticism have limitations. Emmerson points out 
that Solidum's work does not really reflect the reality of the region.92 Emmerson cites 
Michael Haas' comment quoted on the back cover of Solidum's book. According to 
Haas, Solid um, who has been regarded as 'Ms. ASEAN', has produced the book as a 
result of consultation with primary sources and interviews with government officials to 
offer the most authoritative assessment about the region.93 However, Emmerson finds 
that Solidum has not actually provided any evidence that she interviewed government 
officials. There are no notes of interviews at any of her endnotes. Her book relies 
instead on a selection of secondary writings about ASEAN and on official ASEAN 
statements. For example, she frequently cites ASEAN's 1_998-1999 annual reports.94 
Therefore, for Emmerson, her conclusion is not really convincing. 
Jones's argument, which depicts ASEAN as a failed organisation and which predicts a 
slow process of disintegration, is also not compelling. He does not offer enough 
evidence for his argument. When he wrote his book in 2003, Southeast Asia was 
recovering from a financial crisis. It did not show any signs of disintegration. Instead, 
in the same year, ASEAN announced its plan to establish a community based on three 
pillars: economy, political-security and socio-cultural. 
I argue that none of these scholars has investigated ASEAN's crisis management in a 
representative and exclusive manner that provides a way of shedding light on the 
regional system in Southeast Asia. This gap offers an opportunity for a deeper 
investigation, which this thesis aims to do. The linkage between crisis management 
and the regional security system is important because it has been observed previously 
that international crisis management has provided insights into the characteristics of 
9, Emmers, Cooperative Security and Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF. 
92 Donald K. Emmerson, 'Will the Real ASEAN Please Stand Up? Security, Community and Democracy in 
Southeast Asia', available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu /evnts / 4130 /Emmerson 04 05 2005.pdf 
(accessed on 10 January 2010). See also Emmerson, 'Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast 
Asia: Analyzing ASEAN'. 
93 Emmerson, 'Will the Real ASEAN Please Stand Up?' 
94 Emmerson, 'Will the Real ASEAN Please Stand Up?' 
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the international system. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, for example, stimulated 
scholars to depict the existing international system at that time. By investigating this 
crisis , it is clear that the international system by then was characterised by bipolarity, 
with the US and the Soviet Union as the poles. 
2.4. The Balance of Power in Southeast Asia Revisited 
This section reassesses the literature on the concept of balance of power. The purpose 
of this section is to discuss the concept of balance of power and determine whether it is 
relevant to crisis management in Southeast Asia. To that end, it combines the ideas of 
two traditional schools of thought on balance of power, Richard Little's 'balance of 
power' and John David Ciarciori's 'balance of influence'.95 In this section, I argue that 
in the context of Southeast Asia, the balance of power factor should neither be 
exaggerated nor underestimated. On the one hand, the balance of power factor plays an 
important role for ASEAN in managing some crises. It is not only important for 
understanding the management of the crisis, but it also becomes a factor in the 
occurrence of the crisis itself, because a crisis often results from an escalating 
adversarial balance of power. On the other hand, given the different characteristics and 
challenges of each crisis in Southeast Asia, in many cases, management of the relations 
ben,veen ASEAN member states and ben,veen ASEAN member states and external 
powers ·will be difficult to achieve by power-balancing alone. Furthermore, I argue that 
realists and neo-realists often overuse and misuse the term 'balance'. They refer to 
'multilateralism' in Southeast Asia as an 'institutional balancing' and to the norms 
promoted and implemented in the region as 'ideational balancing'. However, the 
purposes of the multilateralism and the promotion of norms in Southeast Asia are not 
only about balancing. 
As highlighted earlier in Section 2.2.B on the importance of 'equal responsibi lities ', I 
further argue that the crisis management in Southeast Asia may provide evidence of the 
presence of a balance of power dynamics among ASEAN member states, if there are at 
least n ,vo equal powers in the region competing or balancing in managing crisis. The 
crisis management can be characterised by a balance of external great power influence 
dynamics if at least n ,vo external great powers exercise thei r influence on ASEAN 
member states in managing their crisis. The influence can be either balanced towards 
associati,·e beha,iour or adversarial beha,iour. 
95 For full reference, see John Da,;d Ciorciari , 'The Balance of Great-P0\1·er Influence in Contemporary 
Southeast Asia ', International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 9, 2009, pp. 157-196; and Rjchard Little , The 
Balance of Power in International Relations, Metaphors, Myths and Models Cambridge: Cambridge 
Unr.·ersity Press, 2007. 
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This section consists of three subsections. The first section examines the conventional 
understanding of the term balance of power by reviewing its meaning and critiques in 
the literature. The second section explores the literature on the balance of power in the 
context of the Asia Pacific. This leads to the third section which describes the role of a 
balance of power in Southeast Asia and suggests why ASEAN's crisis management is 
useful as an indicator of the existence of a balancing system in the Southeast Asian 
context. 
A. Balance of Power Theories 
The central suppositions of the concept of balance of power are based on realist 
assumptions. Attempts to understand IR in terms of the balance of power can be traced 
back more than five hundred years. Historically, the balance of power concept was 
given a fundamental position in studies by Machiaveli and Hobbes, and other classical 
realists. In the 19th century Morgenthau developed the concept and his work has 
become one of the foundations of the development of realism theory itself. Morgenthau 
has been regularly identified as the 'father of realism' and the precursor of neo-realism. 
After Morgenthau, the concept of balance of power was then developed within modern 
IR theory by Kenneth Waltz. He introduced the balance of power as a central theme of 
neo-realism perspective. The concept was then revisited by the English School scholars, 
such as Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. Mearsheimer and others continued the work on 
balance of power within the realist framework. 
Although the concept has been discussed by many scholars and from different 
perspectives, the balance of power has no single precise definition. Inis Claude argues 
that there are four key definitions of the term balance of power.96 These are: a situation, 
associated with the distribution of power; a policy, referring to the policies taking the 
power situation into account: a symbol, related to a sign of realistic concern with the 
power and issues; and a system, seen as 'a certain kind of arrangement for operation of 
international relations in a world of many states'. 97 Michael Sheehan has further 
explained the difference between balance of power as a policy and as a system.98 As 
policy, it involves 'the creation and preservation of equilibrium, the confrontation of 
power with countervailing power to prevent a single power laying down the law to all 
others'.99 As a system, the balance of power has often been used as 'a point of reference 
for studying the working of the states system'.100 Because my thesis will try to correlate 
96 Inis Claude, Power and International Relations, New York: Random House, 1965, pp. 13-39. 
97 Claude, Power and International Relations, pp. 13-39. 
98 Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory, London: Routledge, 1996. 
99 Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory , p. 53. 
100 Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory, p. 53. 
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ASEAN's crisis management and the regional security system in Southeast Asia, it will 
focus on the balance of power as a system, not as a policy. 
There have also been some other categorisations of the balance of power. Organski, for 
example, divides 'balance of power' according its modes of operation. 101 Regarding 
forms of operation, Organski argues that two types of balances can be distinguished. A 
simple balance involves two groups, each consisting of one or more states, opposing 
each other with a roughly equal amount of power while, a multiple balance includes 
several groups balancing each other on a unilateral multilateral basis. 
Among scholars who have investigated the balance of power, four prominent authors 
have made significant but contentious theoretical contributions in international 
relations102 These authors are Hans J. Morgenthau (Politics Among Nations, 1948), 
Hedley Bull (The Anarchical Society, 1977), Kenneth Waltz (Theory of International 
Politics, 1979) and J. Mearsheimer (The Tragedy of Great Power, 2001). The work of 
Morgenthau, Hedley Bull, Kenneth Waltz and Mearsheimer is investigated by Richard 
Little in his book 'The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths 
and Models'. 103 He acknowledges and critiques the works of these authors. This 
literature review will not reiterate the critiques of these four prominent scholars, but 
will look more deeply into the argument prompted by Richard Little, that the modern 
conception of the balance of power embodies two distinct traditions of thought. The 
first, an adversarial tradition, depicts political actors in competitive and self-interest 
terms. 104 In the second tradition, the associative tradition assumes that in a balance of 
power, political actors can be co-operative and pursue policies which embrace the 
interest of others. In modern IR literature, the associative approach of balance of power 
is seen in the works of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. 
The central question addressed in this thesis is whether 'crisis management' provides a 
way of understanding regional security systems in Southeast Asia and if it does, what 
types of security systems are they? The term 'crisis management' itself comprises two 
traditional thoughts of balance of power. The term 'crisis' can be associated with the 
result of an escalation of an 'adversarial balance of power' while 'management' can be 
associated with a relationship within an 'associative balance of power'. Therefore, these 
two traditional approaches to balance of power are applied in ASEAN's crisis 
management. 
101 A.F.K. Organski, 2 nd edn, World Politics, New York: Knopf, 1968. 
102 Little, The Balance of Power in International Relations, Metaphors, Myths and Models. 
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B. Balancing in the Asia Pacific 
The conceptualisation of a 'balance of power' in the Asia Pacific has been widely 
discussed. Paul Dibb, for example, refers to a balance situation as one where no one 
power is in a position to determine the fate of others. 10s He claims that Asia's future 
will be determined by cooperation and peaceful interaction between China, Japan, 
India, Russia and the US. He also contends that even though there are established 
regional security organisations, such as the ARF, new emerging transnational issues 
such as climate change, scarce resources, an ageing population, greater expenditure on 
arms and nuclear weapons could change the situation. He argues that potential shifts in 
the regional balance of power will carry uncertain results as the interaction of great 
powers in the Asia Pacific region is still unstable. 106 Thus, Dibb reasserts, 'it is time to 
challenge ASEAN's complacency in this regard'.107 
Susan Shirk, on the other hand, doubts the future of the effectiveness of a balancing 
system in the Asia Pacific. She postulates that the prospect for managing multipolar 
relations among four major powers in the Asia Pacific region (the US, Japan, China and 
Russia) by balance of power methods is not good.108 Her argument is supported by 
Chinese scholar Ji Guoxing who contends that: 
In the Asia-Pacific a new stable relationship among the big countries has not yet 
emerged and there is disequilibrium in international relations. Relations among 
the US, Japan, Russia and China have decisive effects on the stability of the 
whole Asia-Pacific. 109 
These relations are subject to overall adjustment and a stable relationship among the 
four will not likely emerge soon. Now that multipolarity has returned to the Asia Pacific, 
Shirk believes that balance of power methods are likely to fail. 110 Shirk reasserts that 
due to multipolar dynamics in the Asia Pacific replacing bipolarity, a balancing system 
is too problematic. Multipolar balances are problematic because: 
Greater complexity breeds a greater risk of miscalculation because of mistaken 
estimates of relative power and different interpretations of history; 
miscalculations can also be caused by confusion about the commitment of 
coalition partners to deter an aggressive state; countervailing coalitions are 
likely to form too slowly to deter an aggressive state; and shifting alliances 
inhibit cooperation among coalition partners. 111 
10 5 Paul Dibb, The Future Balance of Power in East Asia; what are the Geopolitical Risk, SDSC Working 
Paper, No. 406, January 2008 , pp. 1-12. 
106 Dibb, 'The Future Balance of Po,ver in East Asia'. 
107 Dibb, 'The Future Balance of Pm,•er in East Asia ', p. 11 
108 Susan Shirk, 'Asia Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers? ' in David A. Lake 
and Patrick Morgan , eds, Regional Orders: Building and Security in a New World, University Park: The 
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If Shirk sees that the balance of power is eroding in the Asia Pacific region, Acharya 
sees it is also eroding in Southeast Asia. 11 2 Whether or not balance of power applies in 
Southeast Asia is discussed in Chapter 3, 4, and 5. 
C. Southeast Asia: Does a Balance of Power Operate? 
It is also important to make a distinction between the balance of power dynamics 
among ASEAN member states and the balance of external great power influence in 
Southeast Asia and between the associative and the adversarial balance of power as 
illustrated in Figure 2.1. Among scholars who apply the balance of power theory in the 
Southeast Asian context are Leifer, Emmers, Robert Ross, Evelyn Goh, and John David 
Ciorciari. Leifer argues that the balance of power is relevant to an examination of 
ASEAN and ARF. Leifer does not investigate the balance of power factor only in terms 
of adversarial relations and self-help. Instead, he combines realist perspectives and 
neo-Grotian understandings. He is sceptical of the potential role of either ASEAN or 
ARF, both of which he argues, should be viewed as 'a modest contribution to a viable 
balance or distribution of power within the Asia Pacific by other than traditional 
means'. 11 3 
FIGURE2.1 
Balance of Power in Southeast Asia 
Associative Balance of Power 
Balance of External Great Power 
Influence 
Balance of Power 
among ASEAN members 
Adversarial Balance of Power 
Source: Adapted by author from Little 2007 and Ciarciori 2009 
Emmers adds to Leifer's argument by stating that balance of power dynamics are at 
work in the Southeast Asia region. 11 4 These dynamics were the key factor in the 
foundation of ASEAN and have developed in significance as ASEAN has grown. The 
balance of power factor, according to Emmers, was significant on the occasions of the 
Third Indochina conflict, the integration of Brunei Darussalam, the South China Sea 
conflict and the establishment of the ARF. 11s He further contends that in Southeast Asia, 
112 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. 
113 Michael Leifer, 'The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending Model of Regional Security', Adelphi Paper, 
302, 1996, p. 21. 
114 Emmers, Cooperative Security and Balance of Power in ASEAN and Southeast Asia, pp. 40-84. 
115 Emmers, Cooperative Security and Balance of Power in ASEAN and Southeast Asia. 
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the balance of power and cooperative security can coexist and complement each other. 
In his opinion, a cooperative security model depends on and cannot exclude the 
balance of power factor. It is Emmers' view that ASEAN was established because of 
efforts to prevent Indonesia's hegemony and as the organisation develops, the feelings 
of mistrust, bilateral disputes and contradictory strategies among its members push 
them to become dependent on external guarantees to ensure individual security 116 In 
short, the balance of power factor in Southeast Asia, for Emmers, is demonstrated in 
the region's rejection of 'intra-mural hegemony' and its 'countervailing responses to 
external threats'. 117 
While Leifer and Emmers do not separate clearly the concept of 'balance of power' from 
the 'balance of influence' in examining Southeast Asia, Ciorciari clearly divides 'balance 
of power' and 'balance of great power influence'.118 He contends that the security system 
in Southeast Asia is 'a multi-dimensional balance that is relatively resilient and places 
significant constraints on any external power's ability to exercise unwanted dominance 
in the region'. 11 9 Emmers calls this the 'promotion of countervailing response of 
external threats'. 12° Ciorciari argues that Southeast Asia's security system does 
represent the dynamics of balance of external great power influence. Like Leif er and 
Emmers, he sees that external great powers have contributed significantly to the course 
of Southeast Asian affairs . However, unlike the other two authors who emphasise the 
role of military muscle as the key to the balance of power dynamics in Southeast Asia, 
Ciorciari examines four key dimensions of the aggregate balance of external great 
power influence in the region: the military, economic, institutional and ideational 
balances. 121 
Ciarciori claims that the establishment of multilateralism, such as ARF, is part of the 
region's effort to achieve such a balance and refers to it as an 'institutional balancing' .122 
He further argues that institutions in Southeast Asia are used as a 'playing' field among 
states with different material power capabilities. 12 3 Emmers and Leifer also take a 
similar view. Leifer argues that ARF is best viewed as 'valuable adjunct(s) to the 
working of the balance of power in helping to deny dominance to a rising power with 
hegemonic potential'. 124 Multilateralism in Southeast Asia therefore, is used as a site 
where small or 'middle powers ' can challenge China and the US. Goh also sees the 
116 Emmers, Cooperative Security and Balance of Power in ASEAN and Southeast Asia . 
117 Emmers, Cooperative Security and Balance of Power in ASEAN and Southeast Asia, pp. 52-53. 
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institutional balance as important in Southeast Asia. She agrees that ASEAN members 
have tried to 'institutionalise major power balancing' .12s Institutions are mechanisms by 
which Southeast Asian countries have attempted to bring about an 'associative' balance 
of influence in the region. 126 
In contrast to these three scholars, Acharya challenges the relevance of the balance of 
power and other classical realist concepts in the discourse. Acharya argues that the 
balance of power is actually a concept of gradually eroding importance in Asia, because 
'Asia is increasingly able to manage its insecurity through shared norms, nsmg 
economic interdependence and growing institutional linkages' .127 
David Kang and Martin Stuart-Fox take a similar view to Acharya's that the concept of 
balance of power is gradually eroding in Southeast Asia. Kang contends that countries 
in Southeast Asia are generally 'bandwagoning' rather than 'balancing' external 
powers, 128 while Stuart-Fox argues that Southeast Asian states prefer to develop 
'bilateral regimes' than 'balancing coalitions' .129 For Kang, Southeast Asian states are 
generally pursuing accommodative strategies towards China because 'Asia has different 
historical traditional, geographic, political realities and cultural traditions than the 
West, where realist IR theories were born.'13° Therefore, Southeast Asian countries are 
generally 'bandwagoning' rather than 'balancing' China. China is the gravitational 
centre of Asia and the East Asia order will be more hierarchical in the future. 131 
Meanwhile, Stuart-Fox argues that for Southeast Asian countries, clear alignments are 
too confrontational and provocative.132 Strong alignments can be seen as being against 
the essence of Southeast Asian 'strategic culture', which has tended to view robust 
alliances as unwise. Therefore, Southeast Asian countries tend to avoid balancing 
coalitions. Stuart-Fox quotes the late Ali Alatas, the former Indonesian Foreign 
Minister who refers to non-alignment as 'the moral alternative to polarizing alliance 
blocs '.133 
I argue that in investigating the balance of power in Southeast Asia, Emmers overlooks 
cases that are not of major interest to these external guarantees or great powers outside 
125 EYelyn Goh , 'Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing regional security 
strategies', International Security, 32:3, 2007/ 08, pp. 113-157, p. 144. 
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the region. Some non-traditional security threats in Southeast Asia, such as smoke haze, 
the spread of SARS/Bird Flu, the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, and the 2008 Cyclone 
N argis are difficult to see as a reflection of balance of power dynamics or as attractive to 
great powers' interests. ASEAN's cooperation over the management of smoke haze 
problems is an example. It reflects genuine efforts to address a problem of haze in 
Indonesia which affected other countries in Southeast Asia. I argue that claims made by 
Leifer and Emmers that balance of power dynamics contribute more to regional 
security than does ASEAN's cooperation are also misleading. ASEAN's cooperation has 
successfully prevented the region from erupting into open conflict or war. Both Leifer 
and Emmers also fail to respond to critiques from neo-liberal institutionalists, such as 
Hurrel, who argue that balance of power dynamics only matter during the initial phase 
of regionalism and disappears in its later development. 134 
It is dangerous to see multilateralism only as an effort to achieve a balance. There is a 
'balancing' part being played there, but it is not only about balance. Countries in 
Southeast Asia used multilateralism to pursue their national interests, and not 
necessarily to balance other countries in the region or to balance great-power influence. 
Multilateral forums like the ARF, APEC and ASEAN Plus Three were not established in 
order to balance external powers either. If they were established for the purpose to 
balance external powers, as argued by Ciarcioari, Emmers and Leifer, it is not proven 
that ASEAN members can really shape the interaction between the US and China in 
these forums. Furthermore, the sheer number of meetings among ASEAN officials -
now close to 500 per year - has created an expectation of cooperative behaviour, 
including peaceful management of issues as, they arise. 
Ciarciori also refers to the efforts to implement norms in Southeast Asia as 'ideational 
balance'.13s He agrees that ASEAN is used as a place to influence the development of 
norms of democracy and human rights. In that sense, Ciarciori seems to be confusing 
the term 'influence' with 'balance'. Democratic countries like Indonesia and the 
Philippines, have indeed been trying to impress the norms of democracy and human 
rights on other member countries of ASEAN, particularly Myanmar, and persuaded 
other countries to agree to include these norms in the ASEAN Charter. 136 However, this 
does not mean that they are trying to 'balance' the norms of democracy and human 
rights with other norms, such as authoritarian principles. 
134 See Andrew Hurrell , 'Fore,vord to the Third Edition : The Anarchical Society 25 Years On', in Hedley 
Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Palgrave, 1977. 
13s Ciarcioari, 'The Balance of Great-Power Influence', p. 176. 
136 Interview with senior level of officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3, Jakarta , 16 
February 2011. 
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In relation to external great powers, historically there were cases where great powers 
influenced ASEAN member countries, but their influence did not involve attempts to 
balance power with each other. Here, instead of a balance of external great power 
influence, the importance of one or more great powers' influence on one or more 
ASEAN member states is recognised. In short, the concept of 'balance of power' should 
be used cautiously, and be neither exaggerated nor underestimated. 
The argument pursued above does not imply that this thesis will exclude the balance of 
power option from the nature of the security systems in Southeast Asia. Instead, this 
study will investigate to what extent the security system in the region reflects the 
balance of power dynamics by using crisis management as an indicator. It will also seek 
to answer to what extent the region is associated with the balance of power dynamics 
among Southeast Asian countries and with the balance of external great-power 
influence. Further, it will canvass which crisis shows evidence of an adversarial balance 
of power and which crisis shows an associative balance of power, if balance of power 
was operating. 
In summary, few scholars attempt to link the concept of balance of power in Southeast 
Asia to ASEAN's crisis management. In the introduction, it was shown that Leifer uses 
the Cambodian crisis to conclude that the security system in Southeast Asia is based on 
the dynamics of balance of power. Emmers utilises some cases, but only two of them 
can be really referred to as crises: the Cambodian crisis and the South China Sea crisis. 
Other scholars whose work is reviewed here, such as Ciorciari, Kang, and Stuart-Fox do 
not apply crisis management in explaining the security system in Southeast Asia. Hence, 
this thesis will follow other historical literature mentioned earlier and use the 
management of three crises as an indicator, thus developing an interesting way of 
analysing the security system in Southeast Asia. Therefore, it will hopefully contribute 
to the literature on crisis management and balance of power, particularly in Southeast 
Asia. 
2.5. Conceptualising a Concert of Powers 
This section reviews the literature on the concept of a concert of powers. I argue that 
understanding the nature of Southeast Asia in terms of a concert of powers is worth 
examining for several reasons. First, theories of concert-like behaviour can be applied 
not only in the international system but also in regional contexts. Second, Southeast 
Asia faces many issues that can be potentially dealt with by a concert of powers model. 
Third, a concert of powers does not necessarily require spheres of influence. Finally, the 
existence of a concert of powers in Southeast Asia can be determined by how ASEAN 
manages its crises. I further argue that a concert of powers may be indicated in 
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Southeast Asia if dominant powers within the region share 'equal responsibilities ' in 
managmg cnses. 
The literature on concert of powers can be divided into three groups. The first body of 
literature examines the Concert of Europe which took place in Europe in the 19th 
century (particularly between 1815 and 1854, although some historians argue that it 
remained in existence until 1914). The second body of literature investigates the 
possibility of a concert of powers in the Post Cold War era. The third explores the 
chances of establishing a concert of powers in the Asia Pacific. None of the literature 
examines Southeast Asia as a concert of powers, and this thesis proposes to fill that gap. 
The Concert of Europe was established at the end of the Napoleonic Wars and managed 
inter-state relations in Europe between 1815 and the outbreak of the Crimean War in 
1854. The Concert's members were the great European powers of the day: Prussia, 
Austria, Great Britain and Russia (France joined in 1818). The literature establishes 
that there are six special requirements for great powers to establish a concert of powers, 
based on the experience of the Concert of Europe, namely: (i) common rights and 
responsibilities; (ii) special managerial roles; (iii) formal and common consent; (iv) 
conceptual norms; (v) protection of small powers; and (vi) a relationship management 
among themselves. Ian Clark emphasises four requirements: common rights and 
responsibilities, formal and common consent, special managerial roles and 
management of relations among great powers. Clark asserts that there are two 
principles in the Concert of Europe: (i) the great powers had a common responsibility 
for maintaining the peace treaties of 1815 and for solving the problems that arose in 
Europe; and (ii) when the status quo had to be modified or a problem had to be settled, 
changes should not be made unilaterally and rewards should not be made without their 
formal and common consent. 137 He argues that the significance of the concert lies in its 
elaboration of diplomatic conduct for the great powers. The importance of the concert 
derives from two inter-related ideas: first, the formal assertion of the unique privileges 
and responsibilities of the great powers in the maintenance of international order; and 
second, if the special managerial role of the great powers was to be recognised, it would 
be necessary to order the relationships more formally between the powers 
themselves. 138 
The responsibilities and the managerial role of the great powers in the maintenance of 
international order have been highlighted by historians of the period. Of the former , 
137 Francis H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, Cambridge: Cambridge UniYersity Press, 1963, p. 
225 quoted in Ian Clark, Reform and Resistance in the International Order, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980. 
138 Clark, Reform and Resistance in the International Order. 
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Elrod has observed that 'concert diplomacy' actively cultivated the conception of the 
great powers as a unique and special peer group. 139 This is quite similar to Albrecht-
Carrie's argument that 'order could best be maintained by the clear assertion of the 
right and responsibility of those possessed of power, the great powers'. 14° 
Of the latter, Elrod has likewise drawn attention to the concert as 'a conceptual norm 
among the great powers of the proper and permissible aims and methods of 
international politics' or more simply put, the Concert as a 'group norm'. 
Medlicott also adds another element of concert diplomacy, which is 'protection of the 
small powers' .141 He is of the opinion that a concert could serve as a means of protection 
of the smaller powers by the great powers, and a concert could serve as a means of 
preserving peace by preventing war between the great powers themselves. A concert of 
powers, therefore, is of the powers, and between the powers. 142 
The second body of literature involves scholars who were inspired by the example of the 
Concert of Europe, such as: Robert Jervis, Risto Pentilla, John Kirton, Charles and 
Clifford Kupchan, Richard Rosecrance, and Benjamin Miller. They suggest that such a 
model might be appropriate in the post Cold War world: Charles and Clifford Kupchan 
argue that a new concert made up of the US, Russia, Britain, France and Germany may 
bring a stable collective security regime to Europe. 143 Rosecrance similarly calls for a 
global concert, with the US, China, Russia, Japan, and the European Community as its 
members. 144 Others, such as Pentilla and Kirton, argue that the G7 or G8 already fulfils 
this kind of role. 14s Miller, among this group of scholars, suggests that there are two 
types of concert. One focuses on the mutual restraint which typifies the relationship 
between major powers in a concert. Here the powers define their own interests, to some 
degree, in terms of the larger common good. Miller calls this a 'passive concert', in 
which each of the great powers still behaves as an individual actor, but acts in a more 
moderate way. 146 The second type of concert refers to an arrangement where great 
powers are more active as regulators of the international system, and in their 
139 Richard.B Elrod, 'The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System', World Politics, 8:2 , 
1976, pp. 159-174, p. 167. 
140 R. Albrecht-Carrie, The Concert of Europe 1815-1914, Harper, 1968, p.5 quoted in Ian Clark, Reform 
and Resistance in the International Order, Cambridge : Cambridge Unh·ersity Press, 1980, p. 79. 
141 W.N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone and the Concert of Europe, Athlone Press, 1956, p. 18 quoted in 
Ian Clark, Reform and Resistance in the International Order, Cambridge: Cambridge UniYersity Press , 
1980, p. 79. 
142 W.N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone and the Concert of Europe, Athlone Press. 1956. 
143 Clifford Kupchan and Charles Kupchan, 'Concerts, CollectiYe Security and the Future of Europe', 
International Security, 16:11, 1991, pp. 114-161. 
144 Richard Rosecrance, 'A New Concert of Powers', Foreign Affairs, 71:2, 1992, pp. 64-82. 
145 See John Kirton , 'The Diplomacy of Concert : Canada , th e G-7 and the Halifax Summit' , Canadian 
Foreign Policy, 3:1, 1995 and Kirton, The Seven Power Sumit As an International Concert, aYailable at 
http://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/html/1807/4855 /kcom.htm (accessed on 26 October 2009). See also 
Risto E.J. Pentilla, 'The G8 as a Concert of Powers', Adelphi Papers, 43:355, 2003, pp. 17-32. 
146 Benjamin Miller, 'Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts', Review of International Studies, 
20:4, 1994, pp. 327-348, p. 329. 
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relationships with smaller powers in the system. This 'regulatory concert' stresses the 
great powers' 'co-managerial responsibilities for maintaining peace and stability and 
resolving disputes' .147 It is also more collective and more demanding. 148 
Some scholars view a concert as a formal institution, while others perceive it as 
informal. For some, the key to a concert lies in its attempt to formalise international 
politics, to systematise a spontaneous balance of power situation. For others, by 
contrast, the keynote of a concert is its informal nature, to the point where its very 
existence has been called into question. Pentilla, for example, focuses on whether the 
collaboration of great powers is temporary or permanent; he also divides concerts into 
two types. The first is a temporary concert or a 'concert with a small 'c". 149 It is typically 
set up to seek a solution to a particular crisis. Therefore, it has a mandate: to find a 
solution and then dissolve. There are various examples of this type of concert. The four 
largest European Union (EU) members that met in London on 4 November 2001 to 
coordinate their response to the 'war on terror' could be regarded as such a concert. 
Pentilla also mentions that the Contact Group set up to resolve the crises in 
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Namibia as another example of this kind of concert. 1s0 The 
second form of concert is a permanent Concert or a 'concert with a capital 'C". 1s1 It is a 
great-power coalition which is involved in long-term joint management. It is aimed at 
maintaining international order and justice, promoting growth and ensuring the 
sustainability of the financial system. Such a concert, - according to Pentilla, is 
represented by the G8. 1s2 
Finally, a third body of scholars examines the possibility of establishing a concert of 
powers in the Asia and Asia Pacific regions. Among these scholars, Shirk and Michael 
Wesley are strong proponents of the idea of an Asia Pacific concert of powers, while 
Nicholas Khoo and Michael Smith are sceptical of this idea. Acharya, Ayson, Goh and 
Brian Job see the possibility of an Asia Pacific concert of powers with some limitations. 
Shirk, a State Department official during the Clinton Administration, argues that in 
order to avoid offending regional sensitivities, the objectives of an Asia Pacific concert 
would have to be modest. She suggests a regional concert could have two goals: first, to 
'regulate relations between the major powers'; and second, 'to prevent conflicts 
between other regional states from provoking a major conflict between the great 
powers'. 153 She argues that, at a minimum, the concert would establish a norm that the 
powers would not intervene militarily in conflicts between smaller states. A regional 
147 Miller, 'Explaining U1e Emergence of Great Power Concerts', p. 330. 
148 Miller, 'Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts'. 
149 Pentilla, The GB as a Concert of Powers, p. 18. 
15° Pentilla, The GB as a Concert of Powers. 
1S1 Pentilla, The GB as a Concert of Powers, p. 19. 
1s2 Pentilla, The GB as a Concert of Powers. 
153 Shirk, 'Asia Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers? ', p. 252. 
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concert of powers comprising of China, Japan, Russia and the US would, according to 
Shirk, be more workable than a larger body. However she realises that an Asia Pacific 
concert would not attempt to provide security for all the states in the region. 1s4 Instead 
it would establish a norm that powers can not intervene militarily in conflicts among 
the less powerful states. Some crises among small and middle powers might erupt 
without precipitating a response from the concert. This distinguishes Shirk's model 
from the Concert of Europe. In an Asia Pacific concert, great powers could not dictate 
to small and medium powers, instead they would have to recognise the much greater 
autonomy of small and middle powers in the international system.1ss 
At a Sydney conference held in December 2009, an idea for an Asia Pacific concert of 
powers was proposed by Australia and reiterated by the former Executive Director of 
the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Michael Wesley. Wesley stated that an Asia 
Pacific concert of powers could bring together eight of the biggest powers of the Asia 
Pacific - the US, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Indonesia, and Australia, 
all of which are members of the G20. 1s6 Wesley's certainly provoked criticism 
particularly from Asia Pacific countries that were not included either in the G20 or in 
the concert, such as Thailand. A senior level Thai officer said that the idea of an Asia 
Pacific concert was in line with Kevin Rudd's idea of an Asia Pacific community, which 
according to him was really disappointing for Thailand as Thailand is one of the most 
influential and important countries in Southeast Asia but was not invited or 
consulted. 1s? He also said that some ASEAN member countries were reluctant to accept 
that idea. 1s8 
In contrast to the idea of a concert, Khoo and Smith claim that the existing reality of 
American dominance in the Asia Pacific is far more viable than a concert of powers.1s9 
They argue that the proposal for a formalised Concert of Asia along the lines of the 
Concert of Europe appears to have little to do with the inherent condition of the 
region's international relations. 160 Khoo and Smith argue that ASEAN nations would 
not accept such an idea as they either suspect it of harbouring designs to impose 
154 Shirk, 'Asia Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers? '. 
155 Shirk, 'Asia Pacific Regional Security: Balance of POv\·er or Concert of Powers? '. 
156 Amitav Acharya, 'Asia Pacific Security: a Concert or What? ' paper for the Pacific Forum CSIS Pacnet, 12 
March 2010, pp. 1-4, available at http: //www.iseas.edu.sg/ aseanstudiescentre/ascdf3 acharva.pdf 
(accessed on 30 June 2010). 
157 Interview with a senior leYel officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Bangkok, 21 February 
2011. 
iss Interview with a senior level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Bangkok, 21 February 
2011. 
159 Nicholas Khoo and Michael L. Smith, 'The Future of American Hegemony in the Asia Pacific: a Concert 
of Asia or a Clear Pecking Order? ' Australian Journal of International Affairs, 56:1, 2002. 
160 Khoo and Smith, 'The Future of American Hegemony in the Asia Pacific'. 
51 
traditional patterns of dominance by China or have still not totally forgiven acts 
committed by Japan.161 They see little to recommend a Concert of Asia in practice. 162 
Between these contrasting views, scholars like Ayson, Acharya, Job, and Goh, see some 
prospect of establishing a concert in the Asia Pacific while acknowledging that this idea 
has some limitations. Ayson argues that the Six Party Talks (SPT) could offer a bridge 
to an Asian concert of powers. He suggests that such a concert would be a process of 
great power collaboration which would create expectations that the major powers can 
sit down together and seek to manage problems. 163 While Ayson focuses on examining 
the SPT, Acharya notes that the recent occurrence of bilateral summits between the 
region's four 'great powers' - the US, China, Japan and Russia - could, like the 
Concert of Europe, be formalised into a system able to contain rivalry, maintain order 
and preserve peace. i64 
However, Acharya admits that the notion of an Asia Pacific concert has several 
limitations.16s First, an Asia Pacific concert is seen more as venue for moderating the 
major powers' rivalry than in developing a joint approach on their part to other regional 
issues. 166 Second, 'if an Asian concert is to emerge, it will not resemble the classic 
nineteenth century European varieties', and it will be characterised by cross-cutting 
bilateral channels, with occasional alternative asides from ad hoc multilateral 
consultations.167 Finally, Acharya argues that a concert approach in Asia is likely to be 
more relevant in managing security issues in North-east Asia than in Southeast or 
South Asia, as Southeast Asia is less central to external great power relations and the 
external great powers' involvement in South Asia may produce declaratory 
commitments and some complementary parallel measures. 168 Acharya echoes Job 's 
argument that even if a fully-fledged and institutionalised concert is unlikely to emerge 
in the region, less formal patterns of cooperation, including 'concerting behaviour' and 
'ad hoc consultations among major powers' are already evident. 169 
Another critique Acharya makes in response to Wesley's statement at the Sydney 
Conference is related to Wesley envisaging an Asia Pacific concert that includes the 
region's 'smaller states as well as the great powers' .17° Acharya asserts that concerts by 
161 Khoo and Smith, 'The Future of American Hegemony in the Asia Pacific'. 
162 Khoo and Smith, 'The Future of American Hegemony in the Asia Pacific'. 
163 Ayson, 'The Six Party Talks Process: Towards an Asian Concert? ' 
164 Acharya, 'Asia Pacific Security: Community, Concert or What? '. 
16s Amitav Acharya , 'Recording Asia: "Cooperative Security" or "Concert of Powers"?' , IDSS Working Paper 
Series, No.3. July 1999, pp. 1-25. 
166 Acharya, 'Recording Asia '. 
167 Acharya, 'Recording Asia ', p. 20. 
168 Acharya, 'Recording Asia'. 
169 Brian L. Job, 'A Matter of Delicate Diplomacy: Prospect for a Concert of Power in the Asia Pacific', Paper 
presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Diego, USA, 
September 1996. 
17° Acharya, 'Asia-Pacific Security: Community, Concert or What', p. 1. 
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definition either exclude smaller nations or reduce them to the status of objects, rather 
than subjects, of a regional diplomatic system. 171 
Goh argues that the basic principles of a concert of powers are applicable in a 'duet' of 
power between the United States and ChinaP2 A potential duet between Washington 
and Beijing would, Goh suggests, involve four aspects: (i) spheres of influence, (ii) 
power distribution, (iii) exercise of power through the use of force, and (iv) modes of 
conflict management that involving territorial change by consensus, multilateral 
conference diplomacy and restraint of minor allies by each great power.173 Goh claims 
that the major characteristic of a concert of power is the acceptance of sphere of 
influence. 174 The evolution of the concept of a concert of powers from Concert of 
Europe to a possible Southeast Asian concert of powers is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
FIGURE2.2 
Evolution of Concert of Powers: Concert of Europe to Southeast Asia? 
Concert of Europe __ _ Concert of Powers 
Post Cold War Era 
___ Asia Pacific Concert of 
Powers: Pros and Cons 
l 
Southeast Asia 
Concert of Powers? 
Source: Compiled by author 
A. Why a Concert of Powers in Southeast Asia? 
The literature discussed in the previous section does not address Southeast Asia as a 
region in which the dynamic of 'concert diplomacy' could work. Yet, in the 2003 
ASEAN Concord II, ASEAN member states reaffirmed the organisation as a concert: 
REAFFIRMING that ASEAN is a concert of Southeast Asian nations, bonded 
together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring 
societies, committed to upholding cultural diversity and social harmony. 17s 
The absence of comment in the literature on a concert of powers in Southeast Asia is 
understandable because the scholars reviewed earlier do not go beyond the accepted 
definition of 'great powers' constituting a concert. Most of these scholars refer to the US, 
171 Acharya, 'Asia-Pacific Security: Community, Concert or What'. 
172 Evelyn Goh, 'US Strategic Relations with a Rising China: Trajectories and Impacts on Asia-Pacific 
Security', in Kevin J . Cooney and Yoichiro Sato, eds, The Rise of China and International Security: 
America and Asia, London: Routledge, 2009 , p. 69. 
173 Goh, 'US Strategic Relations ,,ith a Rising China', pp. 69-79. 
174 Goh, 'US Strategic Relations ,,ith a Rising China '. 
17s ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) available at 
http: /hvww.asean.org/asean /a sea n-su m mi t/item / declara tion-of-asea n -concord-ii-ba li-concord-i i 
(accessed on 3 November 2012). As of December 2012, the ASEAN Secretariat's website has been 
reconstructed. Some of the links cited in this thesis may have been changed. The main link for the 
Secretariat's website is www.aseansec.org. 
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China, Germany, France, and England (some also include Russia, Japan, and India) as 
existing great powers. I argue, however, that the concept of 'great powers' can be 
applied not only in the international system, but also in regional systems. 
My argument rests on four points. First, theories of concert-like behaviour are indeed 
applicable to regional systems, such as the Asia Pacific, Europe, America, Africa or a 
smaller region, such as Northeast Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Susan Shirk, 
for example, although conceding that a Concert of Europe was in effect a global 
management system, asserts that theories of concert-like behaviour can be applied in 
regional systems. 176 Brian L. Job also argues that a concert can exist in both global and 
regional systems. m Furthermore, Rosecrance and Peter Schott cite a concert of 
Western powers as an example of a regional concert of powers. They argue that a 
regional concert of Western powers continued to function after 1945-1947 and preceded 
the bipolar alliance in that it offered the Soviet Union membership (in the Marshall 
Plan) in 1947. When the Soviet Union refused, the regional concert became an alliance 
(NATO).178 
Although Acharya and Ayson imply in their arguments that there is no great power in 
Asia, except China, and therefore a concert of powers in the Asia Pacific has many 
limitations, a counter-argument is raised here. If a comparison of power is carried out 
within a smaller region, it is possible to identify comparatively great powers and small 
powers within that region, so it could be argued that China is a 'great power' in 
Northeast Asia while Indonesia is a 'great power' in Southeast Asia. Importantly, 
Douglas Lemke, separates power hierarchy into global hierarchy and local hierarchy.179 
Within a local hierarchy, one can measure and compare the power of countries and see 
whether or not the great powers in the local hierarchy have conducted 'concert 
diplomacy'. 
Second, Acharya claims that a concert approach is likely to be more relevant in 
managing security issues in Northeast Asia than Southeast Asia or South Asia. 180 He 
claims that Southeast Asian issues are less central to external great power relations. In 
contrast to Acharya, I argue that Southeast Asia actually has a large range of serious 
issues to be managed such as terrorism, transnational crimes, border disputes, and 
environmental threats. They are central to both global great powers and local dominant 
176 Shirk, 'Asia-Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers? '. 
177 Brian L. Job, 'Matters of Multilateralism: Implications for Regional Conflict Management', in Lake and 
Morgan, eds, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World. 
178 Richard Rosecrance and Peter Schott, 'Concerts and Regional InterYention', in Lake and Morgan, eds, 
Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World. 
179 Douglas Lemke's theory will be further elaborated in the section 'Identifying Great Powers in Southeast 
Asia. 
180 Acharya: 'Recording Asia '. 
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powers. The issue of terrorism in Southeast Asia is considered seriously by the US. The 
multi faceted maritime issue in the Malacca Strait is a big problem for China, Japan 
and the US because any disturbance in the Strait may disrupt access to their imports. 
South China Sea issues have also drawn the attention of the external great powers to 
the region. These issues could easily escalate to a wider confrontation if they are not 
well managed. For local dominant powers, these issues are considered to be serious and 
need to be handled. However, this thesis will focus on the 'local dominant power 
relations' instead of 'global great power relations' in examining a concert of powers in 
Southeast Asia. This will be further explained in the next section. 
Third, Goh contends that a major characteristic of a concert system is spheres of 
influence in the system across which other powers are not expected to intrude. 
Members of a concert of powers, I argue, do not necessarily have to possess spheres of 
influence. If, as argued earlier, the Six Party Talks, the Contact Group (to resolve the 
crises in Herzegovina, Kosovo and Namibia), the G-20, and G-7 or G-8 are models of a 
concert system, then not every member of the groups has a sphere of influence. Within 
the Six Party Talks, for example, Japan does not have a sphere of influence. Within the 
G-20, South Korea does not have a sphere of influence. The European concert system 
indeed demonstrated that Great Britain and Russia had spheres of influence, but it is 
difficult to draw generalisations from the European case for Southeast Asia or any other 
region. The spheres of influence factor, therefore, will not'be used as an indicator of a 
concert system in this thesis because the concept is not applicable to Southeast Asia. 
Finally, whether Southeast Asia can be regarded as a concert of powers or not can be 
measured by how ASEAN manages its crises. Do the 'dominant powers' in Southeast 
Asia sit together to resolve crises or did any single country act vigorously in managing 
the crises? Do 'small/status-quo powers ' give special rights and responsibilities or 
special managerial roles to their 'dominant power' fellows? Or do 'dominant powers' in 
Southeast Asia act as if they are given such roles? The answers to these questions will 
provide evidence as to whether the dynamic of the security system in Southeast Asia 
reflects a concert of powers or not. Therefore this thesis will further examine the 
linkage between the management of crises by ASEAN member states and a Southeast 
Asian concert of powers. 
B. Identifying Regional Powers in Southeast Asia 
In this section, I start with establishing the foundation for my arguments by reviewing 
the literature on powers, great powers, and dominant powers. I then classify powers in 
Southeast Asia according to whether they are economic or military power, and based on 
on Lemke's theory of regional dominant powers. I argue that Indonesia, Singapore, 
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Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines can be considered as regional dominant powers 
in Southeast Asia. 
A considerable amount of literature in international politics has analysed and debated 
international great power politics. Balance of power theorists argue that an equality of 
power among nations tends to discourage war.181 Others, however, believe that power 
transitions and hegemonic declines tend to lead to great power conflicts. 182 These 
theorists claim that differential rates of growth in power between the dominant state 
and a challenger lead the challenger to overtake its rival. During such periods of power 
transition, characterised by an approximately equal distribution of power, conflict is 
very likely.183 
Other scholars focus on the means for boosting national power. Most and Starr 
emphasise the importance of foreign policy 'substitutability'. 184 A nation can augment 
its national capabilities through the internal build-up of military strength or through 
alliance formation. Others, such as Waltz, also suggest that each nation's power can be 
boosted through external and internal means. The growth and expansion of a nation's 
economy and population, increases in military strength, and the development of 
military strategies fall into the category of 'internal means'. Alignment and realignment 
of nations, by strengthening and enlarging a nation's alliances or by weakening and 
shrinking any opposition, fall into the category of external means of increasing national 
power.18s 
The process of great power emergence is underpinned by the fact that the economic 
(and technological and military) power of states grows at differential, not parallel rates. 
The emergence of regional powers is also underpinned by the differential growth rates. 
The process is similar for regional powers, although their scope is only regional instead 
of international and world-wide. However, the power transition in a region does not 
always lead to conflict or crisis. 
For the purpose of identifying regional dominant powers in Southeast Asia, in this 
thesis I will use the multiple hierarchy model theory developed by Douglas Lemke and 
key economic and military indicators as measures of power. 186 The multiple hierarchy 
model theory suggests the international power hierarchy has nested within it localised 
181 See Claude, Power and International Relations, and Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. 
182 See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1981; and A.F.K. 
Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. 
183 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics. See also A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger. 
184 Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics, Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1986, p. 98. 
185 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: Random House, 1979. 
186 Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
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power hierarchies operating within minor power regions of the overall international 
system. This theory is an extended theory of the power transition theory which argues 
that in the international hierarchy, at the top sits the dominant power, the most 
powerful state in the system. 187 The dominant power supervises the informal patterns 
and the rules of interstate interaction labelled the 'status quo'. It also carries out these 
tasks because it benefits from the status quo. To the extent that other states are similar 
to the dominant state, they too get benefits from the status quo and are satisfied with 
it.188 Lemke further argues that 'states disadvantaged by the status quo are dissatisfied 
and if their efforts at development are successful, such that they come to rival the 
dominant state in power, the probability of conflicts among the great powers for control 
of the international system is expected to rise dramatically'. 189 
In the multiple hierarchy theory, Lemke separates hierarchy into international 
hierarchy and local hierarchy.19° In the international hierarchy, powers are divided into 
global dominant powers, global status quo powers and global dissatisfied status quo 
powers, while in the local hierarchy powers are divided into local dominant powers, 
local status quo powers and local dissatisfied powers. 191 Local dominant powers are 
fighting for control of the status quo of their local hierarchies and fight for the privilege 
to write the rules governing important local elements of their relations with each 
other. 192 In the context of Southeast Asia, Vietnam could be regarded as a dissatisfied 
status quo power because it wanted to change the system fo give it more benefits. This 
was shown when the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia. Indonesia could also be labelled 
as a 'dissatisfied state' when it engaged in confrontation with Malaysia and forced East 
Timor to become part of its territory. However Indonesia could be more appropriately 
categorised as a dominant power that was dissatisfied and wanted to gain more benefits. 
Nowadays, the political situation is relatively more stable, and Indonesia, Thailand, 
Singapore can be regarded as dominant powers, while Vietnam can be referred to as a 
status quo power. The reasons for this assessment will be explained below. 
A state is dissatisfied if it is willing to use force to try to alter the status quo. States may 
be dissatisfied with the status quo for a number of reasons. First, the existing informal 
rules in the system may disadvantage the dissatisfied status quo power, when it is 
receiving no direct benefits from the rules. Second, states may be dissatisfied because 
they employ different domestic institutions for the allocation of values in their societies 
187 Lemke, Regions of War and Peace. 
188 Lemke, Regios of War and Peace. 
189 Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, p. 27. 
19° Lemke, Regios of War and Peace. 
191 Lemke, Regios of War and Peace. 
192 Lemke, Regios of War and Peace. 
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from those used by the dominant powers . 1931 argue that in the current system there is 
no dissatisfied status quo power in Southeast Asia. Myanmar may be dissatisfied, but it 
has not shown any willingness to use force to try to alter its status in the region. It 
utilised force domestically instead of externally in order to change its status quo status. 
The other states are similar in domestic composition and international outlook to the 
dominant powers and they are satisfied with the rules employed by dominant 
powers. 194 They are labelled as status quo powers. In Southeast Asia, these 
characteristics fit Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Myanmar. As a new member of ASEAN, 
Vietnam could arguably also be labelled as a status quo power. 
To complement the use of Lemke's multiple hierarchy model theory, I will also use 
some key economic and military indicators (particularly defence expenditure and 
military manpower) to measure the power of ASEAN member countries. Many scholars, 
such as Arbertman and Kugler, and Merritt and Zinnes, argue that economic indicators, 
including Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are valuable measures of power. Among 
power transition researchers GDP, often weighted by the efficiency of the government 
of the state, is the most commonly used measure of national capabilities. National 
product is preferred by power transition researchers because of the theory's focus on 
domestic and demographic factors as the basis of power. GDP measures have emerged 
as empirically the most robust and most plausible. The studies by Kugler and 
Arbertman, and Merritt and Zinnes have demonstrated that GDP measures of power 
are highly correlated. 19s 
Based on these key economic and military capabilities which are analysed usmg 
Lemke's classification of power, I argue that Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand are local dominant powers, while Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Vietnam, 
Laos and Myanmar are local status quo powers. The Philippines cannot be categorised 
as dominant in terms of economic and military capabilities. However, in terms of ideas 
and roles in managing crises, it can be referred to as one of the local dominant powers. 
This will be further explained in the case study chapters (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) . The 
economic and military indicators of ASEAN member countries are set out in Tables 2.2. 
2.3, 2-4, and 2.5. 
193 Robert Powell , In the Shadow of Power, Princeton: Princeton UniYersity Press, 1999 quoted in Lemke, 
Regions of War and Peace. 
194 Lemke, Regions of War and Peace. 
195 Kugler, Arbertrnan and Merrit and Zinnes offer a detailed discussion on GDP as measu res of power. 
Their explanation can be seen in Marina Arbertman and Jacek Kugler, Political Capacity and Econom ic 
Behaviour, Boulder: Westview Press , 1997 and Richard Merritt and Dina Zinnes, 'AlternatiYe Indexes of 
ational Power', in Power and World Politics, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989. 
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TABLE 2.2 Selected Basic Economic Indicators for ASEAN Member States at 2010 
Totalland Total Gross domestic Gross domestic per GDP International merchandise trade Foreign direct 
area populationt/ product 2/ at current capita Growth investments inflow 
urices 
Country Km2 Thousands US$ PPP$Mn US$ PP$ Percent Export Import Trade Trade in US$milli Percent 
million Mn In In percent on Share 
US$ milli US$ mill share to 
on ion GDP 
2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 :1010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Brunei 5,765 415 12,402 19,406 29,915 46,811 2.6 8,615 2,384 10,999 88.7 629 o.8 
Darussalam 
Cambodia 181 01!'i 15,269 11168 28,985 731 18Q8 s.o s .. <;84 4897 10,480 9:1,8 78:1. 1.0 
Indonesia 1860.:160 214.181 708,032 1 010,998 3,021 4,40:l 6.1 1S7,779 11s.663 2()1,442 41.4 11.104 17.5 
LaoPDR 236 800 6 210 6,so8 16 lOS 1 o,ii:; 2,585 7.2 2.41'1 2 076 <1.o;og 69.1 111 0-4 
Malaysia 1.".\0 2.<;2 28.909 2:18 8 40 41,<;,157 8 262 14.161 7.2 198,801 164,7:l.".l 36<1.o;<i,t 1,<;2.2 Q,1S6 12.0 
Myanmar 676,s77 60 16:1 41.025 76 601 71s 1271 s.1 7600 4199 11,798 27-4 4',0 o.6 
The 300,000 94,013 189,326 351,686 2,014 3,741 7.3 51,432 58,229 109,660 57.9 1,713 2.2 
Philiooines 
Sin.R;auore 710 S 077 221.01_<; 291 0'l<l <l'l.029 S7,505 14.5 :171194 :128 079 6.000 271 111.6 <io;i::20 46.6 
Thailand S13 120 67,112 :118,709 58s,698 4,7:15 8,701 7.8 lQ<:;,312 189,728 38S,041 120.8 6,:120 8.::i 
Vietnam 1'11 212 86.Q10 107 6!i0 291 260 1,218 1,1Sl 6.8 721Q2 84.801 156,001 1,1,:;,8 8 oso.o 10.5 
ASEAN 4.4:l'i:.830 <;;Q8.4Q8 1.858 683 3.107,829 3,106 5.1Q't ,.1 1.070,C)41 C)74,7Q0 2 0.11.i:;,731 110.1 76,208 100.0 
Sources: ASEAN Community in Figures 2011 
Symbols used Notes: 
' not available as of publication time 1/ In 2010, CLMV's population comprised more than 2896 (168.6 mn) that of the total ASEAN with total GDP (PPP$) representing 
' n.a. not applicable/not available/not compiled 1396 (413 Bn PP$) 
Data in italics is the latest updated/revised figure from the previous of the total ASEAN 
posting 2/GDP per capita in PPP$ is GDP converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates hence PPP $1 in a 
country, say Cambodia has the same purchasing power as PPP $1 in all other countries in the world. 
PPP is an index of purchasing power, showing the purchasing power of US$1 in a country compared to US$1 to benchmark country 
USA 
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From Table 2.2, I rank countries based on their key economic indicators in the Table 
2.3. 
TABLE2.3 
Ranking of Key Economic Indicators of ASEAN Member States at 2010 
Country Total Total GDP GDP Growth Total Foreign 
Land Population 201oin per ofGDP Trade Direct 
2010 2010 US$and capita 2010 2010 Invesbnent 
PPP$ 2010 (FDI) 
2010 
Brun 9th 10th 8th 2nd 10th 8th 8th 
Cam 8th t1' 9th 9th 9th 9th 7th 
Indo 1st 1st 1st 5th '111 4th 2nd 
Lao t1' 8th 10th 8th 4 th and 10th 10th 
_i:;th 
Mal 5th 6th 3rd 3rd 4th and 3rd 3rd 
5th 
Myan 2nd 5th t1' 10th 8th t1' 9th 
Phil 6th 2nd 5th 6th 3rd 6th 6th 
Sing 10th 9th 4th 1st 1st 1st 1st 
Thai 3rd 4th 2nd 4th 2nd 2nd 5th 
Viet 4th 3rd 6th t1' 6th 5th 4th 
Sources: Adapted from ASEAN Community in Figures 2011 
Table 2.3 shows that Thailand is always within the big five. Except for its growth of 
GDP in 2010, Indonesia is also always within the big five. For Malaysia, the situation is 
quite similar but the exception lies in its total population. Meanwhile, Singapore's 
exception lies in its total land and population. For GDP per capita, Growth of GDP, 
Total Trade and FDI inflow, Singapore always ranks first. Vietnam and the Philippines 
are at a similar level. Although the Philippines showed weaker key indicators compared 
with Vietnam in 2009, the Philippines' roles in crisis management and ideas for 
ASEAN as an organisation are more robust than those of Vietnam. The military 
indicators can be seen in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 below: 
TABLE2.4 
lnteniational Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower 
Coun Defence Defence Defence No in Esti 
try Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Arm mated 
US$m Per Capita %GDP Forces Reser 
Para 
milit 
ary 
(000) vists (ooo) 
(000) 
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2012 2012 
Brun 360 ~~2 ~'-1 Q,ii; 8'-<1 889 2.50 :uB 2.88 7 1 
Camb 2i;_i; 27S 271 18 lQ lQ 2.26 2.i:.4 2-41 124 0 
Indo 5,108 4,821 7182 22 20 30 1.00 o.8q 1.02 302 400 
Laos 17 14 n.k. 3 2 n.k. 0.32 0.25 n.k. 29 0 
Mal 4,370 3,883 3,651 160 140 129 1.96 2.01 1.54 109 52 
Mvan n.k. n.k. 1,762 n.k. n.k. ~~ n.k. n.k. 4 .91 406 0 
Phil 
Sing 
Thai 
Viet 
1.427 1,363 2,024 15 14 20 0.82 0.85 1.02 125 131 
7662 7,831 8,098 l~'i54 i~i;ss 1,575 4.05 4.29 3.64 73 313 
4,2Qd 4,732 4.821 66 72 73 1.58 1.79 1.52 306 200 
2,907 2,1.17 2~'i73 ~~ 24 29 3.22 2.20 2.51 482 5 ,000 
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Chapter Ten: Country Comparisons-
commitments, force levels and economics', The Military Balance, London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 
463-476, p. 469. 
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2012 
2 
67 
280 
100 
25 
107 
41 
75 
114 
40 
TABLE2.5 
Ranking of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower of ASEAN Member States 
Coon Defence Defence Defence Number Estima Paramilit Approximate 
try Ex:pendit Expenditure Expenditure inArmed ted ary Rank 
ore Per Capita %GDP Forces Reserv (ooo) 
US$m (ooo) ists 
(ooo) 
2010 2010 2010 2012 2012 2012 
Brun ~ 2nd 3rd 10th ~ 10th 8th 
Camb 8th 9th 5th 6th 8th/9th/ 6th ~ 
10th 
Indo 2nd 6th 8 th and 9 th 4th 2nd 1st 2nd 
Laos 9th n.k. n.k. 9th 8th/9th 4th 10th 
/10th 
Mal 3rd ~rd 6th ~ 6th gth 6th 
Myan n.k. 5 th (2010) 1st 2nd 8th/9th/ 3rd 5th 
10th 
Phil 6th 8th 8 th and 9 th 5th 5th ~ 9th 
Sing 1st 1st 2nd 8th 3rd 5th 1st 
Thai 4th 4th ~ 3rd 4th 2nd 3rd 
Viet 5th ~ 4th 1st 1st 8th 4th 
Source: Adapted by author from International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Chapter Ten: 
Country Comparisons- commitments, force levels and economics', The Military Balance, 
London:Routledge,2012,pp.463-476,p.469. 
Tables 2-4 and 2.5 show that Singapore is in first place in terms of defence expenditure 
followed by Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Cambodia, the Philippines, 
Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar and Laos follow. From these tables of key economic and 
military capabilities, it can be seen that Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand 
are always among the big five, in terms of both economic and military capabilities. 
2.6. Drawing a Possible Connection between Crisis Management and 
Regional Security Systems in Southeast Asia 
In this section, I establish some key indicators for the three security systems discussed 
as follows: 
Indicators of a security community 
Based on the characteristics of a security community reviewed in this chapter, it is 
possible to compile several indicators: 
• A comparability of political values among decision-makers; 
• A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers; 
• A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other 
governments; 
• Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's 
direction and coordinate their policies; 
• Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning; 
• Development of trust and collective identity formation; 
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• A total absence of armed inter-state conflict, or prospects for such conflict in the 
reg10n; 
• A total absence of a competitive military build-up or arms race involving regional 
actors; 
• Formal or informal institutions and practices; and 
• A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful 
relationship. 
Indicators of a balance of power 
From the characteristics of a balance of power elaborated in the literature review 
section, it is possible to construct several indicators: the first set of characteristics refers 
to a balance of power dynamics among ASEAN member states and the second set refers 
to a balance of external great power influence. 
Balance of power among ASEAN member states: 
• Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors; 
• Intentions of some states to expand; 
• Alliances on the basis of short-run interests; and 
• War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft. 
Balance of external great power influence: 
• Dependency on external great powers as security providers; 
• Alignments with external great powers; 
• Military cooperation with external great powers; 
• Distribution of external great powers' armed forces; and 
• Economic dependence on external great powers. 
Indicators of a concert of powers 
Based on the literature on a concert of powers in Section 2-4, several indicators will be 
utilised: 
• A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order; 
• A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers ; 
• A pattern of cooperative behaviour; 
• Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms; 
• An effective equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all 
dominant powers; 
• A joint approach to regional issues; and 
• A need for system stability and international order. 
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Table 2.6 demonstrates how I will analyse each indicator in the three case studies. This 
table is a summary of the indicators of the three concepts chosen for analysis of a 
regional security system: a security community, a balance of powers and a concert of 
powers. Each indicator is ranked as significant, moderate, or insignificant in terms of 
its importance to the existence of a security community, a balance of powers and a 
concert of powers. These indicators are fully assessed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
TABLE 2.6 Indicators of a Regional Security System in the Crisis Management of 
the ASEAN Member States during the Three Case Studies of Crises 
No. Indicators Vietnam Crisis East Timor Crisis Myanmar Cyclone 
Nanas Crisis 
.,., . Communitv 
A A comparability of political Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
values among decision- Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
makers 
B. A mutual predictability of Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
behaviour among decision- Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
makers 
C. A mutual responsiveness of Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
government to actions and Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
communication of other 
governments 
D. Precipitating factors that Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
encourage states to orient Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
themselves in each other's 
direction and coordinate 
their policies; 
E. Processes of transactions, Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
international organisations Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
and social learning 
F. Development of trust and Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
collective identity Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
formation 
G. A total absence of armed Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
inter-state conflict or Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
prospects for such conflict 
in the region 
H. A total absence of a Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
competitive military build- Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
up arms race involving 
regional actors 
I. Formal or informal Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
institutions and practices Insilffiificant? Insirnificant? Insirnificant? 
J. A high degree of economic Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
integration as a necessary Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
precondition of a peaceful 
relationship. 
Balance of Power 
Among.ASEAN Members 
A Relatively equal powers Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
among a minimum of two Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
actors 
B. Intentions of some states Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
to expand Insilffiificant? Insiimificant? Insilffiificant? 
C. Alliances on the basis of Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
short-run interests Insirnificant? Insil!Ilificant? Insirnificant? 
D. War as a legitimate Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
instrument of statecraft Insil!Ilificant? Insilffiificant? Insiimificant? 
Balance of External Great Power influence 
E. Dependency on external Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
great powers as security Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
providers 
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No. Indicators Vietnam Crisis I East Timor Crisis Myanmar Cyclone 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
Nanrls Crisis 
Alignments with external Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
great oowers Insilmificant? Insilmificant? Insilmificant? 
Military cooperation with Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
external great powers. Insignificant? Insi1mificant? Insi1mificant? 
Distribution of external Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
great powers' armed forces Insilmificant? Insilmificant? Insiimificant? 
Economic dependence on Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
external great powers Insilmificant? Insilmificant? Insiimificant? 
Concert of Powers 
A decisive shock to the Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
stability of the prevailing Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
order 
A high and self-conscious Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
level of cooperation among Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
dominant powers 
A pattern of cooperative Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
behaviour Insilmificant? Insilmificant? Insilmificant? 
An effective, equal, Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
collectively predominant, Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
interdependent group of all 
dominant oowers 
Institutionalised summit Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
diplomacy and supporting Insignificant? Insignificant? Insignificant? 
consultative mechanisms 
A joint approach to Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
recional issues Insiimificant? Insignificant? Insiimificant? 
A need for system stability Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ Significant/Moderate/ 
and international order Insilmificant? Insilmificant? Insignificant? 
Sources: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author 
2. 7. Conclusion 
This chapter has identified several shortcomings in the relevant bodies of literature. 
First, there is a gap in the research on crisis management, particularly the proposed 
connection between crisis management and the existence of a regional security system. 
Second, there are problems with the research on security communities: the literature is 
a-theoretical, has little basis in empirical work, or does not examine representative 
crises. Third, there is room for further analysis of the concept of a concert of powers or 
a variation of it. Fourth, another way of examining the regional security systems, 
including balance of power dynamics in Southeast Asia, by using crisis management as 
an indicator, has potential as an analytical tool. Fifth, from the literature reviews of 
three possible different regional security systems -a security community, a balance of 
power and a concert of powers- it is possible to construct indicators that can be used 
to analyse the proposed connection between crisis management and the type of security 
system in Southeast Asia. This analysis will inform judgements about the type of 
security systems operating in Southeast Asia. To this end, the thesis will investigate 
three case studies in the next three chapters: the 1978-1991 Cambodian crisis, the 1999-
2002 East Timor crisis and the 2008-2010 Cyclone Nargis crisis. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE 1978-1991 CAMBODIAN CRISIS 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 examine three case studies, the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor 
crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis. This chapter investigates whether the crisis 
management conducted by ASEAN countries during the Cambodian crisis (1978-1991) 
indicates a particular type of regional security system. 1 The evidence reveals that the 
management of the Cambodian crisis by ASEAN member states can be partly explained 
by just four out of the ten indicators associated with a security community during the 
acute and the de-escalation periods of the crisis. I argue that during the acute period of 
the Cambodian crisis, the crisis management can be explained by five out of seven 
indicators associated with a classical concert of powers and each indicator is considered 
as significant. Because two important indicators are not evident, this observation 
requires me to hypothesise that it may be necessary, after examining the other case 
studies, to introduce another type of security system concept whose indicators are 
modifications of the classical concert. During the de-escalation period of the 
Cambodian crisis, the ASEAN member states' crisis management is explained by three 
out of five indicators associated with a balance of external great power influence and 
each is rated as significant. The importance of a balance of external great power 
influence is related to a change of behaviour of the world's great powers in the de-
escalation period of the crisis. These events had a strong impact on the management of 
the Cambodian crisis by ASEAN member states. 
For the purposes of the analysis in this thesis, the period of the Cambodian crisis began 
with the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia on 25 December 1978 and ended with the 
signing of the Paris Peace Accords on 23 October 1991. The crisis is divided into two 
periods, the acute and de-escalation periods. In this chapter, the events before the 
invasion that can be considered as the escalation period are not investigated. The acute 
period is divided into two phases. The first phase began on 25 December 1975 and 
ended at the end of 1985 and the second phase started in 1986 and concluded in 1989. 
This definition does not disregard the fact that many events that occurred before the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia had a spill-over effect on the crisis, such as the 
Second Indochina conflict and the refugee influx crisis. It is also recognised that the 
whole crisis did not merely end at the signing of the Paris Agreements in 1991. However, 
1 This chapter is about the management of the Cambodian crisis by ASEAN member states, but I refer to 
the organisation where it is relevant. 
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this thesis focuses on the period from 25 December 1978 to 23 October 1991 in order to 
elaborate in detail the ASEAN member states' role during this particular period. 
In this crisis Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia played important roles in 
trying to manage the crisis while the Philippines played a relatively smaller role. Brunei 
Darussalam joined ASEAN in 1984 while the crisis was still in train. Nevertheless, as a 
new member of ASEAN it did not participate actively and only followed the lead of the 
association. It is essential to note that at the time of the crisis Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos 
and Myanmar were not yet members of ASEAN, and therefore, ASEAN was regarded by 
Vietnam as an outsider, with no rights to intervene. However, ASEAN was concerned 
because the crisis disrupted the region's stability and each member, particularly 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, had its own interests in bringing peace to 
the region. 
This chapter is divided into seven sections. Following the introduction, the background 
to the crisis is elaborated in the second section. The third section examines the different 
perceptions of the threat held by the ASEAN members. The fourth section offers an 
analysis of the management of the crisis, and argues that it does not point to the 
presence of a security community. The fifth section elaborates how the management of 
this crisis does not indicate a balance of power among ASEAN member states. However, 
during the de-escalation period, the management of this crisis is characterised as a 
balance of external great power influence. The sixth section throws light on how the 
management of the Cambodian crisis indicates that a modified concert of powers was 
operating as a security system during the acute period. These sections are summarised 
in a brief conclusion. 
3.2. Background 
Acute Period 
The acute period of the Cambodian crisis can be further divided into two phases. The 
first phase started when 100,000 Vietnam troops launched a military campaign backed 
by war planes, tanks and artillery against Cambodian forces on 25 December 1978, 2 
and ended in the end of first half of 1980s. During this phase, there was a sharp 
polarisation of positions pertaining to the Cambodian issue at both the regional and the 
international level and there were no signs of settlement. 3 The Cambodian crisis was 
locked in a situation of stalemate or 'stable war'.4 There was little resistance from the 
forces of Pol Pot against the invasion. Within 12 days , on 6 January 1979, Phnom Penh 
2 Chang Pao-Min, Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985. 
3 Ramses Amer, Peace Keeping in a Peace Process: The Case of Cambodia, Upsalla: Department of Peace 
and Conflict Research ofUpsalla University, 1995. 
4 William S. Turley, 'The Kruer War: Cambodia After Paris', Survival, 32:5, 1990, pp. 437-453, p. 437. 
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fell to the invaders, and a new government was formed under the leadership of Heng 
Samrins The pro-Vietnamese government that was established was called the People's 
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The new government with Vietnamese support gained 
control of major areas but Pol Pot and his men fled, and remained military active in 
rural areas, particularly along the Thai border. 
The occupation led to several related offensive operations. To 'punish' Vietnam, China 
concentrated 160,000 regular troops, 700 aircraft and hundreds of heavy artillery 
pieces along the Vietnamese border. 6 China began the invasion on 16 February 1979. 
The punitive nature of the invasion was made clear by China on 24 February 1979 at a 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting on the Sino-Vietnamese border war. 
The Chinese delegate declared that the objectives of China's military action were 
limited and urged the UNSC to take 'immediate and effective measures to stop 
Vietnam's armed aggression against Kampuchea and to bring an end to Vietnam's 
military occupation'.? Vietnam further exhibited its power by launching a dry-season 
offensive along the Thai-Kampuchean border from November 1984 to March 1985. 8 
The second half of the 1980s to 1990 is considered as the second phase and had a 
different nature from the first phase of the acute period because this period saw 
important changes in the interaction at both regional and international levels. This 
phase was a bridging phase towards the de-escalation period. At the regional level the 
early steps were bilateral discussions between Indonesia and Vietnam. 9 Prince 
Sihanouk met with Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the PRK, in Paris. That was the first 
high level meeting between representatives of the two Cambodian governments. The 
regional dialogue continued with a meeting in Indonesia in July 1988, known as the 
first Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM 1) with the participation of the ASEAN members, 
Laos, Vietnam, and the four Cambodian parties. The JIM 2 was held in February 1989. 
At the international level a Paris Conference on Cambodia was convened from 30 July 
to 30 August 1989. These meetings resulted in a declaration of intention by Vietnam to 
withdraw the last of its troops from Cambodia in late September 1989. 10 
De-escalation Period 
The period 1990-1991 is regarded as the de-escalation period, during which the focus of 
attention shifted from regional initiatives to external great power initiatives. The US 
s M. Nagendra Prasad, Indonesia 's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem , Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2001. 
6 Pao-Min , Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam . 
7 Pao-Min, Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam , p. 87. 
8 Prasad, Indonesia 's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem. 
9 Amer, Peace Keeping in a Peace Process: The Case of Cambodia. 
10 Amer, Peace Keeping in a Peace Process: The Case of Cambodia. 
moved in 1990 to review its own position in relation to the crisis. From mid-1990 it 
expanded its range of dialogue on the issue and initiated direct talks with Vietnam on 
Cambodia. A diplomatic dialogue was also initiated for the first time between the US 
and Phnom Penh regime. Furthermore, the Soviet Union under President Gorbachev 
developed a strong interest in promoting detente in relations with the global great 
powers. 11 It began to advance efforts in normalising its relations with China and sought 
to develop relations with ASEAN. The changing Soviet emphasis placed further 
pressure on Vietnam to also modify its approach to Cambodia. 12 
The work of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council was also crucial 
during the de-escalation period. On 28 August 1990, the Permanent Five presented a 
document entitled: 'Framework for a comprehensive political settlement of the 
Cambodia conflict', and the Cambodian parties accepted it as a basis for a 
comprehensive settlement at a meeting in Jakarta on 9-10 September 1990.13 However, 
the situation remained deadlocked during the first five months of 1991, with the only 
notable progress being a cease-fire implemented in May. To break the deadlock, the 
four Cambodian parties met in Jakarta on 2-4 June 1991. The meeting did not produce 
positive outcomes. However, this meeting became a basis for a dramatic change in 
relationship between the Cambodian parties. At a series of meetings from June to 
September 1991 the Cambodian parties reached agreement on the major disputed 
points. The crisis ended at the Paris Conference on Cambodia on 23 October 1991 and 
two agreements were signed: the 'Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of 
the Cambodia conflict' and the 'Agreement concerning the sovereignty, independence, 
territorial, integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia' .14 This 
event marked the end of the crisis. 
3.3. The Differing Threat Perceptions 
ASEAN member countries held differing perceptions of the threat arising from the 
Cambodian crisis. Understanding the threat perceptions of each ASEAN member is 
important to further investigate the member's behaviour in managing the crisis and to 
comprehend the dynamics of the groupings of the different states during the crisis. 
ASEAN member states were divided on the significant issue of whether Vietnam or 
China was the greatest threat to their immediate and long-term security. Indonesia and 
Malaysia shared the view that China was a major threat and therefore pursued a more 
flexible approach vis-a-vis Vietnam. In contrast, Singapore and Thailand took an 
11 Frank Frost, 'The Cambodian Conflict', Parliamentary Research Service Background Paper, 7 May 1991. 
12 Simon Long, 'China a nd Kampuchea: Political Football on the Killing Fields', The Pacific Review, 2:2, 
1989, pp. 151-157. 
13 Amer, Peace Keeping in a Peace Process: The Case of Cambodia, p. 17. 
14 Amer, Peace Keeping in a Peace Process: The Case of Cambodia, pp. 18- 19. 
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uncompromising stance towards Vietnam as they believed that a coalition between the 
Soviet Union and Vietnam would pose a major threat to the region's security. The 
threat perception of each ASEAN member states is elaborated below. 
Indonesia 
Indonesia viewed China as the main threat while it did not see that Vietnam could 
expand its hegemony. Reaffirming Indonesia's armed forces chief, General Benny 
Murdani's statement, General Purnomo, Secretary to the Coordinating Minister for 
Defence and Political Affairs stated that: 'According to reports I have in hand, the 
Vietnamese are weak from malnutrition which makes it impossible for them to launch 
an invasion to the south'. 1s Jakarta feared that if China could teach a lesson to Vietnam 
by invading it, a similar invasion of other Southeast Asian countries could also become 
a possibility. General Murdani, even more surprisingly, stated that Vietnam's 
intervention in Cambodia was 'a question of survival' aimed at protecting itself from a 
Chinese threat. 16 Figure 3.1 shows that Indonesia considered communism as one of the 
biggest threats. 
Indonesia had strived to be independent of Dutch colonialism for about three and a half 
centuries. This had an impact on how the country perceived other countries which also 
had fought against colonialism, including Vietnam. Indonesia considered Vietnam to be 
a country which shared memories of colonial domination and had engaged in a 
prolonged struggle against European imperialism. Hence, Indonesia had empathy for 
Hanoi. Unlike the other ASEAN member states, Indonesia adopted a more sympathetic 
attitude vis-a-vis Vietnam. The relationship between Indonesia and Vietnam continued 
to develop and consolidated during the crisis. 17 Furthermore, both countries identified 
China as a security threat. The Communist Coup d'etat in Indonesia in 1965 influenced 
Indonesia in its perception of China and the threat of communism. This was confirmed 
by a statement from General Benny Murdani, during his visit to Hanoi, 'Some countries 
say that Vietnam is a threat to Southeast Asia but the Indonesian Army and people do 
not believe it'. 18 
15 US Embassy (Jakarta) Translation Unit, Press Summary 53/ 1984, March 19, 1984, quoted in Donald E. 
Weatherbee, Southeast Asia Divided The ASEAN-Jndochina Crisis, Boulder: West\iew Press, 1985, p. 20. 
16 US Embassy (Jakarta) Translation Unit, Press Summary 53/ 1984. 
17 Prasad, Indonesia 's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem . 
18 US Embassy (Jakarta) Translation Unit, Press Summary 34/1984, February 17, 1984, quoted in 
Weatherbee, Southeast Asia Divided The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis, p. 20. 
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Indonesia's characterisation of degree of threat is based on the types of enemy faced in 
the 249 military operations undertaken by the Anned Forces between 1945 and 2004.19 
The figure shows that Communists represented an internal security threat in 12 per 
cent of Indonesia's military operations. Therefore, Indonesi_a was always cautious about 
communism and saw China as one pole of communism. Interestingly, Indonesia also 
perceived Malaysia as a threat during the period of Soekarno's Confrontation policy, 
which had caused the two countries become suspicious towards each other. However, 
the perception of Malaysia as a threat for Indonesia was relatively small during the 
Cambodian crisis. 
Indonesia consistently shows suspicion towards external great powers. The sense of 
insecurity for Indonesia is best exemplified by the strong view among Indonesia's 
policymakers that the country's security depends on its ability to manoeuvre between 
the US and China. Indonesia's suspicion is partly related to the strong feelings of 
nationalism and anti-colonialism developed as a result of the bitter experiences with 
foreign powers throughout its history. 20 Hence, Indonesia was never fully comfortable 
with the involvement of external great powers in Southeast Asia, particularly China, 
during the period of the Cambodian crisis. 
19 Evan Laksmana, The enduring strategic trinity: explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture', 
Journal of Indian Ocean Region, 7:1, 2011, pp. 95-116. 
20 Daniel Novotny, Torn between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy, 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010 quoted in Laksmana, The enduring strategic trinity: 
explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture'. 
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Perception of a Soviet threat was not as well-defined for Indonesia as it was for other 
ASEAN members. The threat perception was most tangible indirectly in the sense that 
Vietnam could not sustain its military occupation of Kampuchea without Soviet 
resources. 21 Indonesia was not too worried about Vietnam's link to the Soviet Union 
through military assistance. Indonesia's concern was that the increased Soviet activity 
would diminish the prospects for a Southeast Asian zone of peace and eventually 
another Chinese effort to 'punish' Vietnam could escalate to a widening regional 
conflict. 
Malaysia 
Similarly to Indonesia, Malaysia saw that ASEAN could compromise with Vietnam over 
the Cambodian issue to allow it to break with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the then 
Malaysia's Prime Minister, Tun Hussein Onn and President Soeharto of Indonesia 
affirmed the Kuantan Principle when they met in Kuantan Malaysia in March 1980. 22 
Though to a lesser extent than Indonesia, Malaysia viewed Beijing as a primary danger 
to its security and wished that Vietnam would be integrated into the region. Malaysia's 
perception of the threat was dominated by fears of internal subversion due to China's 
past assistance to the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), its interference in its 
domestic affairs and the existence of a large ethnic Chinese minority in the federation. 23 
Furthermore, Malaysia perceived that a strategy of 'bleeding Vietnam white' which was 
supported by China would only boost the Vietnamese dependence on the Soviet 
Union. 24 
Malaysia also shared Indonesia's view that the crisis could extend great-power rivalry 
in the region and thus bring greater instability. Both Indonesia and Malaysia came to 
the conclusion that Vietnam would serve as a 'counter-weight' against Chinese 
expansionism in Southeast Asia and would also assist in stopping the revival of power 
rivalry in the region. To Malaysia, the extension of their influence by China and the 
Soviet Union in the conflict had brought the rivalry of the two big communist powers 
into the region. As the main architect of ASEAN's Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN), Malaysia wanted these giants to play only a minimal role in the 
region. Malaysian Foreign Minister, H.E. Tengku Ahmad Rithuddeen, at the twelfth 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Bali 28 June 1979 stated: 
2 1 Weatherbee, Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis. 
22 Leonardo C. Sebastian, 'Southeast Asian Perceptions of China: the Challenge of Achieving a New 
Strategic Accommodation', in Derek Da Cunha, ed., Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security, Singapore: 
!SEAS Publishing, 2000. 
23 Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, London: 
Routledge Curzon, 2003 .Emers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF. 
24 Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN WAY, Singapore: 
!SEAS Publishing, 2005, p. 94. 
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The tensions and conflicts prevailing in Indochina continue to be destabilizing 
factors in the region of Southeast Asia hampering further efforts by ASEAN 
member countries to establish the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. In my 
view, these factors emphasize more strongly the need to pursue with greater vigor 
the objectives of ZOPF AN for Southeast Asia. 2 5 
To a greater degree than Indonesia, Malaysia's concern was related to the problems of 
the boat people and refugees from Indochina. Malaysia shared a land border with 
Thailand and was host to thousands of refugees. When the crisis broke out, there were 
around 75,000 refugees in Malaysia. 26 Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen also stated at the 
twelfth AMM in Bali: 
It is estimated that in June 1979 itself, well over 17,000 Vietnamese boat people 
would have landed in ASEAN countries and Hong Kong. Out of this in Malaysia 
alone, there are more than 75,000 boat people awaiting resettlement in third 
countries. We are now being deluged by these boat people, whose rapid influx is 
causing serious political socio-economic and security problems. 27 
This statement demonstrates that the refugee exodus issue was a major concern for 
Malaysia, which therefore sought action from ASEAN to address the problem. 
Thailand 
While Indonesia and Malaysia were regarded as the 'soft-liner' group, Thailand and 
Singapore can be regarded as the 'hard-liner' group. Thailand was ASEAN's front line 
and therefore was directly threatened because it had to confront immediate security 
problems from the Vietnamese domination in Cambodia. In the 19th century, Vietnam 
and Thailand had competed for power in Cambodia. Milton Osborne argues: 
The almost total control exercised over Cambodia by the Vietnamese at this 
period set of the stage for a struggle by Siam to regain its influence ... The 
Vietnamese, following the stern policies of Emperor Minh Menh, attempted to 
change the face of Cambodia. Vietnamese provincial administration was 
substituted for Cambodian, and an attempt was made to impose Vietnamese 
patterns of dress on the Cambodians. 28 
Thailand had already perceived Vietnam as a threat since the US-Vietnamese war. 
However, Thailand was not able to exhibit its military capability or its capacity to deter 
Vietnam. For Bangkok, the Vietnamese intervention was the logical outcome of the 
Vietnamese quest for domination over Indochina, a goal inseparable from reunification. 
Thailand saw that a reunited Vietnam would pose an immediate danger to its security 
25 ASEAN, Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 1967-1987, 
Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1987, p. 312. 
26 John Funston, 'Indochina Refugees: The Malaysian and Thai Response', in Asian Thought and Survey, 
Vol. 14, September 1980 quoted in Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia. 
27 ASEAN, Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 1967-1987, p. 
312. 
28 Milton Osborne, The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1969, p.10. 
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environment. It feared that the creation of an Indochinese federation under Vietnam's 
rule would disrupt its territory. Evans and Rowley argue: 'Thailand was seeking to 
balance Moscow and Beijing against each other, though Bangkok's aim was to bring as 
much restraining influence as possible to bear on a reunited Vietnam'. 2 9 
The perception of Vietnam as a threat was shared by the Thai Foreign Minister, Upadit 
Pachariyangkhun who claimed that Vietnam's armed intervention 'suddenly shattered' 
all hope and expectation of starting a new era of 'constructive and peaceful coexistence' 
among the peoples of the Southeast Asian region. 3° The situation was difficult for 
Thailand: on the one hand as a front-line state, it needed to confront the risk brought to 
Cambodia; on the other hand Thailand also had to make sure its national security was 
not compromised when agreeing to a united position of ASEAN. 31 
Singapore 
Like Thailand, Singapore was critical of Vietnam and viewed the latter as the primary 
threat. Singapore saw Vietnam as looking to establish an Indochinese hegemony in the 
Southeast Asian region. Singapore's Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam, at the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers Meeting on 28 June 1979 claimed that Southeast Asia was Vietnam's 
target. He quoted an extract from Article 5 of the treaty between Laos and Vietnam: 
The two sides will endeavor to strengthen the militant solidarity and the relations 
of cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries: together with the socialist 
countries and the international communist movement positively contribute to 
strengthening solidarity and mutual support and assistance on the basis of 
Marxism and Leninism and proletarian internationalism .... support the struggle 
of the peoples of Southeast Asia for real national independence, democracy, 
peace and neutrality and establish and develop relations of friendship and 
cooperation with other countries in the region. 32 
Singapore perceived that Vietnam wished to liberate the people of Southeast Asia 
whose independence, democracy and neutrality they considered somewhat suspect. 
For Singapore, the Vietnamese refugee problem was also an issue. The refugee exodus 
was not merely a humanitarian problem, but it was more a military exercise to promote 
Indochinese hegemony in Southeast Asia. This was reflected in a statement by 
Rajaratnam at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 28 June 1979 in Bali that: 
29 Grant Evans and Kelvin Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War, London: Verso, 1984, p. 182. 
30 Asia week, 'Time to Talk', 24 July 1981, p. 1, quoted in Prasad, Indonesia 's Role in the Resolution of the 
Cambodian Problem, p. 22 . 
31 Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia. 
32 S. Rajaratnam quoted in Nayan Chanda, 'Agreement to disagree', FEER, June 26, 1981. 
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Seen in this context the refugee problem is not an exercise in humanitarianism. It 
is a military exercise to further the ambitions which the Vietnamese have 
concealed from us but not from their own people and their allies. They made us 
blind to it . Their ambitions are hegemony in Southeast Asia. 33 
This statement shows Singapore's serious concerns about the refugee issue. Not only 
did Rajaratnam consider it a humanitarian problem, but he also saw it as an effort by 
Vietnam to disseminate its people to build hegemony in Southeast Asia. 
The Philippines 
The Philippines identified Vietnam as the main source of the problem and considered 
that it should assume its just responsibilities as a member of the international 
community.34 Manila is geographically separate and was not confronted with foreign 
troops at its border. It was more reserved in its condemnation mostly because it was 
occupied with its own domestic problems. 35 Nevertheless, Vietnam's invasion of 
Cambodia was for the Philippines a violation of international norms and a violation of 
the principles stated specifically in ASEAN's Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
(ZOPFAN) and the TAC. 
The Philippines' main interests were the maintenance of peace in the region and the 
termination of the influx of refugees from Indochina. Achieving peace in the country 
really depended on the stability of Southeast Asia as a whole, and Vietnam's invasion of 
Cambodia threatened to jeopardise the region's stability. Even though it was 
geographically separate, refugees from Vietnam were also a problem for the Philippines, 
with an estimated number of 6,000 refugees entering the country.36 Consequently, it 
supported the proposal by the UK for an international conference on Indochina 
refugees under the auspices of the UN. 37 
Brunei Darussalam 
As a small country, Brunei considered itself vulnerable to foreign invasion and 
aggression. To Brunei, a peaceful and stable region was essential to its survival, 
therefore the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was indeed a bad precedent. Brunei 
which only joined ASEAN in 1984 appeared to be following the position of Thailand 
and Singapore. However, it did not really play an active role during the crisis. 
The elaboration above shows the different perceptions of the threat held by ASEAN 
member states during the crisis. The different perceptions influenced their policies and 
33 ASEAN, Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 1967-1987, p. 
322. 
34 ASEAN, Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 1967-1987. 
35 Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia, p. 90. 
36 ASEAN, Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 1967-1987. 
37 ASEAN, Statement by theASEAN Foreign Ministers at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 1967-1987. 
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determined their contribution to managing the crisis, which will be elaborated in the 
next three sections. By investigating the three explanatory concepts of regional security 
systems during the crisis (a security community, a balance of powers and a concert of 
powers), the contribution of ASEAN member states will be examined. 
3.4. A Security Community? 
This section addresses whether or not ASEAN member states' management of the 
Cambodian crisis indicates that there was an operating security community in the 
region. The ten indicators of a security community listed in Box 3.1 are used to address 
the question: 
Box. 3.1. The Ten Indicators of a Security Community 
A. A comparability of political values among decision-makers; 
B. A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers; 
C. A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of 
other governments; 
D. Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each 
other's direction and coordinate their policies; 
E. Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning; 
F. Development of trust and collective identity formation; 
G. A total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such conflict 
in the region; 
H. A total absence of a competitive military build up arms race involving 
regional actors; 
I. Formal or informal institutions and practices; and 
J. A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a 
peaceful relationship. 
Each of the indicators is treated as equally important. Table 3.1 provides an explanation 
of each indicator of a security community in the Cambodian crisis and a detailed 
analysis of these indicators follows. 
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TABLE3.1 
A Security Community in Southeast Asia during the Cambodian Crisis? 
No. I Indicators Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Singapore The Philippines and 
Bnmei Darussalam 
A 
B. 
Security Co~~ty 
A comparability of ASEAN member states demonstrated that they shared some political values on the one hand but held different political 
political values values and responded to the crisis differently on the other hand. 
among decision- t----------:-----..---,---=-~----=----r----=----=---=------,----------~-----------1 
makers: During the Thailand's values After the Vietnamese -· Singapore supported 
Thailand's view that 
Vietnam was the 
biggest threat to 
regional security. 
Brunei and the 
Philippines were of the 
view that the crisis was 
a concern for regional 
stability. 
Moderate Cambodian crisis, depended on its invasion, its values 
A mutual 
predictability of 
behaviour among 
decision-makers: 
Moderate 
Indonesia's political decision-makers. were more similar to 
values vis-a-vis the During the leadership Indonesia's as it 
crisis were similar to of Prime Minister regarded China 
those of Malaysia. Kriangsak Chomanan instead of Vietnam as 
and Prem the main threat. 
Tinsulanond, 
Thailand was hardline 
towards Vietnam. 
However, Thailand 
under the Chatichai 
government from 
1988 adopted a more 
flexible approach vis-
a-vis Vietnam. 
During the Cambodian crisis in general, the decision-makers' behaviour was unpredictable, although to some extent it was 
also predictable. Commonly predictable behaviour among the decision-makers included the desire to work as a unit, the 
willingness to elevate the principle of consensus to a high position, and willingness to compromise and bargain. The 
unpredictable behaviours are elaborated in below columns. 
Behaviour of decision- Thailand's behaviour Malaysia's behaviour 
makers in Indonesia was unpredictable was relatively 
was consistent during the crisis, consistent. The only 
exercising 'soft-liner' because it really unpredictable 
policies. Its behaviour depended on the behaviour was its 
could be regarded as decision-makers of support to the arms 
unpredictable by the time. It was ammunition to 
other ASEAN member consistent until the Cambodia. 
The behaviour of 
Singapore 
unpredictable. 
example of 
was 
An 
its 
unpredictable 
behaviour was that 
while being a 'hard-
liner'i___ Si~ore 
As they basically did not 
have a particular 
standing, their decision 
maker's behaviours 
were predictable. 
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No, I Indicators 
C. 
D. 
A mutual 
responsiveness of 
government to 
actions and 
communication of 
other governments: 
Significant 
Precipitating factors 
that encourage states 
to orient themselves 
in each other's 
direction and 
coordinate their 
policies: 
Moderate 
Indonesia Thailand Malaysia 
Security Community 
states, particularly in I Prime Minister 
regard to its close Chatichai took power. 
relations with 
Vietnam. For 
Indonesia, it might 
not be unpredictable 
since the behaviour of 
decision-makers was 
always based on the 
'free' and 'active' 
foreign policy. 
However, the close 
relations with 
Vietnam and official 
visits to Hanoi were 
often seen as a 
surprise by other 
countries. 
Singapore 
supported Indonesia, 
which was a 'soft-
liner' to be the 
interlocutor of the 
negotiations between 
Vietnam and parties 
in Cambodia. 
The Philippines and 
Brunei Darussalam 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore were all responsive and active in actions and communication with other 
governments. 
The main factors for 
Indonesia were 
regional stability and 
the settlement of the 
crisis. 
Other precipitating 
factors for Indonesia 
were the trauma with 
The main 
precipitating factor 
for Thailand was its 
geographic proximity 
with Cambodia. 
Other precipitating 
factors for Thailand 
were regional 
The main 
precipitating factors 
for Malaysia were 
regional stability and 
settlement of the 
crisis. 
Other precipitating 
factors were earlier 
confrontation with 
The main 
precipitating factor 
for Singapore was the 
fear of Vietnamese 
hegemony. 
Other precipitating 
factors for Singapore 
were Indo-Mall!_Ysia 
The main precipitating 
factor for the 
Philippines and Brunei 
was regional stability. 
The precipitating factors 
that discourage them 
from orienting 
themselves in each 
other's direction were 
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No. Indicators Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Singapore The Philippines and 
Bnmei Darussalam 
Security Community 
China and stability, and the Indonesia and its condominium and the domestic problems and 
communism and the prevention of trauma with fear of spill over geographical distance. 
close bilateral Vietnamese communism. effects to Singapore, 
relations with hegemony. regional stability and 
Vietnam. the settlement of the 
crisis. 
E. Processes of The transactions and The transactions and The transactions and The transactions and There were no identified 
transactions, negotiations by the negotiations by negotiations by negotiations by specific transactions 
international Indonesian Thailand were Malaysia were Singapore were and negotiations 
organisations and Government were exercised with conducted with conducted with conducted by either the 
social learning: exercised with Cambodia, with Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Philippines or Brunei 
Significant Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, the us, ASEAN as a group the US, China, ASEAN individually. The 
ASEAN as a group China, ASEAN as a and the UN. as a group and the transactions and 
and the UN. group and the UN. UN. negotiations involving 
them were under the 
ASEAN framework. 
F. Development of trust Trust and collective identity formation were developing from early in the crisis until the Paris Agreements in 1991. Vietnam's 
and collective attack near the Thai Border in 1980 contributed to strengthen ASEAN cohesion. It forced also Jakarta to adopt a tougher 
identity formation: stance against Vietnam. However, to what extent was not identified. 
Moderate 
G. A total absence of The Cambodian crisis itself reflected that there was not a total absence of armed interstate conflict in the region. However, 
armed inter-state during the crisis, there was a total absence of armed inter-state conflict among ASEAN member states. 
conflict or prospects 
for such conflict in 
the region: 
InsilOlificant 
H. A total absence of a There was no military build up arms race among ASEAN members 
competitive military 
build-up arms race 
involving regional 
actors: 
SilOlificant 
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No. Indicators Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Singapore The Philippines and 
Brunei Darussalam 
Securitv Community 
I. Formal or informal Formal practices included bilateral meetings with Malaysia, negotiations with ASEAN member countries, negotiations 
institutions and within the UN. 
practices: 
Significant Informal practices Informal practices Informal practices Informal practices: No informal practices 
conducted by conducted by conducted by conducted by identified being 
Indonesia were Thailand were Malaysia were Singapore were conducted individually. 
'Cocktail Meeting', negotiation with negotiation with negotiations with Formal meetings 
negotiation with Vietnam, negotiation Vietnam, and parties Vietnam, negotiation involving these two 
Vietnam, and parties with parties m in Cambodia with parties m countries were held 
in Cambodia. Cambodia, Cambodia, under the ASEAN 
negotiations with negotiations with framework. 
China, negotiation China, negotiation 
with the US. with the US. 
J. A high degree of There was very limited economic integration demonstrated during the crisis. 
economic integration 
as a necessary 
precondition of a 
peaceful relationship: 
Insignificant 
Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author 
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A. A comparability of political values among decision-makers 
ASEAN member states demonstrated that they shared some political values on the one 
hand but held different political values and responded to the crisis differently on the other 
hand. Thus, the indicator, a comparability of political values among decision-makers, is 
considered as moderate. The commonly-held political values included a desire to achieve 
stability and to manage relations; to protect national resilience; to advance the principle of 
non use of force; to assert the importance of dialogue; and to intensify joint efforts to 
secure more expeditious and increased departure of immigrants for permanent settlement 
in the Third Countries. 38 Another value shared by members of the group was their 
willingness to use the UNSC as an avenue for taking the necessary and appropriate 
measures to restore stability in Indochina. These values were those which the ASEAN 
member countries could set up and assert in a united way. 
Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia maintained a consensus that the Vietnamese 
invasion was a threat to regional stability and urged Vietnam to withdraw its troops from 
Cambodia. On 9 January 1979, the then Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja stated: 
The ASEAN member countries deeply deplore the current escalation and 
enlargement of the conflict between the two states in Indochina. They express 
grave concern over the implications of this development and its impact on the 
peace, security and stability in Southeast Asia.39 
This statement was strongly supported by the other ASEAN Foreign Ministers in that 
meeting; they reaffirmed the statement of the Indonesian Foreign Minister as the chair of 
the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) at the time. 4° 
The ASEAN member states also strongly deplored the armed intervention, arguing that it 
was against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea. They 
also believed that the Kampuchean people had the right to determine their future by 
themselves free from interference or influence from outside powers in the exercise of their 
rights of self determination. Among their political values there was also a desire to advance 
the principle of non use of force and therefore, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, at the 
Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Minister on the Current Political Development in the 
Southeast Asian Region in Bangkok on 12 January 1979 published a Joint Statement that 
38 Interview with Dr. Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Researcher, Canberra, 16 and 24 August 2011. 
39 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Documents on the Kampuchean Problem 1979-1985, Bangkok: Thai 
Watana Panich Press, 1986, p. 73. 
4° Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Documents on the Kampuchean Problem 1979-1985. 
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the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was against the principle of non-use of force. ASEAN 
member countries also reaffirmed several times in their Joint Statements/Communiques 
that they sought a peaceful resolution by a peaceful means by a Cambodian settlement. 41 
Frank Frost argues that there were additional reasons for the comparability of political 
values among decision-makers in general in January 1979. This was partly because the end 
of the Second Indochina War had occurred only a short time earlier, three years before 
Vietnam invaded Cambodia. Furthermore, there was evidence of political repression 
within each of the countries, particularly Cambodia. There was also a substantial problem 
of the refugee exodus from the mainland border. The effect of this sizeable refugee 
movement was felt by most ASEAN countries, thus creating a comparable value that a 
settlement for Cambodia was expected to address the problem of the refugee influx. 42 The 
refugee crisis had a big impact on how ASEAN reacted to the Vietnamese invasion. This 
background created an extraordinarily disturbed environment across the region. 
However, the management of the Cambodian crisis was a dynamic process and during the 
process the group had different political values in several elements: different perceptions 
of threat, different strategic outlooks, particularly in engaging Vietnam in negotiations, 
and different approaches on how to solve the crisis . These differences then lead to a 
division of ASEAN member states. Thailand and Singapore were regarded as the 'hard-
liners' while Indonesia and Malaysia were known as the 'soft-liners'. While the first group 
perceived Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia as an effort to seek hegemony in Southeast Asia, 
the second group, even though it did not support Vietnam, saw the invasion as a means of 
survival to protect themselves from China's expansion. The two groups were of one voice in 
their statements, but they had a different approach. While pursuing regional efforts, each 
of the member states acted individually. This individual behaviour sometimes could not be 
predicted and accepted by the others. Indonesia and Malaysia tried to pursue a 'softer' 
approach towards Vietnam. This however assisted the association to include Vietnam in 
many negotiations and to soften Vietnam's demand. Hence, the 'soft-liners' particularly 
Indonesia played the role of 'interlocutor' or 'mediator' in creating a bridge between 
Vietnam and the 'hard-liners '. In short, the indicator of 'comparability of the political 
values of member states' is regarded as moderate, in its ability to shine light on a security 
community during the crisis. 
41 The willingness of ASEAN member countries to utilise a peaceful means ,,·as reflected in their Joint 
Statements/Communiques. See ASEAN, Statement at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at ASEAN Ministerial 
Meetings 1967-1987. 
42 Interview with Dr. Frank Frost, Austra lian Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 16 and 24 August 2011. 
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B. A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers 
During the Cambodian crisis in general, the decision-makers' behaviour was unpredictable, 
but in some cases, was also predictable. Therefore the 'mutual predictability of behaviour 
among decision-makers' indicator is rated as moderate. Usually, the behaviour of a country 
can be predicted from its political values. The members of ASEAN did act based on their 
values, however given the tense situation, some countries could not understand if one 
acted beyond what had been agreed. For instance, Indonesian officials paid at least nine 
visits to Hanoi. This was often criticised by Thailand and Singapore. It may be predictable 
in the sense that the other members knew that Indonesia had a growing friendship with 
Vietnam, but it could also be seen as unpredictable particularly by Singapore and Thailand 
who disapproved of any excessive indulgence towards Vietnam. 
Frank Frost argues that the predictable point was that ASEAN genuinely wanted to work as 
a unit and placed great emphasis on the principle of consensus.43 He says that members 
would put a high value on compromise and willingness to bargain. 44 However, I argue that 
'consensus' was undermined by 'national interests'. A consensus was not apparent when 
Thailand and Singapore criticised the Kuantan Principles, for example. Indonesian 
President Soeharto and Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussein met in March 1980 in 
Kuantan on peninsular Malaysia's east coast, to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia in 
general and the Indochina conflict in particular, resulting in the Kuantan Principles being 
agreed. The four main elements of the Principles were: (i) Vietnam should ·withdraw its 
troops from Cambodia in a phased manner; (ii) Vietnam should not remain in the orbit of 
Soviet influence; (iii) Vietnam should ask the Soviet Union to withdraw from Vietnamese 
military bases; (iv) and Cambodia's neutrality should be restored as well as its earlier 
status of a buffer state between Vietnam and Thailand. 45 These principles were not well 
received by Thailand and Singapore who favoured a tough stance instead of a conciliatory 
stance against Hanoi.46 
These principles may also have seemed nai"ve, especially the third principle, coming just 
three months after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This principle failed to become an 
ASEAN position. The Kuantan Principle contained elements of a possible trade-off 
between Vietnam's security interests and that of ASEAN as defined by Malaysia and 
43 Interview ·with Dr. Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 16 and 24 August 2011. 
44 Interview with Dr. Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 16 and 24 August 2011. 
45 Prasad, Indonesia 's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem . 
46 Prasad, Indonesia 's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem. 
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Indonesia.47 Thailand and Singapore considered this meeting to be unpredictable because 
Indonesia and Malaysia should not have had met without seeking the participation of 
Thailand and Singapore. It can be argued that Thailand and Singapore should have been 
able to predict that this would occur because each country held some different perceptions 
of the issue. However, I argue that this was unpredictable to Thailand and Singapore 
because the Kuantan Meeting was convened in March 1980, only a few months after the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers met in June 1979 and had agreed on a Joint Statement towards 
the Cambodian situation. 
The behaviour of member countries was unpredictable in the sense of who supported 
whose ideas. In March 1983, Malaysia proposed the 'Five-plus-Two' Talks at the Non-
Aligned Movement Meeting in New Delhi. The idea was to bring the five ASEAN countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) together with Vietnam and 
Laos. This idea was supported by Indonesia. Thailand rejected the proposal because 
Bangkok did not want to recognise Vietnam as one of the main parties of the negotiations. 
Surprisingly, Singapore, which was also rigid vis-a-vis Vietnam, supported the idea.48 
Another surprising behaviour was also demonstrated by Singapore. Despite being a hard-
liner with little tolerance vis-a-vis Vietnam, Singapore proposed Indonesia as ASEAN's 
'interlocutor' to carry on further negotiations with Vietnam. 49 This proposal was endorsed 
by the other members at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting held in Jakarta on May 7-8, 
1984. This appointment then established a new stage of ASEAN's efforts to seek a 
resolution of the Cambodian crisis. 
Malaysia's support for military assistance to Cambodian resistance might also be seen as 
unpredictable by Indonesia. While Indonesia always saw Malaysia as a partner in this 
crisis, Malaysia supported Singapore's idea of transferring ammunition, training, 
communication equipment, and food to the Coalition Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea (CGDK). With Singapore, Thailand and the US, Malaysia also supported 
regular meetings in Bangkok to ensure the transfer of this assistance. 
Thailand's policies vis-a-vis Vietnam after the formation of Chatichai Choonhavan 's 
government were also quite unpredictable. Chatichai was strongly interested in resolving 
47 Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizee and Sorpong Peou, eds, Cambodia-the 1989 Paris Peace Conference, Toronto: 
Kraus International Publications, 1991. 
48 Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia. 
49 Prasad, Indonesia 's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem . 
the Cambodia issues through more friendly cooperation with the Indochina states. This 
new policy was also reflected by the visit of Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila to Hanoi 
on January 9-11, 1989 which marked the first visit by a Thai Foreign Minister in ten years. 
The meeting resulted in a Joint Press Statement, issued on 11 January 111989 in which the 
two ministers said: 
Thailand and Vietnam, being two close neighbors sharing common borders with 
Kampuchea, have an important role and direct interests in solving the 
Kampuchean question. .. agreed that the building up of mutual trust and 
confidence between the two countries is essential in contributing to a 
comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problem. so 
Without talking to his counterparts in ASEAN, the newly elected Prime Minister Chatichai 
Choonhaven declared his intention of strengthening economic ties with Vietnam, although 
this was a policy that undermined the actions and initiatives of ASEAN.s1 These events 
occurred when Indonesia was pursuing its own agenda in relation to Vietnam while trying 
to maintain ASEAN unity by endorsing punitive actions against Vietnam. Thailand's 
policies were most likely dictated by economic interests and traditional concerns. 
In short, during the Cambodian crisis, the general pattern of the behaviour of the ASEAN 
member states was that Indonesia was quite persistent in pursuing 'soft line' policy, while 
Malaysia and Singapore were changing over time on the basis of issues, even though 
Malaysia was consistent to a greater extent than Singapore. Thailand was relatively 
consistent in promoting a harsh policy vis-a-vis Vietnam until the change of the Thai 
government in late 1988. 
C. A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of 
other governments 
The indicator, a mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of 
other governments, is rated as significant. Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore 
were all active in actions and communication of other governments. Meanwhile, the 
Philippines and Brunei Darussalam were not keen to be closely engaged. Even though 
Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore were all responsive to the actions and communication 
of other government, the responsiveness of each country was different and really depended 
on its own perceptions of threat and national interests. 
so Prasad, Indon esia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem , p. 81. 
s1 Shaun Narine, 'ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security', Pacific Affairs, 71:2, 1998, pp. 195-214. 
Overall, I argue that there was a mutual responsiveness in the way that the other ASEAN 
members supported and wanted to support Thailand throughout the 1980s, but 
particularly at key points, such as in mid-1985 when Thailand was more pressured by 
Vietnamese military operations. There was also responsiveness by some countries like 
Indonesia and Malaysia who wanted to explore how to find a basis for additional thinking 
and additional communication. Those countries were sensitive to the others' interests in 
looking for a consensus. There was sensitivity on the Thai side in recognising that its 
interests were not necessarily all shared at all times by other members. 
Indonesia was responsive and active from the beginning of the crisis. Even though it had a 
growing relationship with Vietnam, Indonesia was aware that Singapore and particularly 
Thailand were not always in favour of Indonesia's approach. Indonesia pursued its 
interests bilaterally while trying not to step ahead of or breach ASEAN. Later on, Jakarta's 
approach was appreciated by the international community. Indonesia conducted a multi-
track approach: a bilateral, regional and multilateral approach. Throughout the crisis, 
Indonesia had never forced other countries to accept its ideas or proposals in seeking 
avenues to resolve the crisis. For example, Indonesia and Malaysia did not force Singapore 
and Thailand to accept the joint statement known as the Kuantan Declaration. Among 
Indonesia's initiative was the 'Cocktail Meeting', which was proposed in December 1985. 
The format of the proposal was changed several times to adjust to other countries' interests. 
The idea was originally initiated by Prince Norodom Sihanouk in July when he proposed 
an informal meeting of all major parties in the Cambodian dispute, including Vietnam, 
China and the USSR. Indonesia's proposal of the 'Cocktail Meeting' was restricted only to 
the Cambodian factions. Because of Thailand's rejection of the format of the meeting, the 
format was modified to become a two-staged meeting. The first stage was a meeting with 
the Khmers. The second stage was a meeting between CGDK and Vietnam. The idea was 
finally endorsed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in June 1986 together with the 
proposal of 'Proximity Talks' from Malaysia.52 The 'Cocktail Meeting' was subsequently 
transformed into the JIM 1 held on 25 July 1988. Indonesia continued mediating the 
negotiation by convening the JIM 2 in 1989, Hun-Sen-Prince Sihanouk Talks in Jakarta in 
May 1989, the JIM 3 or the First Informal Meeting on Cambodia (IMC) in 1990 and the 
Second Informal Meeting on Cambodia. 
Malaysia was no less active and responsive than Indonesia. Malaysia proposed the 'Five-
plus-Two' Formula and the 'Proximity Talks'. Malaysia proposed the idea of 'Proximity 
s2 Prasad, Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem. 
85 
Talks' at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AFMM) in Kuala Lumpur in May 1985. 
The objective of the talks was to bring the CGDK and the Heng Samrin regime together to 
push the Cambodians to resolve the crisis by themselves. This was a forward-looking idea 
which put emphasis on a political settlement rather than a military solution. This idea was 
supported by all the other countries but Thailand. Without any efforts to compel Thailand 
to accept the proposal, it was finally endorsed at the AFMM. 
Because Thailand and Singapore were 'hard-liners ', they not only pursued a diplomatic 
approach, but also a practical approach by sending military assistance to Cambodia with 
the help of China and the US. Thailand and Singapore were also sensitive towards 
Indonesia and Malaysia who wanted to explore more bases for cooperation. They might 
have thought at the beginning that Indonesia's close relationship with Vietnam was 
unacceptable, but in the middle of the process of seeking a resolution for the crisis, they 
agreed for Indonesia to be an interlocutor. 
Brunei, even though not very active, hosted several meetings such as the AFMM held in 
Bandar Seri Begawan on 21 January 1989 as preparatory to JIM II, and the AFMM on 3 
July 1989 as preparation for the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC). The 
latter was an avenue for the ministers to present their views o_n the Cambodian settlement 
for the PICC's perusal_s3 
D. Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves 1n each 
other's direction and coordinate their policies 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand exhibited some common precipitating 
factors that both encourage states and discourage them from orienting themselves in each 
other's direction, and thus this indicator is considered as moderate. Among those factors 
were: (i) the refugee influx; (ii) Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia; (iii) the alignment 
between Vietnam and the Soviet Union; and (iv) the Vietnamese incursion over the Thai 
border. Before the actual crisis fully emerged, that is before the invasion in December 1978, 
I argue that the refugee inflows had already constituted a crisis which began to produce a 
much greater degree of communication and coordination on those issues. The Vietnamese 
expansion was clearly a precipitating factor. There was a strong alignment between 
Vietnam and the Soviet Union, as Vietnam's invasion came after it had signed the 
friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in December 1978. This added significantly to the 
concerns of the ASEAN countries. 
53 Prasad, Indonesia 's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem. 
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Even though they had common precipitating factors, each country had its own specific 
impetus factors to orient them in each other's direction and coordinate their policies. For 
Indonesia, the main impetus factor was the stability of the region. Indonesia perceived that 
a prolonged Cambodian crisis would only benefit China, while a quick resolution of the 
Cambodian issue would help Vietnam to escape from international isolation and also to 
serve as a 'credible buffer' against China.s4 
As with Indonesia, the main factor for Malaysia to be drawn towards other countries was 
the objective of regional stability. Instead of letting Indochina become a site for external 
great power rivalry, Malaysia preferred to unite with other members of the organisation to 
manage the crisis. The faster ASEAN could manage the crisis, the better for Malaysia in the 
sense that the end of crisis was expected to stop the influx of refugees. 
The main precipitating factor for Thailand to orient itself in the direction of others was the 
fact that it was the most affected country. Being ASEAN's frontline, Thailand did not want 
to be left out by the other members. Furthermore, after the act of aggression at the Thai-
Kampuchean border, Thailand was intimidated by the tactics employed by Vietnam. More 
than two thousand Vietnamese troops had invaded Thai territory, leaving death and 
destruction. Thailand's security had been jeopardised as a result. Without the help of other 
countries in the region, Thailand did not have the capacity to assist the Cambodian 
civilians to express their legitimate right of returning to their own country. 
For Singapore, the key precipitating factor in coordinating its policies with other ASEAN 
members was that Singapore realised that it did not want Vietnamese hegemony in the 
region. S. Dhanablan, Singapore Foreign minister at the Thirteenth ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting on 25 June 1980 said: 
It is especially dangerous to us who are neighbours of a Vietnam that has 
announced repeatedly that it is the vanguard of a revolution to 'liberate' the 
nations of Southeast Asia and usher them into an era of genuine independence. 
The Vietnamese have told ASEAN members in bilateral talks that they have no 
aggressive intentions on their neighbours. But in all their official appeals and 
exhortations to their own people and their socialist friends , they have constantly 
reiterated that it is their duty and obligation to bring about communist regimes in 
Southeast Asia because only socialist states are truly independent. ss 
54 Prasad, Indonesia 's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem, p. 161. 
55 ASEAN, Statements by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at ASEAN Ministerial Meetings 1967-1987, p. 349 . 
Furthermore, Singapore did not have the capability to settle the crisis without other 
member countries. It also did not have a strong reason to refuse to coordinate with other 
member countries. 
However, there are some precipitating factors that discourage states from orienting 
themselves in each other's direction and coordinating their policies. These factors include: 
(i) differences in political values and in the perception of threats; (ii) different national 
interests; (iii) geographical separation (for the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam); (iv) 
domestic issues (for the Philippines); (v) changes in policies of decision-makers (in the 
case of Thailand); (vii) relationship with conflicting parties: Thailand had a poor 
relationship with Vietnam on the one hand, and Indonesia had a growing relationship with 
Vietnam on the other hand. Because there is a balance of precipitating factors that 
encourage states to cooperate and discourage them from cooperating, this indicator is 
rated as moderate. 
E. Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning 
In the Cambodian crisis, various continued processes of transactions occurred among 
ASEAN member countries themselves, between ASEAN and conflicting factions and 
Vietnam, between ASEAN and the UN and between each ASEAN state and other external 
powers such us China, the US, the Soviet Union, France and Australia. ASEAN utilised the 
existing international organisations, such as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
as a diplomatic leverage point. From the beginning, ASEAN concentrated its diplomatic 
efforts at the UN, mobilising international support of Hanoi and securing approval for an 
International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK). ASEAN was the major actor in initiating 
this conference and for ASEAN, such a conference was critical in assisting the international 
community to recognise that the central issue in the Cambodian problem was Vietnam's 
invasion and occupation of that country. 56 ASEAN also discussed the issue of the 
Cambodian crisis with the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). It shared with the NAM the 
Five-plus-Two formula proposal by Malaysia at the Seventh Summit of the Non-Aligned 
Movement in March 1983.57 
In any negotiation, including at the ICK, there is an element of transaction. During the ICK, 
for example, China, supported by the US, rejected the ASEAN proposal which gave equal 
status to the Vietnamese aggressor and the legitimate Cambodian government. China 
S6 Acharya, Lizee and Peou, eds, Cambodia-the 1989 Paris Peace Conference. 
57 Justus van der Kroef, 'Kampuchea : The Road to Finlandization 1983', Asian Profile, 13:3, 1985, pp. 221-241. 
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claimed that the Khmer Rouge was willing and capable of convening free and fair elections 
and should be restored to power. France finally put forward a compromise formula. The 
final statement of the conference called for 'appropriate arrangements to ensure that 
armed Kampuchean factors will not be able to prevent or disrupt the holding of free 
elections, or to intimidate or coerce the populations in the electoral processes'. ss 
Social learning was reflected by the change in Thailand's stance from 'rigid' to a softer one 
after the change of Prime Minister and the change in Malaysia's and Indonesia's behaviour 
on key occasions such as Vietnam's incursion across the Thai border. Given the various 
transactions and social learning, the indicator of 'processes of transactions, international 
organisations and social learning' is rated as significant. 
F. Development of trust and collective identity formation 
There was a considerable development of trust and collective identity throughout the crisis. 
Trust and collective identity formation had been developing from early in the crisis until 
the signing of the Paris Agreements in 1991. The Vietnamese attack near the Thai Border in 
1980 jeopardised ASEAN cohesion. It forced Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur to adopt a tougher 
stance against Vietnam. While Jakarta's and Malaysia's stance towards Vietnam were 
growing tougher, Thailand's foreign policy towards Vietnam was becoming more flexible 
after Chatichai became Prime Minister. 
According to Frank Frost, ASEAN developed some degree of trust and collective identity 
during the Cambodian Crisis. He argues: 
ASEAN did operate successfully to manage differences. It did pursue goals in 
relation to the Cambodia conflict and there was a lot of cooperation too from 1979 
onwards. I think that it is necessary to talk about issues like trust and collective 
identity formation in a qualitative way. I am not arguing that ASEAN at the end of 
the Cambodia conflict period had developed a high level and high degree of 
collective identity. There is no high level interstate trust or collective identity to the 
extent they would be willing to give over some sovereignty to the organisation at 
the end of the Cambodian crisis. It did not transform the association. I do not 
think the Cambodia cooperation removed any possible area of sensibility between 
countries and potential for mistrust , because some of them no doubt continue 
distrusting each other. 59 
Even though trust and collective identity had developed, still some levels of distrust and 
the Cambodian crisis did not remove the sensitivity among ASEAN member states. 
However, the evidence reveals that ASEAN member countries placed trust and collective 
identity on a higher level than the distrust and sensitivities. The assortment of trust, 
58 Acharya, Lizee and Peou, eds, Cambodia-the 1989 Paris Peace Conference, p. xxxi. 
59 Interview with Dr. Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 16 and 24 August 2011. 
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collective identities, distrust and sensitivities suggests that the indicator of 'development of 
trust and collective identity formation' is moderate. 
G. A total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such conflict 
in the region 
-
The Cambodian crisis itself reflected that there was not a total absence of armed interstate 
conflict in Southeast Asia, if Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar are considered 
geographically part of the region. The Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in December 1978, 
China occupied the northern Vietnamese border area in February-March 1979, and the 
Vietnamese conducted an incursion on the Thai-Kampuchean border in 1985. These events 
highlight that the region did not reflect a total absence of armed inter-state conflicts. 
However, during the crisis, there was a total absence of armed inter-state conflict among 
ASEAN member states. The principle of TAC helped member states restrain themselves 
from using force. This does not mean that there was a total absence of suspicion of each 
other. The feelings of suspicious and distrust did exist among ASEAN member states. 
Singapore was afraid of an Indo-Malay mini empire and an Indochinese Empire. Malaysia 
and Indonesia were suspicious towards each other. Malaysia also showed distrust towards 
the Philippines due to the latter's claim over Sabah. In short, the combination of crises, 
suspicion, territorial claims, fear of other countries' expansion renders the 'total absence of 
armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such conflict in the region' indicator 
insignificant in pointing to the presence of a security community during the crisis. 
H. A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race involving 
regional actors 
In general there was no arms build-up or an arms race in Southeast Asia during the 
Cambodian crisis. To investigate the existence of a competitive military build-up or arms 
race, I will elaborate the definitions of 'arms race' and 'military build-up'. Barry Buzan 
states that 'the term arms race suggests self stimulating military rivalry between states in 
which their efforts to defend themselves militarily cause them to enhance the threats they 
pose to each other'. 60 An arms build-up is defined by Acharya as an 'upward spiral in key 
military indicators such as defense spending and arms procurement'.61 Acharya argues that 
an arms build-up will become an arms race if it is driven by an interactive or competitive 
dynamic among the countries involved. 62 
60 Barry Buzan cited in Arnitav Acharya, An Arms race in post Cold War Southeast Asia, Singapore: ISEAS 
Publishing, 1994, p. 3. 
61 Arnitav Acharya, An Arms race in post Cold War Southeast Asia, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 1994, p. 3. 
62 Acharya, An Arms race in post Cold War Southeast Asia. 
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During the Cambodian crisis, the ASEAN states not only rejected turning their regional 
grouping into a military block but also kept their defence spending at relatively modest 
levels in comparison to other Third World States. In the early 1980s, ASEAN countries 
began shifting towards conventional warfare capabilities, but this transition was initially 
focused on land forces. This may be the result of the security concerns raised by the 
Cambodian crisis. The late 1980s saw a shift of emphasis towards naval and air forces 
signalling the salience of maritime security issues. 63 This again reflected a transition of 
emphasis, from counter-insurgency to conventional warfare. 
Defence industries in Southeast Asia was characterised as 'lowest- late comers' during the 
crisis. 64 Defence industries in the region displayed little ambition to achieve total self-
reliance in defence production, 6s as set out in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
TABLE 3.2 ASEAN Defence Expenditure Data Compared, Absolute Figures 
(Constant million 1985 US dollars) 
Year Bnmei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
USS SIPRI USS SIPRI USS SIPRI USS SIPRI USS SIPRI USS SIPRI 
1975 n.a. 70 2,069 2,557 719 1,143 760 1,109 642 535 1,012 959 
1976 n.a. 123 1,809 3,195 621 1,195 721 1,283 554 647 1,058 1,182 
1977 203 124 2,494 3,0855 894 1,371 1,121 1,268 678 720 1,230 1,553 
1978 196 125 3,126 2,066 1,093 1,152 1,219 826 682 579 1,219 1,278 
1979 241 224 2,334 1,971 1,645 1,298 1,082 758 747 582 2,194 1,739 
1980 n.a. 234 2,683 2,184 1,76o 1,618 792 713 769 653 1,418 1,662 
1981 233 224 3,360 2,375 2,405 1,951 942 746 835 747 1,966 1,654 
1982 217 242 3,183 2,292 2,365 1,899 1,009 781 824 792 1,711 1,734 
1983 276 265 2,701 2,243 2,223 1,468 712 779 1,002 773 1,766 1,858 
1984 314 259 2,024 2,205 919 1,108 519 503 939 1,013 1,805 1,989 
1985 205 292 2,341 1,936 1,764 977 474 386 1,188 1,151 1,517 2,050 
1986 226 326 1,603 1,979 982 1,465 502 424 1,134 1,114 1,524 1,997 
1987 179 263 1,704 1,793 1,455 1,286 766 437 1,078 1,125 1,579 1,996 
1988 213 287 n.a. 1,717 1,641 1,312 855 476 1,184 1,209 1,573 1,977 
1989 n.a. n.a. 1,570 1,722 1,418 1,362 1,168 645 1,288 1,264 1,493 1,959 
1990 n.a. n.a. 1,776 1,520 1,557 1,389 878 616 1,313 1,305 1,601 2,105 
1991 n.a. n.a 1,739 1,568 1,670 1,204 843 549 1,518 1,508 1,761 2,292 
Sources: Amitav Acharya, An Anns Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control, 
Singapore: !SEAS Publishing, 1994, p. 13. 
63 Acharya, An Arms race in post Cold War Southeast Asia. 
64 Acharya, An Arms race in post Cold War Southeast Asia, pp. 6-7. 
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TABLE 3.3 ASEAN Defence Expenditure Data Compared (Percentage of GDP /GNP) 
Year Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
IISS SIPRI IISS SIPRI 11SS SIPRI IISS SIPRI IISS SIPRI IISS SIPRI 
1974 n.a. 2.1 2.6 4-5 3.8 5-9 2.1 2.9 5.1 4.7 3.2 3.7 
1975 n.a. 3.5 3.8 5.1 4.0 6.9 2.6 3.3 5.3 5.5 3.7 3.2 
1976 n.a. 4.8 .1 . ., .,.8 .1.8 .,.9 .1.0 3-4 .,.4 6.o 3-7 3.6 
1977 n.a. 4.1 3-4 5.1 4-4 6.1 3-4 3.2 6.4 6.3 4.0 4-4 
1978 n.a. 4.6 4.0 s.o 4.S .,.8 3-3 2.7 S.7 s.6 3-4 4-3 
1979 n.a. 6.1 3.2 4.1 5-7 5-5 2.6 2-4 5-7 5.0 3-7 5-4 
1980 n.a. 3-9 3.9 3.8 5.7 6-4 1.7 2.2 5.2 5.0 3.3 S.1 
1981 4.6 4.S ~.Ji 3.7 8.1 8.1 2.1 2.2 5.2 S.1 4.6 4.8 
1982 n.a. 5-3 3-3 4.2 8.2 7.8 2.3 2.3 n.a. 5.1 5.0 4.9 
1983 n.a. 6.5 3.5 3.7 7.1 5.6 1.8 2.2 4.8 4.5 4.1 s.o 
1984 8.o 6 . ., 2.4 3 . .'i 2.6 3.8 1.6 1.5 4-9 5-S 4.2 5.0 
1985 6.o 7-7 2.8 3.0 5.6 3-5 1-4 1.3 6.7 6.5 4.1 5.0 
1986 7.2 n.a. 2.3 3.0 3.7 5.7 1.7 1-4 6.6 6.3 3.7 4-7 
1987 n.a. n.a. 1.9 25 4.6 4-5 2.1 1.3 5.6 5.8 3-7 4-3 
1988 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.3 n.a. 4.1 n.a. 1.3 n.a. 5.5 n.a. 4.0 
1989 n.a. n.a. 1.4 2.1 3-7 4.0 2.8 1.8 S.3 S.1 2.6 3.2 
1990 n.a. n.a. 1-4 1.6 3.7 3.6 2.2 1.8 4.9 5.0 2.6 3.2 
Sources: Amitav Acharya, An Anns Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control, 
Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 1994, p. 14. 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that the overall spending on defence by the ASEAN states was 
generally on the rise, particularly in the case of the Philippines and Thailand in contrast to 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Interestingly, spending in relation to the total Gross National 
Product ( GNP) had actually declined, especially for Indone~ia, Malaysia and Thailand. 
Singapore had the highest ratio of defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, while 
Indonesia had the lowest. In general, I conclude that there was no arms race or arms build-
up in Southeast Asia during the Cambodian crisis, and this indicator is rated as significant. 
I. Formal or informal institutions and practices 
ASEAN convened many formal and informal meetings related to the Cambodian crisis, 
thus indicating the significance of the 'formal or informal institutions and practices' 
indicator in shedding light on the existence of a security community during the crisis. 
Formal meetings were conducted through either the ASEAN framework or the UN 
framework. The ASEAN member states used the UNGA to support ASEAN's stances. 
Throughout the crisis, the number of formal meetings conducted by ASEAN member states 
increased as they were supported by the role of the UN and the Permanent Five Members 
of the UNSC. After the Paris Agreements in 1991, which are not discussed in this thesis, 
some ASEAN members were involved in the UN Peace-keeping Operation in Cambodia. 
With regard to informal practices, many are noted during the Cambodian crisis, 
particularly conducted by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand both among 
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themselves, under the ASEAN framework or with external parties such as Vietnam, 
Cambodia, the US, Soviet, China and the UN. Informal practices initiated by Indonesia 
included the Kuantan Meeting with Malaysia, the 'Cocktail Meeting' that later transformed 
into the JIMs, negotiations with Vietnam and parties in Cambodia. Informal meetings 
conducted by Thailand included negotiations with parties in Cambodia, negotiations with 
Vietnam, negotiations with the US, negotiations with China, and negotiations with 
Singapore. Informal meetings conducted by Malaysia consisted of among others, the 
'Kuantan Meeting' with Indonesia, negotiations with Vietnam, negotiations with parties in 
Cambodia, and negotiations to transfer arm supply, with the US, Thailand, and Singapore. 
For Singapore, informal meetings were convened with Vietnam, parties in Cambodia, 
China, the US, and Malaysia. For the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam, no informal 
practices were conducted individually. All formal meetings involving these two countries 
were held under the ASEAN framework. 
J. A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a 
peaceful relationship 
There was very limited economic integration or any effort towards economic integration 
identified. During the Cambodian crisis, even between 1967 and 1990, intra-ASEAN trade 
as a percentage of a total trade changed only modestly. ASEAN failed to cooperate in the 
creation of industrial projects during this period because the ASEAN economies were 
either too similar to each other, and therefore competitive, or so different as to make 
efforts to create economic integration difficult. 66 
The idea of AFTA only came up after the 1992 ASEAN Summit in Singapore. Former 
ASEAN Secretary-General, Tan Sri Ajit Singh argues that before 1992, the economies of 
Southeast Asian countries grew remarkably well. 
If you look at the economic broader picture of the economic situation, right up 
before 1990 to the end of 1997, ASEAN started experiencing a double digit 
growth. When countries are doing well economically, you find that there is only 
little incentive for them to think about issues like having an ASEAN Free Trade 
Area or any financial arrangement with each other. They are all competing for the 
same market. Arising from that situation, one of the important results of the 
1992 Summit was the decision to create an ASEAN Free Trade Area. So when I 
assumed my task as the Secretary-General, my top priority was to implement 
AFTA. So, I saw AFTA [in] the very first five years. That was the specific task 
given to the Secretary General. I played a key role. It is my task to creating public 
awareness of AFTA from public and business community. 67 
66 Narine, 'ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security'. 
67 Interview with Tan Sri Ajit Singh, former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur, 10 March 2011. 
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After the Asian Financial crisis in 1997, ASEAN tried to deepen its economic integration by: 
establishing an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) to prevent the distraction of FDI from 
Southeast Asia to other regions while increasing intra ASEAN investment; initiating the 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) where trade disputes are adjudicated by the AEM 
or SEOM which has binding rules and is linked to the ASEAN Secretariat; setting up an 
ASEAN Surveillance Process which is aimed at guaranteeing economic stability through 
the establishment of an early warming system and evaluating potentially destabilising 
financial and economic trouble spots in the region; and expediting the reduction of tariffs 
in the region, integrating eleven priority sectors including fisheries, electronics, healthcare 
and tourism, simplifying the custom procedures, harmonising regulations and standards 
and other forms of trade barriers. 68 
To summarise, the extent to which the crisis management conducted by ASEAN member 
states during the Cambodian crisis is suggestive of a security community is rated in Table 
3.4 and Figure 3.2. 
TABLE3.4 
Summary of the Indicators of a Security Community during the Cambodian Crisis 
Security community during the Cambodian crisis 
No Indicators Significant Moderate Insignificant 
A A comparability of political values among y 
decision-makers 
B. A mutual predictability of behaviour among y 
decision-makers 
C. A mutual responsiveness of government to y 
actions and communication of other 
governments 
D. Precipitating factors that encourage states to y 
orient themselves in each other's direction and 
coordinate their oolicies 
E. Processes of transactions, international v 
oraanisations and social learning 
F. Development of trust and collective identity y 
formation 
G. A total absence of armed inter-state conflict or y 
prosoects for such conflict in the region 
H. A total absence of a competitive military build- y 
up arms race involvine: regional actors 
I. Formal or informal institutions and practices v 
J. A high degree of economic integration as a y 
necessary precondition of a peaceful 
relationship 
Total 4 4 2 
Source: Compiled by author 
68 James R Ferguson, 'ASEAN Concord II: Policy Prospects for Participant Regional 'Development', 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26:3, 2004, pp. 393-415. 
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FIGURE3.2 
Indicators of a Security Community during the Cambodian Crisis 
f ? +---------------~ 
.s 
~ 6 +---------------~ 
'6 □ significant 
C 
= 5+---------------~ □ rroderate 
0 j 4 -t---r----..,.,..,,, □ insignificant 
E 
::I 
Z 3 ------1 
Significance 
Source: Compiled by author 
Table 3.4 and Figure 3.2 demonstrate that ASEAN's crisis management during the 
Cambodian crisis did not reflect that it was operating as a security community. 69 It 
explained some indicators such as a mutual responsiveness of governments to actions and 
. 
communication of other governments; processes of transactions, international 
organisations and social learning; a total absence of competitive military build-up or an 
arms race involving the regional actors; and formal and informal institutions and practices. 
However, besides being minor (only four out of ten indicators are significant) these 
significant indicators were shared by the four dominant powers. 
3.5. Balancing in Southeast Asia? 
The next section of the chapter analyses whether the crisis management by ASEAN 
indicated that there was a balancing system in the region. This section is divided into two 
parts: the first is an analysis of the possibility of a balance of power dynamic existing 
among ASEAN members while the second part is an examination of the possibility of a 
balance of external great power influence. There are four indicators of a balance of power 
being adopted among ASEAN member states as listed in Box 3.2. 
69 The table and figure might not reflect precisely each indicator. 
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Box 3.2 The Nine Indicators of a Balancing System 
Balance of Power among ASEAN member states: 
A. Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors; 
B. Intentions of some states to expand; 
C. Alliances on the basis of short-run interests; 
D. War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft; 
Balance of External Great Power Influence: 
E. Dependency on external great powers as security 
providers 
F. Alignment with external great powers; 
G. Military cooperation with external great powers; 
H. Distribution of external great powers' armed forces; and 
I. Economic dependence on external great powers. 
Table 3.5 provides a brief overview of the indicators of a balancing system in Southeast 
Asia during the Cambodian crisis. 
TABLE3.5 
A Balancing System in Southeast Asia during the Cambodian Crisis? 
No. Indicators Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Singapore The Philippines and 
Brunei Darussalam 
Balance of Power 
Balance of Power among ASEAN Member States 
A. Relatively equal Indonesia, Malaysia Singapore, Thailand can be considered as relatively equal powers during the Cambodian crisis. 
powers among a 
minimum of two 
actors: 
Si2nificant 
B. Intentions of Indonesia had no Thailand had no Malaysia had no Singapore had no Generally there was no 
some states to intention to expand. intention to expand. intention to expand. intention to expand. intention to expand, 
expand: Instead, Thailand Instead, Singapore but the Philippines had 
Insignificant feared Vietnam's feared an Indochinese a claim over Sabah. 
intention to expand. Empire and Malaysia-
Indonesia mini 
Empire. 
C. Alliances on the There was no alliance between ASEAN member states. However, groups existed within ASEAN. 
basis of short-
run interests: Indonesia shared a Thailand shared a Malaysia shared a Singapore shared a The Philippines was 
Moderate similar view with similar view with similar view with similar view with not included in any 
Malaysia towards the Singapore and they Indonesia towards the Singapore towards the groupings. Brunei was 
crisis and they were were often regarded as crisis. They were often crisis and they were not included in any 
often regarded as a a 'hard-liner' group. regarded as a 'soft- often regarded as a groupings. However, 
'soft-liner' group. liner' group. 'hard-liner' group. its stand in general 
followed Thailand and 
Singapore. 
D. War as a For Indonesia, war Thailand was against As a strong supporter Singapore was against Both countries were 
legitimate was an illegal the Vietnamese of ZOPFAN, Malaysia the Vietnamese against the Vietnamese 
instrument of instrument of invasion of Cambodia. was against the invasion of Cambodia. invasion of Cambodia 
statecraft: statecraft. Therefore But since its security Vietnamese invasion. However, Singapore 
Insignificant Indonesia was against was threatened, it also also provided military 
Vietnamese invasion of provided military assistance to 
Cambodia. Indonesia assistance to Cambodia. War was 
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No. Indicators Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Singapore The Philippines and 
Brunei Darussalam 
Balance of Power 
ruled out any Cambodia. So, war was not unthinkable for 
possibility of the use of not unthinkable for Singapore too. 
force in dealing with Thailand. 
the Cambodian crisis. 
Balance of External Great Power Influence 
E. Dependency on Indonesia's foreign Thailand had a Malaysia retained Singapore had a The Philippines had a 
external great policy was free and dependency on China some forms of dependency on China dependency on the US 
powers as active. Indonesia did and to a lesser extent to dependency on the and also the US. 
security not rely too much on the us. The us former colonial power 
providers: external great powers supplied arms to the as an external security 
Significant to solve the regional Thai military. provider. 
crisis. 
F. Alignment with Indonesia had no Thailand had a tacit Malaysia was a Singapore had tacit The Philippines had a 
external great alignment with alignment with China member of FPDA. alignment with China close relationship with 
powers: external powers. and ensured China's and ensured China's the us. The 
Significant Indonesia and commitment to a commitment to a Philippines in the 
Malaysia considered strategy of attrition strategy of attrition overall picture made 
Vietnam as a safeguard against Vietnam. against Vietnam. ASEAN's voices were 
to balance China. stronger in front of the 
Thailand and Singapore and us. 
Singapore viewed Thailand viewed China 
China as necessary to as necessary to balance 
balance Vietnam. 
' 
Vietnam. 
G. Military Indonesia resisted Despite the tacit Like Singapore Singapore nevertheless Strong military 
cooperation military cooperation alignment with China Malaysia maintained remained keen to cooperation between 
with external with external great the US supplied arms some forms of security retain some form of the Philippines and the 
great powers: powers in relation to to the Thai military cooperation with the security cooperation us. 
Significant the Cambodian crisis. under the Manila Pact former colonial power. with the former 
of September 1954. colonial power, not 
least because their 
defence capabilities 
were extremely limited 
at this time. 
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No. 
H. 
I. 
Indicators 
Distribution of 
external great 
powers' armed 
forces: 
Moderate 
Indonesia 
Indonesia did not host 
any external great 
powers' armed forces 
and never supported 
such distribution to 
any country to solve 
the crisis. 
Economic I Not identified 
dependence on 
external great 
powers: 
Moderate 
Thailand Malaysia 
Balance of Power 
The PRC contributed to Malaysia supported 
Thailand's defence distribution of China's 
capabilities through force and US transfer 
the transfer of military of military equipment. 
equipment. 
Thailand demonstrated I Not identified 
economic dependence 
on external great 
powers, particularly on 
China and the US. 
Singapore 
Singapore supported 
distribution of China's 
force and US transfer 
of military equipment. 
Not identified 
Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author 
The Philippines and 
Brunei Darussalam 
The US had· military 
bases in the 
Philippines, namely 
the Na val Base Subic 
Bay, in Olongape, 
Zambales and the 
Clark Air Force Base. 
The Naval Base Subic 
Bay was established in 
1884 by Spain and 
captured by the US in 
1898. It was closed in 
in 1992. The Clark Air 
Force Base was 
established in 1930 
and closed in 1991. 
For the Philippines, 
there was an economic 
dependence on the US. 
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Balance of Power among ASEAN Member States 
A. Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors 
During the Cambodian crisis, four countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand had relatively equal powers, thus the indicator, relatively equal powers among a 
minimum of two actors, is rated significant. Within the equal powers, suspicion existed 
towards each other. Indonesia was suspicious towards Malaysia. Malaysia perceived 
Indonesia and Singapore as a plausible threat while Singapore was suspicious of Indonesia 
and Malaysia. An official of ASEAN interviewed for this research argued that there was no 
such balance of power among ASEAN members. What they have is a 'competition', which 
is always disadvantageous, but some times is helpful to for advancing the organisation.7° 
Many scholars argue that there has never been a 'balance of power' among ASEAN 
member states. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy for Political Affairs, Vice Presidential Office 
of Indonesia, for example, suggests that there has been no balance of power in Southeast 
Asia because there are no relatively equal powers between a minimum of two actors.71 She 
also argues that the increasing military budgets of countries in Southeast Asia are not 
aimed against other ASEAN member countries.72 Alexandra Retno Wulan from the Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta also suggests that: 
There is no balancing within ASEAN member countries. The core principle of 
balancing is that there is one strong power and the others try to balance this strong 
power ... There is no such unipolar in Southeast Asia. 73 
Evan Laksamana, a researcher from CSIS Indonesia, defines what happens in Southeast 
Asia as a 'balance of weakness and dependency' instead of a balance of power. He argues: 
Southeast Asian countries are mutually dependent and weak vis-a-vis their 
neighbours. I had in mind the precarious balance and dependency of Indonesia-
Malaysia, Malaysia-Singapore, Singapore-Indonesia, Philippines-Vietnam, 
Vietnam-Thailand, Thailand-Myanmar, Cambodia-Thailand. This is just the 
bilateral side, where both countries see the other as the potential rival or enemy 
[militarily] but also realise they both need each other in terms of economic 
engagement or political weight. Indonesia cannot go to war with Malaysia, for 
example, not only because the military might not actually win, but because they 
are one of Indonesia's largest investors, especially in Kalimantan and the fact that 
billions of dollars depend on the Indonesian working migrants based there. This is 
of course very simplistic, but that feeling seems real in the minds of some 
policymakers. The same goes to Singapore and Malaysia and Singapore vis-a-vis 
Indonesia for example , as well as other countries. 74 
7o Interview with a senior level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, Putrajaya, 10 March 2011. 
71 Interview with Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to the Vice President, 
Secretariat of the Vice President of Indonesia, Jakarta, 29 March 2011. 
72 Interview with Dr. Devli Fortuna Anwar, Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to the Vice President, 
Secretariat of the Vice President of Indonesia, Jakarta, 29 March 2011. 
73 Interview with Alexandra Retno Wulan, CSIS-Jakarta Researcher, Jakarta, 18 February 2011. 
74 Interview with Evan A. Laksamana, CSIS-Jakarta Researcher, Jakarta, 21 March 2011. 
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In contrast to Laksmana's view, I argue that Southeast Asia is not characterised as a 
'balance of weakness' nor a 'balance of dependency' because first, dominant powers in the 
region are not weak; and second, countries may be dependent on each other, but these 
dependencies do not lead to the notion of 'balance' because smaller countries are more 
dependent on dominant powers, and not vice versa. The concept of 'balance of weakness' 
may only be applicable to smaller powers and the concept of 'balance of dependency' may 
only be relevant within smaller powers and within dominant powers. It cannot be 
generalised across Southeast Asia as a region. 
B. Intentions of some states to expand 
There was no intention by any member state to expand during this time, so it can be 
argued that the 'intentions of some states to expand' indicator is not significant in 
explaining the presence of a balance of power among ASEAN member states. Some 
member countries indeed feared the possibility of expansion of other countries. Thailand 
was afraid of another Vietnamese expansion into Cambodia and a possible encroachment 
into Thailand itself. Singapore feared an Indochinese empire in Southeast Asia. It also 
feared - although to a lesser extent - an Indonesia-Malaysia mini empire. Even though 
Malaysia did not speak out blatantly, it had reason to fear Indonesia's expansion. 
Indonesia's confrontation policy resulted in Malaysia's uncertainties about Indonesia as a 
security threat. These fears and suspicions were felt more strongly in the acute than in the 
de-escalation period. 
Indonesia itself, after the fall of the Soekarno regime, tried to convince its neighbours that 
it did not have any intention to expand. That was one of the reasons for Soeharto 's support 
for the establishment of ASEAN; he saw it as a forum in which the government of 
Indonesia could convince its neighbours that it did not have any intention to expand. 
Indonesia did not fear Indochinese expansion in the region, and was more afraid of the 
expansion of communism in Southeast Asia. Figure 3.1 demonstrates that action against 
communism represented 12% of Indonesia's military operations. 
C. Alliances on the basis of short-run interests 
There was no alliance among ASEAN member states during the Cambodian conflict, but 
there were groupings. Hence, the 'alliances on the basis of short-run interests' indicator is 
rated as moderate. The pattern of the groupings was not permanent during the Cambodian 
crisis. For example, Thailand changed its policy after Prime Minister Chatichai took power. 
The pattern of alignment among the core group was more complicated than simply 
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dividing them into the soft-liner and hard-liner group. Some countries tended to have a 
particular orientation towards the issue of major powers. Thailand had an intensive 
cooperation with China in terms of channelling support for the resistance. Malaysia and 
Indonesia had different balances of interest particularly towards the role of China. There 
were some factors arising from historical evolution which gave rise to different 
perspectives, for example the role of Vietnam. Thailand, unsurprisingly had reservations 
about and rivalry with Vietnam. It was shocked by the Vietnamese invasion, which was 
followed by the refugee influx, and by the communists coming to power in Laos. 
Indonesia had stronger communication with Vietnam during the period, due to a sense of a 
common identity of interests. Both had declared independence in 1945. There was also a 
shared identity of interests, and perhaps a basis and capacity for dialogue, indicated by 
Indonesia's willingness to talk with Vietnam, on the parts of both the Foreign Ministry and 
Defence Ministry. 
Being members of the one group, the joint stance between Indonesia and Malaysia was 
reflected in the Kuantan Declaration and their support for each other's proposals. 
Indonesia and Malaysia maintained consistent interests in moving ahead, such as the 
'Five-plus-Two Dialogue' proposal. Malaysia was also supportive of the idea of the 'Cocktail 
Party' Meeting proposed by Indonesia. 
According to Frank Frost, after its change of government, Thailand departed a little from 
ASEAN's position on the Cambodian crisis. There was interplay of regional policy, 
domestic political structure and characters, and the impact of domestic changes on 
regional policy. Frost also sees that Singapore, Indonesia and Brunei were quite consistent 
while the Philippines did not fit the pattern of any grouping. 75 
It should be noted that there had been four bilateral border security cooperation within 
ASEAN during the Cambodian crisis: between Thailand and Malaysia, Malaysia and 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Indonesia, and Malaysia and the Philippines. The Malaysia-
Thailand arrangement constituted the earliest and most comprehensive cooperation within 
ASEAN. Since 1977, joint operations, both combined and coordinated, had been used to 
suppress the 'bits and pieces' left of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) operating on 
the Thai-Malaysia border. These operations continued until 1989, when the CPM signed a 
peace accord with the Thai-Malaysian authorities, proclaiming an end to its armed struggle. 
75 Interview with Dr. Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 16 and 24 August 2011. 
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The joint operations led to the destruction of several CPM sanctuaries, kept the CPM on 
the run for most of the 1970s and 1980s and led to demoralisation within its rank.76 
For Malaysia and Indonesia, after the peace accord was signed between the two countries 
at the end of their confrontation in 1967, a joint border committee was established to 
conduct counterinsurgency operations along the Kalimantan-Sarawak and Kalimantan-
Sabah borders. The scope of these operations was enlarged in 1984 to cover maritime 
security issues facing the two sides, including smuggling, piracy and arms selling. With the 
decline of the communist threat, the border committee shifted its attention to the South 
China Sea issue and military exercises and joint contingency plans for a common response 
against a spill-over of the Cambodian crisis. 77 
In addition to the annual meetings of the intelligence agencies of all the ASEAN countries, 
bilateral arrangements covering intelligence exchanges existed between Singapore and 
Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia, Indonesia and Thailand, 
and Singapore and Brunei.78 On the escalation of the Cambodian crisis, it was claimed that 
some bilateral exercises could be geared to providing a common response to a Vietnamese 
threat. Furthermore, bilateral military exercises also served as a confidence building 
measure, helping the participants to overcome mutual suspicion and promoting an 
understanding of each other's military-security requirements .79 Indonesia, Singapore and 
Malaysia, despite their divergent perspectives, were ready to assist Thailand against a 
Vietnamese attack. Indonesia asserted that it would provide aid to Thailand. Indonesia's 
Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, General Panggabean, stated that 
Indonesia's assistance could take the form of economic as well as military aid. Malaysia 
was less accommodating as far as direct military aid was concerned. The Home Minister, 
Ghazalie Shafie, indicated that Malaysia envisaged provision of logistic support rather than 
troop assistance as the form of aid in the event of a Vietnamese attack. Singapore's position 
was to be ready to provide logistic support as well as armaments to Bangkok. 80 
76 Amitav Acharya, 'Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the 
Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN', Journal of Peace Research, 29:1 , 1992, pp. 7-21. 
n Acharya, 'Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World '. 
78 Amitav Acharya, 'A Survey of Military Cooperation among the ASEAN States: From Bilateralism to Alliance? ' 
Occasional Paper of Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, o. 14, May 1990. 
79 Acharya, 'Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World '. 
80 Acharya, 'A Survey of Military Cooperation among the ASEAN States : From Bilateralism to Alliance?'. 
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D. War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft 
War was not regarded as a legitimate instrument for any ASEAN country during the whole 
period of the Cambodian crisis, thus the indicator of war being a legitimate instrument of 
statecraft is considered as insignificant. ASEAN member countries viewed Vietnam's 
invasion of Cambodia as being against ASEAN's principle of the non-use of force. Vietnam 
and Cambodia as countries in dispute were regarded as outsiders to the organisation. An 
ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) meeting was held to discuss the escalation of the 
armed conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia. It resolved that in conformity with the 
principles of the UN Charter and the Bangkok Declaration, all countries in the region shall 
be obliged: 
to strictly respect each other's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political system; to refrain from using force or threatening to use force or 
threatening to use force in their bilateral relations, from interfering in each other's 
internal affairs and from carrying out subversive activities, directly or indirectly 
against each other; to settle all difference between the countries by peaceful means 
through negotiations in a spirit of equality, mutual understanding and respect. 81 
ASEAN also rejected the idea of becoming a military pact despite concerns regarding the 
crisis. Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila stated: 'We in ASEAN don't want to be seen 
as a military pact ... and even though regional security relates to all of us, we have never 
agreed to have multilateral military exercises'. 82 
Balance of External Great Power Influence 
The Cambodian crisis cannot be separated from great-powers rivalry. In this section, I 
argue that the management of the crisis is explained more by the indicators associated with 
a balance of external great power influence during the de-escalation period. During this 
period, the US started playing a more active role, the Soviet Union started changing its 
behaviour and promoted a 'detente' relationship with other world's great powers; and the 
Permanent Five took charge in the crisis management. External powers, such as France 
and Australia, started demonstrating significant roles in the crisis. 
E. Dependency on external great powers as security providers 
The 'dependency on external great powers as security providers' indicator is significant in 
pointing to the presence of a balance of external great power influence. Many academics 
argue that the Indochina crisis situation was dependent on the triangular relationship 
among China, the Soviet Union and the US. Banning Garrett, for example, argues that the 
81 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Documents on the Kampuchean Problem, 1979-1985, p. 73. 
82 Bangkok Post, 11 September 1982 quoted in Acharya, 'A Survey of Military Cooperation ', p. 7. 
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basic dynamic of the triangular relationship during the Indochina crisis was each power 
trying to prevent any collaboration against it by the other two. 83 Some ASEAN countries, 
particularly those that were directly threatened, depended on external security providers. 
Thailand had a tacit alignment with China and military assistance from the US. The tacit 
alliance with China resulted from Sino-Thai relations and not from a common position vis-
a-vis the Cambodian crisis. Singapore strongly supported this alliance and Indonesia and 
Malaysia were not against it because they tried to tolerate the other countries' interests. 
However, it somehow affected the unity of the organisation. Thailand was not able to 
depend on ASEAN states to militarily oppose the invasion of Cambodia, deter incursion on 
its border or defend its territory. 84 The tacit alignment with China ended in January 1979 
after Vietnam invaded Cambodia. The PRC continued to give assurances to Thailand that it 
would invade Vietnam if Vietnamese troops entered Thailand. The PRC not only acted as a 
deterrent but also a provider of military equipment to Bangkok. 8s 
However, the external security given by the providers did not amount to a security 
guarantee. There were two basic problems with security and defence associations, as 
identified by Ronald Yalem: (i) the difference in power and resources of great powers and 
their regional allies, and the consequent opportunity for and the propensity of the great 
powers to manipulate and control their lesser allies; and (ii) the conflict between the 
interests of the great powers and their ability to concentrate their superior military and 
economic resources within one region on the one hand, and the regional security 
environment where threats could be indigenous in origin on the other hand. 86 Thailand, 
during the Cambodian crisis, sought security assistance from the US, which transferred 
increased financial and military aid to Thailand. In February 1979, when the Thai Foreign 
Minister visited Washington, President Carter told him that the US would honour its 
security commitments under the Manila Pact of September 1954. It also accelerated supply 
of arms to the Thai military. However, Thailand was a victim of the second weakness, as 
argued by Yalem, pertaining to its formal alliance with the US and this was reflected in the 
US policy. The US' assistance was not merely for helping Thailand but more related to US 
relations with the other external great powers, such as the Soviet Union and China. 
83 Banning Garret, 'The Strategic Triangle and the Indochina Crisis', in David P.W. Elliott, Th e Third Indochina 
Conflict, Boulder: Westview Press, Inc, 1981. 
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F and G. Alignment and military cooperation with external great powers 
Two indicators, namely the alignment with external factors and the military cooperation 
with external factors, are examined in this section. The combining of these two indicators 
is aimed at seeing the broader picture of cooperation with external powers and its 
implication for their roles in the crisis. The crisis between Cambodia and Vietnam served 
to give rise to a wider struggle engaging the interests of major external states over the 
appropriate and acceptable pattern of power in Indochina. The conflict became central to 
the competing interests of China and the Soviet Union, when they committed resources to 
the cause of their respective clients. 
The key elements of a balance of external great power influence during the Cambodian 
crisis were the changes of behaviour of external great powers. The Soviet Union's 
behaviour change was related to the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations and the 
strengthening alliance between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Sino-Soviet differences 
escalated when the Vietnamese opted for an alliance with the Soviets and the latter 
provided them with much needed equipment and assistance. China was further alarmed by 
the Kampuchean developments. The Pol Pot government, which was supported by China, 
was largely and obviously menaced by the Vietnamese government. While China called for 
the formation of a 'provisional coalition government' head~d by Sihanouk, the Soviets 
proposed a 'provisional organ under the charge of Sihanouk with quadripartite 
representation'. 87 During the de-escalation period, the change of behaviour of the external 
great powers, which led to the importance of a balance of external great power influence, 
will be further explained below. 
Soviet Union 
None of the ASEAN member states established an alliance with the Soviet Union during 
the Cambodian crisis. However, Vietnam's alliance with the Soviet Union was crucial in 
this crisis and will therefore be discussed. It somehow affected the pattern of alignment 
between Thailand and Singapore with China and the US. The Soviet Union's role was also 
crucial in bringing the crisis to an end. International support for Vietnam's Cambodia 
policy had been largely confined to the Soviet Union and its allies. The USSR, which saw 
Vietnam as a 'bastion of peace and socialism in SEA', is estimated to have provided aid 
valued at $US73om in 1979 and during the period since the signing of the Soviet-Vietnam 
friendship treaty (November 1978) and the Kampuchean invasion saw an increased Soviet 
87 Frank Frost, The Kampuchea Conflict: Internal conditions, regional and international implications and the 
current prospects for negotiation and settlement, Department of the Parliamentary Library Current Issues 
Brief, No. 5, 1980. 
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presence in Vietnam. 88 There were an estimated 5000-8000 Soviet training personnel in 
Vietnam, and extensive use of Vietnamese base facilities was made by Soviet aircraft and 
naval vessels. 89 The only major non-Soviet bloc country that recognised the PRK in 
Cambodia was India. It did not merely derecognise the DK but also recognised the PRK as 
announced by the government just after the border fight oflate June 1980. 
Radical change in Eastern Europe and internal instability in the Soviet Union reinforced 
Soviet President Gorbachev's need for greater outreach to the West. This motivated the 
Soviets to attempt to reach a detente with the US and China, after Mikhail Gorbachev. 
Gorbachev's desire to improve relations with the PRC was indicated in a speech in 
Vladivostok on 28 July 1986. Negotiations on the normalisation of relations were initiated 
in August 1988. The restoration of party-to-party ties with China also had an impact on 
Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. When Sino-Soviet relations were 
restored, the Soviet Union terminated its support for Vietnam. Without substantial 
support from the Soviet Union, Vietnam was unable to continue its occupation of 
Cambodia; the Vietnamese leaders understood that it would not receive any further 
substantial support from the Soviets. Consequently, being no longer able to rely on 
external assistance and in urgent need of domestic economic reforms, Vietnam withdrew 
its troops in September 1989. Its decision made a Sino-Vietn9-mese dialogue possible and 
brought the prospect of a peaceful solution in Cambodia closer.9° 
China 
China had a tacit alliance with Thailand and to a lesser extent with Singapore. Chinese 
strategic policy was dominated by its aspiration to avert a situation where one single state 
could control Indochina and threaten its south-eastern border. 91 It had three major 
objectives in the region. First, it looked for a significant decline of Soviet influence in the 
region. Second, it sought the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia and the removal of 
Vietnamese power from China's southern periphery. Third, it sought the termination of the 
Vietnamese-influenced Heng Samrin/ Hun Sen government. 92 China would not accept 
Vietnamese hegemony over Cambodia and Laos. Therefore, China remained relentlessly 
opposed to the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea. After the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia in December 1978, China was prepared to 'punish' Vietnam during its invasion 
88 Frost, The Kampuchea Conflict. 
89 Frost, The Kampuchea Conflict. 
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in February-March 1979 and it issued warnings that a second 'punishment' could not be 
ruled out if Vietnam continued what China regarded as aggressive and expansionist 
policies in the region. China was particularly suspicious of Vietnam's alignment with 
Moscow and perceived the invasion of Cambodia as part of a Soviet regional expansion. 
China, therefore, established a tacit alignment with Thailand. 
China was the only state that strongly supported the DK regime. Chinese leaders attempted 
to downplay the DK regime's past record in office as policy 'errors' which the Khmer Rouge 
was rectifying. In addition to its direct military activities, Beijing actively supported the 
Khmer Rouge resistance, which had established sanctuaries along the Thai-Cambodian 
border. The Khmer Rouge had killed over 40,000 to 50,000 soldiers by June 1980.93 
Receiving Chinese assistance through Thailand, the Khmer Rouge fought guerrilla warfare 
that prevented the Heng Samrin government from fully controlling its territory. 94 
Moreover, it obliged Vietnam to commit numerous troops in Cambodia and to hold yearly 
offensive operations along the eastern border of Thailand. These attacks against Khmer 
resistance led to military incursions into Thai territory. Some limited military assistance 
was provided by Thailand and Singapore to the so-called non-communist Khmer 
resistance. China saw the withdrawal of Vietnam and the restoration of the DK regime as 
the only acceptable outcome in Kampuchea. 
Over 1986-90, Thailand had planned to rely upon Chinese weapons purchases to 
modernise Thai defence capabilities in three areas: (1) strengthen Thailand's ability to 
handle border incursions; (2) strengthen Thailand's integrated air defence; and (3) expand 
Thailand's naval capabilities. Chinese terms for the purchases were reportedly at 
'friendship prices' -half the normal cost, low interest rates, and a five-year grace period for 
instalment payments.95 After Chavalit resigned from the Army in March 1990 to become 
deputy defence minister, the Thai military's enthusiasm for Chinese weapons faded , and 
Chavalit's successor, General Suchinda, declared that Thailand would turn to the US for 
weapons purchases. 
United States 
Thailand and the Philippines were the US' allies during the cns1s. US policy in the 
Indochina region was particularly sensitive because of the deep impact which the Vietnam 
93 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF. 
94 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF. 
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War had on American society and on the lives of several million US servicemen and their 
families. America's political strategic interests centred on assuring a settlement in 
Cambodia that restored stability to Southeast Asia, secured the interests of the US treaty 
ally Thailand and the other members of ASEAN and checked the expansion of Soviet 
influence through Vietnam or other means in Southeast Asia. 96 
The US had a strong interest in the strategically and economically important 
communication routes that converge in the Straits of Malacca and other passageways in 
the region. The Soviet presence at US built bases in Vietnam including Soviet bombers, 
fighter aircraft, submarines and surface warships at times posed a potentially serious 
challenge to US access to those routes, but in late 1989, Moscow pulled some forces back 
from bases in Vietnam. US interest in working with ASEAN members to check Soviet-
backed Vietnamese expansion continued in parallel with US cooperation with other 
ASEAN regional actors concerned with Soviet and Vietnamese influence, notably China 
and Japan. Indeed, common opposition to suspected Soviet expansion or 'hegemonism' in 
Asia was a central feature of US-Chinese negotiations following the opening of diplomatic 
relations with Beijing in 1972. 97 
The US strongly condemned the Vietnamese invasion and _ presence in Cambodia and 
supported moves to maintain diplomatic recognition for the DK in the UN as a response. 
In contrast to China, the US did not support the return to power of the DK regime, which it 
regarded as thoroughly discredited and unacceptable. Somphong Chomak argues that 
Thailand and the US were incorporated into an alignment opposed to the consolidation of 
Vietnamese power throughout the whole of Indochina. 98 
The US remained an ally of Thailand, the key ASEAN conduit of support for all three 
Cambodian resistance groups and the base for the 300,000 displaced Cambodians who 
provided the new recruits for the resistance. The US also transferred covert and overt aid 
to the non-communist Cambodian resistance. Besides allying with Thailand, US leaders 
also focused on various efforts by third parties to reach a settlement in Cambodia. Efforts 
by ASEAN countries, France, Australia and the UN were considered in the late 1980s and 
1990_99 Interestingly, US President Jimmy Carter had tacitly approved China's punitive 
96 Robert G. Sutter, The Cambodian Crisis & US Policy Dilemmas, Boulder: West\iew Press, 1991. 
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offensive on Northern Vietnam during Deng Xiaoping's visit to the US in early 1979. 100 
This complex alignments and military cooperation with external great powers led me to 
consider that these two indicators are significant. 
H. Distribution of external great powers' armed forces 
Both the Soviet Union and China deployed their armed forces in the 'conflicting area'. The 
Soviet Union launched a large-scale military supply in the spring of 1979 to aid Vietnam, 
with a total of 79 flights over Thai air-space within May and June 1979 alone. 101 The Soviet 
Union also supplied the most sophisticated weapons transported to the Sino-Vietnamese 
border areas. 102 Hanoi also relied upon the Russians for technical and logistic support and 
tehnical and military advice. Vietnam also opened up its air bases and seaports to Soviet 
use. 103 China, on the other hand, had stationed up to 300,000 troops along the Sino-
Vietnamese border in 1979, which served to impose high costs on Vietnam's military 
venture in Cambodia. Hanoi itself deployed approximately 150,000 troops in Cambodia for 
over 10 years to defend Heng Shamrin against the insurgent forces. 104 
The US possessed two military bases in the Philippines during the Cambodian crisis, 
namely the Naval Base Subic Bay, in Olongape, Zambales and the Clark Air Force Base. 
Naval Base Subic Bay was established in 1884 and closed in 19_92, while the Clark Air Force 
Base was established in 1930 and closed in 1991. The Clark Air Force Base was a 
stronghold of the combined Filipino and American Forces during the end of the Vietnam 
War. However, these military bases did not necessarily have a connection with the US 
involvement during the Cambodian crisis . Thus, the 'distribution of external great powers' 
armed forces' indicator is regarded as moderate in indicating the existence of a balance of 
external great power influence in Southeast Asia during the Cambodian crisis. 
I. Economic dependence on external great powers 
The indicator, economic dependence on external great powers , 1s rated as moderate 
because it was only Thailand that was heavily dependent on external assistance during the 
crisis. It is difficult to separate economic aid and military aid in the crisis , as these were 
already interconnected at the time the crisis occurred. Thailand was dependent, 
particularly for economic assistance to support the Cambodians, on China and the US. 
100 Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Reg ional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security, Adelphi 
Paper no 302, London : International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996. 
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Chinese aid to Thailand totalled $283 million from 1985 to 1989 alone, and the military 
also gained preferential access to advanced weapons technology and oil. This allowed the 
Thai military to control a fifth of the national budget by 1982, shoring up the capitalist 
dictatorship. 10s 
Washington assisted the CGDK camps in Thailand with an input of US $20 million and 
annual aid ranging from US$17 million to US$32 million thereafter. 106 The US also 
transferred up to $5 million through international relief agencies to children within 
Cambodia. 107 Japan gave about US$5.8 million in assistance to Thailand between 1980 and 
1984. During the same period Canada transferred about US$3.5 million. West Germany in 
1981-1984 assisted Thailand by donating US$3-4 million. 108 
Thailand also requested the United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO), which was 
responsible for assisting the refugees, to assist about 80,000 Thai villagers. In 1984 alone, 
assistance given to Thai villagers who were affected by the refugee exodus and fighting on 
the border amounted to US$4,205,300. 109 Several International Organisations also 
assisted both the refugees and Thai villages. The International Committee of the Red Cross, 
for example, had begun its assistance operation, including medical treatment, in 1975. 
UNICEF provided assistance in water supplies, medication _and education worth US$2 
million during 1980-1981. no Another international organisation that offered assistance was 
the World Food Program, which provided food assistance. 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia were less dependent on such external assistance than 
Thailand. However, initiated by Singapore, ASEAN gave military aid to CGDK. Jakarta 
was unwilling to join or to legitimise ASEAN's behaviour. With Singapore leading the way, 
a covert Singaporean-Malaysian-Thai-American group was convened regularly in Bangkok 
to coordinate assistance to the CGDK. This included arms, ammunition, training, 
communication equipment, food and the establishment of a Khmer language radio station 
with British assistance. Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia spent around US$70 million.11 1 
Vietnam was dependent on the Soviet Union. Soviet officials provided material support 
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(over $3 billion a year in economic and military aid) to support Vietnam and PRK. In 1989, 
they reportedly gave Phnom Penh double the amount of military equipment delivered in 
1988. However, aid levels dropped quickly after that. 112 
Vietnam had virtually no other choice to rely on but to the Soviet Union for the necessary 
economic assistance to rebuild the underdeveloped country. In late 1975, Le Duan, First 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Working People's Party of Vietnam, signed a 
number of highly significant economic agreements in Moscow. One pledged 'coordination 
of national economic development plans' of the two countries, 113 while another promised a 
major Soviet guarantee of Vietnam's forthcoming five-year plan (1976-80). The Soviet 
Union was Vietnam's major aid donor and its largest trade partner. Moreover, Vietnam 
increased its exports to the Soviet Union by 157 per cent in the first six months of 1977 in 
its effort to pay off Soviet loans which had financed Hanoi's huge trade deficit. Finally, 
other than the small arms which came largely from China until the end of the war when 
Beijing terminated the flow, and the $5 billion worth of equipment left by the US forces in 
1975, Vietnam's military hardware came from the Soviet Union. 
Vietnam was also subject to an economic embargo by the US. The US finally ended its 
embargo. This was seen to be the main incentive that could be _offered by the US in order to 
encourage Hanoi to press its client regime in Phnom Penh to be flexible over a Cambodian 
settlement. The US also exerted influence on the lending policies of international financial 
institutions and some influence on the lending policies of other sources, notably Japan. 
The Role of Other External Powers 
In order to envisage a more comprehensive picture of the cns1s, the decisive role of 
external powers will be elaborated. Although they were not particularly aligned with any 
conflicting factions in the crisis or with Southeast Asian countries, their roles were crucial 
in helping ASEAN states bring peace to Cambodia. 
Australia 
Australia's involvement was recorded when Australian Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden set 
out the principles which Australia considered necessary in seeking a settlement. Hayden's 
proposal was to pursue a comprehensive Cambodian solution based on: 
112 Sutter, The Cambodian Crisis & US Policy Dilemmas. 
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... the acceptance by Vietnam of an appropriate accommodation with its 
neighbours; phased withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia matched 
by an effective arrangement to prevent Khmer Rouge forces going back into 
Cambodia; an act of self-determination for Cambodia; the creation of conditions 
for the peaceful return of displaced Cambodians to Cambodia; the acceptance by 
all parties that Cambodia is neutral, independent and non-aligned and the 
restoration of normal relations on the part of Vietnam with China, ASEAN and 
the west. 114 
However, such a proposal encountered resistance from ASEAN, particularly from Thailand 
and Singapore, and from China. Hayden continued to try to insert new ideas into the 
debate. A series of three seminars on Cambodia were held at Griffith University which 
brought representatives of all major contending parties together with the exception of the 
Khmer Rouge. ns Hayden, later on in 1986, initiated a proposal for a tribunal to try the 
Khmer Rouge on charges of genocide as a way of improving the conditions for national 
reconciliation, but this proposal was not widely accepted. n 6 
Australia's proposal was then developed by Gareth Evans, the successor of Hayden. Based 
on initial suggestions by Prince Sihanouk and US Congressman Stephen Solarz, Australia 
announced its proposal on 24 November 1989. This proposal sought an enhanced role for 
the UN in the transitional process. Unlike Hayden's proposal, this proposal quickly gained 
widespread support. From December 1989, Senator Evans' envoy, Michael Costello, did 
shuttle diplomacy, 'selling' the proposal to Southeast Asian countries. This proposal then 
became a reference for conflicting parties in the JJM_ n 7 With this proposal, Australia was 
able to cooperate actively with the ASEAN member states in looking towards a settlement. 
Senator Evans worked closely with Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, as Michael 
Maley, one of the contributors of the Red Book on the election part has observed: 
I am pretty sure the proposal was developed in a very close consultation with 
Deplu. When we were doing the actual drafting, it was the Australian exercise, but 
the ideas were being bounced around the other players to make sure that it was 
not going to make any embarrassment or cause difficulties to any party. 
Diplomacy associated with the ideas was starting at the same time as the 
document was being cooked together. 11B 
He also argues that the Red Book was quite influential and useful in pursuing avenues 
towards a settlement. He particularly argues: 
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France 
It was quite influential in terms of the shape of the mission, and the model for a 
UN mission was ultimately embodied in the Paris Agreements and its annexes 
were reasonably quite close to what was in the Red Book. The proposal also gave 
a momentum to the process in which Australia was able to think through what 
should happen after the signing of the agreement. 119 
Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia requested on April 6, 1989 that the French President hold an 
International Conference with the goal of facilitating a resolution to the Cambodian 
problem. France responded positively the next day, with the French Foreign Minister 
stating: 'France confirms that it would be ready to accommodate the indispensable 
international conference intended to bring about and guarantee the restoration of peace in 
Cambodia'. Several other factors also encouraged France to host an International 
Conference on Cambodia. First, with its historical links with the Indochina region, it felt 
that it had a moral obligation to help to resolve the Cambodian crisis. Secondly, France had 
been maintaining contacts with Prince Sihanouk: Sihanouk had mentioned that the future 
Cambodian Constitution should resemble the French Constitution. Third, France also did 
not want a communist-dominated government in Cambodia. Fourth, as it was celebrating 
the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution of 1789, the French government had a 
desire to play a meaningful role in promoting peace and security in the world. Finally, it 
also wanted to establish a 'Francophone community world wide'. 12° France therefore 
requested that Indonesia serve as a Co-chairman of the PICC. 
The mix of international changes and their subsequent effects, particularly after the Soviet 
introduced a new era of flexibility in foreign relations as the Soviet Union tried to curtail 
foreign involvements, helped the creation of a settlement. At the same time, relations 
between Beijing and Moscow had improved. Vietnam lost its economic assistance from the 
Soviet Union. This process started to create new incentives for terminating the crisis. It 
was then easier for ASEAN, Australia, and the Permanent Five, including France to 
contribute and propose a peace settlement as the conflicting parties had become more 
flexible. The overall balance of power dynamics is summarised in Table 3.6 and Figure 3.3. 
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TABLE3.6 
Summary of the Indicators of a Balancing System during the Cambodian crisis 
Balance of Power among ASEAN Member States 
No Indicators Significant Moderate Insignificant 
A Relatively equal powers among a y 
minimum of two actors 
B. Intentions of some states to y 
exnand 
C. Alliances on the basis of short- y 
run interests 
D. War as a legitimate instrument y 
of statecraft 
Sub Total 1 1 2 
Balance of External Great Power Influence 
E. Dependency on external great y 
oowers as security providers 
F. Alignment with external great v' 
powers 
G. Military cooperation with y 
external great powers 
H. Distribution of external great v' 
powers' armed forces 
I. Economic dependence on v' 
external ?;reat powers 
Sub Total 3 2 0 
Total 4 3 2 
Source: Compiled by author 
FIGURE 3.3 
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121 Figure 3.3 combines a balance of power among ASEAN member states and a balance of great-power 
influence because scholars supporting the balancing idea often refer to both types. 
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Table 3.6 and Figure 3.3 reveal that the crisis management by ASEAN member states 
during the Cambodian crisis shows one significant indicator out of four associated with a 
balance· of power among ASEAN member countries. The regional security system, however, 
was characterised by signs of a balance of external great power influence in which some 
ASEAN member states still depended on external security providers, and had some forms 
of alignment and military cooperation with external great powers. Three out of five 
indicators were associated with a balance of external great power influence and each 
indicator is rated as significant. Nevertheless, the region could not be considered to exhibit 
the full dynamic of a balance of external great power influence because two indicators, 
namely the distribution of great power armed forces and economic dependence on great 
powers, were not significant. The balance of external great power influence dynamic 
existed throughout the whole period of crisis, but was only relevant and important in the 
settlement of the crisis during the de-escalation period. The US and the Permanent Five 
began to move in from 1990. The Soviet's efforts to promote a 'detente' situation with other 
great powers and to coerce Vietnam to pursue similar policies towards its neighbour also 
occurred during the de-escalation period. Therefore, during the de-escalation period the 
crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states indicated a balance of external 
great power influence. Because the external great powers were balancing towards an 
associative behaviour, it is fair to say that the crisis management during the de-escalation 
period was characterised as an 'associative balance of external great power behaviour'. 
3.6. ASEAN as a Concert of Powers? 
The final section provides an analysis of whether ASEAN worked as a concert of powers, as 
measured by the following indicators 122 listed in Box 3.2: 
Box 3.3 The Seven Indicators of a Concert of Powers 
A. A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order; 
B. A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers 
C. A pattern of cooperative behaviour; 
D. An effective equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all 
dominant powers; 
E. Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative 
mechanisms; 
F. Ajoint approach to regional issues; and 
G. A need for system stability and international order. 
Each of the indicators of a concert of powers is treated as equally important. Table 3.3 
provides a brief overview of each indicator of a concert of powers. 
122 These indicators are adapted from the literature on the concert of powers (see Section 2.5) . 
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No. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
Indicators 
A decisive shock 
to the stability 
of the prevailing 
order: 
Significant 
A high and self-
conscious level 
of cooperation 
among 
dominant 
powers: 
Significant 
TABLE3.7 
A Concert of Powers in Southeast Asia during the Cambodian Crisis? 
Indonesia 
For Indonesia, the 
Vietnamese invasion 
of Cambodia was a 
shock to the region's 
stability. 
Thailand Malaysia 
Concert of Powers 
For Thailand, besides For Malaysia, the 
being a shock to the Vietnamese invasion 
region's stability, it of Cambodia was a 
was a shock to the shock to regional 
country's stability. stability. There was 
also a fear of a spill-
over effect. 
Singapore 
For Singapore, besides 
being a shock to the 
region's stability, there 
was a fear of a spill-
over effect. 
Countries had differences but were still cooperative. All dominant powers in Southeast Asia 
considered the crisis important and therefore there was a high and self-conscious level of 
cooperation. Meetings and conferences were held intensively and communication and negotiations 
were also conducted actively. 
A pattern 
cooperative 
behaviour: 
of I A common pattern of cooperative behaviour was evident in the sense that the dominant powers 
were willing to cooperate to find a settlement. However, some particular patterns of behaviour 
disturbed the cooperative behaviour of dominant powers. 
Significant 
The Philippines 
and Brunei 
Darussalam 
It was a shock to the 
region's stability for 
the Philippines and 
Brunei Darussalam. 
However, it was not a 
decisive shock to their 
specific national 
interests. 
Limited self-conscious 
level of cooperation 
among the Philippines 
and Brunei 
Darussalam. 
Prior to and during the 
crisis, the pattern of 
cooperative behaviour 
demonstrated by the 
Philippines was not 
too active or involved 
in the management of 
the crisis. 
Brunei only joined 
ASEAN in 1984 and 
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No. 
D. 
E. 
Indicators 
An effective, 
equal, 
collectively 
predominant, 
interdependent 
group of all 
dominant 
powers: 
Moderate 
Institutionalised 
summit 
diplomacy and 
supporting 
consultative 
mechanisms: 
Significant 
Indonesia 
During the cns1s, the 
pattern was similar to 
Malaysia's. However, 
Indonesia was 
regarded as an 
interlocutor because of 
its close relations with 
Vietnam. 
Thailand Malaysia 
Concert of Powers 
During the cns1s, the During the cns1s: the 
pattern was similar to pattern was similar to 
Singapore's. Indonesia's. 
Singapore 
During the cns1s, the 
pattern was similar to 
Thailand's. 
The Philippines 
and Brunei 
Darussalam 
like the Philippines, it 
was not too active. 
The roles of the four members were relatively effective and equal. However, the roles were not 
always collectively predominant and interdependent. 
Their roles were not 
effective or equal 
compared to the other 
four members: 
Indonesia carried out 
some summit 
diplomacy with 
Malaysia, for example 
the Kuantan Meeting. 
Indonesia's leader also 
met the Foreign 
Minister of Vietnam in 
August 1985. 
President Soeharto 
also met PM Rajiv 
Gandhi in New Delhi 
on 16 November 1985. 
Thailand leaders met 
with ASEAN, China, 
Vietnam and the 
Khmer Rouge, and the 
nationalist Cambodian 
leaders. 
Malaysia carried out 
some summit 
diplomacy with 
Indonesia, for 
example, the Kuantan 
Meeting; and other 
ASEAN member 
states. 
Indonesia, Thailand, 
Malaysia, and 
Singapore. 
Singapore conducted No individual summit 
summit diplomacy diplomacy was 
with ASEAN member identified. 
states. 
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No. Indicators Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Singapore The Philippines 
and Brunei 
Darussalam 
Concert of Powers 
Supporting consultative mechanisms included: the Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, 12-13 January 1979, ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting in Bali, 28-30 June 1979, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 25-26 June 1980, the 
International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) in New York in 1981, the Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1982 to establish CGDK, 
the Jakarta Informal Meetings in July 1988 and February 1989, International Conference on Cambodia in Jakarta in 1991. 
F. A joint There was a joint approach. However each country also pursued other approaches individually. 
approach to 
regional issues: 
Moderate 
G. A need for There was a need for system stability and international order. 
system stability 
and 
international Indonesia considered Thailand also saw the Malaysia saw the need Singapore perceived a The Philippines and 
order: the need for system need for system for system stability need for system Brunei also saw the 
Significant stability and stability. However its and the need for stability. However, the need for regional 
international order national interests as the avoiding the rivalry of need for the stability. 
as its primary most affected country external great powers. prevention of 
objective. came first. One of the reasons for Vietnamese hegemony 
Malaysia's need for in Southeast Asia came 
system stability was first. 
the fact that it also 
became host of 
Cambodian refuj!;ees. 
Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author 
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A. A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order 
The crisis can be regarded as a decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order for 
several reasons. First of all, it violated the rule of the international states system, 
namely respect for national sovereignty which had been stipulated as the core principle 
of ASE.AN in 1976. Failure to respond would have discredited ASEAN and created a 
dangerous precedent. The Vietnamese invasion was a blatant case of aggression that 
altered the strategic environment in Southeast Asia. 
Secondly, a member state of ASEAN, Thailand, faced a direct external threat to its 
national security in the presence of Vietnamese military troops on its border. The other 
member states faced an indirect threat, the flow of predominately Indochinese refugees. 
This concern was shared by countries like Malaysia and Singapore. Indonesia's 
concerns were more about regional stability and the cessation of hope of establishing 
stable relations with Hanoi. The Cambodian crisis was the main priority of ASEAN for 
almost 20 years. Scholars such as Emmers contend that no comparable anxiety was 
demonstrated with Indonesia's entry into East Timor in 1975 and Malaysia's challenge 
over the legitimacy of Brunei Darussalam. 123 It is also often argued that Vietnam 
invaded its neighbour either to create an Indochinese federation under its control or to 
respond to a Chinese threat on its south-western border. General Vo Nguyen Giap, 
leading strategist and founding father of the People's Army of Vietnam, had then 
declared: 
Indochina is a strategic unit: a single theatre of operations. Therefore, we have 
the task of helping to liberate all of Indochina -especially for reasons of 
strategic geography, we cannot conceive of Vietnam completely independent 
while Cambodia and Laos are ruled by imperialism. 124 
Finally, it was feared that the strategic influence of external powers like China, Soviet 
and the US would result in more complication. The Cambodian crisis was related to the 
Sino-Soviet split. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and its hegemony over Laos was 
unacceptable to China. The PRC was highly suspicious of Hanoi's alignment with 
Moscow and perceived the occupation of Cambodia as part of a regional expansion by 
the Soviet Union. The invasion of Cambodia received financial assistance from the 
Soviet Union, whose regional presence increased in early 1979 through its military 
deployment at the air and naval bases at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. Interestingly, 
although the US shared the same concern with China, it had scaled down its military 
involvement in Southeast Asia and was initially unwilling to demonstrate an active 
response to the power shift in Indo China. Out of fear of the revival of communism and 
the greater influence of China, Indonesia and Malaysia supported Thailand and 
123 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF. 
124 Gareth Porter, 'Vietnamese Policy and the Indochina Crisis', in David W.P. Elliot ed., The Third 
Indochina Conflict, Boulder: Westview Press, 1981, p. 69. 
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Singapore, who saw Vietnam as posing a greater threat than China, in condemning the 
Vietnamese aggressive action. 
This complex situation united the ASEAN member countries in assuming a common 
respon.se for the need of regional order and stability. Rooted in the aspiration of the 
founding states, ASEAN's principal concern was and still is to establish a framework for 
regional order. Even though security did not formally become part of its agenda until its 
fourth summit in January 1992, the Association's success in its first 25 years was 
primarily in the political-security realm. 12s In fact, internal security and stability are 
major preoccupations of the ASEAN states and have significant regional implications, 
but the responsibility for addressing domestic conflicts is assigned almost entirely to 
each member state. 126 
B. A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers 
Countries with strong interests, such as Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore 
showed a self-conscious level of cooperation with considerable awareness of fellow 
countries' interests. This chapter argues that the dominant powers in ASEAN during 
the crisis were Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, and all demonstrated high 
commitment throughout the crisis. ASEAN, at that time, had not envisaged or 
formulated any conflict management in relation to conflicts involving non-member 
states. However, the dominant powers demonstrated a high and self-conscious level of 
cooperation, as shown by the intensity of the dialogue, meetings, conferences, and 
mediation sessions that ASEAN convened on the Cambodian issue. 
Because of its geographic location and military links with the US, the Philippines did 
not feel threatened by either Vietnam or China. Consequently, the Philippines, unlike 
the other four members of ASEAN, did not play a significant role in the crisis. Similar 
to the Philippines, Brunei also did not show a high and self-conscious level of 
cooperation pertaining to the management of the Cambodian crisis after joining 
ASEAN in 1984. It, however, was willing to be host to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' 
Meeting in January and July 1989. 
125 Muthiah Alagappa, 'Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict', 
Journal of International Affairs, 46:2, 1993, pp. 439-467. 
126 ASEAN, 'Declaration of ASEAN Concord', available at http://w,vw.aseansec.org/1216.htm (accessed on 
13 July 2010). As of December 2012, the ASEAN Secretariat's website has been reconstructed. Some of the 
links cited in this thesis may have been changed. The main link for the Secretariat's website now is 
www.asean.org. 
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C. A pattern of cooperative behaviour 
The pattern of cooperative behaviour did exist but had been changing from the early 
1970s up to the Paris Agreements in 1991. In this chapter, I argue that the pattern of 
cooperative behaviour in the early 1970s revealed Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand to 
be in one group and Malaysia and the Philippines in another group; these groups 
shared similar perspectives towards regional security. While Singapore and Thailand 
wanted a US presence in the region, Indonesia wanted ASEAN to play a greater role. 
These three countries, therefore, were less sympathetic towards Malaysia's proposal of 
the principle of neutralisation. The Philippines, interestingly, despite its close 
alignment with the US, welcomed the Malaysian proposal as it aspired to engage China 
in the region. 
Leifer argues that it was difficult for ASEAN to formulate a common response to this 
crisis. Its member states have never possessed a legal responsibility for collective 
defence. 12 7 ASEAN member states indeed held diverse perspectives and interests in how 
to define regional security and in how they viewed the conflict. However, ASEAN finally 
achieved a common stance on this issue. Its common values can be seen in several 
phases of the crisis. 
After the Vietnamese occupation in Cambodia in late December 1978, the pattern of 
-
cooperative behaviour changed. Pre-crisis, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand could be 
located in one group while Malaysia and Thailand were in the other group. Right after 
Vietnam invaded Cambodia, Thailand and Singapore perceived Vietnam as a threat and 
were together regarded as a 'hard-liner' group while Indonesia and Malaysia perceived 
China as a threat to regional stability and were known as a 'soft-liner' group. The 
Philippines abstained from the debate. This pattern, however, led to a single stance of 
working together to resolve the problem. The single stance invigorated cooperative 
behaviour among the ASEAN states. 
D. An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of 
all dominant powers 
The roles of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore were relatively effective and 
equal, although it is hard to say that the group was fully collective, predominant or 
interdependent. There were instances when they demonstrated themselves to be a 
collective, predominant and interdependent group of dominant powers. No one country 
claimed to be the decision maker. No one country became so angry or was disturbed by 
another country's perspective which was different from its own. 
12 7 Michael Leifer, 'ASEAN and the problem of common response', International Journal, 38:2, 1983, pp. 
316-329. 
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However, the dominant powers did not always share the same strategic outlook and 
this was due to a long-established different emphasis by Indonesia and Malaysia on the 
one hand, and Thailand and Singapore on the other hand. Those differences were 
evident quite soon after the 'Kuantan Declaration'. Meanwhile, the role of the 
Philippines and Brunei Darussalam were not equal compared to other four ASEAN 
members. 
Because the roles of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore were effective and 
equal and were considerably predominant and interdependent, the 'effective, equal, 
collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers' indicator can 
be regarded as moderate. 
E. Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative 
mechanisms 
High Level Diplomacy 
The various institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative 
mechanisms suggest that this indicator is significant. Institutionalised high level 
diplomacy included: the Kuantan Meeting in 1980, the Special Meeting of ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers, 12-13 January 1979, ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bali, 28-30 June 
1979, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 25-26 June 1980, the 
International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) in New York in 1981, the Meeting in 
Kuala Lumpur in 1982 to establish CGDK, the Jakarta Informal Meetings in July 1988 
and February 1989, International Conference on Cambodia in Jakarta in 1991. Among 
these meetings, the Kuantan Meeting was the only summit of leaders. The declaration, 
joint statements and other outcomes of these meetings led to ASEAN's success m 
gathering international support for a settlement at various international meetings. 
On 9 January 1979, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Professor Mochtar Kusumaatmadja 
formulated the initial ASEAN response to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. However, 
the statement did not mention Vietnam in order to preserve a possible form of dialogue 
with the country. A special meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers was held in 
Bangkok on 12-13 January 1979 and led to a stronger position being taken that 
condemned the invasion. The Joint Statement of 12 January declared: 'The ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers strongly deplored the armed intervention against the independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea' .128 In addition, it asserted the right 
of the 'Kampuchean people to determine their future by themselves free from 
128 ASEAN, 'Joint Statement of the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Current 
Political Development in the Southeast Asia Region, Bangkok, Thailand, 12 January 1979', aYailable at 
www.aseansec.org(3zo8.htm (accessed on 21 September 2011). 
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interference or influence from outside powers in the exercise of their rights of self-
determination and called for the immediate and total withdrawal of foreign forces from 
Kam puchean territory'. 129 
This response was repeated in the joint communique of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
organised in Bali on 28-30 June 1979. ASEAN's diplomatic response to Vietnam's 
invasion of Cambodia was brought to the UN in 1979. Soeharto and the Malaysian 
Prime Minister Hussein Onn discussed how the satisfaction of interest in Cambodia 
might be achieved at Kuantan, Malaysia, in March 1980. The 'Kuantan Declaration' 
proposed a political settlement that specifically recognised Hanoi's security interests in 
Kampuchea. Cambodia should be made neutral and non-aligned with a maximum 
degree of autonomy, but Hanoi would exercise 'effective veto power over much of 
Cambodia's defence and foreign policy'. 13° 
Informal Meetings 
The JIMs were examples of informal meetings and also paved the way for the 1989 
Paris Peace Conference and the 1991 Paris Accord. The First JIM in Bogor provided a 
breakthrough in the peace process. The four Kampuchean parties sat down together at 
the same table, free from any outside influence, to discuss independently their own 
affairs. The first JIM had provided a vivid example of how through an informal 
meeting, a problem could be discussed and negotiated. 
Other informal meetings included talks between the Foreign Ministries of Indonesia 
and Vietnam in Ho Chi Minh City in July 1987, followed by the talks between Prince 
Sihanouk and Hun Sen in late 1987. Indonesian and Vietnamese officials also visited 
each other at least nine times seeking to explore ways to conduct dialogues with 
Vietnam. Indonesia's visits can be traced back to May 1980 when General Murdani, 
Indonesia's Military Intelligence Chief, visited Hanoi to draw out from his counterpart. 
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach, Vietnam's views on Cambodia. On 3-4 September, 
Murdani paid a second visit to Hanoi to discuss the Cambodian problem with Vietnam 
Foreign Minister, Thach. Almost three years later, Murdani paid another three day visit 
on 13 February 1984 as Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces. This time, his 
trip was termed an 'official visit' for the Indonesian Foreign Minister was informed in 
advance of the visit. He sought to impress Vietnam that Indonesia was trying to look for 
an early solution to the Cambodian crisis in the wider interests of the region. 
12 9 ASEAN, 'Joint Statement of the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Current 
Political Development in the Southeast Asia Region'. 
130 Serpong Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy?, Singapore: !SEAS 
Publishing, 2000, p. 140. 
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The Vietnamese Defence Minister returned Murdani's visit in April 1985, reaffirming 
the deepening friendship and relationship between Indonesia and Vietnam. Vietnamese 
Foreign Minister Thach visited Jakarta in August 1985 to talk with Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja and President Suharto. In July 1987, Mochtar made a visit to Vietnam 
to convey a message from Prince Sihanouk to the Vietnamese leaders and also to 
discuss and finalise his 'Cocktail Party' proposal. The Joint Press Release said that the 
proposed talks would be held in an 'informal way' between the two sides of Kampuchea 
on the basis of equal footing without preconditions and with no political label. 131 
On 21 November 1987, Vo Van Kiet, Deputy Prime Minister of Vietnam visited Jakarta, 
and praised Indonesian foreign policy for its substantial contribution to the promotion 
of peace and stability in the world in general and Southeast Asia in particular. 
Following the signing of the Mochtar-Thach agreement, the two countries formed a 
high level group consisting of senior Foreign Ministry Officials. This working group met 
twice, first on 23-24 November 1987 and then on 21-23 December 1987 to prepare the 
groundwork for the 'Cocktail Party'. 132 Another meeting that was recorded was Alatas' 
visit to Hanoi on 17-19 November 1988 to discuss various aspects of the crisis with 
Vietnam and to seek Vietnam's support for the JIM II. 133 
F. A joint approach to regional issues 
The joint approach by ASEAN can be seen in the first (1978- mid 1980s) and second 
phases (mid 198os-1990) of the acute period. During the first phase, ASEAN made 
several efforts to manage the crisis. In these efforts, ASEAN presented a united voice. 
These efforts included, firstly, ASEAN making clear its stance that it was against the 
Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia in December 1978 and the subsequent 
overthrow of the existing government and the establishment of the pro-Vietnamese 
government -the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in early January 1979. 
Secondly, ASEAN's role in establishing the Coalition Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea (CGDK) in 1982 was also crucial. ASEAN encouraged the formation of the 
Khmer resistance coalition in 1982 and successfully led efforts at the UN to deny 
international acceptance of Vietnam's presence. 134 Thirdly, ASEAN was also regarded 
as successful in generating international condemnation and isolation of Vietnam. 
ASEAN's lobbying for support from other countries in the UN proved triumphant as a 
131 ASEAN, 'Joint Press Release of the Informal ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, Bangkok, 16 August 
1987), available at http://www.aseansec.org(37oo.html (accessed on 21 July 2011). 
132 Prasad, Indonesia 's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem. 
133 Prasad, Indonesia 's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem. 
134 Frank Frost, 'The Cambodia Conflict: the Path towards Peace', Contemporary Southeast Asia, 13:2, 1991, 
pp. 119-161. 
125 
growing majority of member-states of the UN supported the ASEAN position in the 
General Assembly during the 198os. 13s 
Throughout the 1980s, the General Assembly adopted resolutions calling for the 
withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia, criticising the military intervention in the 
country and expressing support for the struggle of the opposition coalition. ASEAN's 
success was also reflected in the declaration of a July 1981 ASEAN-initiated, UN 
sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea. The declaration also called for 
total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia, emphasised the right of the 
Cambodian people to self-determination and stressed the need for Cambodia to remain 
non-aligned in order to safeguard the legitimate security concerns of its neighbours. 136 
In mobilising international support for its goals, the ASEAN member states successfully 
used their membership in the UN, the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the 
British Commonwealth, as well as ASEAN's dialogue partnership with the US, the 
European Community, Japan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
During the second phase of the acute period, the approach adopted by ASEAN member 
states was not directed against Vietnam. Instead, ASEAN members gradually changed 
their perceptions towards Vietnam and the relations between Vietnam and the ASEAN 
-
countries gradually improved. This development is identified in several activities: (i) 
Indonesia-Vietnam dialogue in 1987; (ii) discussions between the Cambodia parties, 
the ASEAN members, Laos and Vietnam from 1987-1988; (iii) Jakarta Informal 
Meeting in 1988; and (iv) total withdrawal from Cambodia in September 1989. The 
involvement of 'dominant powers' in the Paris Agreements in October 1991 was 
evidence that they also played a role in the de-escalation period even though external 
great powers took charge. This change of approach was also related to the change of 
government in Bangkok. Chatichai Choonhavan, who became Prime Minister in August 
1988, abandoned the hard-line position of Thailand and adopted a new step-by step 
approach to the resolution of the conflict. Bangkok was then prepared -at least in the 
short term- to accept some Vietnamese political influence in Cambodia and Laos in 
return for a settlement. 
G. A need for system stability and international order 
The indicator, a need for system stability and international order, is rated as significant. 
Karl Deutsch and J . David Singer define 'stability' as 'the probability that the system 
13s Ramses Amer, 'Regional integration and conflict management: the case of Vietnam', Asia Europe 
Journal, 2:4, 2004, pp. 533-547. 
136 Alagappa, 'Regionalism and the Quest for Security'. 
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retains all of its essential characteristics: that no single nation becomes dominant; that 
most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur'. It is a 
characteristic of such a system; Deutsch and Singer add that it has the capacity for self-
regulation: the ability to counteract stimuli that would otherwise threaten its survival, 
much as the automatic pilot on an airplane or the governor on a steam engine would 
do. 137 Looking at these definitions, I argue that there was a need for system stability and 
international order during the Cambodian crisis. This indicator is significant because 
all ASEAN member states considered the system's stability and international order 
were crucial during the crisis. What made a difference between Indonesia, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore were their efforts in managing the crisis. Big efforts were 
demonstrated by Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. The efforts included 
meetings between leaders, negotiations between officials, visits to Vietnam and other 
ASEAN member states, and negotiations with external parties. In conclusion, the above 
analysis is rated in Table 3.8 and Figure 3.4. 
TABLE3.8 
Summary of the Indicators of a Concert of Powers during the Cambodian Crisis 
No Indicators Significant Moderate Insignifi Note 
cant 
A. A decisive shock to the ,.; Significant 
stability of the prevailing particularly 
order during the 
acute period 
B. A high and self-conscious ,.; Significant 
level of cooperation among throughout 
dominant powers the period 
C. A pattern of cooperative ,.; Significant 
behaviour throughout 
the perioud 
D. An effective, equal, ,.; Moderate 
collectively predominant, troughout 
interdependent group of all the period 
dominant powers 
E. Institutionalised summit ,.; Significant 
diplomacy and supporting particularly 
consultative mechanisms during the 
acute oeriod 
F. Ajoint approach to regional ,.; Moderate 
issues throughout 
the acute 
period 
G. A need for system stability ,.; Significant 
and international order throughout 
the acute 
period 
Total 5 2 0 
Source: Compiled by author 
137 Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, 'Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability', in James 
N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, rev. edn, 
New York: Free Press, 1969. 
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FIGURE3.4 
Indicators a Concert of Powers during the Cambodian Crisis 
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Table 3.8 and Figure 3.4 together reveal that ASEAN fulfilled most of the indicators of a 
concert of powers in this crisis. These indicators are: a decisive shock to the stability of 
the prevailing order; a high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant 
powers; a pattern of cooperative behaviour; institutionalised summit diplomacy and 
supporting consultative mechanisms; and a need for system stability and international 
order. 
-
I argue that these indicators show that the crisis management conducted by ASEAN 
member states during the Cambodian crisis in five out of seven indicators is similar but 
not identical with a classical concert of powers and each is rated as significant. Two 
indicators are considered moderate. The crisis management did not indicate any 
insignificant indicator at all. Therefore, it is fair to say that the management of this 
crisis indicated a modification of a classical concert of powers. However, because most 
of the significant indicators were important only during the acute period, the regional 
security system in Southeast Asia during the Cambodian crisis indicated a modification 
of a concert of powers only during the acute period of the crisis. As explained earlier in 
Section 3.5, the crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states indicated the 
existence of a balance of external great power influence during the de-escalation period. 
Because two indicators of a concert of powers are not evident, this observation requires 
me to hypothesise that it may be necessary, after examining the other case studies, to 
introduce another type of security concept whose indicators are variations of the 
classical concert. 
3.7. Conclusion: A Variation of a Concert of Powers? 
The crisis management during the Cambodian crisis certainly did not indicate the 
existence of a fully-fledged security community because only a minority of the four 
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significant indicators of the total ten indicators was indicated, and those four 
significant indicators were only demonstrated among the regional dominant powers. I 
argue that the nature of the crisis management indicated the existence of a balance of 
external great power influence during the de-escalation period. The de-escalation 
period was relevant to the management of the crisis because the external great powers, 
China, US and Soviet Union started to change their behaviour towards the crisis in 
early 1990 when the crisis was de-escalating. 
During the acute period, the regional security system in Southeast Asia was explained 
by the majority (five out of seven) of the indicators associated with a concert of powers. 
Dominant powers, during that period, acted largely but not completely like a concert of 
powers. There are some unique characteristics that are different from the classical 
conceptualisation of the concert of powers. First of all, the term 'concert of powers' 
usually comes with the notion of great powers. Instead of great world powers, the 
concert in Southeast Asia involved the 'regional dominant powers' - Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Furthermore, the term 'concert of powers' includes 
the notion that military forces could be used by the great powers to restore order in the 
region. However, in Southeast Asia the use of force to restore the region's order and 
stability was unthinkable. Diplomatic means was the main joint approach of the 
concerts in the region. 
Because of these unique characteristics, it is now necessary to consider whether a 
modified conceptualisation of a concert of powers is required to characterise the 
security system in Southeast Asia. The analysis in the next two case studies will 
therefore include observations about the possible variation of a classical classical 
concert of powers which could potentially provide the basis for indicators of a new 
conceptualisation of a concert of powers. 
The management of the Cambodian crisis also demonstrates that there was unequal 
sharing of responsibility among ASEAN member states. Countries like the Philippines 
did not participate actively because of the geographical separation, thus the crisis did 
not directly threaten its national interests. Furthermore, the benefit for the Philippines 
of being inactive in this crisis exceeded the benefit of being active because of the 
political domestic challenges Manila encountered during the period of the crisis. 
Meanwhile, Brunei Darussalam was hardly involved because it was a relatively new 
member, the crisis did not directly threaten its national interests, and it did not have 
the capacity to assist in managing the crisis. The next chapter examines a possible 
connection between the management of the East Timor crisis by the ASEAN member 
states and the regional security systems operating during that crisis. 
129 
CHAPTER4 
THE 1999-2002 EAST TIMOR CRISIS 
4.1. Introduction 
In 1999, ASEAN confronted another challenge, the East Timor crisis. 1 This was one of 
the most serious crises that ASEAN member states have coped with and it put ASEAN's 
international image at stake. For the purpose of explaining how ASEAN's role helps 
shed light on the regional security system in Southeast Asia, this chapter determines 
the period of the crisis to be between 27 January 1999 and 20 May 2002. The East 
Timor crisis started on 27 January 1999 when the Indonesian President B.J. Habibie 
announced a referendum for East Timor in which the East Timorese could opt for 
independence or accept Indonesia's proposal for autonomy. It ended when the East 
Timorese gained independence in May 2002. This period is selected because, during 
this time ASEAN member states demonstrated their serious involvement, unlike before, 
particularly when Indonesia took over East Timor as its territory and ASEAN member 
countries remained silent. 
In this chapter, I argue that during the escalation and acute periods the cns1s 
management conducted by ASEAN member states is characterised by the external 
influence of the UN, Australia, particularly of the US as an external great power. Their 
management did not however indicate a balance of external great power influence 
because the principle of balance was not evident. During the de-escalation period, the 
crisis management is characterised as meeting seven out of ten indicators of a security 
community, and each indicator is rated as significant. However, because the significant 
indicators are only met by those countries that participated and not all member states 
of ASEAN, I argue that a partial security community is indicated. The dominant powers 
in this crisis are Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same countries 
which participated actively in the Cambodian crisis. In addition, the Philippines 
became a new 'dominant power' during the de-escalation period of this crisis. 
ASEAN member states were concerned about the crisis because it represented a serious 
challenge to the ASEAN organisation, and it came from East Timor, which was part of 
Indonesia, one of the biggest ASEAN members and is argued to be one of the dominant 
powers in Southeast Asia. Most of the ASEAN member states appeared to be awkward 
1 Since its official recognition as an independent country, the official name of East Timor is Timor-Leste. 
This chapter is about the management of the East Timor crisis by ASEAN member states, but I refer to the 
organisation where it is relevant. 
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in responding to this crisis. 2 On the one hand, they did not want to jeopardise their 
relationship with Indonesia, and on the other hand, they were worried that instability 
in East Timor would affect the regional and their national security. The bordering 
neighbours, such as Singapore and Malaysia, generally sensed a greater urgency to 
respond to the crisis than more distant neighbours, such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos 
and Myanmar. 
This chapter comprises seven sections. Following the introduction, the second section 
starts with a brief background on how the crisis escalated, became acute and finally de-
escalated. The third section further sets out the ASEAN member states' different 
perceptions of threats during this crisis. The fourth section examines why the response 
of ASEAN member states to the East Timor crisis does not provide evidence that there 
was a balancing system, either a balancing system among the ASEAN member states or 
a balance of external great power influence. However, it demonstrates that an external 
great power, the US, and other external powers had leverage in influencing the 
response of Southeast Asian states to the East Timor crisis, particularly during the 
escalation and the acute periods of the crisis. The fifth section analyses why the 
management of the crisis is not completely explained by the indicators of a concert of 
powers. An examination of how the role of ASEAN member states in this crisis 
demonstrates some indicators of a security community among the participating powers 
is elaborated in the sixth section. A brief conclusion summarises the finding of this 
chapter. 
4.2. Background 
For the purpose of analysis, the East Timor crisis is divided into three periods: (i) a 
period of escalation, between the time when President Habibie announced a 
referendum and when the result of the referendum was announced (27 January - 30 
August 1999); (ii) an acute period, between the announcement of the result of the 
referendum, in which the majority of East Timorese voted for independence and the 
announcement by Habibie to allow an international peace-keeping force to restore 
security (30 August - 15 September 1999); (iii) a period of de-escalation, when Habibie 
allowed an international peace-keeping force to enter to when East Timor's 
independence was acknowledged in May 2002 (15 September 1999 - 20 May 2002). 
2 By the time the crisis started in 1999, ASEAN already had 10 members: the original five member 
countries; Brunei who joined in 1984; Vietnam which entered the organisation in 1995; Myanmar and Lao 
PDR which entered in 1997; and Cambodia which became a member in 1999. 
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Escalation Period 
The crisis began when the Indonesian President Habibie announced a proposal of a 
referendum in which the people East Timor could vote for independence or accept 
Indonesia's autonomy. This proposal was mostly stimulated by four major events that 
really incited the world's interest in East Timor: the Santa Cruz massacre; the case of 
Portugal versus Australia in the International Court of Justice (ICJ); the granting of the 
Nobel Peace Prize to Jose Ramos Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo; and the capture of 
Xanana Gusmao by the Indonesian government. Another factor that influenced 
Habibie's decision to open up an option for independence was the Australian Prime 
Minister's letter to President Habibie. 
These four major events occurred in a sequence. The first event is known as 'the Santa 
Cruz massacre'. On 12 November 1991, a group of people went to a burial ceremony for 
a friend who had died two days previously. This event was used by this group to protest 
against the Indonesian military's repression in East Timor. It stimulated tension with 
the military and ended up with the killing of some protesters. A key point was that it 
was captured on film. Due to this event, opposition to Indonesia's rule in East Timor 
increased. The Catholic Church also raised this issue and it gained popular attention 
around the world. After the event, the Portuguese government increasingly championed 
the East Timorese issue in international fora, including the UN. The second event that 
also attracted international attention was the capture of Xanana Gusmao on 20 
November 1992. Because of international pressure, in 1993 his sentence was commuted 
from life imprisonment to 20 years in prison. Also because of international pressure, on 
20 June 1998, President Habibie offered to free Xanana Gusmao, withdraw troops and 
establish a state of autonomy in East Timor. An intriguing argument asserted by 
Suhardi Somomoeljono is that if Habibie had not freed Xanana Gusmao, Xanana would 
have been happy to accept autonomy for East Timor and the position of Governor for 
himself. 3 The third event was the Australia versus Portugal case on 30 June 1995, 
resulting in a judgement of the ICJ on the 'Timor Gap Treaty'. In this case, Portugal 
challenged the legality of the so-called 'Timor Gap Treaty', negotiated between the 
Australian government and the Indonesian government to put forward a 'joint 
development of petroleum resources in an area of overlapping maritime jurisdiction' 
between Australia and East Timor'.4 The fourth event was when Bishop Carlos Belo of 
Dili and Jose Ramos Horta, who was the most prominent international spokesman for 
East Timor, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996. This award raised the issue of 
3 Suhardi Somomoeljono, Menguak Konspirasi Internasional di Timor Timur Sebuah Analisis Yuridis, 
(Exploring an International Conspiracy in East Timor: a Juridical Analysis) Jakarta: Lembaga Studi 
Advokasi Independensi Peradilan Indonesia, 2001. 
4 William Maley, 'The UN and East Timor', Pacifica Review, 12:1, 2000, pp. 63-76, p. 66. 
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Timorese independence, not only in terms of publicity but also in terms of moral 
authority. It was also a shock for Indonesia as the prize givers doubtless intended. 5 
Another event that is also often argued by scholars to have influenced Habibie's 
decision to allow the option for independence was the letter sent to Habibie by the 
Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard. The Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT) and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet of Australia (at the 
time PM&C) suggested the Australian Prime Minister send a letter to President Habibie. 
According to Hugh White, the letter, which was signed on 19 December 1998, 
highlighted that: 
Australia wanted East Timor to remain part of Indonesia, and the proposal it 
made for an act of self-determination was couched clearly in the context of the 
discussions already underway between Indonesia and Portugal and East Timor's 
future in the UN. 6 
On the one hand, Australia wanted East Timor to remain part of Indonesia, and on the 
other, it proposed a self determination act. This rather contradictory proposal was an 
obvious policy shift, from fully supporting Indonesia's inclusion of East Timor in 1975 
to proposing the principle of self determination.? It was not clear whether Howard's 
letter became a major factor in Habibie's decision to open up the option for 
independence. However, it created 'pressure' on Habibie. 
Previously, Habibie had locked in a seven-month timetable for the UN to supervise the 
ballot despite the UN's request for a longer time-frame. Habibie's refusal to allow a 
longer time-frame was suspect because by the later time stipulated he would probably 
no longer be President and his successor might change the policy on East Timor. 8 
Indonesia and Portugal, under the auspices of the UN reached an agreement on 5 May 
1999 to give the UN a mandate to consult the people of East Timor whether to accept or 
reject Indonesia's offer of autonomy. Based on the agreement, the Secretary-General of 
the UN set up a special mission for East Timor (United Nation Mission in East 
Tim or /UNAMET) in the same month. On 30 August, 78.5 per cent of East Timorese 
voted for independence, with 98 per cent of those enrolled casting their votes. 
s Maley, 'The UN and East Timor'. 
6 Hugh White, 'The Road to INTERFET: Reflections on Australian Strategic Decisions Concerning East 
Timor December 1998-September 1999', Security Challenges, 2008, 4:1, pp. 69-87, p. 72. 
7 White, 'The Road to INTERFET'. 
8 Damien Kingsbury, 'East Timor to 1999' in Damien Kingsbury, ed., Guns and ballot boxes: East Timor's 
vote for independence, Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 2000. 
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Acute Period 
The crisis escalated from the day when the result of the popular consultation was 
announced, and the militia did not accept the result of the consultation. Fighting 
between militia and independence supporters caused much destruction and many 
deaths in the territory. Hundreds East Timorese were estimated to have been killed; 
many were forced to flee into the hills or into West Tim or. It has been estimated that 
the number killed was 'greatly in excess of 1000 persons and more than 250,000 
people were transported under Indonesian and militia control to West Tim or'. 9 The 
UNAMET was also forced to withdraw. Indonesia lacked the capability to deal with this 
situation: this was when the crisis became critical, and Indonesia needed help. 
During the acute period of the crisis, Indonesia was put under pressure by the UN, the 
US, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and regional neighbours 
through the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meeting. The US indicated that 
it wished for Australian leadership in an East Timor intervention. 10 It also put pressure 
on Indonesia to accept an international peace-keeping force in East Timor. The 
commander-in-chief of the US forces in the Pacific, Admiral Dennis Blair, met General 
Wiranto, who was the Commander of the Indonesian military, in Jakarta on 8 
September 1999, and announced that military ties between the US and Indonesia were 
to be suspended. 11 The external pressures on Indonesia are further elaborated in the 
'balancing system' section (Section 4-4) of this chapter. 
Australia played a key role during the APEC Meetings held in Auckland, in September 
1999. Australia tried to persuade APEC member countries to be part of the 'coalition of 
the willing' in persuading Indonesia to agree to an international peace-keeping force 
entering East Timor and contributing to the peace-keeping force. 12 Following the 
special meeting of APEC Foreign Ministers in Auckland on September 8 1999, the 
APEC Economic Leaders Meeting (AELM) lent considerable momentum to 
international pressure on Indonesia to end the bloodshed and address the 
humanitarian crisis in East Timor. This culminated in the announcement in the early 
hours of 13 September by President Habibie to accept UN peace-keepers. 13 
De-escalation Period 
The crisis slowed down after Habibie's announcement that Indonesia would agree to 
UN peace-keepers. After the announcement, the UNSC acted decisively and 
9 Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee, Peace-keeping in East Timar the Path to Independence, Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, p. 44. 
10 White, 'The Road to INTERFET'. 
11 Damien Kingsbury, East Timar: the Price of Liberty, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
12 James Cotton, 'Against the Grain: East Timor Inten,ention', Survival, 43:1, 2001, pp. 127-142 , p. 132. 
13 Smith and Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timar: the Path to Independence. 
134 
unanimously to authorise a peace enforcement under Resolution 1264 of 15 September. 
The mandate was under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and provided the Multi 
National Force (MNF) with 'all necessary measures' to restore security and deal 
forcefully with the militias and other threats. 14 
The arrival of INTERFET further abated the tension. Led by Major General Peter 
Cosgrove, an experienced infantry officer from Australia, INTERFET began its 
deployment in Dili on 20 September 1999. By the end of September, INTERFET's 
headquarters were fully operational and more than 4,000 troops had been deployed. 15 
By 1 November, a force of over 8,200 was operating and security had been slowly 
restored. 16 As the coalition strengthened and more forces arrived, INTERFET 
continued to maintain security, countered militia activity and maintained cooperation 
with the Indonesian military, Tentara National Indonesia (TNI), to manage the border 
following the TNI's final withdrawal from East Timor on 1 November. The coalition 
comprised a majority of Australian troops, supported by forces from Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Fiji, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, 
Thailand, the UK and the US. 17 The US provided logistics support and intelligence 
capabilities. 18 
Under the UNSC Resolution 1272 of 1999, the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established to provide peace-keeping to 
maintain security and order; to facilitate and coordinate relief assistance to East 
Timorese people; to facilitate the emergency rehabilitation of East Timer's physical 
infrastructure; to administer East Timor and create functional state structures for 
sustainable governance and the rule of law; and to assist in the drafting and conducting 
of elections. 19 UNTAET was led by the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative 
(SRSG), Sergio Vieira de Mello from Brazil and later by Lieutenant-General Jaime de 
los Santos from the Philippines as its Supreme Commander. Interestingly, while 
Michael Smith argues that INTERFET and UNT AET were successful, 2 0 external 
observers, such as Damien Kingsbury argue that there were many flaws in the 
operation. Kingsbury argues that the UN staff was largely unsuited to the task and had 
no understanding of the reconstruction and development context. 2 1 
14 Smith and Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timar: the Path to Independence, p. 45. 
1s Kingsbury, East Timar: the Price of Liberty. 
16 Kingsbury, East Timar: the Price of Liberty. 
17 Kingsbury, East Timar: the Price of Liberty. 
18 Kingsbury, East Timar: the Price of Liberty. 
19 Kingsbury, East Timar: the Price of Liberty. 
2 0 Smith and Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timar: the Path to Independence, Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003. 
2 1 Kingsbury, East Timar: the Price of Liberty. 
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4.3. The Differing Threat Perceptions 
ASEAN member countries held a diverse range of perceptions of threat about the East 
Timor crisis. Understanding the perceptions of threat of ASEAN member states is 
important for further investigation of their behaviour and their contribution during the 
crisis. The perceptions of threat range from the threat to regional stability and 
countries to the threat of a domino effect of separatism. While all ASEAN member 
states were concerned that the instability in Indonesia would affect their security or at 
least regional security, some countries like Thailand and Philippines feared that the 
spirit of independence would influence separatist movements in their countries, 
particularly in Southern Thailand and the Southern Philippines. For Indonesia itself, its 
perception of threat was more complex and derived from both the international and 
domestic communities. The threat perceptions of each ASEAN member state are 
elaborated below. 
Thailand 
Thailand's perception of threat was based on four factors. First, the threat of 
Indonesia's breaking-up was the biggest threat for Thailand. Thailand, like any other 
country in Southeast Asia wished for regional peace and stability. The possibility of 
Indonesia's break-up would certainly affect Thailand's domestic politics and economy. 
Second, Thailand was anxious that the East Timor crisis would somehow impact on the 
-
Muslim separatist movements in its southern province. At the time of the August ballot 
almost Bo per cent of the Thai Army feared that Western interference in East Timor 
could be 'a Pandora's Box' for a similar scene in Thailand. 22 Third, similar to Malaysia, 
Thailand was also concerned that it might be politically damaging to allow Australia to 
lead an international force into Southeast Asia. This might be interpreted that ASEAN's 
lack of capacity to address regional problems on its own terms and indicated the limits 
of its ability to maintain regional stability. This anxiety was reaffirmed by the statement 
of Thai Deputy Foreign Minister M.R. Sukumbhand Paribatra: 
We in ASEAN have been saying since 1971 that we want the region to be free 
from outside interference. Now a problem has arisen that can lead to outside 
interference in regional affairs. So we must do something about it - we cannot 
logically stand still and do nothing - we must put our words into action. 23 
Finally, the downgrading of ASEAN's international image was also considered a threat 
by Thailand. Thai Foreign Minister Pitsuwan was very cautious in his words with 
regard to this crisis and in his separate consultations with APEC members on East 
22 Alan Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis', Australian Journal of International Affairs, 
54:2, 2000, pp. 163-170, p. 165. 
2 3 Jurgen Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture: a constructivist assessment', International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 3, 2003, pp. 57-87, p. 67. 
Timor. 24 Thailand was among the countries which had recognised Indonesia's 
incorporation of East Timor in December 1975 and had been supportive of Jakarta's 
position ever since. 
The Philippines 
The Philippines' perceptions of threat during the cns1s were similar to those of 
Thailand. Apart from the worry that instability in Indonesia would jeopardise regional 
stability, the Philippines did not want to be seen to support any separatism movement. 
The economic relationship with Indonesia was among its concerns. Indonesia's 
investment in the country was estimated at around US$700 million in 1999.25 Any 
disturbance to political relations with Indonesia might bring about negative impacts on 
Manila's economic interests. 
Malaysia 
For Malaysia, the biggest threat was a Western interference in the region. Malaysia's 
perception of the West being a threat was based on its suspicion of Western countries' 
efforts to internationalise the dispute. Like Indonesia, it was unhappy with the UNSC 
decision to let the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) and the UN 
Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) operate under the mandate of Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. 26 The then Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammad 
expressed his criticism of the East Timor crisis and blamed the West for the crisis. He 
argued that Indonesian President, B.J. Habibie was pressured by the West in finally 
providing the option of a referendum while many East Timorese had been well 
integrated with Indonesia. 27 Mahathir claimed that Indonesia was experiencing difficult 
timing in making the decision because the internal situation was a mixed condition of 
political transition, and economic recovery. 28 Mahathir also accused the West of having 
double standards in rejecting East Timor's integration into Indonesia while closing 
their eyes to similar situations in other countries. 29 Many Southeast Asian countries 
shared Mahathir views because the majority of the states were experiencing ethnic 
disputes, separatist movements or demands for independence. 
Malaysia also saw Australia's domination as a threat, as Malaysian Deputy Prime 
Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi stated: 
24 Kavi Chongkittavorn, 'ASEAN peace-keepers must go to Timor', The Nation, 13 September 1999. 
2s Sony Inbaraj, East Timar Blood and Tears in ASEAN, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1997. 
26 Chapter VII of the UN Charter permits UNSC-authorised forces to take coercive and forceful measures as 
necessary to fulfill their mission and mandate. 
27 Dupont, 'ASEAN's response to the East Timor Crisis'. 
28 Dupont, 'ASEAN's response to the East Timor Crisis'. 
29 The Straits Times, 'Timor will be Australia's Vietnam, says Mahathir', 14 October 1999, p. 23 quoted in 
Dupont, 'ASEAN's response to the East Timor Crisis'. 
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We don't wish to see any country appointing itself the protector or leader for this 
region. Asian countries are capable of looking after the region themselves and 
cherish peace for the region more than others. 3° 
Even though Badawi did not explicitly name the country he meant, it was clearly 
directed at Australia. 
Malaysia was also concerned about the flow of illegal migrants and refugees from 
Indonesia during the economic crisis and the transition process into a democracy. It 
feared the possibility of receiving an exodus of illegal migrants and refugees if the 
situation in East Timor deteriorated. 
Singapore 
Singapore did not view the situation in East Timor as a conventional military threat, 
but its first concern was the potential destabilising force in Southeast Asia that could 
disrupt the region's economy and create large-scale population movements triggered by 
violence. 31 While Malaysia was the strongest supporter of Indonesia in this crisis, 
Singapore saw a need to invigorate Indonesia's international credibility. Singapore 
called for Indonesia's armed forces to moderate themselves. Singapore perceived that 
little would be achieved if the international community threatened Indonesia's stability 
by discrediting its civil or military leaders .32 If the East Timor crisis continued, it would 
become another impediment for the regional grouping. For Singapore, another threat 
arose from the possibility of an exodus of illegal migrants or refugees from East Timor. 
This was understandable because of its geographical proximity: Singapore is the closest 
destination country for refugees or illegal migrants from Indonesia. 
Indonesia 
The threats for Indonesia can be divided into two: the first consisted of threats coming 
from the international community and the second included threats from its domestic 
audience. Internationally, first, Indonesia wanted to revitalise its international image. A 
bad image arising from how it handled East Timor was a threat for Indonesia. UN 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan delivered a strong message to Indonesia that East Timor 
was becoming anarchic and therefore it had to accept an international peace-keeping 
force. 33 The second threat derived from the international community, and was related 
to the issue of external powers, particularly Australia, that was perceived by Indonesia 
as being too dominant in its own backyard. Therefore, Habibie invited other ASEAN 
3o Michael Richardson, 'Asians criticize Australia for playing role of 'US deputy', International Herald 
Tribune, 27 September 1999 quoted in Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture', p. 70. 
3, Robert Karniol, 'Singapore-Deconstruction Forges Ahead', Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 June 2001. 
32 Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'. 
33 Chongkittavorn, 'ASEAN Peace-Keepers must go to Timar'. 
countries to participate, rather than letting Australia become the 'leader' of an 
intervention. Pitsuwan said that President Habibie requested for a large-scale of 
ASEAN troops to be deployed in East Timor, and when Pitsuwan answered that ASEAN 
did not have the capacity, President Habibie requested troops from Nordic countries.34 
The statement of President Habibie implied that Indonesia did not want Australian 
leadership in East Timor. 
Third, another international threat for Indonesia arose from the economic and military 
pressures. The IMF and the World Bank threatened Indonesia to stop loans and 
assistance for Indonesia to restore its economy from the financial crisis in 1997-1998. 
Military pressures came from the US, which had stopped military cooperation with 
Indonesia. As mentioned previously, the military tie between the US and Indonesia was 
suspended on 8 September 1999 during the meeting between Admiral Dennis Blair and 
General Wiranto.3s For Indonesia, the economic pressures were harder than military 
pressures because economic assistance from the IMF and the World Bank was 
incremental while Indonesia could still look for another source of military procurement 
aside from the US. 
A second group of threats for Indonesia came from inside the country. Indonesia 
needed to scale down the crisis and prevent the referendum from becoming a precedent 
for separatist movements in Aceh and Papua seeking independence. Indonesia had to 
find the right 'formulation', to show that the East Timor case was different from other 
cases in these regions, so it would not create demands for independence. 
Brunei Darussalam 
Brunei Darussalam had interests in national and regional security. It shares a land 
border with Indonesia. Even though it is located far away north from East Timor, 
Brunei Darussalam would have become one of the first destination countries for East 
Timorese refugees to escape, if something wrong happened in East Timor. 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) 
For the CLMV countries, the threat meant a disruption to regional stability and had 
negative impacts politically and economically. Indonesia had not yet recovered after 
being hit by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1999. A prolonged East Timor crisis was 
predicted to affect Jakarta's process of economic recovery. A protracted crisis in East 
Timor also created a challenge to Indonesia's journey into democracy. One of these 
situations or a combination of political and economical instability in Indonesia would 
34 Surin Pitsuwan, Speech at the Launch of ANU Southeast Asia Institute, Australian National Uni,·ersity, 
Canberra, 23 October 2012. 
35 Kingsbury, East Timar: the Price of Liberty. 
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also impact the smaller countries in ASEAN like Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar due 
to the need to continue economic activities in Indonesia. Vietnam's position on the 
crisis was quite interesting. Before Vietnam became a member of ASEAN, it was among 
the sternest critics of Indonesia.36 After it became a member, Vietnam joined the group 
and remained silent. 
4.4. A Balancing System? 
This section analyses whether or not ASEAN's management of the East Timor crisis 
provides evidence that a balancing system in the region was operating. In this section, I 
argue that there was no balancing system among ASEAN members during the period of 
the crisis, 1999-2002. The crisis management by ASEAN members indicated the 
importance of great-power and external influence, particularly the US, the UN and 
Australia. However, the notion of 'balance' was not evident, because no external great 
power tried to balance the US in this period. The same indicators of a balancing system 
that were used to analyse ASEAN's crisis management in the Cambodian crisis 
(Chapter 3) are adopted again to analyse ASEAN's response to the East Timor crisis. 
Thus, a balancing system among ASEAN member states during the East Timor crisis is 
explained by the indicators listed in Box 3.2 (see Section 3.5). Each indicator is treated 
as equally important. Table 4.1 summarises the elaboration of the indicators of a 
balancing system during the East Timor crisis and a detailed analysis follows. 
36 Cotton, 'Against the Grain: East Timor Intervention'. 
No. 
A. 
B. 
Indicators 
Relatively equal 
powers among a 
minimum of two 
actors: 
Insignificant 
Intentions of some 
states to expand: 
Moderate 
TABLE4.1 
A Balancing System in Southeast Asia during the East Timor Crisis? 
Thailand The Philippines Malaysia Singapore 
Balance of power among ASEAN member states 
Indonesia Brunei and 
CLMV countries 
Indonesia and Thailand were the countries most affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Malaysia's economy had started to recover 
by 1998. Vietnam also gave signals of rapid development. However its power compared to Singapore was not yet equal. Singapore was 
the strongest power in terms of military strength during 1999-2002. Not only did it spend the highest amount on defence expenditure 
but also its percentage of GDP was the highest. 
There was no intention of ASEAN member states to expand, but there existed many territorial disputes and claims. Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei had been and still have been claimant countries of South China Sea. 
Thailand had no 
intention to expand 
but there was a 
border dispute with 
Myanmar. 
The Philippines had 
no intention to 
expand, but had 
been a claimant 
country in the 
South China Sea 
dispute and over 
Sabah. 
Malaysia had no 
intention to 
expand, but at that 
time had territorial 
disputes with 
Indonesia (Sipadan 
& Ligitan and 
Ambalat), 
Singapore (Pedra 
Blanca/ Batu Puteh, 
Middle Rocks and 
South Ledge), with 
Brunei over 
Lim bang, La was, 
Terusan, Rangau 
and 
Louisa Reef and 
with the 
Philippines, 
Vietnam, China and 
Taiwan (the Spratly 
Islands). Some of 
Singapore had no 
intention to expand 
and was always 
cautious of any 
intention of 
expansion by its 
neighbours. There 
were disputes with 
Malaysia over Pedra 
Blanca, Middle 
Rocks and South 
Ledge. 
The case of East 
Timor gave an 
example to 
Indonesia how state 
expansion was not 
accepted 
internationally. 
There were disputes 
with Malaysia over 
Sipadan and Ligitan 
and Ambalat. 
Vietnam and Brunei 
had been and still 
have been 
claimants in the 
Spratly Islands 
dispute. 
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No. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
Indicators 
Alliances on the 
basis of short-run 
interests: 
Moderate 
Thailand The Philippines Malaysia 
these territorial 
disputes have not 
been settled up to 
the time of writing 
(2012). 
Singapore Indonesia Brunei and 
CLMV countries 
ASEAN itself did not work as an alliance and was not divided into alliances among members. However, some groupings had emerged 
pre crisis and during the crisis. Before the crisis, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines always gave strong support to Indonesia. In 
terms of support of Indonesia's early rejection of Western interference, Indonesia was supported by Malaysia and Thailand. 
Singapore and the Philippines did not really say much about this. In terms of contribution to the international force, Thailand and the 
Philippines were in the group giving the biggest contribution of military personnel. 
War as 
legitimate 
instrument 
statecraft: 
a I All ASEAN documents highlighted the principle of the non use of force. However, even though Thailand was aware of ASEAN's 
principle, the border dispute with Myanmar had caused the deaths of 50-100 Myanmar soldiers in February 2001. 
of 
Insignificant 
Dependency on 
external great 
powers as security 
providers: 
Significant 
Thailand and US 
relations also 
developed during 
the period of the 
crisis. Thailand 
also developed 
relations with 
China. 
Balance of External Great Power Influence 
After US In contrast with its 
withdrawal from its criticism of Western 
air force base in countries, 
1991 and naval base particularly on the 
in 1992, the US East Timar issue, 
naval force Malaysia's 
returned on a dependency on the 
regular basis in US had been 
1999. The growing. It was not 
Philippines became a formal ally and 
a major non NATO the US did not 
ally in 2003. necessarily provide 
a security 
guarantee. 
However, its 
closeness to the US 
Singapore's military 
relations with the 
US were also 
growing. Singapore 
declared that US 
aircraft carriers 
would have access 
to the Changi Na val 
Base after its 
completion in the 
year 2000. 
Indonesia looked 
for another source 
for its military 
procurement. After 
the US embargo of 
its export on 
military equipment, 
Indonesia looked to 
the Soviet Union. 
The US lifted the 
ban on spare parts 
for aircraft in 2000 
and military 
cooperation 
resumed slowly 
after that. 
Cambodia, Lao 
PDR and Myanmar 
had a dependency 
on China as a 
security provider, 
while Vietnam had 
been 
'bandwagoning' the 
us. 
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No. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
Indicators 
Alignment 
external 
powers: 
Moderate 
with 
great 
Military 
cooperation with 
external great 
Thailand 
Thailand 
maintained good 
relations with both 
the US and China. 
The Philippines 
The Philippines was 
a non NATO US 
ally. 
Malaysia 
reflected Malaysia's 
belief that the US 
was still the main 
security provider. 
Malaysia did not 
have any formal 
alliance with 
military powers. 
However, the FPDA 
provided a 'credible 
diplomatic and 
psychological 
deterrent' to 
potentially 
threatening 
countries. 
Singapore 
Singapore was and 
is still a member of 
the FPDA. 
Indonesia 
No alignment with 
external powers, 
because of its free 
and independent 
policy. 
Bruneiand 
CLMV countries 
After the 
normalisation 
between Vietnam 
and the US was 
announced on 11 
July 1995, a 
stronger 
relationship was 
built between the 
two countries. 
Between February and December 2000 China negotiated long-term cooperative framework agreements with all ASEAN member 
countries. During 2001-2002, Chinese warships visited several ASEAN member countries. 
1-::::-:--------;;-:---r=--~--:-:-:---~:-::--:---:----:--::---.--:-::--------:---,----------.----------J powers: --· -·· - -·· Strong mllitary 
cooperation with 
the US and China. 
Resumed military 
cooperation with 
the US. As early as 
2002, China invited 
the Philippines to 
participate in a 
naval exercise. 
Malaysia had been 
a member of FPDA 
Like Malaysia 
during 1999-2002, 
Cooperation with Vietnam, Brunei 
Significant 
Distribution of 
and , contributed 
more actively 
within the group. 
Malaysia also 
developed a strong 
military 
cooperation 
the US. 
with 
the US was and Laos had 
suspended by the agreements with Singapore 
developed 
stronger 
a I US in 1999. In 2001 China that included 
cooperation with 
the US and 
participated more 
actively within the 
FPDA. 
military a clause on security 
cooperation was cooperation, 
slowly resumed but between February 
the cooperation 1999 and December 
with Kopasus 2002. 
(Indonesian special Myanmar had a 
military force) was strong military 
only re-established cooperation with 
in 2010. China and India. 
In 19982 Singapore declared that US aircraft carriers would have access to the Changi Naval Base after its colllpletio_n ii} the year 
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No. Indicators Thailand I The Philippines I Malaysia I Singapore I Indonesia I Bruneiand CLMV countries 
external great 2000. Because of the East Timar crisis, external powers' armed forces distributed in Indonesia under UN auspices included those 
powers' armed from Australia, Portugal, South Korea, Japan, and China. The US also deployed ships in Malaysia. 
forces: 
Moderate 
I. Economic Because of the impact of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, the situation reflected economic dependency on external great 
dependence on powers. Even for Indonesia, willingness to open to the international force was related to its dependency to the US particularly and 
external great international loan through the IMF and the World Bank. 
powers: 
Significant 
Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author 
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Balance of Power among ASEAN Member States 
A. Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors 
In the period 1999-2002, there were no relatively equal powers that comprised a 
minimum of two actors, and therefore, this indicator is ranked as insignificant. No 
country can be regarded as a strong economy during that period. Countries like 
Indonesia and Thailand were still affected by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Indonesia 
was struggling with its economy and internal political transition. It was also affected by 
the East Timor crisis and other internal armed conflicts, such as in Aceh and Papua. 
Ethnic and religious (Muslim and Christian) conflicts in Ambon in August 1999 further 
complicated the situation. Procurement in Indonesia in 1999 was also subject to some 
rescheduling and cancellation.37 Thailand focused on recovering its economy. Table 4.2 
shows that Myanmar demonstrated the highest increase in GDP growth during 1997-
2003 and followed by Cambodia and Vietnam. 
TABLE4.2 
GDP Growth in ASEAN Countries 1990-1996 Compared with 1997-2003 
(per cent change from previous period) 
1990-1996 1997-2003 
Brunei Darrusalam 2.8 1.9 
Cambodia s.8 7.8 
Indonesia 8.o 1.5 
Laos 6.5 5.6 
Malaysia 9.5 3.8 
M.YCUllllar 5.5 - 10.5 
Philinnines 2.8 3-4 
Sin2:aoore 8.7 4.2 
Thailand 8.6 1.7 
Vietnam 7.9 6.7 
Source: Asian Development Bank, Economy and Output: Statistical Database System 2004, 
available at htt;ps://sdbs.adb.org/sdbs/index.jsp. (accessed on 10 December 2011) 
In terms of defence expenditure, Malaysia's defence expenditure demonstrated a slight 
decline in 2000 but between 2000 and 2002 its military spending was increasing. 
However, Malaysia did not develop its military rapidly and its defence expenditure 
percentage of GDP was relatively small. Singapore was less affected by the financial 
crisis. Nonetheless, it showed a constant decline in defence expenditure between 1998 
and 2001. Only in 2002 its military spending increased again as shown in Table 4.3. 
'57 International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'East Asia and Australasia', The Military Balance, 99:1, 1999, 
pp. 171-209. 
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Bnm 
Cam 
Indo 
Laos 
Mal 
Myn 
Phil 
Sing 
Thai 
Viet 
98 
Bna 5-0 
Cam 139.0 
Ind 299.0 
Laos 29.1 
Mal 110.0 
Myn 349.6 
Phil 117.8 
Sing 72-5 
Thai 306.0 
Viet 484-0 
TABLE4.3 
Defence Expenditure of ASEAN Member States in 1998-2002 
Defence 
Expenditure 
ustm US$ per capita "GDP 
98 99 00 01 02 98 99 00 01 02 98 99 00 01 02 
386 402 35.3 271 253 1,217 1,240 1,075 826 741 6.7 6.7 7.1 5-5 5.2 
155 176 195 83 87 15 17 15 6 6 5.1 5.1 6.1 2.5 2-5 
967 1,502 614 5,419 6,245 5 7 3 25 29 o.8 1.1 0-4 3.8 3-7 
34 22 20 16 14 7 4 4 3 3 2.6 2.3 1.1 0 .9 o .8 
1,891 3,158 2,579 3,223 3,260 88 146 114 143 145 2.6 4.0 2.9 3.8 3.6 
1,302 2,142 1,020 2,236 2,837 45 42 21 46 58 5.0 5.0 2.8 5.0 5.0 
1,521 1,627 1,357 1,123 1,511 21 22 18 15 19 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.6 2.1 
4,936 4,696 4,316 4,247 4,334 1,275 1,174 1,105 1,036 1,010 5.6 5.6 4-9 5.1 5.2 
2,124 2,638 2,419 1,861 1,730 35 43 38 29 27 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.5 
943 890 2,351 2,311 2,286 12 11 29 29 29 3-5 3.1 7-3 7.2 7.1 
Source: Adapted from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2000-
2003. 
Singapore was arguably the strongest in terms of military power during 1998-2002. Not 
only did it spend the highest amount on defence expenditure (particularly in 1998-
2000) but also the percentage of GDP spent on defence was the highest. Indonesia 
spent a higher amount on defence expenditure in 2001 and 2002 but the percentage of 
the spending was small in relation to its GDP (3.8% and 3.7%, respectively). Myanmar's 
defence spending percentages of its GDP from 1998-2002 were also high, but the total 
amounts in US$ were relatively small. 
TABLE4.4 
Number of Armed Forces, Reservists and Paramilitary of ASEAN Member States 
in 1998-2002 
Numbers in Armed Forees Estimated Reservists Paramilitary 
(000) (000) (000) 
99 00 01 02 98 99 00 01 02 98 99 00 01 02 
5-0 5-0 5-9 7.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 4..l 3-8 3-8 3-8 3-7 
139.0 140.0 140.0 125.0 n.a. n.a n.a. n.a n.a 220.0 220.0 220.0 67.0 67.0 
299.0 297.0 297.0 297.0 400.0 400.0 400.0 400.0 400.0 200.0 200.0 195.0 195.0 195-0 
29.1 29.1 29.1 29.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 10 0 .0 
105.0 96.0 100.5 100.0 40.6 40.6 49.8 42.8 41.6 20.1 20.1 20.1 20.1 20.1 
343.8 343.8 344.0 444-0 n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 85.3 85-3 85-3 100.3 100.3 
110.0 106.0 107.0 106.0 131.0 131.0 131.0 131.0 131.0 42-5 42.5 42-5 44.0 44.0 
73.0 6o-5 6o.5 6o-5 250.0 275-0 213.8 312.5 312.5 108.0 108.0 108.0 94.0 96.3 
3o6.o 301.0 306.0 306.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 71.0 71.0 115.6 104.0 113.0 
484-0 484-0 484-0 484-0 3000, 3000. 3,000. 3000. 3000. 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 
0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Adapted from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2000-
2003. 
Table 4-4 demonstrates that during 1998 to 2002 Vietnam had the largest armed forces 
and number of reservists, while Cambodia had the largest number of paramilitary 
personnel in 1998 to 2000 and Indonesia had the largest number of paramilitary 
personnel in 2001 and 2002. However, this table does not show the numbers of armed 
forces, reservists and paramilitary as a percentage of total population. So, it cannot be 
argued that Vietnam was strong in terms of numbers in the armed forces. Furthermore, 
logically by looking at the number and estimating the rough total of the populations of 
ASEAN member countries, the highest percentage of armed forces per population 
belongs to Singapore and Myanmar. 
B. Intentions of some states to expand 
In this section, I argue that the 'intention of some states to expand' indicator is 
moderate because during 1999-2002, no country demonstrated its intention to exercise 
force to occupy other ASEAN countries; nevertheless many territorial/border disputes 
occurred. The case of East Timor crisis and the Cambodian crisis provided good 
examples to Indonesia, Vietnam and other countries of ASEAN that an invasion or 
expansion was not favourable in the eyes of the international community. However, 
territorial and border disputes could not be avoided. 
Such disputes involved nine out of the ten members of ASEAN. Malaysia, for example, 
-
shares borders with Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei and therefore has been 
involved in territorial disputes and overlapping maritime claims with almost all its 
neighbours. Malaysia's territorial disputes include: (i) Sipadan and Ligitan Islands, and 
Ambalat with Indonesia; (ii) Batu Puteh with Singapore; (iii) Limbang, Lawas, Terusan, 
Rangau and Louisa Reef with Brunei and (iv) the Spratly Islands with the Philippines, 
Vietnam, China and Taiwan. 38 On 2 November 1998, Indonesia and Malaysia 
submitted their intention to solve the dispute to the ICJ. It entered into force on 14 May 
1998. After four years, on 17 December 2002, the ICJ ruled by 16 votes to 1, that the 
sovereignty over Sipadan and Ligitan Island belonged to Malaysia. 39 In the beginning, 
Indonesia rejected the proposal of bringing the dispute to the ICJ, basing its reasons on 
its belief that the ICJ did not understand the problem. On the other hand, Indonesia 
preferred to initiate the use of the ASEAN High Council, which is an adhoc body 
introduced by the TAC of 1976, whose membership comes from representatives at 
ministerial level from each of the member countries. Malaysia rejected this proposal, 
and from Indonesia's point of view, the reason was because Malaysia feared ASEAN 
38 Asri Salleh, Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali , Kamaruzaman Jusoff, 'Malaysia's policy towards its 1963-
2008 territorial disputes', Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, 1:5, 2009 , pp. 107-116. 
39 Salleh, Hamdan, Razali, and Jusoff, 'Malaysia 's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial disputes' . 
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member states would favour Indonesia, particularly as Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, the 
Philippines and Vietnam had territorial or border disputes with Malaysia. 
Interestingly, each dispute was approached differently. While it preferred to bring the 
Sipadan-Ligitan issue to the ICJ, Malaysia rejected Brunei's idea of bringing the dispute 
over Lawas-Limbang-Terusan-Rangau-Louisa Reef to the ICJ. Both countries have 
entered into a number of negotiations to resolve the issues, including several meetings 
between Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. 40 
The Spratly Islands disputes are Malaysia's most complex territorial dispute in the 
South China Sea. The Philippines and Vietnam had occupied reefs and islands claimed 
by Malaysia since 1979 through the publishing of a Peta Baru (New Map). The 
Philippines occupied Commodore Reef (Terumbu Laksamana) while Vietnam occupied 
Amboyna Cay (Pulau Kecil Amboyna) and Barque Canada Reef (Terumbu Perahu). 
Another feature claimed by Malaysia, but not occupied as of 1997, was Luconia Shoal.41 
In March 1998, the Philippines military discovered that Malaysia was building 
structures on the disputed reef. The Philippines, having been assured by the then 
Malaysian Foreign Minister, Abdullah Badawi that the works had not been authorised 
by the Malaysian government, did not make any official protest. However, in June 
1999, Malaysia built a two-storey structure, helipad, pier and radar antenna in the 
-
claimed area. This time China, Taiwan and Vietnam protested against Malaysia's 
actions on the disputed features. By 1996, the Philippines had 595 troops deployed to 
guard its (occupied) nine Spratly Islands.42 
Since 1982 Vietnam has been protesting against Malaysia's claims that were based on 
the Peta Baru. Despite Vietnam's claim to Swallow Reef, Malaysia went ahead and 
occupied the reef on 4 September 1983. Malaysia requested that Vietnam withdraw 
from Amboyna Cay. Malaysia continued to insist on its rights over Amboyna Cay when 
in 1988, Malaysia Deputy Foreign Minister Abdullah Che Wan was reported to have 
asserted that Malaysia's claims were legal and in line with international law.43 In total 
by 1996, Vietnam had occupied 25 islands in the Spratlys with 600 troops stationed 
thereon. 44 In 2002, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
was signed on 4 November 2002 by ASEAN countries and China. It mainly calls for 
states to reaffirm their determinations to maintain peace and stability in the region by 
40 Salleh, Razali, Jusoff, 'Malaysia's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial disputes'. 
4' Salleh, Razali, Jusoff, 'Malaysia 's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial disputes'. 
42 Salleh, Razali, Jusoff, 'Malaysia 's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial disputes'. 
43 Abdullah Che Wan quoted in Salleh, Razali , Jusoff, 'Malaysia 's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial 
disputes'. 
44 Salleh, Razali, Jusoff, 'Malaysia's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial disputes'. 
exercising self-restraint in their conduct and to seek mutually peaceful solutions to the 
Spratlys disputes. 45 
China had undertaken construction work on Mischief Reef, a thousand miles from the 
nearest Chinese territory, prompting diplomatic protests from the Philippines. This is 
among the concerns which have prompted Manila to agree to the return of US naval 
forces to the Philippines on a regular basis, seven years after US bases there were 
closed. 46 Singapore has always been cautious of any intention of expansion by its 
neighbours, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia and the intention of a hegemony 
creation by Vietnam. 
This general picture suggests that although no country wished to expand or exercise 
powers to occupy other ASEAN countries, territorial and border disputes had occurred 
in almost all ASEAN countries during 1999-2002. ASEAN member countries had no 
explicit intention to expand, but implicitly, one can argue that territorial and border 
disputes are the result of another form of an intention to expand. At least nine out of 
ten countries, namely Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Myanmar were involved m 
territorial/border disputes. 
C. Alliances on the basis of short-run interests 
The TAC signed in 1976 does not allow ASEAN to create any alliances among the 
members of ASEAN, but there were some groupings pre crisis and during the crisis. 
Hence, the indicator, alliances on the basis of short run interests, is rated as moderate. 
Before the crisis and during Indonesia's rule of East Timor, Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines always gave their strongest support to Indonesia. Vietnam criticised 
Indonesia's occupation of East Timor but later, after becoming a member of ASEAN, it 
did not continue this criticism. 
In terms of support for Indonesia's early rejection of Western interference, Indonesia 
was supported by Malaysia and Thailand. Malaysia's Foreign Minister, Datuk Seri Syed 
Hamid Albar, indicated that Kuala Lumpur was worried about 'new concepts which 
might compromise sovereignty in the name of humanitarianism'.47 Malaysia's criticism 
of Western interference received a sympathetic response in Southeast Asia because the 
majority of its states were also grappling with separatism, ethnic tensions and the 
demands of nation-building. 48 Prime Minister Chuan also favoured more proactive 
45 Salleh, Razali, Jusoff, 'Malaysia's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial disputes'. 
46 International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'East Asia and Australasia '. 
47 Haacke,ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture, p. 70. 
48 Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis'. 
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actions from ASEAN members, but he questioned whether ASEAN had the capability to 
pursue interventions without the assistance of friendly great powers. 49 Singapore and 
the Philippines did not really say much in relation to Western interference. 
In terms of their contribution to the international force, Thailand and the Philippines 
were in one group based on providing the biggest contribution of military personnel. 
Within this group, there were three sub groups: those which contributed major 
numbers of military personnel (Thailand and the Philippines); those which contributed 
a minimum number of military personnel and also sent civilian personnel (Malaysia 
and Singapore); and the rest consisting of countries which did not contribute any 
personnel such as Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. 
Indonesia could not be included in those groups because its contribution was different 
from the others. It contributed by consenting to the UN peace-keeping operation and in 
its effort - though still regarded minimum by the international community - to 
disarm the militias, and to discontinue TNI's support of pro-independence militias. 
D. War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft 
Since its establishment, ASEAN member states have strongly adhered to the principle 
of non-use of force. Besides the use of force on the border between Thailand and 
Myanmar, other disputes did not lead to an open conflict. Therefore, overall, the 'war as 
a legitimate statecraft' indicator is insignificant in helping to shed light on the 
principles of a balance of power among ASEAN member countries. The non-use of force 
principle took on a special significance in Third World regional organisations because 
of anti-colonial struggles and demand for recognition in international affairs. 50 
Chapter IV, Articles 13 to 17 of the TAC specifically called for a High Council to: 
take cognisance of the existence of disputes and situations likely to disturb 
regional peace and harmony [and] in the event no solution is reached through 
direct negotiations to recommend [to] the parties in dispute appropriate means 
of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation .51 
Although the mechanism has never been used, it indicates a commitment to the non-
use of force in ASEAN's relations with other member states as an effort towards conflict 
avoidance and the members complying with the principle of non-use of force. 
However, during the period 1999-2002, a limited use of force between Thailand and 
Myanmar was identified. Among the many issues straining bilateral relations are the 
failure to demarcate the joint border; the cross border fighting between the Myanmar 
army and various insurgent ethnic groups; the flow of drugs from Myanmar into 
49 Haacke, ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture. 
so Acharya, Constructing a Security Community . 
s1 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community, p. 63. 
Thailand and the activities of various insurgent ethnic groups; and various economic 
issues such as the suspension of Thai fishing rights in Myanmar waters .52 In 1999, 
during the Chuan Leekpai government, Thailand refused to extradite the people 
responsible for the occupation of Myanmar's embassy in Bangkok. The relationship 
deteriorated over the apparent inflow of drugs from Myanmar into Thailand and cross-
border incursions.s3 In February 2001, just days before the successor administration of 
Thaksin Shinawatra assumed office, the long-running diplomatic feud between 
Bangkok and Yangon finally escalated into a serious border confrontation and led to the 
death of approximately 50-100 Myanmar soldiers.54 This border conflict was not a 
major news item and attracted only limited attention in most international media. 
Balance of External Great Power Influence 
E. Dependency on external great powers as security providers 
The 'dependency on great-power security provider' indicator is rated as significant. 
Countries in Southeast Asia have continued believing that an external security provider 
is vital. Singapore has historically considered a continued US involvement in the region 
fundamental to its own security. Malaysia has also perceived the US presence as 
necessary to preserve regional stability. Following US withdrawal from Clark Air Force 
Base in 1991 and Subic Bay Naval Base in 1992 in the Philippines, in January 1998, 
Singapore declared that US aircraft carriers would have access to the Changi Naval 
Base after its completion in the year 2000. Singapore has further developed strong 
military relations with the US Pacific Command (Pacom), including war games, map 
planning and manoeuvre exercises like Cobra Gold.ss Within only seven years, the 
Philippines sought the return of US naval forces to its shores on a regular basis. 
Aside from Malaysia's and Singapore's stronger dependency on and stronger relations 
with the US, Washington stopped its military assistance, including its training schemes 
with Indonesia in 1999, along with military sales, in protest against human rights 
violations in East Timor. Indonesia looked for stronger military trade relations and 
cooperation with Russia afterwards. In October 2000, Indonesia and the US resumed 
the cooperation, signed by lifting the ban on aircraft spare part sales by the US. In 
2001, the US has cautiously resumed low level training exchanges with the Indonesian 
Navy and Air Force. In 2002, the US recommenced its training programme for 
Indonesia, and invited Indonesia to join a global programme called the Regional 
Defence Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Fund (RDCTFF). The total amount for the 
52 Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture: a constructivist assessment'. 
53 Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture: a constructivist assessment'. 
54 Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture: a constructivist assessment'. 
55 Ralf Emmers, 'The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the Southeast Asian Security 
Architecture', RSIS Working Paper, No 195. 
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global programme was $17.9 million and that amount included $4million for Indonesia, 
with three officers on the first course.s6 In Southeast Asia, the Philippines received $1.5 
million and sent two officers on the initial course, while Malaysia received $500.000 
covering four officers.s7 
F. Alignment with external great powers 
The 'alignment with external great powers' is a moderate indicator to shine a light on a 
balance of external great power influence. During the period 1999-2002, only the 
Philippines and Myanmar were allies of external great powers, but bilateral and 
multilateral security arrangements between other member states and external great 
powers were also important. Bilateral security arrangements have indeed persisted in 
Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War period. While not being a formal ally, Singapore 
has further developed close military ties with the US. The Philippine Senate refused a 
new base treaty with the US in September 1991 leading to a complete withdrawal from 
Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base by November 1992. Yet the two countries have 
remained military allies through the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty. Moreover, Manila 
signed a Visiting Forces Agreement with the US in February 1998. Post-9/11, the 
bilateral alliance was further reinvigorated in the context of the global war on terror 
and Washington gave the Philippines a major non-NATO ally status. Brunei has relied 
on an agreement with Britain renewed in December 1994 that guarantees the presence 
of a battalion of Gurkha Rifles in the Sultanate.s8 
During the period of 1999 to 2002 and to date, two ASEAN countries -Malaysia and 
Singapore - have been members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) 
established in London on 16 April 1971. The role of the FPDA has been deepened and 
strengthened since the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks on 11 September 
2001. The five powers saw the emergence of an uncertain multi-polar structure and the 
changing strategic conditions in Southeast Asia as a concern. Andrew Tan argues that 
the 'unwillingness of the ASEAN states to cooperate militarily resulted in Singapore 
and Malaysia turning to other vehicles to improve transnational military 
cooperation'. s9 Conveniently, the FPDA provided such a vehicle. For Singapore and 
Malaysia who are not in formal alliances, in which an American military response to 
external attack against the two countries is not guaranteed, the FPDA provided a 
credible diplomatic and psychological deterrent to potentially threatening countries. 60 
56 Robert Karniol, 'Indonesian officers join US training programme', Jane's Defence Weekly , 9 October 
2002. 
57 Karniol, 'Indonesian officers join US training programme'. 
58 Karniol, 'Indonesian officers join US training programme'. 
59 Andrew T.H. Tan, 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements: the Continuing Relevance', Contemporary 
Security Policy, 29:2, 2008, pp. 285-302, p. 292. 
60 Emmers, 'The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements'. 
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Therefore, the two Southeast Asian nations participated more actively in the FPDA. 
Since 1997, Singapore and Malaysia have also alternatively hosted the FPDA 
Professional Forum as an arrangement to discuss new ideas, concepts and the way 
ahead, including the future of FPDA. The FPDA exercises through out the 1990s and 
early 2000s included complex combined exercises involving a major platform. 61 
While Singapore and Malaysia have built bilateral security arrangement with the US, 
Myanmar is regarded as a close ally of China. Among other popular assumptions is that 
Myanmar is a client state of China. 62 China is the biggest supporter of Myanmar and 
one of its larger trading partners. China's need for Myanmar's energy resources is a 
major determinant of China's support towards the regime. 63 This further demonstrates 
that realpolitik is without doubt influenced by economic interdependence. Myanmar's 
military junta allowed the Chinese navy to set up military facilities in its country's 
military bases in exchange for China's political support on the world stage. Since 1992, 
there has been considerable and continuing speculation about the existence of China's 
naval bases on the Great Coco Island and Hainggyi Island in Myanmar. This formed 
part of China's emerging assertive maritime diplomacy, which is known as a 'string of 
pearls' strategy, which covers ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and 
Cambodia. 64 
G. Military cooperation with external great powers 
Southeast Asian countries sought a greater military cooperation with the US during 
1999-2002 and therefore military cooperation with external powers was a significant 
indicator of a balance of external great power influence. As discussed above, after 
Clinton stopped the US military trade and cooperation with Indonesia in 1999, a year 
after that in October 2000, the US lifted the ban on spare parts sales for Indonesia's US 
built C-130 aircraft. In 2001, the US government has cautiously resumed low level 
training exchanges with the Indonesian Navy and Indonesian Air Force. The US Navy 
taskforce convened a week-long 'Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training' exercise 
with the Indonesian Navy on May 2001. The US and Thailand also invited four 
Indonesian Air Force officers to observe the Cobra Gold Exercise in Thailand. 
Singapore participated in the exercise, and nine countries sent observers. 65 
61 Emmers, 'The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements'. 
62 See Karl D. Jackson and Paul H. Nitze, Myanmar Awakening and US National Interests, Testimony 
prepared for the subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Washington D.C., 26 April 2012. See also Maxwell Harrington, 'Conference Report: China-Myanmar 
Relations: The Dillemmas of Mutual Dependence', Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 3 1:1, pp. 
133-139. 
63 Pak K. Lee, Gerald Chan and Lai-Ha Chan, 'China's 'Realpolitik' Engagement with Myanmar', China 
Security, 5:1, 2009, pp. 101-123. 
64 Lee, Chan and Chan, 'China's 'Realpolitik' Engagement with Myanmar', p. 8. 
65 Lee, Chan and Chan, 'China 's 'Realpolitik' Engagement with Myanmar'. 
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On 3 October 1999, US Defence Secretary William Cohen and Philippine Secretary of 
National Defence Orlando Mercado, met in Manila and announced plans for a joint 
exercise in early 2000. Cohen said that the cooperation is intended to 'facilitate, 
coordinate and assist in meeting the equipment requirements of the AFP'. 66 Under a 
new visiting forces agreement approved by the Philippines Senate in May 1999, the US 
has permission to use ports in the Philippines and to participate in annual joint 
exercises with up to 2,000 troops on each side. 67 After the 9/11 attacks, Singapore and 
Malaysia have closely collaborated with the US on the war on terror. Both countries 
have shared intelligence with Washington. Singapore was the first Asian country to sign 
the Declaration of Principles for the Container Security Initiative (CSI) with the US in 
September 2002. Malaysia has been a close partner of the US since 2001. 68 
Indonesia had actually embarked on a major programme of defence cooperation with 
Australia which was codified in December 1995, including the training of forces in East 
Timor. The cooperation was called 'Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining 
Security'. 69 However, it was revoked by Jakarta in 1999 due to the East Timor crisis. 
Besides cooperation with the US and Australia, Southeast Asia member countries also 
developed military cooperation with China during 1999-2002. From February 1999 to 
December 2000 all ten ASEAN members negotiated long-term cooperative framework 
arrangements with China. Seven ASEAN member countries, namely Thailand, Malaysia, 
Vietnam, Brunei, Singapore, the Philippines and Laos included a clause on security 
cooperation on their agreements with China. Since then, China has also initiated 
defence cooperation with Cambodia and Indonesia while China's military cooperation 
with Myanmar had developed earlier than with other ASEAN member countries.7° 
Since 2001, China and nme ASEAN states have conducted naval goodwill visits. 
Chinese warships visited Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines. In turn, China hosted port visits from Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. In 2002, China invited 
the Philippines to participate in a naval exercise. The development of military 
cooperation escalated from that exercise.71 
66 Brian Bender, 'Philippines, USA strengthen links', Jane 's Defence Weekly , 13 October 1999. 
67 International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'East Asia and Australasia'. 
68 International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'East Asia and Australasia'. 
69 Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention'. 
7° Carlyle A. Thayer, Positioning ASEAN between Global Powers, Paper presented to the 14th Regional 
Outlook Forum 2012, 5 January 2012. 
71 Carlyle A. Thayer, Positioning ASEAN. 
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The year 2002 also marked security cooperation between ASEAN and China. In 
November 2002, ASEAN and China signed a Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea. For ASEAN, this declaration was important because for the first time, 
China was willing to have an agreement with ASEAN as an organisation on the South 
China Sea issue, unlike before when China always preferred to negotiate over this issue 
with individual claimant ASEAN states. 
The details above indicate that security cooperation between Southeast Asian countries 
and external great powers, mainly the US and China, was strong. Dominant ASEAN 
countries mostly placed their priorities on military cooperation with the US and tried to 
balance this with good relationships with China, while countries like Myanmar had no 
opportunity to seek close relationship with the US and therefore sought support from 
China. In short, 'military cooperation with external powers' is a significant indicator, 
providing evidence of the presence of a balance of external great power influence in 
Southeast Asia during the East Timor crisis. 
H. Distribution of external great powers' armed forces 
The 'distribution of external great powers' armed forces' indicator is considered as 
moderate. The distribution of external great powers' armed forces was centred in East 
Tim or. External great powers' armed forces in East Tim or included armed forces from 
-
Japan and China. The armed forces of external powers included those of Australia, 
Portugal, New Zealand, the UK, South Korea, Japan and China. Australian troops grew 
to around 5,500 at peak deployment with a figure of approximately A$740 million. 72 
Republic of Korea sent a battalion-size force to provide security for a significant stretch 
of territory. 
Other external powers that contributed to the East Timor crisis in terms of funds and 
manpower were: France, Italy, Canada, Jordan, South Korea and Kenya. Japan also 
facilitated the launch of INTERFET by providing a fund of US$ 100 million to 
supplement the expenses of less-developed coalition members. Pitsuwan stated that 
ASEAN member countries asked for assistance of US$50 million, but Japan gave 
double the requested amount of money.73 The US provided logistic and intelligence. 
James Cotton argues that the US' role was vital.74 This argument was supported by a 
72 Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Inten,ention'. 
73 Pitsuwan, Speech at the Launch of ANU Southeast Asia Institute, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 23 October 2012. 
74 Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention'. 
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Thai Army officer who said: 'The US ship was there, but what was most interesting was 
that the US Ambassador visited Dili regularly, almost once a month'. 75 
Apart from East Tim or, external great powers' armed forces were only identified in the 
Philippines and in Singapore. As elaborated above, US Naval forces have been in the 
Philippines since 1999 on a regular basis and US aircraft carriers have access to the 
Changi Naval Base after its completion in the year 2000. China was also suspected of 
having naval bases on the Great Coco Island and Hainggy Island in Myanmar.?<> 
I. Economic dependence on external great powers 
Because of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, Southeast Asian countries were 
largely economically dependent on external great powers, such as the US and other 
external powers, such as Japan. The Indonesian economy contracted by more than 13 
per cent in 1998, the Thai economy by around 8 per cent and the Malaysian economy 
by over 7 per cent. With about 1 per cent contraction, recession was milder in the 
Philippines and Singapore. In Indonesia, there was a shift in the direction of growth in 
FDI flows in 1997. For Thailand and Malaysia, inflows increased as a percentage of 
GDP in 1997. Inflows remained strong in Thailand in early 1998 and were stable in the 
Philippines. Investments in Indonesia were discouraged by the unstable political 
environment. 77 
TABLE4.5 
Inward Investment by Investor Country in 1999 by Percentage of Total Investment 
Thailand Indonesia Philippines Malaysia 
Japan 30% 20% 25% 32% 
NIF.s 30% 28% 16% 34% 
us 17°Ai 7°Ai 30% 14% 
Europe 12% 28% 23% 13% 
Others 11% 17°/4 6% 7°/4 
Source: Stephen Thomsen, 'Southeast Asia: the role of Foreign Direct Investment Policies in 
Development', OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 1999, p.11. 
Table 4.5 shows that trends in FDI in those countries were strongly influenced by 
external countries. Inward investment by Japan and New Industrialised 
Economies/NIEs (such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa) shared the highest 
percentage in Thailand and Malaysia. The Philippines' investment came mostly from 
the US. This demonstrates the Philippines' economic dependency on the US; Thailand 
and Malaysia had economy dependency on Japan and NIE countries, while Indonesia 
75 Interview with a Thai army officer who was sent to East Timar as an ADC of Force Commander of 
UNTAET, Bangkok, 23 February 2012. 
76 This speculation is discredited by India's chief of naval staff and the US intelligence claiming that there is 
no Chinese base on the Great Coco Island. 
77 Stephen Thomsen, Southeast Asia: the role of Foreign Direct Investment Policies in Development, 
OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No.I, 1999, pp. 1-33. 
had economic dependency on NIE and European countries. Faced with these external 
influences, individual host countries have had to adjust their FDI policies in order to 
benefit from opportunities offered by the external powers. 
Indonesia's willingness to accept a UN peace-keeping operation could not be separated 
from its economic dependence on external powers. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) announced two days after Clinton's call for cuts in international lending that it 
was suspending its planned visit to review Indonesia's progress on the East Timor crisis, 
before the next instalment of US$450 million could be approved. The total of the IMF 
rescue package for Indonesia was $12.3 billion, and $2.3 billion still had to be granted. 
Airing on Radio Australia, the IMF's Asia Pacific Director, Hurbert Neiss said that 
Indonesia must end the violence in East Timor if it wanted the review to be 
rescheduled.78 Five days later, the World Bank froze a $1 billion aid programme to 
Indonesia. In a move designed to place pressure on the government to stop the violence 
in East Timor, the President of the World Bank, James Wolfenson had written to 
Habibie the previous week urging the government to honour the results of the 
referendum. 79 
The US used its leverage over the IMF to put pressure on Indonesia. US Treasury 
Secretary Larry Summers stated that 'We have urged the IMF and the World Bank to 
make clear that their lending to Indonesia in support of financial stability is dependent 
on the conduct of the Indonesian government and military in East Timor'. 80 Indonesia 
rejected the linkage, claiming that withholding funding would push the country deeper 
into economic turmoil and that such threats amounted to blackmail. Clearly, however, 
this was a major source of international leverage. 
The situation in East Timor also led the US Congress to pass the Leahy Amendment 
which cut the limited amount of aid and training that the US still provided to the TNI 
and made concrete reform of the Indonesian military and the prosecution of those 
responsible the conditions of the restoration of military ties. The Leahy Amendment 
thus created an obstacle to future rapprochement with Indonesia. This situation left 
Habibie with no choice; he finally agreed to accept an international peace-keeping force. 
In contradiction, John Smith argues that calls for Indonesia's debt to be withheld were 
actually aimed at destabilising Western banks and markets rather than pressuring 
78 Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne, 'East Timor and the new humanitarian inte rventionism', 
International Affairs, 7T4, 2001, pp. 805-827. 
79 Wheeler and Dunne, 'East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism'. 
80 Ann Marie Murphy, 'US Rapprochement with Indonesia: From Problem State to Partner', 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 32:3, 2010, pp. 362-387 , p. 368. 
157 
Indonesia on the East Timor issue. On 7 September 1999, BBC Radio News reported 
that: 
The IMF's bail-out of Indonesia was not designed to rescue the Indonesian 
economy from recession... but to save western banks from the threat of 
bankruptcy. This is why western governments are reluctant to use the debt to put 
pressure on Jakarta. s1 
Because no IMF money had ever been given to Indonesia, calls for the IMF to postpone 
its assistance to Indonesia are more likely to destabilise Western banks and markets 
than influence the situation in East Timor. 82 Whether this was a real fact or not, the US 
threat through the IMF which caused resentment in Indonesia's domestic politics had 
influenced Habibie government to accept the international peace-keeping force. 
Other countries like Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam were all heavily dependent on trade 
with Asia; over 60 per cent of Vietnamese and 60 per cent of Myanmar exports had 
Asian countries as their destination including those hit by the crisis. Their capacity to 
absorb exports from India and China had declined. In 1997 Vietnam's export growth 
fell from 21 per cent and to just 3 per cent in 1998. Laos was greatly dependent on 
electricity exports to Thailand and faced major set-backs in export revenue due to the 
reduced energy need in Thailand. 83 Vietnam is the only country in Southeast Asia to 
have engaged in so many intensive negotiations with the US over the past few decades. 
These include the Bilateral Trade Agreement during 1996-2000 which led to 
negotiation on Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) in 2003-2006 and finally 
paved the way for Vietnam's entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on 1 
January 2007. Meanwhile, Myanmar established economic interdependence with 
China. In 2001, Myanmar began joint natural gas explorations with China. Four years 
later Myanmar allowed China to explore in the areas off its western coast in the Bay of 
Bengal. Energy security is an important element in the relationships between these two 
countries. 
The Role of Great Powers and External Powers 
The role of the great powers, particularly the US, was crucial in the East Timor crisis. 
External powers such as the UN and Australia also played important roles. Other 
external powers that also contributed were Portugal, the UK, New Zealand, South 
Korea, Japan, China, France, Italy, Canada, Jordan and Kenya. Although Portugal was 
81 John Smith, 'Third World Debt, G7 Tighten its Nose', available at 
htttp:/ ; .. vww.ragingwave.com/ index_files/ G7%20tightens%20the%2onoose.pdf, (accessed on 15 
November 2011). 
82 Smith, 'Third World Debt, G7 Tighten its Nose'. 
83 Jurgen Ruland, 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis: Theoretical Implications and Practical Consequences for 
Southeast Asian Regionalism', The Pacific Review, 13:3, 2000, pp. 421-451. 
a prominent player, I will only elaborate the role of the UN, Australia and the US to 
specifically look into the balance of power dynamics in the region. 
United States 
Since the Santa Cruz incident in Dili, a bipartisan effort in Congress and an expanding 
grassroots movement set out to reverse US policy on East Timor. After the incident, 52 
Senators wrote to President Bush calling for active U.S. support for the implementation 
of the UN resolutions on East Timor 'with an eye towards a political solution that might 
end the needless suffering in East Timor and bring about true self-determination for 
the territory'. 84 It was the first of many bipartisan House and Senate letters affirming 
support for East Timor's self-determination. Since then, Congress has acted repeatedly 
on several fronts to encourage resolution of East Timor's political status and to protect 
the human and political rights of its people. 8s 
The US also played a role in persuading Indonesia to open up to the UN presence in 
East Timor. The US demanded that Indonesia permit an international peace-keeping 
force into East Timor to stop the violence. In the beginning, for Indonesia, the idea of 
foreign soldiers on Indonesian soil was humiliating. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General Henry Shelton, together with US Pacific Commander-in-Chief, 
Admiral Dennis Blair, was influential in convincing Indonesian Defence Minister 
General Wiranto, to agree to the UN presence in the territory. 86 As discussed above, the 
US also used its influence in international financial institutions as a tool to pressure 
Indonesia. 
US political, econorruc and military persuas10n, as well as involvement in the 
INTERFET mission, was critical to the success of the mission. The US was engaged in a 
major amphibious exercise with Australia, Crocodile '99. The Aegis-class cruiser USS 
Mobile Bay and destroyer USS O'Brien also participated in Crocodile '99. 87 The supply 
ship USNS Killeau was en route to the nearby region. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, the US Ambassador in Jakarta visited East Timor regularly. It shows that the 
East Timor crisis held an important place in the US foreign policy. 
8.t ETAN, 'Background on East Timor and US Policy', available at http://ww,.v.etan.org/timor/BkgMnu.htm 
(accessed on 14 November 2011). 
Bs ETAN, 'Background on East Timor and US Policy'. 
86 Adam Dobb, 'East Timor and Australia's Security Roles: Issues and Scenarios', Australian 
Parliamentary Library Current Issues, No. 3, 1999-2000, available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/1ibrary/pubs/cib/1999-2ooo/2ooocibo3.htm (accessed on 14 November 2011) . 
87 Jim Garamore, 'Clinton Says US Would Aid Aussie Peacekeepers in Timor', American Forces 
Information Service New Articles, Defence Link, US Department of Defense, 10 September 1999 
available at http:/iw\.vw.defense .gov;New !NewsArticle.aspx7ID=4., I 64 (accessed on 1 October 2013). 
See also Maryanne Kelton, More than an Ally? Contemporary Australia-US Relations, Hampshire : 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2008. 
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An Indonesian official in the Indonesian Embassy in the US during the East Timor 
crisis said that they had to issue a lot of visas for Americans to be observers in East 
Timor. When asking Jakarta about the maximum number of visas to be issued, the 
instruction was to give everyone in the US who wanted to go to East Timor a visa. The 
reason was 'We knew where it was going to be, East Timor would finally choose for 
independence with the support of the US. There was no reason to challenge it'. 88 This 
showed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia already expected that the East 
Timorese would vote for independence and the US gave its full support for that. The 
person also mentioned that the Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas at that time had consulted 
with President Habibie and his advisor, Dewi Fortuna Anwar. They agreed that it was 
time to release East Timor which had been a 'pebble in the shoe' for Indonesia's 
international diplomacy. However, this idea was not shared by the Indonesian TNI. 89 
With the support of the US on East Timor independence, Indonesia had no power to 
challenge it. It should be noted that Indonesia received support from the US when it 
invaded East Timor in 1975. 9o Without the continuing US support for Indonesia's 
incorporation of East Timor, no matter how hard Indonesia tried to hold on to the 
province, it would face failure. 
The United Nations 
Since Indonesia had incorporated East Timor as its 2th province in 1975 with the US' 
blessing, the UN had always condemned Indonesia for its action. The UN had observed 
what had been going on in East Timor under Indonesia's rule. It also played an 
important role in expressing concern regarding the deterioration in the security 
situation in East Tim or to Indonesia. The UN, after the New York agreement on 5 May 
1999, administered East Timor, conducted a ballot and led the effort to restore security, 
return refugees and displaced persons, rebuild the physical infrastructure and establish 
a national administration. Since May 1999, there have been six UN or UN-sanctioned 
missions in East Timor: the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) which ran the 1999 
independence referendum; the multinational peace-enforcement operation, INTERFET 
88 Interview with Indonesian Diplomat 1, Canberra, 17 November 2011. 
89 Interview with Indonesian Diplomat 1, Canberra, 17 November 2011. 
90 On the night before the invasion, US President Gerald Ford and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, 
were in Jakarta meeting with Suharto and gave Suharto the green light to invade. Ninety percent of the 
weaponry used by the Indonesian forces in their invasion was from the US (despite a U.S. law that bans the 
use of its military aid for offensive purposes) and the flow of arms, including counterinsurgency equipment, 
was secretly increased. In the United Nations, U.S. ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan ensured that the 
international organisation was ineffective in challenging Jakarta's aggression. Under the presidency of 
Jimmy Carter, the self-proclaimed champion of human rights, there was a further increase in US military 
aid to Indonesia. Since 1975, the US has sold Jakarta over $1 billion worth of military equipment. See 
Stephen R. Shalom, Noam Chomsky and Michael Albert 'East Timor Questions and Answers', available at 
http://www.chomsky.info/articles(199910--o2.htm, (accessed on 4 February 2012). 
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and UNTAET which took East Timor to independence in May 2002 and the post-
independence UN of Mission of Supporter in East Timor (UNMISET), followed by the 
peace-building UN Office in East Timor and from August 2006, the peace-keeping and 
electoral support mission the UN Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT). In 
describing the UN's role in the crisis, Dewi Fortuna Anwar suggests that from the 
beginning, the crisis was under the UN's auspices, not the ASEAN framework. 91 
Australia 
Australia played a significant role in several ways. First, its role through Howard's letter 
in pushing for Indonesia's change of mind on East Timor crisis became an important 
factor of Habibie's option for a referendum. 
Second, Australia also played a role in persuading Indonesia and ASEAN member 
countries that Indonesia should allow international peace-keeping. Australia was 
successful in convincing ASEAN countries to agree to discuss the East Timor issue prior 
to the APEC ministerial meeting in Auckland in 1999. As the potential leader of a 
'coalition of the willing', the delegation from Australia arranged for the APEC 
conference to discuss the East Timor crisis. Before the APEC meeting, in Australia there 
was a talk about the alliance relationship as a result of an obvious lack of US 
engagement. 92 Furthermore, Australia's view on the issue was believed to influence 
other countries to join the 'coalition of the willing'. The Republic of Korea for example, 
decided to contribute to INTERFET after an announcement by President Kim Dae Jung 
at the Auckland APEC meeting on 13 September 1999.93 Australian Prime Minister 
Howard also raised the question of an international peace-keeping force with Habibie 
during their meeting in Bali on 27 April 1999. In his second meeting with Habibie, 
Howard sought to persuade Habibie to allow a larger international police and a small 
number of military observers. 94 Even though his ideas were rejected by Habibie, 
Howard's aspiration was finally achieved. Habibie agreed to allow the international 
peace-keeping force to create security in East Timor on 12 September 1999. Three days 
after that, the UNSC authorised an Australian-led intervention (INTERFET) under 
Resolution 1264. 
Third, Australia's remarkably quick response to the cns1s m September 1999, 
demonstrated that East Timor has a special place in Australia's domestic and foreign 
policy. Its participation in INTERFET and UNfAET was crucial. Australia became the 
91 Interview with Dr. De,vi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to the Vice President, 
Secretariat of the Vice President of Indonesia, Jakarta, 29 March 2011. 
92 Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention'. 
93 Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention'. 
94 White, 'The Road to INTERFET'. 
leader of INTERFET mission. INTERFET became an exercise dominated by Australia. 
The commander of INTERFET, Major General Peter Cosgrove claimed: 'the Australian 
logistics contingents supported the whole [INTERFET] force well above design 
capacity'.9s Under INTERFET, Australia's national contribution to the humanitarian 
programme in East Timor amounted for A$37 million in the 1999-2000 financial year. 
A further A$7.6 million was provided for refugees in West Timor. 96 Cotton argues that 
not only had Australian intervention led to the birth of a new Southeast Asian nation, 
but Australia had also committed to providing security and economic assistance. 97 
Australia managed the transition to the peace-keeping force role of UNTAET (United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor), started its mission in February 
2002 and participated as a major partner in UNTAET.98 Under UNTAET, Australia 
provided trainers for an East Timor Defence Force Training Centre in Mentinaro. 99 
Under UNTAET, Australia provided 80 out of 1270 civilian police (6.29%) and 1500 out 
of 8000 personnel (18.75%) in the UNTAET security force. 100 Australia maintained a 
robust contribution to UNTAET and a significant but declining Australian Defence 
Force (ADF) was maintained until unrest in May 2006 called for another deployment. 
At the outset, Australia's dominant role was not well accepted by Indonesia and some 
ASEAN member states, such as Thailand and Malaysia. Indonesia stated that 
Australia's intervention without Indonesia's consent would be regarded as an attack on 
Indonesia. Australia's policy on East Timor brought the relationship between the two 
countries to a new low. The Australian government had miscalculated reactions from 
Indonesia, such as the thought that East Timor ballot would strengthen the two 
countries' relationship and the expectation that the East Timor initiative would be 
welcomed by Indonesia. 101 The bilateral relationship with Indonesia was severely 
damaged, and the defence cooperation with TNI had been mostly dismantled. 102 
Malaysia also criticised Australia's policy in the territory and Thailand was initially 
afraid of Australia's dominance in the region, as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
However, over time, ASEAN member countries appreciated Australia's role. Thailand 
easily became a good friend of Australia during the operation of INTERFET and 
UNTAET. The discussion of indicators above is summarised in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.1. 
95 James Cotton, East Timar, Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and its afte rmath in Southeast 
Asia, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, p. 88 . 
96 Sue Downie 'UNTAET: state-building and peace-building', in Damien Kingsbu ry and Michael Leach, 
East Timar beyond Independence, Melbourne: Monash University Asia Centre, 2007, p. 37. 
97 Cotton, East Timar, Australia and Regional, p. 89. 
98 Cotton, East Timar, Australia and Regional. 
99 Sue Downie 'UNTAET: state-building and peace-building'. 
10
° Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional, p. 122. 
10 1 William Maley, 'Australia and the East Timor crisis', Australian Journal of International Affairs, 54:2, 
2000, pp. 151-161. 
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TABLE4.6 
Summary of the Indicators of a Balancing System during the East Tim.or Crisis 
No Indicators Significant Moderate In Notes 
sienificant 
Balance of Power am.one: ASEAN member states 
A Relatively equal powers ,.; 
among a minimum of 
two actors 
B. Intentions of some states ,.; 
to exvand 
C. Alliances on the basis of ,.; 
short-run interests 
D. War as a legitimate ,.; 
instrument of statecraft 
Sub Total 0 2 2 
Balance of Extenial Great Power Influence 
E. Dependency on external 
great powers as security 
providers 
F. Alignment with external 
great powers 
G. Military cooperation with 
external great powers 
H. Distribution of external 
great powers' 
armed forces 
I. Economic dependence on 
external great powers 
Sub Total 
Total 
,.; 
,.; 
,.; 
,.; 
,.; 
~ 2 
3 4 
Source: Compiled by author 
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Table 4.6 and Figure 4.1 suggest that ASEAN's role in the East Timor crisis provides 
some significant indicators of a balancing system. These significant indicators are all 
derived from indicators of a balance of external great power influence: a dependency on 
external great powers as security providers, military cooperation with external great 
powers, and economic dependence on external great powers. This demonstrates that 
external great powers played an important role in this crisis, particularly during the 
escalation and the acute periods of the crisis, where the US used its leverage to push 
Indonesia by using its economic and military ties with Indonesia and economic 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank to accept an international peace-
keeping force. However, the notion of balance was barely evident. With regard to the 
East Timor crisis, there was no other external great power demonstrating any effort to 
balance US influence. Apart from Indonesia's attempt to look for a replacement for 
military trade from Russia, no other Southeast Asian countries attempted to seek great 
powers' effort to balance US policies in the crisis. Thus, I rather argue that the crisis 
management indicated the importance of external great power influence instead of a 
balance of external great power influence. 
Not only was US influence important, but influence from other external powers was 
also crucial. Australia's role was decisive, from Howard's letter to its contribution in 
INTERFET and UNTAET. Australia, with the help of the US also played a very 
significant role during the APEC Meeting in Auckland in May 1999 in persuading APEC 
member countries, particularly ASEAN members, to push Indonesia, and to convince 
Indonesia that it could not halt violence on its own and therefore would need help from 
an international peace-keeping force. 
4.5. A Concert of Powers? 
This section investigates whether or not the crisis management by ASEAN member 
countries indicates a concert of powers during the East Timor Crisis. In this section I 
argue that the regional security system in Southeast Asia is explained by only two 
significant, four moderate and one insignificant indicator associated with a concert of 
powers. Therefore the crisis management does not provide convincing evidence that it 
is a concert of powers. The analysis uses the indicators of a concert of powers listed in 
Box 3.3 (see Section 3.6). Table 4.7 provides an overview of the indicators associated 
with a concert of powers and a detailed analysis follows. 
TABLE4.7 
A Concert of Powers in Southeast Asia during the East Tirnor Crisis? 
No. Indicators Thailand The Philippines Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Bruneiand 
CLMV countries 
Concert of Powers 
A. A decisive shock 'The East Tim or crisis was a shock but not a decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order. 
to the stability of 
the prevailing 
order: 
Moderate 
B. A high and self- 'The cooperation among dominant powers was self-conscious but the level was not as high as the cooperation during the Cambodian 
conscious level of crisis. It is important to note that the cooperation was not intended to be conducted among dominant powers. 
cooperation 
among dominant 'Thailand was The Philippines was Malaysia's intention Llke Malaysia, Indonesia wished These countries did 
powers: consistent m its consistent m its to deploy a major Singapore's for a greater role not demonstrate a 
Moderate contribution and contribution and contribution of contribution was by ASEAN member high and self-
cooperation with cooperation with military personnel not as large as those countries. conscious level of 
other ASEAN other ASEAN was rejected by of 'Thailand and the Indonesia played a cooperation 
countries or non countries or non Jose Ramos Horta Philippines. role in trying to because their 
ASEAN countries ASEAN countries who stated that stop TNI's support contribution as 
under INTERFET under INTERFET Malaysian to militias. governments was 
and UNTAET. and UNTAET. personnel would barely visible. 
not be welcome in 
EastTimor. 
C. A pattern of 'There existed a pattern of cooperative behaviour, which showed solidarity with Indonesia; ASEAN member countries supported 
cooperative Indonesia by being silent. Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore further demonstrated support by sending 
behaviour: military/civilian personnel. Based on their contributions, the ASEAN members could be divided into: Thailand and the Philippines 
Significant who gave major contribution of military personnel; Malaysia and Singapore who sent a minimum number of soldiers with civilian 
personnel; and other countries with small roles such as Lao PDR, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar and Brunei Darussalam. However, 
it is important to note that individuals of the latter countries were in East Timor working in NGOs or as volunteers. 
D. An effective, The roles of dominant powers were not equal but their roles were effective. There were also some elements of economic 
equal, collectively interdependency between the dominant powers during the East Timor crisis. 
predominant, 
interdependent 
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No. Indicators Thailand The Philippines Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Bruneiand 
CLMV countries 
Concert of Powers 
group of all 
dominant powers: 
Moderate 
E. Institutionalised No summit diplomacy or consultative mechanism among participant countries. The only high-level meeting about the East Timar 
summit issue was the APEC Ministerial Meeting in New Zealand, 1999. However, even though there was no summit diplomacy, Rodolfo 
diplomacy and Severino, the then ASEAN Secretary-General and Surin Pitsuwan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, were very active in 
supporting exploring how ASEAN could contribute. 
consultative 
mechanisms: 
Insignificant 
F. A joint approach There was no joint approach to the issue of the East Timar crisis. However, there was a joint approach in terms of other issues, such 
to regional issues: as ASEAN integration. 
Moderate 
G. A need for system Thailand saw the Stability in Malaysia saw the Singapore was the For Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam 
stability and need for system Southeast Asia in need for system only Southeast domestic stability and the CLMV 
international stability. It did not general and in stability and Asian country that was the top countries need 
order: see as a direct Indonesia m international order, abstained from priority compared stability and 
Significant threat, but the fact particular lS but it refused voting on the UN to system stability international order, 
that Thailand sent important for the Western deep Resolution in 1975- or the need for mostly for 
troops also reflected Philippines which involvement, 1976. It means that international economic reasons. 
that Thailand shares a border including that of Singapore had order. 
wished for a stable with Indonesia. Australia. longed for stability 
Southeast Asia. in Southeast Asia. 
Singapore did not 
seem worried about 
Western 
involvement. 
Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author 
166 
A. A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order 
Southeast Asian countries at the outset did not perceive the East Timor situation as a 
decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order. However, their views were 
eventually transformed, and they considered the crisis could be a disturbance after 
being persuaded of this by external powers. Singapore, for example, never really 
regarded East Timor as an ASEAN problem as Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong told reporters in November 1999: 'It [East Timor] was not a problem created by 
ASEAN; it was and is an international problem that remains an issue with the UN. It 
never started off as an ASEAN problem'. 103 Malaysia also always saw an internal 
Indonesian issue. As elaborated earlier in this chapter (Section 4.3) for participating 
ASEAN countries, the concerns were if Indonesia continued to be unable to provide 
security in East Timor, it would jeopardise (i) Indonesia's credibility before the 
international community; (ii) ASEAN's credibility as an organisation; and (iii) regional 
stability. If the crisis continued it would accelerate the numbers of East Timorese 
fleeing to neighbouring countries. 
However, to Indonesia it was a decisive shock. Indonesia faced difficulties in its 
economy. The military and Indonesian Parliament members were among parties who 
were against Habibie's decision to hold a referendum. The government also had to 
confront pressures from international community and external great powers, such as 
the US. In a speech on 9 September 1999, President Clinton threatened dire economic 
and other ramifications should Indonesia fail to comply with the international demand 
for intervention: 
If Indonesia does not end the violence, it must invite - it must invite - the 
international community to assist in restoring security. It must allow 
international relief agencies to help people on the ground ... Today, I have also 
ordered the suspension of all programs of military cooperation with Indonesia 
effective immediately. Our military leaders have made crystal clear to senior 
military officials in Indonesia what they must do to restore our confidence. 104 
Habibie's decision for a referendum for East Timor raised concerns about setting a 
precedent for other areas in conflict, such as Aceh and Papua to request a similar 
referendum. In domestic politics, Habibie was accused of aiding an international 
conspiracy to let East Timor go. His transitional government was claimed to be 
illegitimate and therefore did not have the right to make such important decisions for 
Indonesia. Furthermore, Habibie was criticised because he never consulted on his 
policy and before his actions afterwards with the Indonesian Parliament. Under the 
Indonesian National Constitution, for example, an international agreement should get 
103 Cotton, East Timar Australia and Regional Order, p. 126. 
104 Clinton, William, 'Statement by the President on East Timor, 9 September 1999', available at 
http: II clinton6.nara.gov /1000 / og /1999-09-09-statement-by-the-president-on-east-timor.h tml ( accessed 
on 1 November 2011) . 
approval from Parliament. Habibie did not consult with the Indonesian Parliament 
neither before he agreed on the New York Agreement on s May 1999 nor about his 
decision to accept an international force in East Timor in September 1999. 105 Thus, the 
East Timor crisis was a decisive shock only to Indonesia. It was a relative shock for 
participating ASEAN member countries and arguably not even seen as a shock by non-
participating ASEAN countries. For these reasons, this indicator, a decisive shock to the 
stability of the prevailing order, is ranked as moderate in its significance for indicating 
a concert of powers in Southeast Asia. 
B. A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers 
The cooperation among the dominant powers of ASEAN was self-conscious but the 
level was not as high as the cooperation during the Cambodian crisis, therefore the 
'high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers' indicator is 
rated as moderate. Although ASEAN's role in the East Timor crisis was often criticised 
as being minimal, it was crucial. Without the participation of ASEAN member states, 
Indonesia might not have accepted international intervention. However, it is also 
important to note that the cooperation was not intended to be conducted among 
dominant powers. From the beginning, Indonesia wished for a greater role to be 
conducted by the other ASEAN member countries, and Indonesia invited all members 
of ASEAN to participate. Because ASEAN did not have its own peace-keeping force and 
-
because the members thought that the crisis had always been under UN supervision, 
ASEAN did not participate as a group. The participation of ASEAN member states was 
as individual countries under the UN framework, not under any ASEAN framework. 
What is interesting was the dominant powers, with the addition of the Philippines, like 
in the Cambodian crisis, were involved again. 
Thailand and the Philippines had been consistent in their contributions and 
cooperation with other ASEAN countries or non ASEAN countries under INTERFET or 
UNTAET. According to Thanet Aphornsuvan, a Thai lecturer at the Thammasat 
University, Bangkok, ASEAN's role may not have been crucial but Thailand's role was 
pivotal. He stated that: 
Thai troops were not only building and maintaining peace and security but also 
assisting the non military efforts such as building infrastructure like shelters and 
hospitals and also helping with agricultural sector, medical sector and other 
civilian activities. 106 
Malaysia committed to deploying major contribution of military personnel, but this was 
opposed by Jose Ramos Horta who stated that Malaysian personnel would not be 
10s Somomoeljono, Menguak Konspirasi Inernational di Timar Timur. 
106 Interview with Thanet Aphornsuvan, Distinguished Fellow, Thammasat University, Bangkok, 23 
February 2011. 
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welcome in East Timor. Like Malaysia, Singapore's contribution was not as large as 
those of Thailand and the Philippines. However, it was widely recognised that the 
personnel sent to East Timor from Singapore were very smart and professional. 
Michael Maley confirms by saying that: 
Eric [Tan Huck Gim] who was appointed as Deputy Special-Representative for 
the Secretary-General (DSRSG) for Security Sector and Rule of Law for United 
Nations Integrated Mission in Timar-Leste (UNMIT) was very professional. 
Like other Singaporean personnel, he was very smart too. 107 
Indonesia's self-conscious cooperation was seen through its effort to disarm the militia 
that were for autonomy and stop the TNI support of violence conducted by the militia. 
C. A pattern of cooperative behaviour 
There was a clear pattern of cooperative behaviour among ASEAN states before and 
throughout the East Timor crisis. This indicator, thus, is significant, and suggests the 
presence of a concert of powers in Southeast Asia during the crisis. The pattern of 
cooperative behaviour before and during the crisis signalled solidarity with Indonesia. 
Before the crisis, ASEAN maintained solidarity with Indonesia by regarding the East 
Timor issue as Indonesia's domestic problem, and therefore never discussed the issue 
within ASEAN meetings. Unlike the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis was never 
regarded by ASEAN members as a problem of ASEAN. Academics such as Cotton and 
Sonny Inbaraj argue that ASEAN paid no attention to the human rights violations in 
Indonesia. 108 
The dominant powers of ASEAN were divided in terms of support for Indonesia 
regarding the rejection of Western intervention. This further led to a split: Malaysia 
and Thailand supported Indonesia while Singapore and the Philippines did not reject 
Western intervention. Little is known about the view of Brunei and the CLMV countries 
on Western intervention in East Tim or. 
During the crisis, ASEAN also sought to respect Indonesia's sensitivities as much as 
possible. For instance, details of a meeting between Pitsuwan and Alatas and General 
Wiranto on 14 September 1999 to discuss the participation of ASEAN member states 
were treated as confidential. ASEAN foreign ministers decided not to deliberate the 
East Timor issue at their meeting on the sidelines of the 1999 UN General Assembly. 
This respect for Jakarta's sensitivities was also demonstrated by the request of Thai 
107 Interview with Michael Maley, Special Adviser Electoral Reform and International Services, Australian 
Electoral Commission, Canberra, 8 August 2011. 
108 See Cotton, East Timar, Australia and Regional Order, p. 83, and Inbaraj, East Timar Blood and Tears 
inASEAN. 
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Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to see Indonesian 
troops participate in INTERFET. 109 
Furthermore, the measure of solidarity with Indonesia was shown by sending 
military/civilian personnel. Clearly, without Jakarta's explicit consent, ASEAN 
governments would not have joined INTERFET. Based on their contributions, the 
dominant powers can be divided into: Thailand and the Philippines which made major 
contributions of military personnel; Malaysia and Singapore which sent only a limited 
number of soldiers as well as civilian personnel. However, it is important to note that 
individuals of these latter countries were identified in East Timor working in NGOs or 
as volunteers. 
The pattern of deployment by participating countries also demonstrated solidarity with 
Indonesia. ASEAN members' armed forces were not meant to engage in peace 
enforcement. The Thai Army Chief, General Surayu Chulanont, explicitly stated that 
Thai soldiers serving in INTERFET would only participate in peace-keeping operations 
to which Jakarta had given its assent. Therefore, the presence of individual states in 
East Timor was therefore confined to the east rather than the western part of the 
territory. The danger of running into militia members was significantly higher in the 
west than in the eastern part. This pattern of deployment began to change only in 2001 
when Singapore deployed peace-keepers near the West Timar border.n° 
D. An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of 
all dominant powers 
The indicator, an effective equal collectively predominant, interdependent group of all 
dominant powers, is rated as moderate. The participant countries did not really 
contribute as a group, therefore it is difficult to identify an equal contribution. The role 
of Malaysia, for example, could not be regarded as equal to the roles of Thailand and 
the Philippines. The defence forces of ASEAN states, with the exception of Malaysia, 
had little previous experience in UN operations and were initially hesitant about their 
ability to turn war fighters into peace-makers. Singapore and Thailand harboured fears 
that conscripted troops deployed to East Timor could be killed, provoking anti-
government criticism.n1 Furthermore, there were fears of having to fight Indonesian 
troops stationed along the border with West Timor. Also, deploying peace-enforcers 
and peace-keepers to East Timor would incur financial costs. Finally, not all member 
109 Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'. 
u o Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'. 
m Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis'. 
states were welcomed by the East Timorese. These factors led to unequal contributions 
by the dominant powers during the East Timor crisis. 
The role of Thailand was bigger than the role of Malaysia and Singapore in terms of 
military deployment. Thailand also created a good network and work environment with 
other nationals of the armed forces, leading to its role being regarded positively by 
INTERFET and UNTAET officials. The role of Indonesia was different as well, therefore 
it could not be compared with the role of participating countries. Although its TNI and 
police made mistakes here and there, without the commitment of the Indonesian 
government, militias would be very difficult to disarm and it would be difficult to cut 
the link between militias on the one side and TNI and Police on the other side. At the 
end, the contribution Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore were regarded 
effective and successful. Malaysia and Singapore finally increased their military 
personnel. 
E. Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative 
mechanisms 
The 'institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting mechanisms' indicator is 
insignificant in indicating a concert of powers during the crisis. The only high-level 
meeting that discussed the East Timor issue involving ASEAN members was the APEC 
Ministerial Meeting in New Zealand, 1999. However, even though there was no summit 
diplomacy, Rodolfo Severino, the then ASEAN Secretary-General and Surin Pitsuwan, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand were very active in exploring how ASEAN could 
contribute. As mentioned above, on 14 September 1999, the Thai Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Pitsuwan met with Ali Alatas and General Wiranto to discuss the participation 
of ASEAN member-states in the international force. In the afternoon of the same day 
Habibie formally requested Thailand to help organise an ASEAN military contribution 
in a meeting with Pitsuwan. 112 
Summit diplomacy existed not among ASEAN countries or participating ASEAN 
countries but between Indonesia and Australia. As mentioned earlier, Howard met 
Habibie twice to discuss the East Timor crisis. Meetings between high level officials also 
occurred between Indonesia and the US to talk about Indonesia's consent for an 
international intervention to restore security in East Tim or. 
Because no institutionalised summit diplomacy and no regular formal practices among 
dominant powers occurred with regards to the East Timor crisis, there were no formal 
112 Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis'. 
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consultative mechanisms. The only consultative mechanisms found were between the 
military personnel in the field. 
F. Ajoint approach to regional issues 
No joint approach was ever discussed by dominant or participating powers on the issue 
of East Timor crisis. However without a joint approach, the behaviour of participating 
powers was in harmony in the sense of making a contribution to assist Indonesia and 
keeping respect for Indonesia's sensitivities. Apart from the East Timor crisis, the 
organisation had demonstrated a joint approach on regional issues such as ASEAN 
integration and cooperation on counter-terrorism. ASEAN's dominant powers showed 
more active participation in those issues than other members. During 1999-2002, 
there were other issues, such as the proposal for an ASEAN Troika by Thailand and the 
rules of procedure for the ASEAN High Council. The ASEAN Troika proposal was 
rejected by countries like Myanmar, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines while 
ASEAN leaders finally reached agreement on the rules of procedures of the ASEAN 
High Council in 2001. 113 
Outside of the East Timor crisis, a joint approach was reached on 5 November in 2001 
when ASEAN countries signed the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter 
Terrorism in Bandar Seri Begawan, and in late 2002, ASEAN member countries signed 
a Declaration on a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea with China. However, these 
declarations did not really demonstrate a joint approach by dominant powers, but 
more actions by ASEAN as a whole organisation. Therefore, the indicator, a joint 
approach to regional issues, is rated as moderate. 
G. A need for system stability and international order 
There was a need for system stability in Southeast Asia. Malaysia saw the need for 
system stability and international order, but it rejected Western deep involvement, 
including that of Australia. Interestingly, despite Mahathir's criticism of the West, 
Malaysia during the period of 1999-2002 demonstrated a strengthened military 
cooperation with the US. This also meant that Malaysia was seeking an 'umbrella' to 
provide stability in the region. Thailand also saw the need for system stability. It did not 
see East Timor as a direct threat, but the fact that Thailand sent troops also reflected 
that Thailand wanted a stable Southeast Asia. Stability in Southeast Asia in general and 
in Indonesia in particular was important for the Philippines which shares borders with 
Indonesia. Singapore was the only Southeast Asian country to abstain during a UN vote. 
It means that Singapore also wanted stability in Southeast Asia. From statements by its 
113 Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'. 
172 
officials, Singapore was not worried about Western involvement. Instead, in 2000, it 
gave access to US Navy access to the naval base at Changi, showing it still believed that 
the US could play a role in restoring stability in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's position 
was difficult. On the one side, it wanted regional stability and wished for the restoration 
of its credibility. On the other side, it did not want its military officers in East Timor 
become 'victims' of legal procedures about past violation of human rights. 
The indicator, a need for system stability and international order is significant although 
the indicator, a decisive shock to stability and order is insignificant. The need for 
system stability is not necessarily the result of a decisive shock. On the contrary, it 
resulted from other factors such as the complex national interests of ASEAN member 
countries, and solidarity with Indonesia. A review of the indicators of a concert of 
powers is summarised in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.2. 
TABLE 4.8 Summary of the Indicators of a Concert of Powers in Southeast Asia 
during the East Tim.or Crisis 
No. Indicators Sismificant Moderate Insi21lificant 
Concert of Powers 
A. A decisive shock to the stability of v 
the prevailing order 
B. A high and self-conscious level of v 
cooperation among dominant 
POwers 
-
C. Patterns of cooperative behaviour v 
D. An effective, equal, collectively v 
predominant, interdependent 
group of all dominant oowers 
E. Institutionalised summit v 
diplomacy and supporting 
consultative mechanisms 
F. A ioint approach to recional issues v 
G. A need for system stability and v 
international order 
Total 2 4 1 
Source: Compiled by author 
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FIGURE4.2 
Indicators of a Concert of Powers in Southeast Asia during the East Tiinor Crisis 
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Table 4.8 and Figure 4.2 demonstrate that for this concept there were only two 
significant indicators out of seven are met. Those two indicators are the pattern of 
cooperative behaviour and the need for system stability and international order. Four 
indicators of a concert of powers are moderate and one indicator is insignificant. This 
was a testament that the ASEAN's management during the East Timor crisis in 1999-
2002 does not provide evidence that there existed of a concert of powers among the 
dominant powers in Southeast Asia. 
4.6. A Security Community? 
This section analyses some indicators of a security community and examines how 
ASEAN responded to the East Timor Crisis. The indicators of a security community 
elaborated here are the same indicators that were used to analyse the regional security 
system during the Cambodian crisis, and are listed in Box 3.1 (see Section 3.4). Each of 
these indicators of a security community is treated as being equally important. In this 
section, I argue that ASEAN members' management of the East Timor crisis is 
explained by seven out of ten indicators of a security community. However, these 
indicators only applied among the dominant powers, namely Thailand, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. The indicators are not relevant to countries like 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. Table 4.9 summarises 
narratives of all indicators of a security community in Southeast Asia during the East 
Timor crisis. 
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No. 
A. 
B. 
TABLE4.9 
A Security Community in Southeast Asia during the East Timor Crisis? 
Indicators Thailand The Philippines Malaysia I Singapore j 
Secutj!y Community 
Indonesia Bruneiand 
CLMV countries 
A comparability of Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines shared common values: the importance of supporting and maintaining relations 
political values with Indonesia, the strong adherence to the principle of non-interference and strong adherence to ASEAN solidarity. 
among decision- 1-----,c:----:-------:-::--r-------,-:--.,..----.--:~-:-----=-----=---=:-::----.----:,,...------=---:----.--=----:----=-------.--------~ 
makers: Thailand had Human rights is an Malaysia had been Like Malaysia, Before the referendum, Vietnam 
Significant supported important issue for supporting Thailand and the Indonesia valued a supported 
Indonesia since the the Philippines, Indonesia on the Philippines, united Indonesia Indonesia after 
East Timor however good East Timor Singapore including East Timor as becoming member 
integration with relations with situation since supported its most important of ASEAN. 
Indonesia in 1975. It Indonesia had 1975. After Habibie Indonesia. political value. During 
contributed the prevailed in the opened up the its rule, Indonesia 
largest military Philippines' foreign option for sought for support from 
personnel, not only policy. The independence, ASEAN and prevented 
among ASEAN Philippines also Mahathir still this issue from being 
countries but also contributed a large supported discussed in any 
among Asian number of military Indonesia and sent ASEAN meeting. After 
countries. personnel. military and Habibie announced 
civilian personnel. option to vote for 
regional autonomy or 
independence, 
Indonesia elevated 
international image as 
an important value. 
A mutual Most of the behaviour among decision-makers of the ASEAN member countries was predictable. 
predictability of 
~-------~---------,----------,.---------,----,,-----------.------:---:------1 behaviour among - · ·· · Thailand's Philippines had to Among other Singapore's Indonesia's was often The behaviour of 
decision-makers: behaviour was also balance internal ASEAN member behaviour was accused by decision-makers 
Significant predictable. Its aspirations and its countries, Malaysia generally international of Brunei and the 
policy was its relationship with was regarded as the predictable, but its community of being CLMV countries 
consistent m Indonesia . strongest abstention from insensitive towards the was quite 
supporting However, Manila's Indonesia's voting on the UN East Timor crisis. predictable in the 
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No. 
C. 
Indicators 
A mutual 
responsiveness of 
government to 
actions and 
communication of 
other government: 
Significant 
particularly 
during the de-
escalation 
period 
Thailand 
Indonesia, being 
silent on 
Indonesia's rule in 
East Timor and 
giving its assistance 
when the crisis 
arose. 
Thailand was active 
and responsive in 
the crisis. It was 
also responsive to 
actions and 
communication of 
other governments 
in the field. 
The Philippines Malaysia l Singapore 
Security Comm.unity 
behaviour was supporter on the draft resolution of 
predictable because East Timor crisis. A/C-4/37/LS was 
it always valued This also was quite unpredictable 
first its relationship confirmed when to Indonesia. 
with Indonesia, the East Timorese 
particularly rejected any 
Indonesia's Malaysian army to 
investment in East be the leader of 
Timor. UNAMET, given its 
closeness to 
Indonesia. 
l Indonesia 
However, for ASEAN 
countries, Indonesia's 
behaviour is 
understandable and 
predictable. 
The Philippines was 
active and 
responsive in the 
crisis. It was also 
Malaysia was active 
and responsive to 
the crisis. It was 
always consultative 
with Indonesia and 
other member 
countries. Malaysia 
however ended up 
not making a large 
contribution 
responsive 
delivering 
assistance m 
crisis. 
Singapore was also I Indonesia was 
in responsive in the field. 
responsive to 
actions and 
communication of 
other governments 
in the field. 
Interestingly, the 
East Timorese were 
in favour of the 
Philippines' 
involvement. 
because of 
resistance 
working 
its 
to 
under 
Australia's 
leadership and 
rejection by the 
East Timorese 
because Malaysia 
was seen as too 
sympathetic to 
Indonesia. 
the 
The army leaders in the 
peace-keeping force 
met regularly with the 
Military Region 
Commander 
Region/ Panglima 
Kodam (Pangdam) IX 
Udayana. However, 
there was criticism that 
TNI supported the 
violence conducted by 
pro-independence 
militias and the 
government of 
Indonesia did not 
expend effort to stop it. 
Brunei and 
CLMV countries 
sense that they 
gave support to 
Indonesia but 
were unable to 
contribute. 
The level of 
responsiveness of 
Brunei 
Darussalam and 
the CLMV 
countries is 
considerably low. 
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No. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
Indicators 
Precipitating 
factors that 
encourage states to 
orient themselves 
in each other's 
direction and 
coordinate their 
policies: 
Significant 
Thailand 
For Thailand the 
factors were 
regional stability 
and solidarity with 
Indonesia. 
of I Thailand was Processes 
transactions, 
international 
organisations and 
social learning: 
Significant 
consistent in its 
contribution and its 
role. 
The Philippines Malaysia I Singapore 
Securi_ty Community 
For the Philippines, 
the precipitating 
factors were the 
threat to regional 
instability and 
economic relations 
with Indonesia. 
The transaction 
involving the 
Philippines was 
related to the 
assignment of a 
Commander in East 
Timor. 
The precipitating 
factor for Malaysia 
was solidarity with 
Indonesia. 
For Singapore, the 
precipitating factors 
were ASEAN's 
credibility and the 
threat of a refugee 
influx from East 
Timor. 
Malaysia planned a Singapore 
major contribution, increased its 
but because of military and civilian 
refusal of Jose deployment in East 
Ramos Horta, it Timor. 
only sent 30 
personnel. 
However, because 
of process of 
transactions 
Malaysia increased 
its military 
deployment. 
I Indonesia 
Indonesia seen 
international pressure 
on humanitarian 
aspects in East Timor 
as the precipitating 
factor. 
Indonesia in the 
beginning was reluctant 
to receive an 
international force in 
East Timor. After 
international pressures, 
it was willing to do so. 
Indonesia also was 
reluctant to accept 
Australia's leadership 
in INTERFET. The 
participation of other 
ASEAN member 
countries made 
Australia's role more 
diplomatically 
acceptable for 
Indonesia. 
Bruneiand 
CLMV countries 
Not relevant 
Not relevant 
Development of I Trust and a collective identity were developed among member countries who were participating in the peace-keeping force. This did not 
trust and collective necessarily mean that at the end of the East Timor crisis, ASEAN had a high level of collective identity. 
identity formation: 
Significant 
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No. 
G. 
H. 
Indicators 
A total absence of 
armed inter-state 
conflict or 
prospects for such 
conflict in the 
region: 
Insignificant 
Thailand 
Thai-Myanmar 
relations had 
become conflicted 
during 1999-2002. 
The poor 
relationship was 
exacerbated by 
Thailand's refusal to 
extradite the 
perpetrators of the 
1999 occupation of 
the Myanmar 
Embassy in 
Bangkok, as 
requested by 
Myanmar. In 
February 2001, the 
tension escalated 
into a serious 
border 
confrontation and 
lead to the death of 
approximately 50-
100 Myanmar 
soldiers. 
The Philippines Malaysia 
Security Communi__tt_ 
Domestically, the Even though 
Philippines had Malaysia supported 
problems with Indonesia on the 
insurgencies from East Timor issue, 
the Southern Area. during 1999-2000 
The claim over there was friction 
South China Sea between Malaysia 
often created and Indonesia over 
tension with China. Ambalat. Tension 
with Indonesia also 
existed because of 
the smoke haze 
issue. Malaysia and 
the Philippines had 
also not reached 
agreement about 
the Philippines' 
claim over Sabah. 
j Singapore 
Aside from the East 
Timor crisis itself, 
during 1999-2002, 
Singapore criticised 
Indonesia's policy 
in handling the 
smoke haze issue. 
Singapore was quite 
upset about being 
referred to as a 
'little red dot' by 
Indonesian 
President Habibie. 
I Indonesia 
There were tensions 
with Singapore, 
Malaysia and Brunei 
Darussalam because of 
the smoke haze issue. 
Furthermore, there was 
also tension with 
Malaysia over the 
Ambalat issue and 
tension with Singapore 
because of the 
statement of President 
Habibie referring 
Singapore as a 'little 
red dot'. 
Bmneiand 
CLMV countries 
Thai and 
Myanmar had a 
border dispute, 
that led to the use 
of force: Brunei 
Darussalam had a 
territorial dispute 
with Malaysia over 
Limbang, Lawas, 
Terusan, Rangau. 
Brunei and 
Vietnam have 
been claiming 
Spratly Islands in 
the South China 
Sea. 
A total absence of I Competitive military build-up or arms race was insignificant but this does not mean that there was no competitive build-up or arms race 
a competitive before and after the East Timor crisis or in the longer period. 
military build-up 
arms race 
involving regional 
actors: 
Significant 
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No. Indicators Thailand I The Philippines I Malaysia I Singapore I Indonesia I Bruneiand CLMV countries 
Security Community 
I. Formal or informal Informal practices among ASEAN member countries during the East Timar crisis included the meeting between Indonesian Foreign 
institutions and Minister and Thai Foreign Minister to discuss participation of ASEAN member-states in the international force, and informal practices 
practices: conducted by military personnel in the field. 
Moderate 
J. A high degree of In October 1998, ASEAN established an ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) which encompassed two aspects: the monitoring of global, 
economic regional as well as national economic and financial developments, summarised twice yearly in a surveillance report. Discussion of an 
integration as a ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFI'A) was introduced in the Singapore Summit in 1992 and was developing by 1999. APEC established 
necessary in 1994 was also one of the games. It is important to note that after the financial crisis, ASEAN really boosted their efforts for 
precondition of a integration. The ASEAN Plus Three also reflected a sense of integration. 
peaceful 
relationship: 
Moderate 
Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author 
179 
A. A comparability of political values among decision-makers 
Political values of ASEAN member states during the East Timor crisis were comparable 
and therefore, the 'comparability of the political values among decision-makers' 
indicator can be regarded as significant in suggesting the presence of a security 
community in Southeast Asia. For ASEAN member countries, commonly-held values 
were the importance of supporting and maintaining relations with Indonesia; strong 
adherence to the principle of non-interference; and strong adherence to ASEAN 
solidarity. They also shared the view that a weak and isolated East Timor could easily 
become a source of instability for the whole region. 114 Another common value, 
particularly for Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, was the willingness 
to contribute to INTERFET and UNTAET. ASEAN's reputation also depended heavily 
on how ASEAN member states responded to the crisis. 
Bangkok, like Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Manila, has always regarded Indonesia as 
an important friend. Because of this, Thailand did not really want to jeopardise its 
relations with Indonesia by raising the East Timor issue with Indonesia. In December 
1992, approximately 500 international NGO activists gathered in Bangkok for the 
second People's Plan for the 21st Century (PP21) assembly. Ramos Horta was a resource 
speaker during the assembly, and East Timor was one of the themes of the workshops 
in the PP21 assembly. However, the Thai media paid little attention to the issue of East 
Timor. Most of the Thai press had yet to see East Timor as an issue. 
Malaysia had also been a consistent supporter of Indonesia. When the Santa Cruz 
incident happened in 1999 in Dili and the local Malaysian television company aired the 
incident, it was criticised by Indonesian Information Minister, Murdiono. Following 
that, Prime Minister Mahathir sent Malaysian Information Minister to Jakarta as 
personal envoy to express apologies. 11s Malaysia did not condemn the Indonesian 
military or state any negative claims towards what happened like any another Western 
countries, but once more reaffirmed its back-up of Indonesia. The second Asia Pacific 
Conference on East Timor' convened in Kuala Lumpur in November 1996 was cancelled 
by the ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) out of respect for 
Indonesia's sensitivities. In addition, the Malaysian police arrested 66 local activists 
and journalists 116. 
The Philippines paid a higher degree of attention to its internal aspirations than 
Malaysia and Thailand did in relation to the East Timor issue. An Asia Pacific 
114 Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis'. 
115 John Funston, ASEAN and the Principle of Non Intervention - Practice and Prospects , Singapore: 
!SEAS Publishing, 2000. 
116 Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention'. 
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conference on East Timor was set for May 1994 in Manila. When the Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas met with Filipino diplomats in early November 1993 during 
the first round of talks between the Philippine government and the secessionist Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF), he raised the issue of the convening of the Asia 
Pacific Conference on East Timor. After the meeting, Philippine President Fidel Ramos 
gave orders to his National Security Adviser General Jose Almonte to tackle the 
problem of the East Timor conference because he thought the Asia Pacific Conference 
on East Timor (APCET) could endanger its bilateral relations with Indonesia. 
Resistance came from the organisers of the conference but finally on 20 May 1994, 
President Ramos banned East Timorese and other foreigners from attending the 
conference because it was seen as contrary to Manila's national interests. 117 Malaysia 
also supported Indonesia in rejecting the convening of the APCET, as Mahathir 
commented in a reference to President Ramos: 'I would accommodate Indonesia in the 
wider interests of ASEAN'. 118 Malaysian Law Minister Syed Hamid Albar also 
reaffirmed the consistency of Malaysia's stance by saying: 
I think it is important for us to take sensitivities into account, and we must not 
talk of human rights as though they are in a vacuum ... I cannot tell what the 
Filipinos should do but I think we must always be conscious that what we do 
will affect other people. 119 
Another political value that was shared by Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the 
Philippines was the willingness to assume collective responsibility for the region's 
security problems. Malaysia, for instance, made it clear that it was willing to provide 
the commander for the UNTAET Peace-keeping Force, reflecting Kuala Lumpur's long-
standing support for UN Peace-keeping operations. Thailand also shared the same 
aspiration. Malaysia's aspiration was finally destroyed by opposition from Xanana 
Gusmao who thought that Malaysia was too sympathetic towards Indonesia. To 
compromise, an ASEAN force commander, a Filipino Lieutenant-General was chosen to 
lead UNTAET's peace-keeping operation, with an Australian as his deputy. 120 However, 
countries like Myanmar, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam had shown little enthusiasm to 
assume such responsibility. Myanmar had made it clear that it did not approve of any 
external involvement in East Timar. Vietnam did not want to participate either in 
INTERFET or UNTAET. 12 1 
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B. A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers 
Throughout the crisis, the behaviour of the decision-makers of the ASEAN member 
states was predictable, thus highlighting the significance of the 'mutual predictability of 
behaviour among decision-makers' indicator. During the escalation period, ASEAN 
countries remained 'silent' and supported Indonesia. This had been seen in their 
leaders' comments, in the fact that the East Timar issue had never been discussed in 
any ASEAN meeting, also in their support at UNSC session on East Timor. During the 
acute and de-escalation period of the crisis, most of the behaviour among decision-
makers of the ASEAN member countries was predictable. Malaysia's consistent support 
for Indonesia's policy could be seen, from Indonesia's occupation of East Timor to the 
time when the East Timor's independence was recognised internationally in 2002. 
Mahathir had been a staunch defender of Indonesian behaviour in East Timor. Asked 
in Singapore to explain his opposition to East Timor's independence in light of his 
outspoken support for the right of Kosovo, which has a Muslim majority, to break away 
from Serbia, Mahathir said Indonesia was entitled to integrate the territory. 'The 
difference between East Timar and Kosovo is that East Timar has been with Indonesia 
for 25 years, and during that time there were no massacres'. Mahathir added, 'The 
Indonesians were not behaving like Serbs'.122 Bangkok's policies in relation to the East 
Timar issue had also been quite predictable because it had shown a consistency in 
supporting Indonesia's national integrity. Media in Thailand was not too interested in 
the issue and the voice of human rights activists in Thailand was basically 'ignored' by 
the Thai government to sustain its maintain its resilient relationship with Indonesia 
and the 'ASEAN solidarity'. The Philippines, however, found that its internal pressure 
was quite contradictory with Indonesia's pressure. President Ramos faced a dilemma 
between promoting a pure democracy in the Philippines in which activists could voice 
their aspirations on East Timar and sustaining good political relations on the one hand 
and prospective economic benefits from im estment and trade ,.vith Indonesia on the 
other hand. 
Among other ASEAN member countries, Singapore was the only country who was a 
little bit unpredictable. As discussed in Sections 4-4 and 4.5, Singapore was the only 
ASEAN country that abstained from the UNGA votes on East Timar in 1975 and 1976. 
The behaviour of M anmar, Brunei Darussalam, and Laos was predictable in the sense 
that the feared the possibility of regional instability, 'Indonesia s break up' or any 
other regional disorder as impacts of the East Timar crisis, but they did not want to 
assume an responsibility in an of the operations during the East Timar crisis. 
This was also related to their limited capabilities to offer assistance. 
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C. A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication 
of other governments 
Four ASEAN countries (Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore) were very 
responsive in terms of delivering assistance to Indonesia while Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Myanmar and Laos did not commit to any responsibility for any of the UN-sponsored 
East Timar operations. Since the beginning, Thailand and Malaysia had indicated their 
willingness to participate in a peace-keeping force if Indonesia approved. During the 
crisis, Thailand and the Philippines ended up offering the biggest contingents from 
among the ASEAN states, with a Thai general assuming deputy command. Malaysia 
was reluctant to work with Australia as a leader of the peace enforcement 
cooperation. 123 
The four countries were also responsive to acts and communication with Indonesia, in 
particular, and with other countries involved in the field. They did not really work as a 
unity in ASEAN, but they had a collective identity. A Thai army officer interviewed said 
that even though there was no ASEAN Peace-keeping Force and ASEAN countries 
contributed individually under the auspices of the UN, military officials from ASEAN 
countries did develop a sense of collective identity as ASEAN and the successor to 
Lieutenant General Del Costa met regularly with the Indonesian Military Region 
Commander (Pangdam) IX Udayana in Bali to consult with and to update the 
Pangdam on the real situation on East Timor. 12 4 
Bangkok participated in a multinational humanitarian mission to East and West Timor 
in response to another 'invitation' by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas in late September 
1999. Indonesia invited ASEAN members to join this mission in response to concerns 
in the US and elsewhere about the lack of safety for refugees from East Timor and the 
civilian character of the camps in which they were housed. When Australia and the 
United Sates suggested extending military operations in West Timar to hot pursuit of 
pro-Jakarta militias, ASEAN governments, including Thailand argued that such action 
would constitute a flagrant breach of Indonesia's sovereignty. Thai Prime Minister 
Chuan Leekpai reminded the US defence secretary that the mandate of the 
international force in East Timar was restricted to East Timor itself. 12s 
Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore were very active m the peace-
keeping operations. The Thais were the first Asian forces in the Australian-led 
International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) sent on September 20 to quell the 
123 Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'. 
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militia violence in the territory. For INTERFET, the Thai Major-General served as 
deputy-commander with 1,580 Thai military personnel comprising the second-largest 
element after Australia. 126 With the UNTAET, Lieutenant-General Boonsran 
Niumpradit of Thailand in July 2000 became the first commander of the military 
component replacing Lieutenant General Jaime de los Santos of the Philippines. 127 
Liutenant General Boonsrang Niumpradit was known for his keen intellect, infectious 
sense of humour and remarkable people skills. Under his leadership, the force became 
more closely intertwined, and he changed INTERFET's focus from countering militia 
activity to sustaining the support of local people. 128 Apart from their Lieutenant 
General being the first commander, the Philippines also supported INTERFET and 
UNTAET with military personnel. Malaysia and Singapore also contributed military 
personnel and civilian police component. Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Singapore also contributed to the new force, the East Timor Defence Force. Thailand 
offered to provide expertise in civil-military affairs, especially in the area of linking 
national development and security. Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore also 
agreed to help build the new defence force. 129 
Lao PDR, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar did not participate in 
sending military personnel to the international peace-keeping force. However, civilians 
from these countries worked with the UN Agencies in this regard, or worked at NGOs 
based in East Timor. 13° Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam also 
contributed in the training of the East Timor Defence Forces and supported its 
organisational efforts. 
D. Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each 
other's direction and coordinate their policies 
The various precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each 
other's direction make this indicator become significant. The factors included 
solidarity with Indonesia, the pursuit of regional peace and stability and ASEAN's 
credibility. However, there were individual factors such as economic interests and 
refugee influx concerns. For Thailand, the most important precipitating factors were 
the pursuit of regional peace and stability and the need to sustain a good relationship 
with Indonesia. A Thai army officer who was sent to East Timor as an ADC to the Thai 
Force Commander of UNTAET commented: 
126 Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor InterYention'. 
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The biggest interests of Thailand in participating in the UN peace-keeping 
operation were: First, we want regional peace and stability. If you look at the 
history of the rest of the world, war in Iraq, the Middle East and any other place 
in the world, peace for Thailand is more upfront. Second, the relationship 
between Thailand and Indonesia was also important, Thai gave priority to its 
neighbours. We are aware that if there is a problem, the first circle of countries 
who are going to help us are those who share borders with us and then those 
who are our neighbours. For Thailand as a member of ASEAN, the organisation 
is a long term thing, it has real value. 131 
Similar to Thailand, which valued regional peace and stability, the Philippines also saw 
regional peace and stability and its economic relationship with Indonesia as important 
precipitating factors. Support of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor was based on its 
economic interdependency with Indonesia. Instability in Indonesia would jeopardise 
Indonesia's investment in the country. 
For Singapore, ASEAN's credibility and concern about refugee influx were the most 
significant precipitating factors. Thus, the participating countries have common 
precipitating factors as well as other individual precipitating factors. 
E. Processes of transactions, international organisations and social 
learning 
The processes of transaction began when Indonesia kindly asked other ASEAN 
countries to participate. One of the reasons for Habibie's request was that he was 
offended by the role Australia was playing in resolving the East Timor crisis. To 
influence at the last minutes the composition of the international force without 
formally setting preconditions over the nationality troops, Habibie specifically 
requested Thailand, the then Chair of the ASEAN Committee, for ASEAN member 
states to take a major role in the international keeping force. Thailand, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Singapore agreed to help. The Philippines government requested two 
conditions for its participation: first, a UNSC Resolution and second, an invitation 
from the country to intervene. In responding this request, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas 
suggested that any new norm of humanitarian intervention should be based on the 
principles of legitimacy and universal applicability. 132 He also warned that external 
forces might initiate or exploit internal situations for their own political ends. 
Apart from the four ASEAN member countries there were key actors such as Australia, 
Portugal and of course the UN. Also quite a number of UN Agencies and NGOs were 
involved. For an ASEAN country sending its military personnel, there was a need to 
13 1 Interview with a Thai Army officer who was sent to East Timar as an ADC to the Thai Force Commander 
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balance with its own country's interest and Indonesia's interests with the international 
interests that had been mandated to them. AB a Thai official declared: 
You would see a lot of meetings NGO, UN Agency, the political dimensions. 
ASEAN member countries meet to do best to preserve their interests and to 
balance it with the international mandate. We had to do it right because so 
many people were watching us.133 
There was some bargaining between Indonesia and the UN. In the beginning, 
Indonesia did not favour any international intervention and the UN needed permission 
from Jakarta before any peace-keeping force could be set up. When Indonesia accepted 
international intervention, it sought ASEAN leadership for the operations. It finally did 
not refuse Australia's leadership in INTERFET. This demonstrates that transactions 
and bargaining between Indonesia and the UN occurred. Singapore's final intention to 
send troops for UNMISET was also a social learning experience for Singapore. 
F. Development of trust and collective identity formation 
Trust and the formation of a collective identity were developing throughout the 
escalation, acute and de-escalation periods of the crisis. This does not necessarily mean 
that by 2010, ASEAN had developed a high degree of trust and collective identity. The 
participating countries indeed developed some degree of trust and collective identity. 
An ADC to the Force Commander in the East Timor crisis commented that the Thai 
Force Commander realised that apart from being given a mandate by the UN, he was 
also a Thai, and a part of ASEAN. Personnel from ASEAN member countries also were 
aware of bearing an ASEAN identity, despite their duty being under UN auspices. 134 
However, this collective identity was only developed between those countries who were 
participating in the international peace-keeping force. Beyond the East Timor crisis, 
Thailand had border problems with Myanmar; Singapore was offended by Indonesia 
due to the 'little red dot' reference by President Habibie in 1998; and Indonesia 
received criticism from Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam and the Philippines 
over the pollution haze. 
G. A total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such 
conflicts in the region 
The indicator, a total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for conflicts in 
the region, is rated as insignificant. When the East Timor Crisis happened, an armed 
border dispute was occurring between Thailand and Myanmar, which was not widely 
133 Interview with a Thai Army officer who was sent to East Timor as an ADC to the Thai Force Commander 
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known to the public. The relations between Thai and Myanmar had been conflicted 
before the East Timor crisis occurred, because the Thai government was not able to 
agree with his Myanmar counterpart on issues like the joint border, the cross-border 
fighting between the Myanmar army and various insurgent ethnic groups, the flow of 
drugs from Myanmar into Thailand, and various economic issues such as fishing rights 
in Myanmar waters. The situation was exacerbated by Thailand's refusal to extradite 
the perpetrators of the 1999 occupation of the Myanmar Embassy in Bangkok, as 
demanded by Myanmar. In February 2001, before the successor administration of 
Thaksin Shinawatra assumed office, the long-running diplomatic friction between 
Bangkok and Yangon escalated into a serious border confrontation. This dispute led to 
the death of 50-100 Myanmar soldiers. 13s 
The smoke haze problems occurred in 1997-1998. The recurrence of smoke haze in 
2002 had created tension between Indonesia on the one side and Malaysia, Singapore, 
Brunei and the Philippines on the other side. Simon Tay, a researcher from Singapore 
commented: 'ASEAN has to date been unable to supplement failures by Indonesia to 
address Southeast Asian fires' .136 Singapore recorded a Pollutant Standard Index (PSI) 
of 140 in two days in September 1997 (as compared with a reading of 153 during the 
smoke haze problems occurred in October 1994). 137 In Peninsular Malaysia, Malaysia 
Air PSI reached a peak reading of 849 in October 1997 for Kuching in Serawak. In early 
April 1998, the index reached 502 in Miri (Sarawak) causing-the closing of schools. This 
had caused a tension but somehow also forced ASEAN member countries to work 
harder. 
Besides smoke haze problem which was regarded by Cotton as one of Southeast Asia's 
biggest challenges, 138 there was a tension between Indonesia and Singapore. President 
Habibie received criticisms from Singapore for referring to Singapore as a little red dot 
and for accusing the island state of racism for not promoting or appointing Malay 
officers within the Singapore Armed Forces. 139 
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H. A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race involving 
regional actors 
I argue that there was limited, if any, competitive military build-up or arms race in 
1999-2002 due to the impact of the Asian Financial crisis in 1997-1998. Among ASEAN 
members only Brunei Darussalam and Myanmar demonstrated an increase in their 
defence spending. Brunei's defence budget and outlays had increased since 1995 
because of an extensive modernisation program. Myanmar's 1999 defence budget 
increased to K32.6 billion from K24.5 billion in 1998. 14° Singapore demonstrated a 
static defence budgeting showing the same nominal as in 1998 for 1999 Sing$7.3bn 
( $4.2bn) defence budget. 141 The other ASEAN countries had shown a decline in the 
purchasing power of defence budgets in line with currency depreciation. Malaysia, for 
example, delayed an order for 27 patrol vessels from Germany. Indonesia also 
demonstrated a decline in budget spending. 142 The Philippines delayed the initial phase 
of its modernisation program because of the reduced purchasing power of defence. 
Thailand's 1999 defence outlay was b77 billion, decreasing b9 billion from its b86 
billion defence budgets in 1998. Cambodia, the newest ASEAN member announced its 
plan to reduce defence spending, which accounted for 4% of its GDP in 1998 to 3% of 
GDP in 2002. 143 In 2000, although it planned to increase naval personnel from 47,000 
to 67,000 from 2000-2005, Indonesia again limited its defence spending because of 
the poor state of the economy. 144 
Overall, it is fair to say that there was a total absence of a competitive military build 
arms race at that time and therefore it can be argued as an important indicator to 
signify a security community dynamic in Southeast Asia. However, it does not mean 
that there was no arms race before 1999 or after 2002 or within a longer term. 
I. Formal or informal institutions and practices 
Within ASEAN member states and ASEAN participating countries, there were few 
formal opportunities to discuss the East Timor issue. Most were informal and therefore 
I argue that the 'formal or informal institutions and practices' indicator is moderate. 
The only formal practices were the APEC meeting in New Zealand in 1999 where the 
APEC members raised concerns of East Timor crisis and the following meetings 
between Pitsuwan from ASEAN side and Ali Alatas and General Wiranto and between 
Pitsuwan and Habibie. Following the special meeting of APEC foreign ministers in 
Auckland on September 8, the APEC Leaders Meeting gave considerable momentum to 
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international pressure on Indonesia to end the bloodshed and address the 
humanitarian crisis in East Timor, which culminated in the announcement in the early 
hours of September 13 by then President Habibie of Indonesia's willingness to accept 
UN peace-keepers. At that gathering, Minister Ginandjar Kartasasmita, representing 
President Habibie, stated Indonesia's wish for substantial ASEAN participation in a 
multinational force that the UN might establish, upon Indonesia's invitation, to restore 
order and security in East Timor. 14s 
Formal practices were limited in ASEAN because ASEAN's sense of belonging to the 
issue had never really existed. Rodolfo Severino argues that ASEAN responses to the 
crisis in East Timor were always carried out within the UN framework. According to 
him, the UN, instead of ASEAN, bad been facilitating the Indonesia-Portugal talks. This 
is also related to the fact that the UN was more legitimate and capable of undertaking 
the peace-keeping operation rather than ASEAN. 146 
However, there were a lot of informal practices in the field where personnel from 
Southeast Asian countries, namely Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore 
always consulted to Indonesia. 147 In short, the 'formal or informal practices' indicator 
can be regarded as moderate, because there were few formal practices but frequent 
informal practices occurring during the East Timor crisis. 
J. A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a 
peaceful relationship 
There was some level of political and economic integration during the period 1999-
2002. The formal initiative to establish political integration in a form of political and 
security community had not developed yet , but a certain degree of political integration 
\Vas seen in the vva) the political cooperation between ASEAN member countries bad 
been increasingly developing. ASEAN included new members -Vietnam and Myanmar 
in 1997 and Cambodia and Lao PDR in 1999. It did not mean that the efforts to 
integrate were weakened by the new membership. However , it is fair to say that with 
the inclusion of some new entrants, ASEAN needed to work harder to integrate 
themselves, either politically or economically. This effort was still ongoing when the 
thesis was being written. To boost its effort of integration, ASEAN announced an 
Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) in ovember 2000. 
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The formal expression to integrate economically started in the 1992 Singapore Summit 
where countries agreed to develop an ASEAN Free Trade Area and it had been 
developing by 1999. The efforts to integrate economically were also enhanced by the 
fact that some of the ASEAN countries were strongly affected by the 1999 Asian 
Financial Crisis. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) established in 1994 
was one such effort. The ASEAN Plus Three also reflected a sense of integration. 
The period between 1999 and 2000 was unique for ASEAN member states. In 1997, 
some countries in Southeast Asia were strongly hit by the Asian Financial Crisis, 
particularly Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Other countries were affected but the 
impact was smaller compared to those of the other three countries. In October 1998, 
ASEAN members agreed on the establishment of an ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP). 
The ASP encompassed two aspects; first, the monitoring of global, regional as well as 
national economic and financial developments. These developments were summarised 
twice early in a surveillance report. The purpose was to prevent deterioration into 
major macroeconomic and financial instability by ASEAN member states. The ASP 
centred on a peer-review process conducted by the ASEAN Finance Ministers. Through 
the ASP, the Ministers could henceforth raise macroeconomic or financial issues with 
their colleagues that previously considered being none of their business. 148 
ASEAN Leaders at the 3rd Informal Summit in Manila in 1999 recognised the launching 
of the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) in March of 1999 as a major milestone in 
ASEAN financial and monetary cooperation. They likewise noted progress in the 
conduct of the peer review process of the economic situation in ASEAN and welcomed 
the support extended by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the UN Development 
Programme to the ASP. The HOS/ G directed their respective Ministers to explore 
further options to strengthen regional support mechanisms. 149 
After the crisis, ASEAN found itself facing important opportunities and challenges 
including the need to better integrate the new members into the regional and global 
economy. In November 2000, the ASEAN Leaders agreed to launch an 'Initiative for 
ASEAN Integration' (IAI) programme, which gives direction to and sharpens the focus 
of collective efforts in ASEAN to narrow the development gap between ASEAN's older 
and newer members (Cambodia, Laos Myanmar and Vietnam). To realise this object ive, 
the ASEAN Leaders at their Summit Meeting in Phnom Penh in November 2002 
endorsed a Work Plan (with 48 projects) that would ensure dynamic sustained growth 
148 Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'. 
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November 2011) . 
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of the sub region and prosperity of the peoples. Besides the CLMV countries, there are 
also underdeveloped regions in the ASEAN-6 countries, therefore the Initiative for IAI 
is also aimed at bridging the gaps. The first six year IAI Work Plan was implemented 
from July 2002-June 2008.1s0 The indicators discussed above can be seen in Table 4.10 
and Figure 4.3. 
TABLE4.10 
Summary of the Indicators of a Security Community during the East Timor Crisis 
No. Indicators Sienificant Moderate Insienificant Note 
Security Community 
A. A comparability of y Only among 
political values among participating 
decision-makers countries 
B. A mutual predictability of y Only among 
behaviour among participating 
decision-makers countries 
C. A mutual responsiveness y Only among 
of government to actions participating 
and communication of countries 
other governments 
D. Precipitating factors that y Only among 
encourage states to orient participating 
themselves lil each countries 
other's direction and 
coordinate their policies 
E. Processes of transactions, y Only among 
international participating 
organisations and social countries 
learning -
F. Development of trust and y Only among 
collective identity participating 
formation countries 
G. A total absence of armed y All ASEAN 
inter-state conflict or member 
prospect for such conflict states 
in the region 
H. A total absence of a y All ASEAN 
competitive militacy member 
build-up arms race states 
involving self-conscious 
regional actors 
I. Formal or informal y Only among 
institutions and practices participating 
countries 
J. A high degree of y All ASEAN 
economic integration as a member 
necessary precondition of states 
a peaceful relationship 
Total 7 2 1 
Source: Compiled by author 
150 ASEAN, 'Bridging the Development Gap among Members of ASEAN', available at 
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FIGURE4.3 
Indicators of a Security Community in Southeast Asia during the East Timor Crisis 
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Table 4.10 and Figure 4.3 demonstrate that during the East Timor Crisis, ASE.A.N 
member states' response indicated seven out of ten indicators of a security community. 
This was a significant number, and so it can be reasonably argued that the response to 
the East Timor crisis has shown that a security community existed among the 
participant countries, particularly Malaysia, Thaiiand, Singapore, the Philippines and 
Indonesia, and therefore can be regarded as a partial security community. The 
indicators, however, did not apply to non-participant countries, such as Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam. 
This agam demonstrated how Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore have always been 
'important actors' in ASEAN crises, particularly in the two crises that have been 
investigated in this thesis so far, namely the Cambodian crisis and the East Timor Crisis. 
Indonesia's position in East Timor was unique, because its role was not really similar to 
that of Malaysia, Thailand, or Singapore. Its role as the country in which the crisis 
occurred was more as: a country that invited other ASEAN member countries to 
participate, a country which had the responsibility to oblige international mandates to 
withdraw troops and also a country with which other participating ASEAN countries, 
without any request, had always consulted. 
The Philippines emerged out as a new dominant power in this crisis for several reasons: 
(i) geographical proximity, which brought the possibility of the spill over-effect of 
instability to the Philippines; (ii) the fear that the crisis would become a precedent to 
the separatist movement in the Southern Philippines; (iii) a good relationship with 
Indonesia which motivated the country to assist by participating in peace-keeping 
operations; and, (iv) the fact that instability in Indonesia would jeopardise its economic 
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interests, such as trade and Indonesia's investment in the country. In the Cambodian 
crisis, none of these elements really carried any weight for the Philippines. 
Seven of the indicators of a security community can be seen within the five 
participating countries, thus clarifying several points. First, from the Cambodian crisis 
in 1979-1991 to the East Timor crisis in 1999-2002, there was an evolution towards a 
security community, among the dominant powers, for several reasons. First, during the 
Cambodian Crisis, the Philippines was not involved and during the East Timor Crisis, it 
was willing to take responsibility. Second, during the Cambodian crisis only four out of 
ten indicators of a security community were considered as significant, while during the 
East Timor crisis, ASEAN's response showed seven out of ten indicators of a security 
community among the dominant powers. Third, from these seven indicators in the East 
Timor crisis, six indicators only applied among the participating countries. This 
clarifies again that there had been no security community in Southeast Asia as a region 
by the time the crisis arose. It clarifies some scholar's arguments, such as those by Rizal 
Sukma that an ASEAN Security Community might be established among the original 
member countries. 1s1 
4.7. Conclusion 
ASEAN's stance since Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor in 1975 as one of its 
provinces was clear. All member states supported Indonesia. With the exception of 
Vietnam which was not a member at the time when it expressed criticism at Indonesia's 
East Timor policy and Singapore abstained at the UNGA votes on East Timor in 1975 
and 1976, others always maintained their backing for Indonesia. The perception of 
threat of each ASEAN member state in regard to the East Timor crisis was running in 
different directions, thus creating different levels of participation during the crisis. 
While Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore were involved, and the Philippines came in as 
a new 'active power', countries like Brunei Darussalam and the CLMV countries 
preferred not to be engaged too deeply. 
This chapter shows that ASEAN member states still played a role in this crisis. The role 
of ASEAN member states were important for at least for two reasons. First, ASEAN 
countries provided a means to put some pressure on Indonesia to accept an 
international intervention. 1s2 Without the participation of the ASEAN members, the 
APEC summit meeting in Auckland in September in 1999 might not have facilitated the 
international agreement to suggest an intervention. Secondly, the participation of 
151 Interview with Dr. Rizal Sukma, Executive Director of the CSIS-Jakarta, Jakarta, 15 February 2011. In 
the interview Rizal mentioned the possibility of a security community between six ASEAN countries. 
152 Derek McDougall, 'Asia Pacific Security Regionalism: The Impact of Post 1997 Developments', 
Contemporary Security Policy, 23:2, p. 128. 
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Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore within INTERFET and UNTAET 
made the operation more diplomatically acceptable to Indonesia. 1s3 
This chapter has shown that during East Timor crisis, the role of involved members did 
not indicate a concert of powers. The initial indicator of the importance of a concert of 
powers, namely a decisive shock to the prevailing order, was not fulfilled. This created a 
weaker level of cooperation among dominant powers. Furthermore, the capability of 
sustaining financial costs is very different from one country to another. The different 
intimacy with Indonesia and different perceptions of threat between the dominant 
powers also resulted in a looser cooperation as a concert. 
The East Timor crisis, however, provides evidence of the importance of the influence of 
great powers as well as external powers during the escalation and the acute periods 
without the notion of balance and demonstrates a partial security community among 
Southeast Asian dominant powers during the de-escalation period. In the escalation 
and the acute periods of the crisis, the US utilised its leverage to push Indonesia to 
allow an international peace-keeping force through several channels. An external 
middle power, namely Australia, also used its power to influence Indonesia and to 
persuade ASEAN member countries to convince Indonesia to deploy an international 
peace-keeper. The crisis management of ASEAN member states is explained by seven 
-
out of ten indicators of a security community where six out of seven indicators were 
shared only by the dominant powers: Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Indonesia. Unlike the Cambodian crisis, the crisis management of ASEAN member 
states during the East Timor crisis did not indicate a variation of a classical concert of 
powers. The observation of whether or not crisis management indicates a variation of a 
classical concert of powers will be continued in the final case study, the Cyclone Nargis 
CrISlS. 
The management of the East Timor crisis demonstrates that there was unequal sharing 
of responsibility among the ASEAN member states. Countries like Brunei Darussalam, 
and the CLMV countries did not participate actively because of (i) the geographical 
separation (except for Brunei); (ii) the crisis did not directly threaten their national 
interests; (iii) they did not have the capacity to contribute in terms of funds or military 
personnel; and (iv) CLMV countries were relatively new members by that time and they 
shared a sensitivity towards separatist movements with Indonesia. They feared any 
international intervention if something happened in their own backyard. The next 
chapter is the final case study; it examines the Cyclone Nargis crisis in Myanmar. 
1s3 McDouggall, 'Asia Pacific Security Regionalism', p. 128. 
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CHAPTERS 
The 2008-2010 Cyclone Nargis Crisis 
5.1. Introduction 
The final crisis that will be examined in this thesis is the Cyclone Nargis cns1s m 
Myanmar. Unlike the other crises elaborated, the Cyclone Nargis crisis is a non-
traditional crisis. In Chapter 2, a crisis was defined as an important set of events which 
marks a turning point or transformation in a pattern of relationships or a system. 1 This 
definition encompasses many types of crises including natural disasters, environmental 
threats, financial meltdowns, surprise attacks, hostage-takings, epidemics and 
organisational decline. A specific classification of crises by IR scholars refers to critical 
turning points in human activities, which could threaten national security. When 
understood as a turning point, a crisis is associated with rapid or sudden change. In the 
case of Cyclone Nargis, the crisis highlighted a turning point to a degree of change that 
came after a natural disaster. 
Security discourses in recent times have undergone a radical transformation from 
state-centric and militaristic formulation to human-centric. The concept of security in 
this thesis broadens the myriad ways in which insecurity affects different collectivities 
ranging from the state, society, interest groups to cross sections of individuals. In other 
words, the concept of security elaborated in this chapter includes the concept of human 
security. Even though there are debates about this concept, I argue that there are 
linkages between security and human beings because security is related to economic, 
food, energy and environmental issues. Therefore, a natural disaster is one facet of 
human security. 
The Cyclone N argis crisis was a humanitarian catastrophe confronting the people of 
Myanmar and the government of Myanmar. At the outset, the latter demonstrated its 
inability to respond in an effective and timely fashion. The current Indonesian Foreign 
Minister contends that 'In the recent past the largest source of death and destruction 
has not been conflicts but natural disasters. So if there's a common enemy, that's it'. 2 A 
natural disaster now is therefore regarded as a common enemy for every country in the 
world, and thus considered as a security threat. In this chapter, I explore a security 
dimension of a national disaster and assess whether or not a non traditional crisis can 
1 The term 'crisis' is defined in Section 2.2.A. This chapter is about the management of the East Timor crisis 
by ASEAN member states, but I refer to the organisation where it is relevant. 
2 Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, an interview by Peter Hatcher on 15 March 2012, a recording of the 
interview is courtesy of the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra. The material can be seen at 
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/indonesia-urges-calm-over-rise-of-china-2o12o315-
1v8d5.html#ixzz1pF:zjy9zz . The author also attended the interview. 
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be indicated by the explanatory concepts of a regional security system: a balance of 
power, a security community and a concert of powers. 
This chapter focuses on the management of the Cyclone Nargis crisis by ASEAN 
member states in 2008-2010. The period of 2008-2010 is selected because Cyclone 
Nargis struck Myanmar on 2 May 2008 and ASEAN member states started to provide 
assistance right after the incident, and the responsibility of the ASEAN-led 
coordinating mechanism and Tripartite Core Group (TCG) ended on 31 July 2010. It is 
important to investigate this crisis because if ASEAN had failed to assist Myanmar and 
was unsuccessful in convincing Myanmar to open its doors to international assistance, 
ASEAN's creditability as an organisation would have been at risk. This crisis also 
opened a window for ASEAN to develop a meaningful cooperation with Myanmar. The 
ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan is satisfied with the role of ASEAN's role 
during the crisis. He said 'ASEAN had been baptised by Cyclone Nargis' and that it was 
ASEAN that had been able 'to open up the humanitarian space'.3 The crisis is also 
valuable to examine because it was the first crisis that occurred in Southeast Asia after 
the ASEAN Charter was adopted at the 13th ASEAN Summit in November 2007, and 
therefore, the newly appointed Secretary-General of ASEAN was able to test the new 
power of the organisation. The ASEAN Charter was finally ratified by ASEAN member 
states on 21 July 2008, although there was controversy among member nations 
because of some worries about the existing human rights record and doubts about the 
way the Myanmar government would handle a humanitarian crisis. 
Due to the nature of the crisis, the approach this chapter takes in elaborating whether 
or not the management of the Cyclone N argis crisis provides an understanding of the 
regional security system operating in Southeast Asia is a little different from the 
approach used in the previous chapters. The Cyclone N argis crisis was a humanitarian 
crisis, and therefore, a balancing system was not necessarily relevant to the crisis. In 
this chapter, the indicators of a balancing system are summarised rather than 
elaborated. The balance of power section shows that even though border disputes and 
territorial claims continued during the crisis, ASEAN member states placed 
cooperation as their priority. 
This chapter divides the Cyclone Nargis crisis into two periods. The first period was an 
acute period, which started when the Cylone Nargis hit the Ayeyarwady4 (formerly 
Irrawaddy) delta; this was followed by the refusal of the Myanmar government to 
3 Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community, 
Singapore: !SEAS Publishing, 2010, p. 194. 
4 The name 'Ayeyarwady' is an official name introduced by the Myanmar government in 1989. 
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accept assistance from the international community. During this period, ASEAN 
member states, particularly the regional dominant powers in ASEAN tried to encourage 
Myanmar to accept the international aid facilitated by ASEAN. The acute period started 
on 2 May and ended on 19 May 2008 at the ASEAN Special Foreign Ministers Meeting 
in Singapore when Myanmar agreed to an ASEAN-led mechanism. The second period 
was a de-escalation period, which started from the time Myanmar officially accepted 
ASEAN's facilitation of international assistance on 19 May 2008 to the conclusion of 
the ASEAN-lead coordinating mechanism on 31 July 2010. Unlike the East Timor crisis, 
the Cyclone Nargis crisis did not have an escalation period because the nature of this 
crisis, a natural disaster, provided a sudden, shock and unforeseen shock and brought 
the crisis directly to the acute period. 
I argue that the crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states during the 
acute period of the Cyclone N argis crisis can be explained as a modification of a concert 
of powers while during the de-escalation period the crisis management can be 
characterised as an embryonic security community. A modification of a classical 
concert of powers during the acute period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis involved 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore as members. 
This chapter is divided into seven sections. After the introduction, the second section 
provides background to the Cyclone N argis crisis. The third section analyses the 
different perceptions of threats held by ASEAN member countries. The fourth examines 
why ASEAN's management of the crisis did not indicate a balance of power. A detailed 
explanation of how ASEAN's management of the crisis indicated a variation of a 
classical concert of powers in Southeast Asia during the acute period is elaborated in 
the fifth section. The sixth section investigates why the management of the crisis sheds 
light on a security community dynamic during the de-escalation period. A brief 
conclusion summarises the findings of the chapter. 
5.2. Background 
A. Brief History of Myanmar 
The reluctance of the Myanmar government to receive assistance can be explained by 
and traced back to the country's history. There have been ethnic-based divisions in 
Myanmar's historical phases. After being ruled by the British government, Myanmar 
gained its independence in 1948. After independence, the ethnic rivalries contributed to 
the break-up of the political system which was established by the British and hampered 
the stability of the newly independent government. Democratic elections were held for 
the last time in 1960, but in 1962 General Ne Win launched a military coup, which was 
followed by years of economic decline. From 1987, widespread resentment accumulated 
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until it reached a high point with the Red Bridge incident in March 1988. On this 
occasion, the authorities killed dozens of peaceful student protesters and eventually led 
to Ne Win's resignation. On 18 September 1988, a group of officials called the State Law 
and Order Restoration reinstated government control in central Myanmar and 
announced plans for multiparty elections. At this point, Aung San Suu Kyi, the 
daughter of 'independence founder' General Aung San, formed the National League for 
Democracy (NLD). Despite her arrest and disqualification from the elections, the NLD 
won Bo per cent of the 485 seats.s The SLROC refused to accept the result of the vote 
and would not hand over power to the elected government. Under the new name, the 
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), they remain in power until this day. In 
the years that followed, the regime continued to suppress any form of disagreement. 
During the SPDC era, the country has been considered to have the worst human rights 
record in Asia and potentially one of the worst in the world. 6 Among the human rights 
violations by the Myanmar government were the deployment of child soldiers, forced 
labour and the use of porters for the military, the displacement of persons, mass rape, 
the use of chemical weapons, extrajudicial killings and taking political prisoners.? 
B. Background of Cyclone Nargis Crisis 
Acute Period 
Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on the afternoon of 2 May 2008, ripping through the 
-
lower delta regions of the Ayeyarwady and Yangon Divisions. The Cyclone severely 
affected the lives of 2-4 million of the 7.5 million people living in the Ayeyarwady Delta 
and the winds exceeded 190 kilometres and the subsequent 3.5 meter high tidal surge 
swept through the entire villages. 8 Cyclone Nargis is recognised as the worst natural 
disaster in Myanmar's history and the most catastrophic cyclone to hit Asia since 19919 
and the eighth-deadliest cyclone ever recorded. 10 Its casualties stand at 77,738 dead, 
with 55,917 missing. 11 The total amount of physical damage and economic losses caused 
by the cyclone in the affected areas of Myanmar is estimated at about 4,500 kyats 
(approximately US$4,057 million).12 
s Roberts, ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community. 
6 Roberts, ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community. 
7 Roberts, ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community . 
8 Andrew Selth, 'Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar's Fears of Invasion', 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:3, 2008, pp 379-402. 
9 U Kyaw Thu, Speech on 'Post Nargis Current State of Response and Recovery in Myanmar for the ASEAN 
Roundtable on Post-Nargis Joint Assessment for Response, Recovery and Reconstruction,' Yangon, 24 
June 2008. See United Nations Development Program, 'Early Recovery Cluster Myanmar', available at 
http: //·www.mm.undp.org/UNDP Publication PDF /Earlv%20Recovery%20Framework.pdf (accessed on 
1 December 2011). 
10 William Sabandar, 'Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN: A Window for More Meaningful Development 
Cooperation in Myanmar', in Nick Cheeseman, Monique Skidmore, Trevor Wilson, eds., Ruling Myanmar 
From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections, Singapore: !SEAS Publishing, 2010 
11 Pavin Chachavalpongpun and Moe Thuzar, Myanmar Life After Nargis, Jakarta and Singapore: the 
ASEAN Secretariat and !SEAS Publishing, 2009. 
12 Chachavalpongpun and Thuzar, Myanmar Life After Nargis. 
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FIGURE5.1 
Cyclone Nargis: Most Affected Areas by% of Population and Area 
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Source: John Hopkins Bloombergh School of Public Health, 'Cyclone Nargis: Most Affected 
Areas by Percentage Population and Area', available at http://mappery.com/map-of/Cyclone-
Nargis-Affected-Area-Map (accessed on 15 August 2012). 
The Myanmar government was relatively quick in responding to the crisis domestically. 
However, it was criticised as being too slow in taking acti_on with regard to foreign 
assistance. It established a National Disaster Preparedness Central Committee on 3 
May 2008, headed by Myanmar Prime Minister, General Thein Sein. Cabinet ministers 
were assigned to assess damage and loss and to coordinate relief assistance in the 
affected districts. Myanmar's Foreign Minister publicly acJmowledged that it needed 
assistance to respond to the disaster. 13 However, the extent of the damage was too 
enormous, and therefore, international assistance was urgently required in order to 
save the lives of those who had survived the disaster. 
On 6 May, the Myanmar government agreed to receive foreign assistance, but only the 
basis that it would control aid distribution. It was too slow in issuing visas to foreign 
specialists and allowing aid into Myanmar. Supplies were stacked up in neighbouring 
countries waiting for clearance. The US, Britain and France sent naval vessels to deliver 
aid supplies, but were denied pennission to land in Myanmar or to deliver supplies by 
helicopter.14 In Thailand, the US government had loaded a C-130 cargo plane with relief 
supplies that would have taken under an hour to reach Myanmar, but the Myanmar 
13 Chachavalpongpun and Thuzar, Myanmar Life After Nargis. 
14 Selth , 'Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar's Fears oflnvasion'. 
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government did not give clearance for the craft to land at Yangon airport. 1s The United 
Nations World Food Programme had three planes ready to fly in from Bangladesh, 
Thailand and Dubai.16 Inside the country, the movement of foreign aid workers was 
restricted, and distribution of assistance was strongly controlled by the authorities. 
Permission to enter the area of the disaster had first to be attained from Major General 
Thura Myint Aung, Commander of the Southwest Regional Command and Chairman of 
the Ayeyarwady division. 
Within a week, a massive international relief effort began. There were 24 countries 
which had pledged financial assistance, totalling US$30 million. 17 On 5 May 2008, 
forty-eight hours after Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, ASEAN member countries 
extended relief assistance to victims under the leadership of the ASEAN Secretary-
General, Pitsuwan. Singapore and the Philippines dispatched experts to join the UN 
Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team assembled in Bangkok. The 
ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta notified all relevant ASEAN focal points to be on high 
alert and prepared for the mobilisation of emergency assistance. The ASEAN Secretary-
General requested governments, the private sector, and the civil society of ASEAN to 
assist the people of Myanmar. He also sought to mobilise resources to assist survivors 
and alleviate suffering through funds from the ASEAN Cooperation Fund for Disaster 
Assistance (ACFDA), an emergency humanitarian relief fund created by the ASEAN 
Secretariat in Jakarta on 8 May 2008. 
De-escalation Period 
On 19 May 2008, Singapore as the ASEAN Chair at the time hosted a special meeting of 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers. In this meeting, ASEAN tried to convince Myanmar that it 
needed international assistance. According to an Indonesian Foreign Ministry officer 
who attended the meeting: 
ASEAN told Myanmar that such a disaster cannot be solved solely by 
Myanmar. Indonesia tried to convince Myanmar by saying that Indonesia, 
which is relatively bigger and has more capacity than Myanmar would not 
have been able to overcome the impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami in Aceh 
without international assistance. Myanmar finally agreed to the facilitation 
by ASEAN. 18 
The Myanmar government agreed to accept ASEAN to channel communication 
between the Myanmar government and the international aid donors. At the meeting, 
15 Emma Larkin, No Bad News for the King: The True Story of Cyclone Nargis and Its Aftermath in 
Burma, New York: Penguin Books, 2010. 
16 Larkin, No Bad News for the King. 
17 Chachavalpongpun and Thuzar, Myanmar Life After Nargis. 
18 Interview with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1 , Jakarta, 16 February 
2011. 
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ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed to establish an ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism 
and an ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force (AHTF) under the Chairmanship of ASEAN 
Secretary-General, Pitsuwan. The mandate of the ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism 
was to 'facilitate the effective distribution and utilisation of assistance from the 
international community, including the expeditious and effective deployment of relief 
worker, especially health and medical personnel'. 19 In order to assist the HTF, an 
Advisory Group to the AHTF was established, consisting of representatives from 
Myanmar's neighbours (China, India, and Bangladesh), the UN, the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement, the Word Bank, NGOs, UK, Norway and Australia. 
The TCG was also established soon after the decision of the First AHTF Meeting with 
support from the ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference convened on 25 May 
2008 in Yangon. The TCG consisted of three representatives each from the Myanmar 
government, ASEAN and the international humanitarian community led by the UN. 
Chaired by the Myanmar government, this mechanism created latitude for 
international governments, civil society organisations and international NGOs to take 
part in the massive humanitarian assistance to help those who had survived the 
Cyclone. A timeline for the acceptance of the aid is illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
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'
9 ASEAN, 'The Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting Chairman's Statement', Singapore, 19 May 2008, 
Cyclone Nargis, Myanmar available at http://w,-vw.asean.org /news/asean-statement-
communiques/item/special-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting-chairman-s-statement-singapore (accessed 3 
November 2012) . 
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5.3. The Differing Threat Perceptions 
After Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, threats to cyclone affected people and for ASEAN 
member countries were serious. Similar to the previous crises, the perceptions of threat 
were significant and had impacts on the behaviour, policies, and contributions of 
ASEAN member states during the crisis. The threats to affected victims were not 
necessarily the same as those of the Myanmar government, because (i) the first reaction 
of the Myanmar junta military, particularly in preventing the flow of international 
assistance, exacerbated the threats to the affected victims; (ii) while the Myanmar 
government thought of ways of preventing intervention, the affected victims' life were 
placed at risk, demonstrating that the Myanmar government did not see the affected 
victims as its number one priority; (iii) the Myanmar military junta also continued on 
with its plan to convene a referendum while the severe catastrophe was occurring in the 
country's south. The threats to the victims were mostly humanitarian threats. 
ASEAN countries themselves had different perceptions of the threats arising from the 
Cyclone Nargis crisis in Myanmar. Unlike the other crises discussed in this thesis - the 
Cambodian crisis and the East Timor crisis - which presented traditional threats, the 
threats coming from the Cyclone Nargis crisis were non traditional threats and included 
threats of repudiation, threats of incoming refugees, and also threats of ruining the 
reputation of an organisation, in this case ASEAN. 
The affected people in Myanmar 
The scale of Cyclone Nargis was unprecedented in the history of Myanmar. The 
cyclone's destructive winds and battering waves flattened houses, uprooted trees, swept 
away power lines and severed communication systems. Adding to the devastation was 
the cyclone's accompanying saltwater storm surge that was reportedly as high as 12 
meters in some areas of the Delta, which killed thousands of people and animal. 20 Most 
residents of Labutta, Pyapon and Bogale of the Ayeyarwady who lived to tell about the 
suffering had horrifying tales of survival. The cyclone destroyed three-quarters of the 
hospitals and clinics, crippled the primary agriculture and fishery sectors, caused 
property damage estimated at over US$4.1 billion. 21 Hundreds of thousands of homes 
were destroyed along with essential infrastructure like roads, jetties, electricity, water 
supplies, fuel supplies and sanitation systems. The cyclone struck towards the end of 
the dry season, just as the Delta's paddy farmers were in the last stage of harvesting 
their 'dry season' rice paddy crops, which account for 25 per cent of annual rice 
20 ASEAN, The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action, Jakarta: 
ASEAN Secretariat, 2010. 
21 ASEAN, The Story oftheASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action. 
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production in the Delta. 2 2 The continuous obstruction by the Myanmar government of 
foreign humanitarian aid and workers caused yet another humanitarian threat for the 
affected people. 
There was also concern that infectious diseases would break out. The risk consisted of a 
second wave of casualties due to disease and nutritional deficiency if relief was not 
effectively distributed. Road access was also limited, and thus provided challenges and 
required specialised equipment and personnel. The need for shelter and resettlement 
for the affected population also created a challenge, especially shelter with adequate 
sanitation facilities. Provision of water was paramount, where large numbers of people 
did not have access to clean drinking water. Diarrhoea and dengue hemorrhagic fever 
were among health concerns. Food aid was also crucial and needed rapid mobilisation. 
Education for children was also vital to their post-disaster psychological recovery.2 3 
The Myanmar Government 
For the Myanmar government, threats after Cyclone Nargis hit the country included 
intervention of other countries in the political affairs of Myanmar. The presence of 
naval vessels from France, the UK and the US with offers of assistance, the arrival of 
foreign forces including marines, helicopters and amphibious landing craft off the 
country's shore elevated the sense of fear of foreigners, fear of interference and the 
spread of influence under the guise of delivery of aid. 24 These fears brought 
consequences for how the leadership behaved and the perceptions, therefore, shaped 
the strategic realities inside the countries. Thus, the regime saw the crisis 'as more a 
national security issue than a humanitarian operation'. 2s For Myanmar, it would be 
possible that the US might want to plead for access to the Delta so the US President 
could award Aung San Suu Kyi its highest civilian honour -the US Congressional Gold 
Medal.26 
The government itself did not have the experience or capacity to handle such a huge 
disaster relief operation. There has been no catastrophe approaching the scale of 
Cyclone Nargis in living memory in Myanmar. Compared to China, which collected 100 
helicopters to carry out rescue efforts in Sichuan, Myanmar has very poor 
infrastructure (particularly in the Delta) and backward technology.2 7 
22 ASEAN, The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar : Compassion in Action, p. 18 
2 3 ASEAN, A Humanitarian Call the ASEAN Response to Cyclone Nargis, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 
2010. 
24 Roberts, ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis . 
2s Roberts, ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis, p. 90. 
26 Roberts, ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis. 
27 Donald M. Seekins, 'State, Society and Natural Disaster: Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (Burma)' , Asian 
Journal of Social Science, No. 37, 2009, pp. 717-737. 
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Another threat for the Myanmar government was that Cyclone Nargis would impede its 
plan to hold a referendum. The government had conducted a campaign, and if the 
referendum was postponed, it would lose its momentum and the people of Myanmar 
might vote to reject the new constitution. The authorities issued an order forbidding 
criticism of the new constitution and government media distributed mottos: 'To 
approve the State Constitution is a national duty of the entire people today. Let us all 
cast 'Yes' vote[s] in the national interest'. 28 In Yangon, the government applied various 
tactics to ensure the referendum turned out in the regime's favour. In some 
neighbourhoods, votes were collected in advance. A young woman witnessed that she 
was forced to pay K.160,000 (about US$10 -an unaffordable amount for most ordinary 
Myanmar people) if she chose to vote against the constitution. 2 9 Furthermore, the 
majority of people voting in the referendum had not even seen the draft constitution 
(194 pages) and had very little interest in it.3° 
Thailand 
The Thai government has looked at Myanmar in two ways: on the one hand, Myanmar 
has been regarded as the root of transnational threats including the cross-border flow 
of narcotics and refugees that impact Thailand's national security. On the other hand, 
Thailand's diplomatic flexibility in relation to Myanmar is jeopardised by its 
dependency on its neighbour's natural gas, timber and labour.31 For Thailand, the issue 
of the Cyclone Nargis crisis was multi-dimensional. First of all, Thailand shares a 
border with Myanmar. This geographical fact has many implications for Thailand. It 
raised concerns about the possibility of the increased number of refugees to the border 
area. The ten provinces in Thailand which border Myanmar are populated by 6.8 
million Thais, over 120,000 displaced persons in nine UNHCR-run camps, and an 
estimated 500,000 to 1 million registered and undocumented migrants.32 The 2009 
World Refugee Survey states that Myanmar has produced over 750,000 refugees 
including 361,000 in Thailand. 33 It also further raised a health concern. The 
undocumented migrants were the largest public health concern, as many do not have 
access to health services, have increased morbidity and present a number of public 
health risks, such as low immunisation rates. Sharing a border also means Thailand 
had to agree to be the front door of international assistance waiting to get in to 
28 Larkin, No Bad News for the King. 
29 Larkin, No Bad News for the King, pp. 67-68. 
3o Larkin, No Bad News for the King . 
31 Jurgen Haacke, 'ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative', 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:3, 2008, pp. 351-378. 
32 World Health Organisation, 'Myanmar-Thailand Border', available at 
http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/myanthai/en/index.html (accessed on 11 February 2012). 
33 Veronika Martin, Prospects for Hope? Myanmarese Refugees in Thailand, 2005, available at 
http: //www.refugees.org/uploadedFiles/Investiate/Publications &Archives/WRS Archives/2005/veroni 
ka martin.pdf. (accessed on 14 February 2012). 
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Myanmar. A lot of personnel from international NGOs were waiting in Bangkok to 
enter Myanmar. The UN regional office briefly set up a parallel cluster system in 
Bangkok to at least manage coordination while waiting for access arrangements to be 
agreed. 
The second dimension of threat for Thailand is related to its moral obligation. Thailand 
also experienced a similar situation after being hit by the Indian Ocean Tsunami in late 
2004 and thus had a moral responsibility to share experiences and lessons learned. A 
failure to help would risk its international image. 
Finally, Thailand was also among ASEAN members who did not want to jeopardise 
ASEAN's international credibility because of the crisis. While trying its best to assist 
bilaterally, Thailand also encouraged Myanmar to accept ASEAN's role in facilitating 
assistance to Myanmar. 
Singapore 
Singapore did not want the Cyclone N argis issue to endanger its image or reputation as 
ASEAN's Chair. Singapore held the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2008 when Cyclone 
Nargis hit Myanmar. During its chairmanship, looking for a way to exert influence over 
Myanmar was crucial for Singapore. Singapore aspired to a successful chairmanship, 
and this included success in pushing Myanmar to open up to assistance from the 
international community. Singapore shared Indonesia's view that Myanmar's 
membership in ASEAN should be questioned if the junta government refused ASEAN's 
request to facilitate. According to Christopher Roberts, there was discussion in the 
Foreign Ministry of Singapore of the possibility of ousting Myanmar from ASEAN if it 
did not want to cooperate. The Foreign Ministry has discreetly discussed this issue with 
retired Singapore diplomats who are currently working as researchers.34 
Interestingly, Singapore did not want to impose or support any economic sanction as it 
could have created another threat for Singapore if ASEAN countries pushed Myanmar 
further into China's arms. Such sanctions could prompt China and India to engage in a 
destabilising competitive struggle for influence in Myanmar leading to adverse effects 
for ASEAN as an organisation.3s 
Indonesia 
For Indonesia, ASEAN's credibility was number one priority m terms of threat 
perception. Indonesia was at the point where, if Myanmar did not wish to cooperate 
34 Interview with Dr. Christopher B. Roberts, Senior Lecturer, National Security College of the ANU, 
Canberra, 27 September and 21 December 2011. 
35 Haacke, 'ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar'. 
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with ASEAN and open to international assistance with the help of ASEAN, Indonesia 
was willing to question Myanmar's membership in ASEAN. Indonesia wished ASEAN 
would demonstrate its capability to assist Myanmar as a facilitator. 
Like Thailand, Indonesia had a moral responsibility to share its experience and lessons 
learned from the Indian Ocean Tsunami that hit Aceh on 26 December 2004. As a 
member of ASEAN and as a neighbour, if Indonesia did not become involved actively 
and quickly render assistance, its international prestige would have declined. 
Indonesia was one of the countries which opposed the argument that the Cyclone 
Nargis crisis was a matter of international peace and security, and consequently, 
Indonesia saw that the issue should be put outside the responsibility of the UNSC. 
Indonesia was supported by China and Vietnam, and they argued that the situation in 
Myanmar is a purely natural disaster. The three countries were sceptical about 
involving the UNSC in the international response to Cyclone Nargis despite the fact that 
the proposals were actually put on the table.36 Indonesia perceived that there were 
other better forums to discuss the humanitarian dimension of Cyclone Nargis. 
Indonesia also rejected any attempt to give a political spin to the technical realities and 
the situation on the ground. 
Malaysia 
Malaysia was concerned about the possibility of rece1vmg more refugees from 
Myanmar after the Cyclone Nargis crisis. Up to 2010, there were more than 100.000 
refugees in Malaysia and 90% were flowing in from Myanmar.37 Furthermore, it was in 
Malaysia's interest to prevent refugees flowing in from Myanmar in order to restore its 
credibility because Malaysia was being accused by the US of being involved in the 
human trafficking of people from Myanmar. In April 2009, the US Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee published the results of a year-long investigation into allegations 
that the Malaysian government was complicit in the human trafficking of people 
seeking refuge from the extreme persecution they faced in Myanmar.38 The US Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee argued that there is a highly organised collusion between 
police, immigration officials and traffickers in Malaysia which sells refugees into 
prostitution rings and fishing trawlers.39 
36 Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 'Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect', 
Myanmar/ Burma Briefing, No, 2, 16 May, 2008. 
37 Karen Zusman, 'Burma is bleeding wel1 beyond its borders', available at 
http://www.pleasedontsaymyname.org/ (accessed on 11 February 2012) . 
38 Zusman, 'Burma is bleeding well beyond its borders'. 
39 Zusman, 'Burma is bleeding well beyond its borders'. 
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Vietnam 
In the UNSC, Vietnam shared Indonesia's view that the Cyclone Nargis crisis was a 
natural disaster and not a matter of international peace and security. Vietnam also 
refused to allow the issue to be discussed in the UNSC because of the 'R2P' principle. 
For Vietnam, the R2P, which became part of international law through a UN General 
Assembly Resolution in 2005, was created to guide international action when 
confronted with mass atrocities, not natural disasters, epidemics, or similar problems. 
Nevertheless, unlike Indonesia, Vietnam was not willing to question Myanmar's 
membership in ASEAN. As a relatively new member, Vietnam supported continuing 
membership of Myanmar in ASEAN. Furthermore, Vietnam is also prone to natural 
disasters, particularly typhoons. Typhoons Xangsane and Ketsana struck Vietnam in 
2006 and 2009 respectively. These reasons prohibited Vietnam from pushing 
Myanmar too harshly. 
The Philippines. Cambodia. Lao PDR and Brunei Darussalam 
Cambodia and Lao PDR shared Vietnam's view that Myanmar's membership in ASEAN 
was unquestionable. Little was known about Brunei's view. The Philippines was among 
countries which dispatched its experts a few days after the cyclone hit Myanmar. The 
Philippines did not have a strong view about Myanmar's membership of ASEAN. 
However, in general it supported other ASEAN members to push Myanmar to open to 
international assistance. 
5.4. A Balance of Power? 
This section analyses whether ASEAN's management of the Cyclone Nargis crisis in 
Myanmar is characterised by the indicators of a balancing system in the region. In this 
section, I argue that there was no balancing system during the acute and the de-
escalation periods of the crisis between ASEAN member states. These countries were 
also not subject to the leverage of the external great powers and the external powers 
during the Cyclone Nargis crisis. However, it is important to note that external powers, 
such as the US, the UK and France placed pressure on ASEAN to play an active role in 
this crisis. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the approach used here to 
analyse the indicators of a balancing system is different. In this chapter, I will not 
elaborate every indicator as I did in the previous case study chapters. Instead, I will 
summarise the analysis in tables and elaborate only the indicators of a balancing 
system that are relevant to the crisis. Table 5.1 provides a brief overview of the 
indicators of a balancing system in Southeast Asia during the Cyclone N argis crisis. 
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No. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
Indicators 
Relatively equal 
powers among a 
minimum of two 
actors: 
Not necessarily 
relevant 
Intentions of some 
states to expand: 
Moderate 
Alliances on the 
basis of short-run 
interests: 
Moderate 
TABLE5.1 
A Balancing System in Southeast Asia during the Cylone N argis Crisis? 
Myanmar Thailand Singapore Indonesia 
Balance of _power 81t!__ong ASEAN member states 
The Philippines, 
Brunei and CLV 
Countries 
Singapore and Vietnam were leading economically and militarily. Singapore was hit by the global economic crisis but had 
recovered by 2010. Vietnam demonstrated rapid development of military capability. Indonesia started to demonstrate its 
leadership by becoming a member of G-20. However, their powers were not necessarily relevant to the Cyclone Nargis 
crisis. The strength in military power was not relevant to the crisis. Economically, it could be relevant because Singapore 
and Indonesia were ranked no.2 and no.3 respectively in giving financial contribution to Myanmar during the crisis. 
Economic matters did not seem relevant to Thailand which did not perform as well as Singapore and Indonesia 
economically but was the biggest financial contributor to the crisis. 
In general, no states explicitly intended to expand. Nevertheless, every member state of ASEAN has territorial disputes 
with other members. Despite these disputes, countries worked together to assist Myanmar particularly after the de-
escalation period. 
Myanmar and Thailand has border 
Cambodia are engaged disputes with 
in border disputes Cambodia over Preah 
with Thailand and Vihear, with 
Vietnam is involved in Myanmar and with 
territorial disputes in Malaysia. 
the South China Sea. 
Singapore and 
Malaysia were in 
dispute over the Pulau 
Batu Puteh/Pedra 
Blanca and in May 
2008, the dispute was 
settled in Singapore's 
favour. 
Indonesia has a 
dispute with Malaysia 
over Ambalat Block. 
The lingering 
Philipines -Malaysia 
dispute over Sabah 
remained unsettled. 
Brunei had a dispute 
with Malaysia over 
Limbang. 
There were groupings of CLMV countries and the ASEAN-6. The ASEAN-6 gave a stronger push to Myanmar while 
Cambodia, Lao were moderate with Myanmar. The ASEAN-6 countries were willing to question Myanmar's membership 
while the three countries preferred not to be too hard on Myanmar. The other grouping was found in the forum of UNSC, 
where Indonesia and Vietnam would not agree to the issue of Cyclone Nargis being discussed in the UNSC for the reason 
of 'Responsibility to Protect'. Other ASEAN countries did not refuse. 
War as 
legitimate 
instrument 
statecraft: 
a I War is not considered as legitimate. However there was high tension between Cambodia and Thailand that started in 
2008. The tension did not translate into the use of force until 2011. This issue was also swept under the carpet by ASEAN 
of I member states and they focused more on the Cyclone Nargis crisis instead of Cambodia and Thailand's dispute over Preah 
Vihear. 
Insignificant 
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No. 
E. 
F. 
Indicators 
Dependency on 
external great 
powers as security 
providers: 
Not necessarily 
relevant to 
Cyclone N argis 
crisis. 
I Alignment with 
external great 
powers: 
Not relevant to 
the Cyclone 
Nargis crisis 
Myanmar 
Myanmar 
demonstrated its 
dependency on China 
and India while Laos, 
Cambodia and 
Vietnam increasingly 
indicated dependency 
on the US. 
Thailand Singapore Indonesia 
Balance of Extenal Great Power Influence 
Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia had developed security 
cooperation with the US. However, they are not really dependent in 
terms of security on the US. 
The Philippines, 
Brunei and CLV 
Countries 
Since 2002, the 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines have 
remained largely 
dependent on US 
military aid. In 
September 2007, 
China promised an 
initial $6.6m worth of 
assistance for the AFP 
as a 'confidence 
building measure'. 
However, their dependency on external security providers was not relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis. It was only 
relevant for Myanmar which sought help particularly from China and India rather than the US and other Western external 
powers. 
Myanmar has Thailand maintained Singapore 
developed military good relations with developing 
relations with China both the us and activities in FPDA. 
and India. China. 
was 
its 
Indonesia had 
alignment with 
external powers, but 
was developing 
military cooperation 
with the us and 
economic cooperation 
with China. 
The Philippines 
renewed the 1951 
Mutual Security 
Treaty through arms 
and equipment sales 
and military exercises. 
Malaysia was 
developing its 
activities in FPDA 
US and Vietnam 
signed a 
Memorandum of 
Understanding on 
defence cooperation. 
Vietnam leaned on the 
US on the issue of the 
South China Sea. 
Like dependency on external security providers, the indicator of 'alignment with external powers' was only relevant for 
Myanmar. Myanmar looked up to the Chinese government. One week after the earthquake in Sichuan a three-day period 
of mourning was declared in China and the flag was flown at half-mast in memory of the victims. The very next day the 
Myanmar government copied the gesture by lowering flags and announced its own three days of mourning. 
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No. Indicators Myanmar Thailand Singapore Indonesia The Philippines, 
Brunei and CLV 
Countries 
G. Military All ASEAN countries, with the exception of Myanmar developed military cooperation with the US. The close cooperation 
cooperation with with China helped Myanmar substantially in reconstructing the area affected by the Cyclone. 
external great 
powers: 
Not necessarily 
relevant 
H. Distribution of Distribution of external great powers armed forces is insignificant because external great powers distributed assistance 
external great through military means instead of distribution of armed forces. 
powers' armed 
forces: 
Insignificant 
I. Economic Because of the Cyclone Nargis crisis, Myanmar was heavily dependent on international assistance 
dependence on 
external great 
powers: 
Significant 
Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author 
210 
Specific Dynamics Related to the Cyclone Nargis Crisis 
Dynamics within Southeast Asia 
This section examines the specific dynamics of a balancing system that are relevant to 
the Cyclone Nargis crisis. In relation to specific dynamics related to the Cyclone Nargis 
crisis, some indicators of a balancing system among ASEAN member countries are 
relevant to the crisis, particularly the intention of some states to expand, war as a 
legitimate instrument of statecraft and the existence of an alliance (or grouping) on the 
basis of short-run interests. During 2008-2010, there was no explicit intention on the 
part of any Southeast Asian member state to expand. However, there were several 
territorial disputes. Indonesia and Malaysia were engaged in a bilateral dispute over 
Ambalat which is believed to have massive oil and natural-gas potential.4° Manila's 
suspicion that elements in Malaysia's state of Sabah were providing support for Moro 
separatists in Mindanao led Philippine politicians take a hard line on completing 
formal repudiation of the claim to Sabah. Meanwhile, suspicion continued in Thailand 
over Malaysia's alleged sympathy for Muslim separatists in the south of the country. 
Myanmar's membership of ASEAN has compounded ASEAN's problems concerning 
the transboundary spill-over of internal political conflicts. The pursuit by the Myanmar 
military of Kayin (Karen) refugees fleeing to Thailand led to military tensions between 
Nayipadaw and Bangkok.41 Other territorial disputes included the Malaysia-Singapore 
dispute over the Pulau Batu Puteh/Pedra Branca Island in the Singapore Strait, the 
Thai-Malaysia dispute regarding their common border, the dispute between Malaysia 
and Brunei over Limbang and the lingering Philippines-Malaysia dispute over Sabah. 
The Singapore-Malaysia dispute over Pedra Branca had been settled, again through 
arbitration by the International Court of Justice, in May 2008 in Singapore's favour.42 
In addition, a number of disputes existed in the maritime arena over issues such as 
boundary demarcation, exclusive economic zones, fishing rights and resource 
exploitation. The majority of maritime boundaries in the South China Sea and the Gulf 
of Thailand were in dispute. Indonesia and Vietnam are still in dispute over the 
continental shelf of the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea that once led Indonesia 
to consider the possibility of facing a sea battle. Thailand and Vietnam are contesting 
maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Thailand. Little progress has been made in resolving 
border demarcation disputes between Thailand and Laos, an issue that has led to 
armed clashes between the two countries in the last decade. Only 58 km of the 2500 km 
40 International Institute for Strategic Studies 'East Asia and Australasia', The Military Balance, 110:1, 
2010, pp. 377-440. 
41 International Institute for Strategic Studies 'East Asia and Australasia'. 'Ka)in' is the official name fo r the 
Karen ethnic group. introduced by the Myanmar government in 1989. 
42 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of 
regional order, 2nd edn, London: Routledge, 2009. 
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land border between Thailand and Myanmar has been demarcated. 43 Singapore and 
Malaysia have also disputed over water rights. Singapore has sought to 'desecuritise' 
the issue by making serious efforts to become self-sufficient in water supply, through 
measures such as desalination and fresh water recycled from used water. 44 The most 
serious dispute during 2008-2010 was the Cambodian-Thai border dispute which 
began in June 2008. This was a century-long dispute between Cambodia and Thailand 
involving the area surrounding the 11th-century Preah Vihear Temple, located in the 
Dangrek Mountains between the Choam Khsant district in the Preah Vihear province of 
northern Cambodia and the Kantharalak district in the Sisaket province of 
Northeastern Thailand. 
TABLE5.2 
Disputed maritime areas in Southeast Asia with petroleum potential 
Area Countries disputing Note 
jurisdiction 
Doi Lang Myanmar and Thailand Border dispute 
The eastern Gulf of Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia Cambodia objected to a settlement 
Thailand between Thailand and Vietnam 
The southwestern Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam 
Gulf of Thailand 
Pedra Branca Light Singapore and Malaysia Despite the ICJ ruling, sovereignty 
house over the surrounding territorial 
waters has yet to be resolved 
An area north, west Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
and east of Natuna China 
Islands 
Offshore Brunei Brunei, Malaysia, possibly China, 
oossiblv Vietnam 
Sabah Philippines and Malaysia The Philippines maintains a 
dormant claim 
The Gulf of Tonkin China and Vietnam 
The Spratly Islands Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Maritime dispute 
Philiooines, China and Taiwan 
Sulawesi/Celebes sea Malaysia, Indonesia Maritime dispute 
Further territorial Including Malaysia and Thailand, Some of these disputes are in the 
disputes Malaysia and Singapore, Thailand process of being resolved through 
and Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, bilateral initiatives establishing 
Myanmar and Thailand committees for territorial 
demarcation. 
Source: Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and 
the problem of regional order, 2nd edn, London: Routledge, 2009, p. 150. 
However, despite these territorial and border disputes, ASEAN states were willing to 
put their disputes aside and cooperate to help Myanmar in the Cyclone N argis crisis. 
Nevertheless, before ASEAN successfully persuaded Myanmar to agree with ASEAN's 
facilitator role, member countries can be divided into two groups: the first group 
consisted of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam who did not want to push Myanmar too 
harshly, while the second group comprised Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 
the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam who had already been willing to expel 
43 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. 
44 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. 
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Myanmar from ASEAN if it did not want to cooperate. Other groupings also existed in 
terms of the involvement of the UNSC and in terms of the contribution made. 
Indonesia and Vietnam are ASEAN member countries who strongly rejected the issue 
being discussed in the UNSC based on principle 'R2P'. Other ASEAN member countries 
did not demonstrate their rejection. 
After Myanmar agreed with the establishment of TCG in which ASEAN played a 
bridging role, there was no grouping among ASEAN countries. Moe Thuzar, a Myanmar 
ISEAS researcher argues that ASEAN had a collective perspective in helping Myanmar 
and there was no tension between members.4s Even Western governments, who were 
highly critical of Myanmar, were present in the UN Pledging Conferences.46 Thuzar's 
statement implies that this collective perspective was reached after the acute period had 
passed. 
War is therefore still considered illegitimate for the ASEAN member states. However, 
because of the border and territorial disputes that were still lingering, the indicator of 
some states to expand' is regarded as moderate. The indicator of the 'alliances on the 
basis of short-run interests' was demonstrated only by the existence of groupings in 
contributing to the management of the crisis. This aspect will be discussed later in this 
Chapter; it is not considered as significant in indicating a balance of power among 
ASEAN countries. 
Dynamics with External Great Powers 
In relation to a balance of external great power influence dynamics, there were some 
indicators that were related to Cyclone Nargis, such as the distribution of external 
power's armed forces and economic interdependence. The distribution was more a 
distribution of assistance through external power's ships and aircrafts rather than a 
distribution of armed forces. Among the ships and aircraft carrying assistance to 
Myanmar were those of the US and India. US Navy ships with humanitarian supplies 
had arrived but were withdrawn after being denied entry into Myanmar for three weeks. 
Not far off the coast of Myanmar, the US government had mobilised four ships from the 
USS Essex Amphibious Ready Group that had been in the region for the Cobra Gold 
joint task force exercises with the Thai Military. Since 13 May, these huge vessels had 
been positioned offshore in preparation to assist the relief effort. However, even though 
they were on a humanitarian mission, they were equipped for combat. One of the ships, 
the USS Mustin, was a guided missile destroyer. The fleet boasted four amphibious 
landing craft that could operate in areas inaccessible by road, twenty-two helicopters 
45 Interview with Moe Thuzar, !SEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 17 March 2011. 
46 Interview with Moe Thuzar, !SEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 17 March 2011. 
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and more than five thousand US military personnel. The US Navy released photographs 
of a Seahawk helicopter, part of the Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 25, transporting 
pallets of supplies between ships.47 
From 12-20 May, USAID and the US Department of Defence coordinated the delivery 
of nearly $1.2 million of US relief commodities to Yangon on C-130 flights. India, one of 
the few countries which maintained close relations with Myanmar, launched Operation 
Sahyata, under which two Indian Navy ships and two Indian Air Force aircraft 
supplied the first international relief material to Myanmar. The two aircraft carried four 
tonnes of relief supplies each while the Indian navy transported more than 100 tonnes 
of relief On May 8, the Indian Air Force dispatched its third air consignment carrying 
over 32 tonnes of relief material including tents, blankets and medicines.48 England 
and France had also redirected craft towards Myanmar. England had sent the British 
frigate HMS Westminster, and France was moving the amphibious assault ship the 
Mistral. 49 
Thuzar argues that from the Myanmar side, it was difficult not to be prejudiced by the 
sight of the presence of outsiders' ships and aircraft. 
Starting from the early days after the Nargis hit the Ayeyarwady Delta, there 
were aid that came in from neighbouring countries like India and ASEAN 
countries. The problem happened when offers started pouring in. Some of the 
offers were made in a good faith, I would like to believe and I do believe so, but 
there were proposed to be delivered by military means, for example, the US 
navy was there because it was the time when Thai was conducting the Cobra 
Cold Exercise. Mr Severino likes to use the expression that if he were the 
general sitting there, seeing foreign military vessels are approaching his waters, 
that kind of paranoia would set in. I think that was how the perception on how 
international assistance really picked up in the media. 5o 
Thuzar claims that it was not that the Myanmar government did not want to receive 
foreign assistance, but it was the way in which some countries delivered the assistance 
by military means that scared the government. According to her, it is normal for any 
country to be paranoid if foreign military vessels are seen to be approaching their 
waters. Furthermore, she adds that while delivering assistance, some countries brought 
media teams with them, and that was perceived by the Myanmar government as not 
being in good faith. 
The government of Myanmar did refuse, but they were also very cautious. They 
would say 'Give us the aid package. We will mobilise our own troops to 
distribute them and so on' . There is a story where it was not well distributed. 
47 Larkin, No Bad News for the King. 
48 Thaindian News, 'India to send 8 tonnes of relief material to Myanmar,' May 6, 2008 available at 
http://www.thaindian.com/ newsportal/uncategorized/ india-to-send-8-tonnes-of-relief-material-to-
myanmar_ 10o45845.html (accessed on 8 February 2012). 
49 Larkin, No Bad News for the King. 
50 Interview with Moe Thuzar, !SEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 17 March 2011. 
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The difference would have been the interest of those countries to come in with 
media team. The strong rejection is the government did not want any media 
covering the disaster. The reluctance was to be seen in media. 51 
The Myanmar government was afraid that the media teams from other countries would 
report ·on not only the disaster and its reconstruction but also the political situation in 
the country. It was very different in Indonesia which had opened Aceh to international 
media. The Indonesian government wanted to let the world know that the Acehnese 
people were devastated by the disaster and as a result would be more inclined to help. 
During 2008-2010, there was minimal presence of armed forces of external powers in 
Myanmar. In relation to the Cyclone Nargis crisis, there was not really a distribution of 
armed forces, but a distribution of assistance through the means of military vessels and 
aircraft. Consequently, the indicator of 'distribution of external powers' armed forces' 
is insignificant. However, in 2011, the US started to plan the deployment of its military 
forces in two Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines and Singapore, and in 
Southeast Asia's neighbour, Australia.s2 
In connection with economic interdependence, the total economic losses caused by the 
cyclone were very damaging to Myanmar's underdeveloped economy. The Cyclone 
Nargis crisis resulted in lower growth in Myanmar in fiscal year 2008-2009 and the 
economic losses were estimated to be about 2. 7 per cent of the officially projected 
national GDP in 2008. Based on the 2007/2008 Human Development Report, GDP per 
capita for Myanmar was US$1,027, the lowest in the region, compared to US$29,663 
for Singapore, US$8,677 for Thailand, or US$3,843 for Indonesia. 53 Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) to Myanmar in recent years has been about US$3 per 
capita per year, one of the lowest in the world. As shown in Table 5.3 , the comparative 
figure for Lao PDR is US$63 per capita, for Cambodia US$38, Sudan US$55 and 
Zimbabwe US$21. 
51 Interview with Moe Thuzar, !SEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 17 March 2011. 
52 In 2011, the US based military forces in the Philippines, Singapore and Darwin, Australia. Shortly before 
flying to Bali to attend the Sixth East Asian Summit on November 17-18, President Obama announced in 
Canberra that the US military would expand its role in the Asia-Pacific region, despite budget cuts, by 
deploying military forces in Darwin. The US would begin its military outreach in Southeast Asia by 
deploying marines, naval ships and aircraft in northern Australia starting in 2012. The process would be 
gradually intensified until the US had a 2,500-strong task force in Darwin by 2016. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Defence of Indonesia expressed their concern, particularly towards the plan of 
US military development in Darwin. However, Prime Minister of Australia, Julia Gillard and US President, 
Barack Obama assured President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono that the deployment was related to disaster 
management and spelled no harm to Indonesia or the Southeast Asia region. 
53 Sabandar, 'Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN: A Window for More Meaningful Development Cooperation in 
Myanmar'. 
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TABLE5.3 
GDP and ODA Comparisons 2007 /2008 
Country GDP oer capita ODA per capita 
Cambodia US$2,727 US$38 
LaoPDR US$2,039 US$63 
Myanmar US$1,027 US$3 
Sudan US$2,083 US$55 
Zimbabwe US$2,038 US$21 
Source: www.oecd.org/dac/statesidsonline, Development Asisstance Committee, OECD, Paris, 
quoted in William Sabandar, 'Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN: A Window for More Meaningful 
Development Cooperation in Myanmar', in Nick Cheeseman, Monique Skidmore, Trevor Wilson, 
eds., Ruling Myanmar From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections, Singapore: ISEAS 
Publishing, 2010, p.198. 
The relatively high economic losses from Cyclone Nargis stemmed from the disaster's 
impact on assets, industrial production and commerce in the largest city of Yangon as 
well as the Ayeyarwady Delta which is known as the 'rice bowl' of Myanmar (see Table 
5.4). 
Nominal 
GDP 2008 
(Kyat billion) 
.Agricultural 10,632 
Livestock and 2,330 
Fisheries 
Industrv 5,1;\0 
Commerce 6,708 
Total GDP ;tl 672 
TABLE5.4 
Impact on GDP 
Gross Losses Value Added 
(Kyat billion) Coefficients 
225 o.8 
160 o.6 
1~162 0.2 
461 0.7 
Value Added Impact on 
Losses Sectoral GDP 
185 1.7% 
98 4.2% 
2;\Q 4.6% 
<:l.<:l.4 s.0% 
Source: www.oecd.org/dac/statesidsonline, Development Asisstance Committee, OECD, Paris, 
quoted in William Sabandar, 'Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN: A Window for More Meaningful 
Development Cooperation in Myanmar', in Nick Cheeseman, Monique Skidmore, Trevor Wilson, 
eds., Ruling Myanmar From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections, Singapore: ISEAS 
Publishing, 2010, p.198. 
Given its poor economy, Myanmar was heavily dependent on international assistance. 
However, its politics influenced the level of humanitarian assistance. Myanmar 
received only eighth of the international assistance given to Aceh. As of June 2009, 
Myanmar had received 67 per cent of the US$477 million promised in the revised flash 
appeal, and there had been difficulty in securing the US$691 million as the total budget 
for the three-year recovery and preparedness plan.54 On 25 November 2009, ASEAN 
initiated a Post Nargis Assistance Conference (PONAC) to mobilise resources to 
address the immediate critical needs. As a result of this conference, Myanmar received 
US$103.5 million and US$88.5 million from Australia, EC, Germany, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the 
US. By comparison, Aceh had received US$5,140 million in international assistance 
54 Sabandar, 'Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN: A Window for More Meaningful Development Cooperation in 
Myanmar'. 
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during the first three years after the tsunami. ss The difference was that Indonesia 
realised quickly that it needed international assistance. Only a few days after the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami struck Aceh, Indonesia convened an international conference asking 
for pledging. 
These figures demonstrate that Myanmar actually had a very high level of economic 
dependence on external powers. Therefore the indicator of 'economic dependence on 
external great powers' here is considered as significant.s6 Table 5.5 and Figure 5.3 
summarise the indicators of a balancing system in Southeast Asia during the Cyclone 
N argis crisis. 
TABLE5.5 
Summary of the Indicators of a Balance of Power during the Cyclone N argis Crisis 
No. Indicators Significant Moderate In- Note 
sienificant 
Balance of Power among ASEAN Member States 
A Relatively equal Not relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis 
powers among a 
minimum of two actors 
B. Intentions of some v Moderate during 
states to expand the acute and de-
escalation period 
C. Alliances on the basis v Moderate during 
of short-run interests the acute and de-
escalation period 
D. War as a legitimate v Moderate during 
instrument of - the acute and de-
statecraft escalation oeriod 
Subtotal 0 2 1 
Balance of Extem.al Great Power Influence 
E. Dependency on Not relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis 
external great powers 
as security providers 
F. Alignment with Not relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis 
external great powers 
G. Military cooperation Not relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis 
with external great 
powers 
H. Distribution of v Insignificant 
external great powers' during the acute 
armed forces and de-escalation 
period 
I. Economic dependence v Significant 
on external great during the acute 
powers and de-escalation 
period 
Sub total 1 0 1 
Total 1 2 2 
Source: Compiled by author 
55 Sabandar, 'Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN: A Window for More Meaningful Development Cooperation in 
Myanmar'. 
56 Furthermore, after the Asian financial crisis, economic relations between ASEAN member countries and 
external great powers have become more interdependent, so ASEAN member countries during 2008-2010 
were economically dependent on external great powers. 
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FIGURE5.3 
Indicators of a Balancing System during the Cyclone N argis Crisis 
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Table 5.5 and Figure 5.3 show that the regional security system in Southeast Asia 
during the Cyclone Nargis crisis is not reflected by the presence of a balance of power 
among ASEAN member states. There is no indicator of a balance of power among 
ASEAN member states being ranked as significant, and two indicators are regarded 
moderate. There is one insignificant indicator, namely the indicator 'war as a legitimate 
statecraft', and the other indicators are not necessarily relevant to the crisis. 
Furthermore, ASEAN's management of the crisis is only explained by one out of nine 
significant indicators of a balance of external great power influence, namely 'economic 
dependence on external great powers'. One indicator, 'distribution of external great 
powers' armed forces', is considered an insignificant indicator, while there is no 
indicator that can be regarded as moderate. The other indicators are not necessarily 
relevant to the crisis. This means that external great powers played a limited role in the 
crisis, and therefore did not really indicate a balance of external great power influence 
during the Cylone Nargis crisis. The main roles that external powers played were to put 
pressure on Myanmar to open up to international assistance, pressure to put the issue 
on the table of the UNSC and pressure on ASEAN to ensure Myanmar would accept to 
international assistance. These pressures were considered as background factors rather 
than an important indicator of a balance of external great power influence. 
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5.5. A Concert of Powers? 
In this section, I argue that during the acute period of the crisis, from 2 May to 18 May 
2008, regional dominant powers played an important role in managing the crisis. In 
the de-escalation period, regional dominant powers shared the burden of managing the 
crisis with the rest of ASEAN member states. The crisis management by dominant 
powers provides evidence that the regional security system can be characterised as a 
variation of the classical concept of a concert of powers. Regional dominant powers in 
Southeast Asia were Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. However, even though their 
contribution was important, there was little evidence that the cooperation was 
conducted exclusively among these three countries. 
Several indicators are used to analyse the existence of a sub-regional concert of powers 
in the region as listed in Box 3.3 (see Section 3.6). Table 5.6 presents a summary of the 
indicators of a concert of powers in Southeast Asia during the Cyclone Nargis crisis. A 
detailed analysis follows the table. 
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No. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
Indicators 
A decisive shock 
to the stability of 
the prevailing 
order: 
Significant 
particularly 
during the 
acute period 
A high and self-
conscious level of 
cooperation 
among dominant 
powers: 
Significant 
during the 
acute period 
TABLE5.6 
A Concert of Powers in Southeast Asia during the Cyclone N argis Crisis? 
Myanmar 
For Myanmar people, 
Cyclone N argis was a 
decisive shock to 
stability. For the 
government of 
Myanmar, it was a shock 
to its security as it feared 
'intervention' by 
Western countries. 
Thailand Singapore 
Concert of Powers 
Indonesia The Philippines, 
Brunei and CLV 
Countries 
For other ASEAN countries, the crisis was a humanitarian shock and also a potential shock to ASEAN's 
reputation. Countries like Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia perceived the crisis as a shock particularly 
after the Myanmar government resisted international assistance. It was a shock when at the outset, the 
Myanmar government did not want to accept ASEAN's offer to facilitate, even though Mynmar was open to 
bilateral assistance from ASEAN countries, India and China. It was a shock to ASEAN's credibility, 
particularly when France proposed the issue be discussed in the UNSC under the concept of 'Responsibility 
to Protect'. For ASEAN member countries, if Myanmar failed to accept its role, ASEAN's credibility would 
be questioned. On the other hand, countries like Indonesia and Vietnam did not want this humanitarian 
issue to be considered a security issue by the international community and then discussed in the UNSC. 
There was a high and self-conscious level of cooperation among the ASEAN six members particularly during the acute period. Foreign 
Affairs Ministers contacted each other either by phone or by letter. Even though the cooperation was among the six ASEAN member 
states, when it came to practical implementation Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia played the greatest role. The high and self 
conscious level of cooperation continued during the de-escalation period but the burden of managing the crisis was shared among the 
regional dominant powers and the remainder ASEAN member states. 
A pattern 
cooperative 
behaviour: 
of I A pattern of cooperative behaviour vis-a-vis Myanmar dated back to Myanmar's admission into the organisation. The ASEAN member 
countries had different positions that later created different patterns of cooperative behaviour towards Myanmar during the Cyclone 
N argis crisis. 
Moderate 
between the 
six ASEAN 
members 
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No. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
Indicators 
An effective, 
equal, collectively 
predominant, 
interdependent 
group of all 
dominant 
powers: 
Moderate 
during the 
acute and de-
escalation 
J!eriods 
Institutionalised 
summit 
diplomacy and 
supporting 
consultative 
mechanisms : 
Moderate 
during the 
acute and de-
escalation 
periods 
A joint approach 
to regional 
issues: 
Significant 
during the de-
escalation 
period 
Myanmar Thailand Singapore 
Concert of Powers 
Indonesia The Philippines, 
Brunei and CLV 
Countries 
The roles of Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore were effective and relatively equal. They were among the first countries to render 
assistance, sending medical teams and technical expertise. They were also willing to question Myanmar's membership in ASEAN. 
However, it seems the assistance given to Myanmar particularly during the acute period was not collective and interdependent among 
Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia. It was quite collective among the ASEAN-6, while Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia were the 
most important players but their actions were not interdependent. 
This indicator is considered as moderate because there was no institutionalised summit diplomacy among regional dominant powers, 
but there were high level diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms conducted by ASEAN member states under the TCG. 
On 12 May 2008, Pitsuwan organised a meeting between the ASEAN Secretariat, the World Bank and the United Nation's Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for the purpose of assessing potential support for a 'coalition of mercy'. Several 
consultative mechanisms within ASEAN were held afterwards, on 21 May, 25 May, 31 May, 2 June, 10-19 June, 23 June, 24 June, 21 
July, 26 November 2008, 17 January 2009, 9 February 2009, 27 February 2009, 2 July 2009, 17-20 July 2009 , 2 October 2009, 17 
October 2009, 23-25 October 2009, 25 November 2009, 13 January 2010, 8 March 2010, 12 March 2010, 12 March 2010, 7 April 2010, 
18 June 2010 and 31 July 2010. 
Myanmar was initially 
reluctant to accept any 
joint approach by 
ASEAN in helping the 
country. However, 
Myanmar was convinced 
that it could trust 
ASEAN member 
countries as facilitators. 
There was a joint approach by Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and 
Indonesia to pushing Myanmar during the acute period, being the first 
countries to deploy experts and assistance and playing an important role during 
the de-escalation period. A joint approach to other regional issues that arose 
during Cyclone N argis crisis was also demonstrated by these countries. 
The joint approach during the de-escalation period was also demonstrated 
between Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam whose experts were 
represented in the TCG. 
The Philippines' experts 
were also deployed after 
ASEAN-ERAT was sent 
to the Delta. 
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No. Indicators Myanmar Thailand Singapore Indonesia The Philippines, 
Brunei and CLV 
Countries 
Concert of Powers 
G. A need for The need for system stability was demonstrated by the effort of ASEAN member states to push the Myanmar government to accept 
system stability international assistance. The consideration of the expulsion of Myanmar from ASEAN also reflected the need for system stability. 
and international 
order: 
Significant 
particularly 
during the Outside Southeast Asia, the need for system stability was demonstrated, by France's effort to table the issue at UNSC in the context of a 
acute period 'Responsibility to Protect' and the presence of US. French and UK naval ships and aircraft from the US and India. 
Source: Adapted from the literature and interviews and compiled by author 
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A. A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order 
To the Myanmar people and government, ASEAN member states and the international 
community, the Cyclone Nargis crisis was a decisive shock to the stability of the 
prevailing order. Cyclone Nargis had a substantial long-term impact on livelihoods and 
resulted in enormous physical losses. Besides the humanitarian catastrophe, what 
further presented a shock was the fact that the country's military regime only allowed 
limited humanitarian access. Many NGOs were denied access to the country. 
Organisations already present in the country, such as Medecins sans Frontieres and 
Save the Children were able to get relatively small numbers of aid workers into the 
affected areas but reported a tightening of restrictions.s7 Other NGOs, UN agencies and 
states offered assistance to the Myanmar government which insisted on distributing the 
aid itself, and on restricting aid worker's movement. The UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Oxfam reported that, at most, only a quarter 
of the aid required was being permitted to enter the country, and the aid was not being 
effectively distributed.s8 
ASEAN member countries also perceived the crisis as a shock particularly after the 
Myanmar government resisted in allowing international assistance. It was a shock 
when at the outset, the Myanmar government did not want to accept ASEAN's offer as a 
facilitator, even though Myanmar was open to any bilateral assistance from ASEAN 
countries, India and China. It was a shock to ASEAN's credibility and ASEAN did not 
want another embarrassment after the cancelation of Professor Ibrahim Gambari's 
briefing East Asian Leaders on the Myanmar situation at the EAS in November 2007, 
just six months before the crisis. In October 2007, Singapore's Ambassador to the UN 
informed the UNSC that it had invited Professor Gambari to brief the leaders at the 
EAS in November. On 19 November, after Gambari had already departed on a flight for 
Singapore, at an informal dinner, Myanmar objected to the briefing and Myanmar's 
Prime Minister threatened to scuttle the Charter before walked out of the meeting.s9 
Gambari's group briefing was cancelled. This embarrassed ASEAN in front of the 
international community. Singapore as Chair, supported by other members -
particularly the original members - wanted to make sure that the international 
community saw that such an event would not happen again and that ASEAN can do 
things correctly. 
Furthermore, Singapore as ASEAN's chair also saw this catastrophe as a shock because 
ASEAN as an organisation was expected to come up with tangible solutions. Singapore 
57 Larkin, No Bad News for the King. 
58 Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 'Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect'. 
59 Lee Jones, 'ASEAN's Albatross: ASEAN's Burma Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical 
Disengagement', Asian Security 4:3, 2008, pp. 271-293, p. 286. 
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received reports that the Tatmadaw (Myanmar's military government) had not been 
called in to help the victims of the cyclone because they had instead been ordered to 
take up 'defensive positions'. Singapore was facing the risk of losing credibility in its 
chairmanship if ASEAN did not come up with solutions or failed to ensure Myanmar 
accepted international assistance, and in particular, accepted ASEAN as facilitator. 
Indonesia had experienced a similar situation when the Boxing Day Tsunami struck 
Aceh in 2004. Indonesia held a Summit Pledge Conference on 5 January 2005, only 12 
days after the tsunami hit Aceh. If it had not been during the holiday season (Christmas 
and New Year), the Indonesian government would have held the conference earlier 
than 5 January 2005. A Japanese diplomat working at the Japanese Embassy in 
Jakarta during that time reported that the reaction of the Indonesian government 
towards the natural disaster was very fast and it was quite difficult to contact their 
headquarters in Japan to ask to participate in the Summit because of the holiday 
season.60 The fact that the reaction of the Myanmar government was relatively slow, 
particularly in accepting the relief effort was a shock to Indonesia. Given that it had 
experienced a similar situation, Indonesia knew how devastated the victims were and 
how they needed a quick distribution of aid. This prompted the Indonesian government 
to talk with its Myanmar counterpart. The same view was held by Thailand. As its 
closest geographical neighbour which also had a similar experience, Thailand wanted 
Myanmar to react more promptly. 
These shocks resulted in ASEAN's effort to react quickly to the disaster. On 5 May, 
ASEAN released its first press statement and dispatched its Emergency Rapid 
Assessment Team (ERAT) to Myanmar between 9-18 May to assess the extent of the 
disaster. Interestingly, the ASEAN ERAT deployed in Myanmar only consisted of 
countries from the six ASEAN members, namely Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. Myanmar also joined the group. The participation of only six 
members is understandable in the sense that the decision to establish the ASEAN-
ERAT was made in March 2008 before Cyclone Nargis. At the time of Nargis, the 
ASEAN-ERAT had essentially not yet been established.61 In 48 hours, experts from 
ASEAN member countries gathered. Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam found it difficult to 
find experts on disaster management within 48 hours. In the early days, experts from 
Indonesia were sent under the ASEAN Secretariat. Their deployment was conducted 
under the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response 
(AADMER) which had been ratified by Myanmar. On 8 May, the ASEAN Secretary-
General initiated the ACFDA. 
60 Interview with a Japanese diplomat, Canberra, 16 February 2012. 
61 ASEAN, Post-Nargis Needs Assessment and Monitoring, Jakarta: ASEAN, 2010. 
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The frustration was also felt by countries that were willing to help, but access was 
denied. For example, on 7 May, the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner 
proposed that the UNSC invoke the 'R2P' to authorise the delivery of aid without the 
consent of the Myanmar government. This proposal was reiterated by the French 
Ambassador to the UN and by commentators, analysts and politicians, primarily in 
Europe and North America. This proposal was rejected by the Chinese government, 
which argued that the concept did not apply to natural disasters. Similarly, the UN's 
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator 
referred to the proposal as unnecessarily confrontational. 62 The British Minister for 
International Development, Douglas Alexander also rejected, but somehow Britain 
later backtracked and indicated that it would welcome discussion of the 'R2P'. 63 This 
further triggered a substantial scholarly debate. 
On 12 May 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed his 'deep concern and 
immense frustration at the unacceptably slow response to this grave humanitarian 
crisis' and warned of the threat of infectious disease taking hold if urgent assistance was 
not delivered. The Secretary-General tried to contact the head of Myanmar's military 
regime, Than Shwe, but his calls were unanswered. 64 
Various media outlets around the world also jumped on the 'intervention' calls 
bandwagon. The Australian, for example, suggested 'it's time for an aid intervention'. 
Time Magazine recommended that it was time to consider 'the more serious option' of 
'invading Burma' and the AsiaTimes Online argued that while an invasion was 'once a 
paranoid delusion', it was now a 'strong pre-emptive possibility'.6s 
For the Myanmar government, the catastrophe brought a fear of invasion by Western 
countries. The junta perceived the cyclone more as a 'security threat' than a 'natural 
disaster. For them, granting permission for a massive relief effort would result in a 
large flow of foreign aid workers and media personnel. The junta believed that it was 
essential to prevent 'alien cultural influences' that might result in 'social instability'. 66 
62 Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 'Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect'. 
63 Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 'Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect'. 
64 Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 'Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect', 
p. 3. 
6s Roberts, ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis, p. 190. 
66 Roberts, ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis, p. 191. 
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B. A high and self conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers 
Cooperation was established not among Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia exclusively, 
but rather among ASEAN-6 member countries. The level of cooperation among 
Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia, however, was high and self-conscious, and 
therefore I argue this indicator is significant. This is shown in the acute period of the 
crisis. On 5 May 2008, two days after Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, ASEAN member 
states successfully extended relief assistance to the victims of the cyclone. The ASEAN-
ERAT was sent to join the UN Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) Team 
assembled in Bangkok. The members of ASEAN-ERATwho were deployed to Myanmar 
were from the six member countries. 67 
Even though the cooperation was actually conducted among the six ASEAN members, 
when it came to practical implementation Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia were the 
most active players. The ASEAN Secretariat updated the situation to all ASEAN 
members, but communication among the six members was very intensive. 68 The vigour 
of the ASEAN members' role is represented in 5. 7 and Figure 5.4. 
TABLE5.7 
Classification of the Contribution of ASEAN Member Countries in the Cyclone 
N argis Crisis 
Contribution Countries Period 
Pushing Myanmar Hard Thailand, Singapore, Acute Period 
to open to international Indonesia, the Philippines 
Assistance 
Early Assistance and Thailand, Singapore, Acute Period 
Deployment (ASEAN- Brunei, Malaysia, the 
ERAT and relief Philippines and Indonesia 
assistance, and UNDAC) 
Financial contribution Thailand, Singapore and Acute and De-escalation 
Indonesia (rank no 1-3), period 
followed by Brunei, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Lao, Vietnam 
and Cambodia. 69 
Technical expertise Thailand, Singapore, Acute and De-escalation 
Indonesia, the Philippines Period 
and Malaysia 
ASEAN Humanitarian Thailand, Singapore, De-escalation Period 
Task Force Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Brunei, Laos, 
Cambodia, Vietnam. 
TCG Thailand, Singapore, De-escalation Period 
Indonesia and Vietnam 
Volunteers Thailand, Singapore, De-escalation Period 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei 
Darussalam, the Philippines, 
Cambodia,Laos,Vietnam 
Source: compiled by author 
67 ASEAN, Post-Nargis Needs Assessment and Monitoring, Jakarta: ASEAN, 2010. 
68 Interview with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2, Jakarta, 16 February 
2011. 
69 See Table 5.8 Post Nargis support from ASEAN members. 
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FIGURE5.4 
Classification of the Role of ASEAN member countries in the Cyclone N argis crisis 
The Philippines, Malaysia (/~i;f -,, __ ) 
\_''·--···--·--··.//// 
Vietnam, Brunei 
Note to figure: The inner circle comprises countries which played the most active role during the Cyclone 
Nargis crisis, followed by the second circle, and by the third circle countries which played 
the least active role. 
Source: Compiled by author 
Both Table 5.7 and Figure 5.4 suggest that Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia 
consistently played a role in all aspects of contribution. Interestingly, a Thai military 
officer claimed that Thailand played the greatest role in assisting Myanmar while an 
Indonesian official also claimed that Indonesia played the greatest role in pushing 
Myanmar to open up to international assistance.7° Thailand contributed approximately 
US$29. 7 million to relief and recovery efforts, and was the first country to provide 
assistance to Myanmar following the Cyclone, which was transported on a C-130 
aircraft on 6 May 2008. Relief support included food, medicine and medical supplies, 
drinking water, survival kits, plastic sheets, roofing materials, water purifiers, 
generators, diesel, satellite telephones, boats, tillers, fertiliser, agricultural and fishing 
equipment. Thailand also offered its Don Muang Airport as a staging area, where relief 
supplies from other countries could be channelled through to Myanmar. All told, 26 
cargoes of relief from all over the world were transported on C-130 aircraft from 
Thailand and from other countries. Thailand was also the first country to dispatch a 
medical team to Myanmar at the end of May 2008. Thailand contributed cash, 
equipment and materials towards the set up and operation of the TCG and AHTF 
Coordinating Office in Yangon. Thailand supported the TCG Pilot Project in Seik Gyi 
Village by helping to renovate the monastery in Seik Gyi and reconstruct schools in 
70 InteIView with a Thai Army officer who was in charge of the Cyclone Nargis Crisis, Bangkok, 23 February 
2011. and InteIView with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1, Jakarta, 16 
February 2011. 
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Nyang Wai Village. Former Thailand Ambassador to Myanmar, Bansarn Bunnag was 
designated an ASEAN member to the TCG from mid July 2008 to December 2009.71 
Indonesia was one of the first countries to provide humanitarian assistance to 
Myanmar following the Cyclone. Material weighing 22,395 MT was transported on two 
Hercules planes that arrived at Yangon International Airport on 9 May 2008. The aid 
included 27 sacks of clothing, 150 sacks of biscuits, 10,000 blankets, 50.000 sarongs, 
10 tents, 292 bags of medicine, 744 sacks of food and 4,000 bags of instant noodles. On 
2 June 2008, a team of 30 medical professionals from Indonesia carrying 7 MT of 
medication, medical supplies and operational tools, arrived in Myanmar to help 
survivors in Kawhmu Township. During the recovery phase, Indonesia donated US$1 
million to build a 38 bed hospital in Pynsalu.72 
Singapore contributed US$3.5 million to the post-Nargis relief and recovery effort. The 
assistance began in June 2008, when Singapore provided funding for an aviation group 
handling equipment at the Yangon International Airport that was used in the 
distribution of relief supplies. In September 2008, Singapore supported crop replanting 
activities in six designated townships: Dedaye, Ngapudaw, Labutta, Mawlamyinegyun 
and Kyaiklat. On 2 July 2008 five Singaporean psychologists organised a workshop on 
disaster mental health issues that was attended by 35 Myanmar officials. Four months 
later, Singapore donated 1,000 wooden fishing boats and nets through an 
implementing partner, Mingalar Myanmar .73 
TABLE5.8 
P tN . S OS - largJS uppo m em er rt fro ASEAN M b Stat es 
Rank ASEAN Member states Total funds committed/ contributed 
(USD 
1. Thailand 29,713,688* 
2. Singapore 5,634,900* 
3. Indonesia 1,800,000* 
4. Brunei Darussalam 1,303,693 
5. Malaysia 1,160,772* 
6. Philiooines 350,000 
7. Cambodia 310,000 
8. Vietnam 300,000 
9. LaoPDR 120,000 
Total 40,693,053 
Note:* cash and in-kind contribution 
Source: The ASEAN Secretariat, A Humanitarian Call the ASEAN Response to Cyclone Nargis, 
Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, 2010, p. 80. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the indicator, a high and self-conscious level of 
cooperation among dominant members, is significant in this case. 
71 ASEAN, A Humanitarian Call. 
72 ASEAN, A Humanitarian Call. 
73 ASEAN,A Humanitarian Call. 
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C. A pattern of cooperative behaviour 
The pattern of cooperative behaviour vis-a-vis Myanmar had actually been established 
since Myanmar's admission into the organisation. Given that the pattern of cooperation 
was slowly being established and was changing among the dominant members, the 
indicator of 'pattern of cooperative behaviour of dominant powers' is rated as moderate. 
There were some other grounds that slowly created a pattern of cooperative behaviour 
towards Myanmar among the ASEAN-6 members, including the proposal for 
Constructive Engagement by Thailand, the proposal for an ASEAN Troika by Indonesia, 
the issue of Myanmar Chairmanship in ASEAN, the cancelation of Gambari's briefing, 
and the UNGA vote in 2007. These occasions further influenced the pattern of 
cooperative behaviour that emerged in helping Myanmar during the Cyclone Nargis 
CflSIS. 
These events finally but slowly created a pattern of cooperative behaviour, mostly 
among the ASEAN-6 members, so when the Cyclone Nargis crisis hit Myanmar; it was 
relatively predictable that the ASEAN-6 members would cooperate to provide 
assistance. It is not a secret that some countries like Indonesia and the Philippines 
actually have a long-term agenda towards democratisation in Myanmar. However, they 
could not express it bluntly to the Myanmar government at the time of the crisis, 
because it risked Myanmar objecting to the role of ASEAN as facilitator. 
Not only during the acute period, but also during the de-escalation period, these 
countries played a bigger role. According to Pavin Chacalpongvun, Thailand and 
Singapore played the biggest role. Thailand, for example, at least had three significant 
roles: as a next-door neighbour, a frontline neighbour, and as a gateway of assistance 
delivery. Thailand offered its airport to be the place where supplies from other 
countries could be channelled through Myanmar and, 26 cargoes of relief from all over 
the world were transported on C-130 aircraft from Thailand. 74 Furthermore, the 
ASEAN Secretary-General who is from Thailand and the Thai Ambassador in 
Naypyidaw, were the most influential people on the ground. While Pitsuwan was not 
always around, Bansarn Bunnag became the focal point for any foreigner to consult 
with.7s 
Chacalpongvun also stated that Singapore was important in several ways: as being a 
rich country and as Chair of ASEAN. Singapore also had business interests in Myanmar, 
so its assistance could be seen as a long-term investment. The Dean Ambassador in 
Yangon was the Ambassador of Singapore, Robert Chua, who was the second most 
74 ASEAN, A Humanitarian Call. 
75 Interview with Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, !SEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 16 March 2011. 
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influential person after Bansarn Bunnag. 76 Ambassadors carried significant political 
weight with their respective nations and as members of the TCG. Moreover, they were 
on the ground, they were aware of what was happening and they relayed what they 
were seeing and hearing back to the ASEAN Secretariat. At the same time, they were 
the only Ambassadors in Myanmar who were seriously committed.77 
Indonesia also played a significant role in pushing Myanmar by questioning the 
meaning of ASEAN to Myanmar and the meaning of Myanmar to ASEAN. Three out of 
seven officials who served on the TCG were from Indonesia. These persons are Adelina 
Kamal, Head of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Division of the 
ASEAN Secretariat; Dr Puji Pujiono, Senior UNDP officer seconded to the ASEAN 
Secretariat; and Dr William Sabandar, Special Envoy for Secretary-General of ASEAN 
for Post Nargis Recovery.78 
In terms of financial contribution, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia could also be 
ranked no.1 to no.3 in that order. Thailand ranked no.1 with US$29,713,688 of 
assistance, Singapore with US$ 5,634,900 of contribution and Indonesia with 
US$1,800,ooo of funds given to Myanmar. Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam also 
rendered large contributions. Malaysia contributed US$1.16 million worth of aid on 
two C-130 Royal Malaysian Air Force aircraft and sent humanitarian supplies 
consisting of blankets, clothing, dry food, medicines, tents and water purification 
tablets. 79 However, for Malaysia, aside from assistance in terms of funding and 
humanitarian supplies, little is known. Brunei contributed US$1,303,693 of assistance 
and supported the deployment of two volunteers to Myanmar to join the ASEAN 
Volunteers.80 However, it lacked the technical expertise to assist the cyclone victims. 
Vietnam did not give a substantial contribution but the Vietnamese Ambassador in 
Naypyidaw played a role by becoming a member of the TCG as shown in Table 5.9. 
76 lnterview with Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, !SEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 16 March 2011. 
77 ASEAN, The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action. 
78 ASEAN, Charting A New Course, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010. 
79 ASEAN, Charting A New Course. 
80 ASEAN, Charting A New Course. 
230 
TABLE5.9 
Officials Who Served on the TCG 
M., ASEAN UN 
Namesandr . ti.on Names and Desitmations Names and Desi1D1&tions 
U Kyaw Thu, Chair of the TCG Singapore Ambassador Mr. Bishow Parajuli, UN Resident 
and Ch~ Civil Service Selection Mr. Robert HK Chua Coordination/Humanitarian 
and Training Board Coordinator 
U Aung Htun Kliaing, Deputy Thai Ambassador Mr. Daniel Baker, then Acting UN 
Director General, Department of Mr Bansarn Bunnag Humanitarian Coordinator 
Social Welfare, Ministry of Social 
Welfare and Resettlement 
u Than Aye, Ministry of Vietnamese Ambassador Mr Ramesh Shresta, UNICEF 
Agriculture and Irrigation, Mr Chu Cong Phung Country Representatives 
Diretor General of the 
Department of Agricultural 
Planning 
Dr Anish Kumar Roy, then Mr. Thierry Delbreuve, Head of 
Special Representative of UNOCHA in Myanmar 
Secretary-General of ASEAN in 
2008 
Ms Adelina Kamal, Head of Mr. Bhairaja Panday, UNHCR 
Disaster Management and Countrv Representative 
Dr Puji Pujiono, Senior UNDP 
officer seconded to the ASEAN 
Secretariat 
Dr William Sabandar, Special 
Envoy for Secretary-General of 
ASEAN for Post Narcis Recovery 
Source: ASEAN, Charting a New Course, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010, p. 31 
Table 5.9 shows that among the CLMV countries, only the Vietnamese Ambassador was 
a member of the TCG from ASEAN. However, Vietnam's cqntribution to Myanmar was 
relatively small, about UA$300,ooo and ranked no. 8 among ASEAN member 
countries in terms of funding. Compared to its economic growth, Vietnam's 
contribution to Myanmar can be regarded as small. Countries like Cambodia, Laos had 
neither the capacity in terms of funding nor the technical expertise. Cambodia and Laos 
also did not want to push Myanmar too hard in opening up to international assistance 
and did not want to question Myanmar's membership in ASEAN because they were also 
relatively new as members. They appeared not to want to create problems for 
themselves. 
The pattern of cooperative behaviour vis-a-vis Myanmar was slowly established. This 
pattern could be seen among the ASEAN-6 members, but among these, Thailand, 
Singapore, and Indonesia played the most important roles. Therefore, the indicator, a 
pattern of cooperative behaviour among dominant powers, is regarded as moderate. 
D. An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of 
all dominant powers 
The role of regional dominant powers, namely Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore was 
quite effective. However, the cooperation was not really collective and interdependent. 
The contnlmtions of the Thai, Indonesian and Singaporean governments were 
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relatively equal, and thus this indicator is considered as moderate. They effectively 
pushed Myanmar to open up to international assistance by agreeing to the 
establishment of the TCG. According to See Seng Tan, Indonesia and Singapore were 
the strongest countries exerting influence in pushing Myanmar.81 The contribution of 
Indonesia and Singapore in terms of funding may not be equal to Thailand's 
contribution; this amounted to US$29,713,688, which was bigger than the total 
contribution of the other nine ASEAN countries together. However, in terms of 
technical expertise contributed, their roles were about equal. In addition, Thais, 
Singaporeans and Indonesians served as TCG officials. 
While Indonesia sent a medical team to help survivors in a field hospital and mobile 
clinic, the Singapore government conducted a workshop on disaster mental health 
issues in October 2008 and the Thai government provided two medical teams, both 
under the patronage of H.R.H. Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn. Whilst the 
Indonesian government donated US$1 million to build a 38 bed hospital-cum-cyclone 
shelter in Pyinsalu Township, Singapore supported the reconstruction of Kayin Chaung 
Hospital, a 16 bed facility that was inaugurated by Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong in 
June 2009 and the Thai Red Cross Society funded the renovation of the National Blood 
Centre in Yangon and helped construct a rural health centre in Taman Village and a 16-
bed hospital di Daw Nyein Village, Pyapon Township. 82 
Interestingly, a sense of competition developed between ASEAN and China in helping 
Myanmar. Chacavalpongpun commented that the Chinese government wanted to play a 
pivotal role and had been aggressive and fast in rendering assistance. He said: 
I remember I walked with J a Du, the spokesperson of the Myanmar government 
for the whole process of reconstruction. He showed me a new village and 
accidentally mentioned that it was funded by China. After realising that I was 
from an ASEAN member country, he corrected and said that it was not from 
China. The construction of the new village was very fast. 
China wanted to be regarded as the closest friend of Myanmar, and as the one who 
came first to help. China, which was facing a comparable catastrophe after the Sichuan 
earthquake, urged Myanmar to follow its example and be more open with the 
international community. 83 
81 See Seng Tan, 'Herding Cats: Socialisation and Political Change and Continuity in ASEAN', Seminar 
organised by the Regulatory Institutions Network, School of Regulation, Justice and Diplomacy, College of 
Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University, Canberra, 21 August 2012. 
82 ASEAN, A Humanitarian Call. 
83 International Crisis Group, 'Burma/ Myanmar after Nargis: Time to normalize aid relations', Asia Report, 
No. 161, 20 October 2008, pp. 1-39. 
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E. Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative 
mechanisms 
There was limited institutional summit diplomacy but a number of informal summit 
diplomatic moves, and formal and informal consultative mechanisms occurred. Among 
the regional dominant powers any summit diplomacy was made through telephone 
communication. Greg Sheridan of the Australian reported that probably no foreign 
leader had been more influential in the unfolding events in Myanmar than the 
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Indonesia had been trying to engage 
Senior General Than Shwe for several years in a process of personal correspondence. 84 
This is evidence that there was summit diplomacy but it was conducted informally. 
On 19 May, Singapore called for a Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers and 
after 19 May, a sequence of supporting consultative mechanisms occurred. These 
consultative mechanisms were conducted not only by regional dominant powers, but 
also by ASEAN as an organisation and as a party to the TCG Mechanism. 
Besides these consultative mechanisms, the Coordinating Office of AHTF established a 
delivery unit, headed by a monitoring and evaluation officer and supported by four data 
analysts. The delivery unit tracked the delivery of pledges resulting from the ASEAN 
Post-Nargis Conference to follow up with donors, to monitor the delivery of the 
project's trust fund and implementing partners; and communicate the overall delivery 
of assistance to stakeholders. 
The indicator 'institutionalised summit diplomacy and supportive consultative 
mechanisms' can be regarded as moderate, because (i) the summit diplomacy between 
regional dominant powers and the Myanmar government was informal rather than 
institutionalised; (ii) institutional summit diplomacy existed among ASEAN member 
states, where regional dominant powers were influential; and (iii) supportive 
consultative mechanisms were not conducted by Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore 
alone, but by ASEAN as an organisation and as party to the TCG, where regional 
dominant powers played important roles. 8s 
F. Ajoint approach to regional issues 
A joint approach was explicitly demonstrated by the ASEAN-6 members after the 
Cyclone hit Myanmar. Strong communication was established among those members. 
This joint approach, for example was demonstrated by Thailand, Singapore, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia in pushing Myanmar hard during the acute period. Among 
84 Greg Sheridan, 'SBY shepherds Indonesia into a modern community', The Australian, 25-26 February, 
2012. 
8s ASEAN, A Humanitarian Call. 
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the ASEAN-6 members, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia played the biggest role. 
Their roles in working with the Myanmar government during the acute period included 
being the first country to render assistance and send medical teams (Thailand), and 
being one of the first countries to contribute funds and provide humanitarian 
assistance (Singapore and Indonesia). The foreign ministers of Singapore, Indonesia 
and Thailand engaged in shuttle diplomacy, reassuring the world of ASEAN's attempt 
to act as facilitator. 86 However, little evidence was found to demonstrate that these 
three countries cooperated exclusively with each other in assisting Myanmar. 
A joint approach during the de-escalation period was demonstrated by all ASEAN 
member states. It was not until the meeting held when the acute period ended that the 
ASEAN-led mechanism started and brought the government of Myanmar, ASEAN, the 
UN, and international NGOs (TCG) together. The TCG agreed on 31 May to conduct a 
Post Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) to address the Pledging Conference's call for a 
credible and multi-sectoral assessment. 
During the de-escalation period, ASEAN worked as an organisation under the TCG, in a 
joint approach. All ASEAN member countries were represented in the AHTF. However, 
in the TCG only Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam, the ASEAN Secretariat 
and the ASEAN Secretary-General were represented. 
As elaborated in the 'balance of power' section (Section 5-4), during the Cyclone Nargis 
crisis, a crisis was also developing between Cambodia and Thailand over the Preah 
Vihear Temple. This crisis did not really involve ASEAN as an organisation, but did 
involve Singapore as Chairman in 2008 and Indonesia when the crisis turned into 
conflict in 2011. Pitsuwan terms the border dispute 'two Buddhists are fighting over a 
Hindu ruin, and two Muslims are mediating'. He was referring to Cambodia and 
Thailand as two Buddhists; the Hindu ruin is the Preah Vihear; and the two Muslims 
refer to the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa and himself. 87 
G. A need for system stability and international order 
Nationally, regionally and internationally there were pressures for system stability, thus 
I argue that the indicator of 'a need for system stability and international order' during 
the Cyclone Nargis crisis, and thus indicating a concert of powers in Southeast Asia, is 
significant. Looking back to the definition of stability discussed in Chapter 3, Deutsch 
and Singer set out three necessary preconditions of stability: 'that no single nation 
86 Chachavalpongvun and Thuzar, Myanmar Life After Nargis. 
87 Surin Pitsuwan, Speech at the Launch of ANU Southeast Asia Institute, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 23 October 2012. 
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becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale 
war does not occur'. 88 The Cyclone Nargis crisis does not meet the first two 
requirements because the Myanmar government became too dominant and the victims 
· faced challenges to survive. Nationally, Cyclone Nargis provided an opportunity to 
impede the process of the referendum. People who were afraid of the government and 
already agreed to vote 'Yes' might change their mind because of the weak government 
response to the crisis. The rejection of a new constitution might have changed the 
government and disrupted system stability. 
For ASEAN, Myanmar's case could also bring about the possibility of disruption of 
system stability. ASEAN member countries were affected in terms of their prestige. 
Singapore had to demonstrate appropriate responses as it was burdened with the 
chairmanship of ASEAN. Thailand and Indonesia had the responsibility for sharing 
their experiences as both had experienced a tsunami in 2004. This shows that the 
Cyclone Nargis crisis was a concern for ASEAN as well as for individual regional 
dominant powers. For ASEAN, there was a need to strengthen cooperation on disaster 
management to prevent or at least better manage such disasters in the future. 
There was a need to find tangible solution because the ASEAN Charter was signed at 
the ASEAN Summit in 2007. It was expected that in June 2008, the ASEAN Charter 
would enter into force. ASEAN thought that if there was disagreement with Myanmar 
over the crisis, it might threaten to scuttle ASEAN's Charter ratification. Furthermore, 
the international community would not support the Charter if ASEAN did not come up 
with tangible solution. 
The Cyclone Nargis crisis, however, provided both a need and an opportunity for 
ASEAN to develop its cooperation on disaster management. Cyclone N argis can be 
considered as the first 'true' engagement of ASEAN in the mission of relieving natural 
or manmade disasters. ASEAN as an organisation had tried to put its own stamp on 
crisis management in its region, but had never been offered the chance. Cyclone Nargis 
was also a reminder that ASEAN should expedite its AADMER, which finally entered 
into force in November 2009 after being ratified by all ten member states of ASEAN. 
AADMER also provides for the establishment of an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for 
Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) to undertake 
operational coordination of activities under the Agreement. This also represented 
ASEAN's affirmation of its commitment to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). 
AADMER was signed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in July 2005. Cyclone Nargis 
88 Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, 'Multi polar Power Systems and International Stability', in James N. 
Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory , rev. edn., pp. 
315-317. 
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really forced the organisation to expedite the ratification of the agreement, and 
provided a need and also some latitude at the same time. 
A need for international order was demonstrated when the French Foreign Minister 
called · for the UN to invoke R2P in relation to Cyclone N argis in order to secure the 
delivery of aid without the approval of the government of Myanmar, as discussed 
previously. Moreover, the decision of the US and France to send their naval ships 
stocked with supplies to the coast of Myanmar created uncertainties as to the nature of 
the international humanitarian intervention, and was possibly perceived as a threat to 
the integrity of the State rather than a lifeline to Cyclone-affected peoples. This also 
demonstrated that external great powers like the US and middle powers like the French 
believed that there was a need for international order. 
The tension between the international community and the Myanmar government in the 
first two weeks after Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar was also evidence of the need for 
system stability. While there was willingness from members of the international 
community to help the victims and survivors, the Myanmar government was suspicious 
of their motives. Table 5.10 and Figure 5.5 provide a brief summary of the indicators of 
a concert of powers during the Cyclone N argis crisis. The analysis of the indicators of a 
concert of powers is illustrated in Table 5.10 and Figure 5.5. 
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TABLE5.10 
Summary of the Indicators of a Concert of Powers during the Cyclone N argis Crisis 
No 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
Indicators Sitrnificant Moderate InsiEDificant Note 
Concert of Powers 
A decisive shock to v' Significant, 
the stability of the particularly 
prevailing order during the acute 
period 
A high and self- v' Significant, 
conscious level of particularly 
cooperation among during the acute 
dominant powers period 
A pattern of v' Significant 
cooperative between the six 
behaviour members and 
moderate 
between 
dominant powers 
An effective, equal, v' Moderate during 
collectively the acute and de-
predominant, escalation period 
interdependent 
group of all 
dominant powers 
Institutionalised v' Moderate during 
summit diplomacy the acute and 
and supporting de-escalation 
consultative period 
mechanisms 
A joint approach to v' Significant 
regional issues 
A need for system v' - Significant, 
stability and particularly 
international order during the acute 
period 
Total 4 3 0 
Source: Compiled by author 
FIGURE5.5 
Indicators of a Concert of Powers during the Cyclone N argis Crisis 
Significa nee 
Source: Compiled by author 
o Significant 
□ Moderate 
□ lnsigmcant 
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Table 5.10 and Figure 5.5 show that during the acute period of the crisis, the security 
system in Southeast Asia is confirmed by four significant and three moderate indicators 
associated with a concert of powers. Because not all but a majority of indicators were 
indicated, it is appropriate to refer to the security system as a 'variation of a classical 
concert of powers'. 
5.6. A Security Community? 
This section analyses the indicators of a security community and discusses how ASEAN 
member states responded to the Cyclone Nargis. In this section, I argue that the crisis 
management by ASEAN members during the de-escalation period is explained by eight 
out of ten indicators associated with a security community, and each is rated as 
significant. I adopt the same indicators used to analyse the regional security systems 
during the Cambodian crisis and East Timor crisis as listed in Box 3.1 (see Section 3-4). 
Table 5.11 provides an explanation of each indicator of a security community in the 
Cyclone Nargis crisis; this is followed by a detailed analysis. 
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No. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
Indicators 
A comparability 
of political values 
among decision-
makers: 
Significant 
during the de-
escalation 
period 
A mutual 
predictability of 
behaviour among 
decision-makers: 
Moderate 
during the 
acute period 
and significant 
during the de-
escalation 
period 
A mutual 
responsiveness of 
government to 
actions and 
communication 
of other 
governments: 
TABLE5.11 
A Security Community in Southeast Asia during the Cyclone Nargis Crisis? 
Myanmar 
As a recipient country, 
Myanmar had a fear of 
intervention, particularly 
from Western countries. 
ASEAN members had a 
humanitarian concern: 
Myanmar should have 
opened up to 
international assistance 
from the beginning. 
Thailand Singapore 
Security ~!>~uni!Y 
Indonesia The Philippines, 
Brunei and CLV 
Countries 
ASEAN member states in general have comparable values. ASEAN member states share similar histories, 
values and societal norms. These commonalities provided a platform to create an understanding between 
Myanmar and the donor community, and to ease the fears of Myanmar that had been battered by its 
response to the deadly Cyclone. Nevertheless, there were differences of political values between ASEAN 
member states. Compared to other member states of ASEAN, Malaysia, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and 
Vietnam expressed solidarity with Myanmar in this crisis by not placing undue pressure on the country. 
During the acute period of the crisis, there were differences in willingness to push Myanmar too hard and to 
use the concept of 'R2P'. However, during the de-escalation period, the values converged, and all member 
countries worked together to help Myanmar. 
During the acute period, the behaviour of the decision-makers of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam was relatively predictable, but the 
behaviour of decision-makers of the ASEAN-6 was not really predictable. Behaviour of decision-makers was relatively more predictable 
during the de-escalation period. 
Responsiveness to actions and communication during the acute period varied. In general, ASEAN member states were responsive but in 
particular, their level of response was different. The amount of initial contribution was different. There were also differences in terms of 
the speed of dispatching assistance and the level of willingness to push Myanmar to open up to international assistance. 
Responsiveness to actions and communication by all ASEAN member countries was clearly seen during the de-escalation period. 
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No. 
D. 
E. 
Indicators 
Significant 
particularly 
during the de-
escalation 
period 
Precipitating 
factors that 
encourage states 
to orient 
themselves in 
each other's 
direction and 
coordinate their 
policies: 
Myanmar Thailand Singapore 
Security Community 
Indonesia The Philippines, 
Brunei and CLV 
Countries 
There were five common precipitating factors that encouraged ASEAN member states to orient themselves in each other's direction and 
coordinate their policies: (i) the fact that the Cyclone Nargis crisis is a natural disaster and humanitarian crisis and (ii) the possibility 
that if ASEAN failed in finding a tangible solution, ASEAN's credibility would have been disturbed, (iii) the opportunity to show 
international awareness of poverty in Myanmar; (iv) the opportunity and the need to develop cooperation on disaster management, and 
( v) the need to test the power of the ASEAN Charter. 
Aside from common precipitating factors there were individual precipitating factors. Thailand shares a border with Myanmar, was a 
front line state, and had similar experience of natural disasters. Singapore held the chairmanship of ASEAN and had business and 
investment interests in Myanmar. Indonesia also had experienced a similar disaster. 
Significant 
during 
acute and 
escalation 
periods 
the I Some factors discouraged states from coordinating their policies: (i) national interests, (ii) solidarity with Myanmar -not to push 
de- Myanmar too hard, and (ii) the lack of capacity in terms of financial contribution and technical expertise. Nevertheless, the precipitating 
factors that encourage states to coordinate outnumber those that discourage states from coordinating their policies. 
of I There were various processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning occurred from the first day. This indicator 
was significant during the acute period and the de-escalation period. 
Processes 
transactions, 
international 
organisations and 
social learning: 
Significant 
during 
acute 
and 
escalation 
periods 
the 
period 
de-
240 
No. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
Indicators 
Development of 
trust and 
collective identity 
formation: 
Significant, 
particularly 
during the de-
escalation 
period 
A total absence of 
armed inter-state 
conflict, or 
prospects for 
such conflicts in 
the region: 
Insignificant 
during the 
acute and de-
escalation 
periods 
A total absence of 
a competitive 
military build-up 
arms race 
involving 
regional actors: 
Insignificant 
during the 
acute and de-
escalation 
periods 
Myanmar Thailand Singapore 
Security Community 
Indonesia The Philippines, 
Brunei and CLV 
Countries 
Myanmar itself showed I Trust was developed particularly during the de-escalation crisis. The ASEAN Volunteers program also 
development of trust in strengthened trust and enhanced people-people communication during the Cyclone Nargis crisis. 
ASEAN as an 
organisation. While in 
the beginning it was 
reluctant to receive 
ASEAN as a facilitator, 
Myanmar finally agreed 
to an ASEAN -led 
mechanism. 
There was no open armed inter-state conflict, but there were some disputes. The disputes included between Thailand and Cambodia 
over Preah Vihear Temple in 2008; Indonesia and Malaysia over the Ambalat block; Malaysia and the Philippines over the Philippines' 
suspicion of Sabah's support for Moro separatists in Mindanao; Malaysia and Thailand over Malaysia's alleged sympathy for Muslim 
separatists in the South of Thailand; Myanmar and Thailand over Kayin (Karen) refugees; Malaysia and Singapore over Pulau Batu 
Puteh; Thailand and Malaysia over their common border; Malaysia and Brunei over Limbang; and the plethora of territorial claims in 
South China Sea. However, the element of 'total absence or presence of armed inter-state conflicts, or prospects for such conflicts in the 
region is rated as insignificant' because it was not relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis. 
Increases in military expenditure by ASEAN member countries are identified. However, the growth was relatively stable, there was no 
dramatic increase or extraordinary decrease. This growth of military expenditure did not relate to the situation in the Cyclone Nargis 
crisis. Therefore, the element 'total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race' is rated as insignificant because it was not 
relevant to the management of Cyclone Nargis. 
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No. 
I 
Indicators Myanmar Thailand Singapore Indonesia The Philippines, 
Brunei and CLV 
Countries 
Formal 
informal 
institutions 
practices 
Significant 
during 
acute and 
escalation 
periods 
Securi_!y Community 
or I The indicator of 'existence of formal or informal institutions and practices' is significant due to the frequent and substantial practices 
and meetings during the crisis, both formal and informal. Formal institutions established during the Cyclone Nargis crisis included the 
and I TCG mechanism, ASEAN Volunteers Program, ASEAN ERAT, ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force for the victims of Cyclone N argis crisis, 
and the UN Advisory Group. Informal institutions included presence of volunteers, NGOs from donor countries. 
the I Informal practices/meetings included negotiations between the Secretary-General of ASEAN with TCG members stakeholders in the 
de- field, such as victims of Cyclone, businessmen, volunteers, experts, and NGOs; between Ambassadors of ASEAN and stakeholders; 
between experts and stakeholders; between volunteers and stakeholders. 
J. I A high degree of ASEAN member states consolidated efforts to be more integrated economically. Within the last ten years, ASEAN has further 
economic consolidated through the ASEAN Plus Three Arrangement, the ASEAN Swap Arrangement, the ASEAN Surveillance Process and the 
integration as a ASEAN Economic Community and its plans of action and blueprint. 
necessary 
precondition of a 
peaceful 
relationship 
Significant 
during the 
acute and de-
escalation 
periods 1 
Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author 
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A. A comparability of political values among decision-makers 
The comparability of political values was significant in the Cyclone Nargis cns1s. 
ASEAN member states share similar histories, values and societal norms. These 
commonalities provided a platform for an understanding between Myanmar and the 
donor community, and worked to ease the fears of a government that had been 
reaffirmed by its response to the deadly Cyclone. As a recipient country, Myanmar had 
a fear of intervention, particularly from Western countries. The common values held 
by all ASEAN member countries made it easier for ASEAN to ensure that such an 
intervention would not occur and that ASEAN would stand by Myanmar during the 
crisis. The most important political value shared by all ASEAN member states was that 
Cyclone Nargis was a humanitarian crisis and ASEAN member states should render 
assistance to Myanmar. They all also agreed that due to the nature of the cns1s, 
Myanmar should have been open to international assistance from the beginning. 
The political value of the importance to help Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis was 
collectively shared by all ASEAN member states. Nonetheless, the process of rendering 
assistance showed that the political values among ASEAN member states were actually 
divided. They all agreed about the significance of rendering assistance, but the nature 
of that assistance varied. Countries like Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam had limited 
sources of finance and technical expertise. Even so, Vietnam's expert was a member of 
the TCG. Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia rendered the greatest contributions, 
dispatching funding, technical expertise, humanitarian supplies, and also medical 
teams. 
Other divisions in political values also became obvious. The ASEAN-6 members 
generally supported the democratisation of Myanmar, with Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand as consistent players. On almost all occasions, they had been 
highly critical of Myanmar. Malaysia's and Brunei Darussalam's policies have not 
always been consistent. In the UNGA vote against Myanmar, for example, Brunei was 
abstained. However, Brunei did not consider the option of suspension or expulsion of 
Myanmar from the organisation during the Cyclone Nargis crisis. Malaysia supported 
the ASEAN consensus not to defend Myanmar in 2005, and also supported the 
suspension of Myanmar's Chairmanship in 2005. Nevertheless, Malaysia rejected the 
draft resolution of UNGA in December 2007. Malaysia was also against the idea of 
suspending or throwing Myanmar out of ASEAN. 
Malaysia and Brunei were supported by Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam who always 
maintained their backing of Myanmar and shared solidarity as new members of ASEAN. 
They also did not want to push Myanmar too hard towards democratisation or during 
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the Cyclone N argis crisis. In short, unlike Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia, five of 
other countries, Malaysia, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were not really eager 
to expel Myanmar from ASEAN if Myanmar did not cooperate. However, this option 
had become an official option and was offered by ASEAN as an organisation at the 
Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting on 19 May 2008 in Singapore.89 
Groupings of political values can also be recognised among ASEAN member states in 
the UNSC. Indonesia shared a similar perspective with Vietnam, that the notion of 
'R2P' should be rejected. It was not acceptable to these two countries for the issue to be 
brought to the UNSC. The others did not explicitly support or reject the concept. 
However, the concept of 'R2P' finally became one of the options offered to the 
Myanmar government at the ASEAN Special Foreign Ministers Meeting in Singapore 
on 19 May 2008. This means that ASEAN member countries were willing to play 'sticks 
and carrots' with Myanmar. 
In conclusion, all ASEAN member countries agreed that Myanmar needed assistance. 
During the acute period, the political values were divided in the process of ensuring 
Myanmar of how important international assistance and the role of ASEAN would be. 
A division of political values also occurred with regard to the involvement of the UNSC. 
However, during the de-escalation period, the political values of member countries 
were collectively comparable. They worked hand in hand to help the affected people in 
Myanmar. The indicator of 'comparability of political values of member states' became 
more significant during the de-escalation period. 
B. A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers 
I argue that the behaviour of the decision-makers from Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 
was quite predictable during the acute and de-escalation periods of the crisis. However, 
the behaviour of decision-makers of the ASEAN 6 members vis-a-vis Myanmar were 
quite unpredictable during the acute period and even before Cyclone Nargis. This 
behaviour dated back to the submission by Myanmar to the organisation. Singapore, 
Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines had been relatively consistent in pushing 
Myanmar towards democratisation. Malaysia and Brunei, on the other hand, were not 
really consistent. 
Malaysia was among the strongest supporters of the acceptance of the military junta 
into ASEAN in 1997. At the end of 2005, Malaysia was part of an overwhelming 
consensus among ASEAN six members that unless Myanmar decided to be more 
89 ASEAN, The Story oftheASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action .. 
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constructive in the way in which it responded to their expectations, the grouping could 
no longer publicly defend Myanmar.9° As mentioned above, the meeting with Professor 
Gambari to brief East Asian leaders on Myanmar at the Singapore Summit was 
cancelled. In the UN General Assembly vote on the situation in Myanmar in late 2007, 
Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand all abstained, 
while Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar and Vietnam voted against the revised draft resolution 
under consideration. Cambodia was absent. This shows that the ASEAN-6 members did 
not necessarily agree with each other. Even though it was part of the ASEAN consensus 
in 2005 not to defend Myanmar if the junta government did not act in a constructive 
way and also invited Gambari to brief EAS leaders on the Myanmar issue, Malaysia 
voted against the draft resolution of UNGA in December 2007. Malaysia also did not 
want to consider the option of Myanmar's suspension and expulsion from ASEAN. This 
policy was criticised by Lim Kit Siang of the Democratic Action Party (DAP) of Malaysia 
who also served on the ASEAN Inter-parliamentary Steering Committee for not 
choosing Myanmar's suspension and expulsion from ASEAN as options. 91 
Brunei was also one of the countries that agreed to the invitation of Professor Gambari 
and which abstained from the UNGA vote of the draft resolution in 2007, and did not 
agree with the suspension and exclusion of Myanmar. In terms of financial contribution, 
it was quite unpredictable that a rich country like Brunei would give contribution of 
$1,300,000 only. It was understandable that Brunei could not send technical expertise, 
but Brunei had given $6,000,000 to all the countries affected by the 2004 Indian 
Ocean Tsunami, and $1,900,000 to Aceh alone.92 Malaysia also gave a relatively small 
amount compared to its GDP. However, Malaysia had experienced a decline in terms of 
its GPD, its domestic investments and also FDI. 
In the de-escalation period demonstrated, the behaviour of ASEAN member states was 
more predictable. The quite unpredictable and surprising point, in a positive way, was 
the role of the ASEAN Secretariat and the Secretary-General of ASEAN. Since the 
Cyclone hit Myanmar, Pitsuwan had been very active in contacting the Myanmar 
government, ASEAN member states, the World Bank and the donor community to help 
the people of Myanmar. 
As a new Secretary-General of ASEAN had been appointed less than a year before the 
Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, Pitsuwan wanted to show his best. He also wanted to 
9o Jurgen Haacke, 'Comparing ASEAN Countries' Efforts to Influence Political Developments in Myanmar: 
Towards a New Regional Approach?' SIIA Papers, No, 4, 2008, pp. 173-200. 
91 Haacke, 'Comparing ASEAN Countries' Efforts to Influence Political Developments in Myanmar'. 
92 Azlan Othman, 'His Majesty visits tsunami-hit Aceh', available at 
http://www.sultanate.com/news server/2 feb 2.html, (accessed on 6 March 2012). 
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test the new powers of ASEAN as a legal entity after the ASEAN Charter was signed in 
2007. On s May, Pitsuwan called ASEAN member countries to provide urgent relief 
assistance to the victims of Cyclone Nargis. At the ASEAN Regional Forum Senior 
Officials Meeting (SOM), he stressed the need for ASEAN to intensify its efforts in 
disaster management. Pitsuwan also used his personal diplomacy to persuade the 
government of Myanmar to open up avenues for relief workers and specialists to assist 
the cyclone victims, in the spirit of the 2005 ADDMER and to manage the mounting 
concern and frustration reported in the international media.93 He also wanted to test 
the power of the new legal organisation after the Charter was signed at the ASEAN 
Summit in 2 007. 
Chachavalpongpun suggested that: 
There was a personal ambition of Dr Surin Pitsuwan as a new Secretary-General 
of ASEAN. Surin was really active since day one, and he always kept coming 
back to the affected areas to monitor. He used all of his channels to help 
Myanmar.94 
Chachavalpongpun also added that Pitsuwan's channels in Myanmar made the 
operation of the TCG much easier. For example, there was an occasion when the TCG 
need cash money urgently, and they really could not wait another day. Because of 
Pitsuwan's good relationship with the Thai Ambassador in Myanmar, the Thailand 
Embassy lent the TCG money. Another example was when the ASEAN Secretariat had 
difficulty in finding a location for its office, a Thai businessman with a close connection 
with Pitsuwan and owned a hotel offered a whole floor of his hotel to be used as the 
ASEAN Secretariat office, at a very low rate.9s People on the ground praised Pitsuwan's 
leadership in the crisis, suggesting it was instrumental in achieving a solution. His 
interest in and concern for the survivors of Nargis was apparent to all working with him 
and his steadfast commitment to the overall post-Nargis effort.96 However, according to 
Roberts, in 2008, when the ASEAN-led mechanism had just started, Pitsuwan had 
already been too optimistic that the mechanism would be a success. This made 
observers quite worried that Surin's optimism would not be realised .97 
The behaviours of ASEAN member states themselves were generally predictable, 
particularly during the de-escalation period. Therefore, the indicator, a mutual 
predictability among decision-makers, was moderate during the acute period, but 
significant in the de-escalation period. 
93 Cbachavalpongpun and Tbuzar, Myanmar Life After Nargis. 
94 Interview with Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, !SEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 16 March 2011. 
95 Interview with Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, !SEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 16 March 2011. 
96 ASEAN, The Story of theASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action. 
97 Interview with Dr. Christopher B. Roberts, Senior Lecturer, National Security College of the ANU, 
Canberra, 27 September and 21 December 2011. 
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C. A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication 
of other governments 
Responsiveness to actions and communication during the acute period varied, but 
became more equal and significant during the de-escalation period. In general, ASEAN 
member states were responsive but in particular, the level of response was different. 
The amounts of initial contributions were rather different. There were also differences 
in terms of the speed of dispatching assistance and the level of willingness to push 
Myanmar to open up to international assistance. 
When the ASEAN Secretary-General called for assistance from ASEAN member 
countries, and deployed the ASEAN-ERAT on 5 May 2008, no one from Cambodia, 
Laos and Vietnam was present. It was not because they were not responsive, but more 
because they did not have the capacity to provide a quick response to render assistance 
to Myanmar. Again, Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia, had been very responsive 
since the beginning. Following the Cyclone, several UN and donor agencies approached 
Dr Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, the Director of the Indonesian Bureau for Recovery and 
Reconstruction Agency of Aceh and Nias, Indonesia to offer assistance. Dr 
Mangkusubroto assigned Mr Heru Prasetyo, then Director for International Relations 
and Dr William Sabandar, Chief of Nias recovery program for the BRR, to closely 
monitor developments in Myanmar.98 However, Indonesian doctors could not enter 
Myanmar and much of the Indonesian aid was held up in S1ngapore waiting to get in.99 
Indonesia and Singapore worked together to ensure the Myanmar government allowed 
assistance in. The Indonesian government also consulted with Dr Noeleen Hayzer, 
Under-Secretary of the UN and Executive Secretary of Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). Dr Hayzer immediately contacted 
Pitsuwan to make sure that the Cyclone N argis crisis would be discussed at the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers Meeting. 
Singapore, along with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines was part of the ASEAN-ERAT. 
ERAT members were permitted access to the Delta and conducted an assessment from 
9 to 18 May. They also consulted with government representatives, members of civil 
society, NGOs and UN staff members, as well as survivors of the Cyclone. 100 Derived 
from the team's assessment, they made several recommendations to a Special ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers' Meeting held on 19 May in Singapore. The deployment of the 
ASEAN-ERAT was significant because it was the first official and international 
98 ASEAN, The Story oftheASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action. 
99 ASEAN, The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action. 
100 ASEAN, The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action. 
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assessment team allowed by the Myanmar government to enter the country following 
the Cyclone. 
Thailand's assistance was also rendered very quickly after Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar. 
According to a senior Thai military officer who was involved closely: 
The government of Myanmar allowed us to visit the country and to provide 
assistance since the beginning. Even though we have border issues with 
Myanmar, we try to maintain a good relationship with the country. After the 
ASEAN Special Foreign Ministers' Meeting in May 2008, the Thai Minister of 
Defence deployed the Thai military forces because it has the capability to handle 
disaster relief. The Thai military forces worked together with European NGOs 
and ASEAN NGOs. I remember there were some Muslim NGOs from Indonesia 
who also rendered assistance. 101 
When asked who played the biggest role during the Cyclone Nargis crisis, he said: 
Within ASEAN, Thailand played the biggest and most important role, while 
within the international community; China had the biggest influence in 
Myanmar during the crisis. China played the greatest role because Myanmar has 
the biggest trade with China.102 
Thuzar agrees with the view that Thailand played the greatest role: 
A lot of Thais volunteered in Myanmar. In terms of facilitating the entry of the aid 
workers, they would gather in Bangkok for entry visa and so on. Bilaterally, the 
relationship is good and under bilateral relations, the assistance was offered. Dr Surin 
himself offered that Bangkok airport be used as an entry point for aid packages which 
were then forwarded to Yangon.103 
Responsiveness to actions and communication were clearly seen during the de-
escalation period. All members were active in helping the survivors under ASEAN-led 
mechanism of TCG. The structure of the ASEAN-led Coordinating Mechanism can be 
seen in Figure 5.6. 
101 Interview with a Thai Army officer who was in charge of the Cylone Nargis crisis, Bangkok, 23 Februa ry 
2010. 
102 Interview with a Thai Army officer who was in charge of the Cyclone Nargis crisis, Bangkok, 23 
February 2010. 
103 Interview with Moe Thuzar, !SEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 16 March 2011. 
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FIGURE5.6 
Structure of ASE.AN-led Coordinating Mechanism 
ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force for 
the Victims of Cyclone Nargis 
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-Board ~ Myanmar Countries 
(CCB) Representatives of ASEAN 
Representatives of UN 
Source: The ASEAN Secretariat, The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar 
Comparison in Action, Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, p.37. 
Figure 5.6 shows that the four key focal points in the coordinating mechanism for 
Cyclone Nargis assistance: the AHTF, the Myanmar Central Coordinating Board (CCB), 
the TCG, and the Advisory Group and invited International Organisations and donor 
countries. The AHTF, chaired by Surin, was established to provide policy decisions and 
determine priorities and targets with regard to the implementation of this ASEAN-led 
initiative. It was made up of two senior representatives fr_om each of the 10 member 
states. The first meeting was held on 25 May, just before the ASEAN-UN International 
Pledging Conference in Yangon. 104 An Advisory Group was also set up to assist the 
AHTF by providing relevant technical expertise and inputs. Its members included 
representatives from neighbouring countries (China, India, and Bangladesh), the UN 
the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, the World Bank, the ADB and NGOs. International 
donors represented by Australia, Norway and the UK joined the Advisory Group at a 
later stage.10s When asked to name ASEAN's greatest contribution to the post-Nargis 
effort, Myanmar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded, the 'the convening of the 
Pledging Conference on 25 May 2008, the conduct of the Damage and Loss Assessment 
and Village Tract Assessment and Post-Nargis and Regional Partnership Conference on 
25 November 2009' .106 Another important contribution by ASEAN member states was 
the ASEAN Volunteers Program in which all member countries were represented. 
Thus, the indicator, a mutual responsiveness to actions and communication of other 
governments, is more significant during the de-escalation period than during the acute 
period of the Cyclone N argis crisis. 
104 ASEAN, The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action . 
105 ASEAN, The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action. 
106 ASEAN, The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action, p. 31. 
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D. Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each 
other's direction and coordinate their policies 
The indicator, precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each 
other's direction and coordinate their policies, is considered significant because the 
precipitating factors that encourage outnumber those that discourage states from 
coordinating their policies. There were five common precipitating factors that 
encouraged ASEAN member states to orient themselves in each other's direction and 
coordinate their policies: (i) the fact that the Cyclone Nargis crisis was a natural 
disaster and a humanitarian crisis; (ii) the possibility that if ASEAN failed to find a 
tangible solution, ASEAN's credibility would be questioned; (iii) the opportunity to 
show international awareness of poverty in Myanmar; (iv) the opportunity and the 
need to develop cooperation on disaster management; and (v) the need to test the 
power of the ASEAN Charter. 
These four factors were connected one to another in several ways. First, all ASEAN 
member countries felt compelled, out of a sense of compassion, urgency and fraternity 
to support one of their members whose people had suffered death, destruction and 
despair. It was a humanitarian crisis where an estimated 140,000 people were killed or 
missing. While the international community also felt sympathy, ASEAN countries, as 
Myanmar's closest neighbours and 'siblings' felt obliged to help their 'little brother'. 
Second, Myanmar has become a 'pebble in ASEAN's shoe'; ASEAN was urged by the 
international community to take the lead. If ASEAN failed, it would lose credibility. 
ASEAN had never carried out such large-scale undertaking before, but it had 
confidence in taking the lead, and finally the result was very positive. The third factor 
was that ASEAN could play an important role in promoting cooperation over the 
alleviation of poverty in Myanmar. ASEAN wished to show the world that Myanmar 
needed help, and Cyclone N argis stirred opened international awareness of how limited 
had been the development assistance given to Myanmar up to this time. 
The fourth factor was the need to develop cooperation on disaster management. 
ASEAN had AADMER, signed in 2005 after the Indian Ocean Tsunami hit some 
ASEAN countries in 2004. Cyclone Nargis was a push factor for ASEAN members to 
expedite cooperation on disaster management. As mentioned in the previous section, 
an agreement finally entered into force in November 2009 after being ratified by all ten 
member states of ASEAN. AADMER also provided the foundation for the establishment 
of an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster 
management (AHA Centre). 
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The last factor was that Cyclone N argis occurred at a crucial time, when ASEAN 
member states were embracing the ASEAN Charter and the association was striving to 
become a more collective, dynamic and inclusive entity. The disaster provided ASEAN 
with a need and opportunity to test the power of the Charter, to make meaningful 
progress on the goals of the Charter to bring ASEAN closer to the people, enhance the 
well-being and livelihoods of ASEAN people, and narrow development gaps through 
closer cooperation with the Myanmar government. 
Aside from common precipitating factors, there were also precipitating factors for 
individual countries. Thailand, which shares a border with Myanmar, was a front line 
states, having had a similar experience of a natural disaster. Singapore held the 
chairmanship of ASEAN and had business and investment interests in Myanmar. 
Indonesia also had experienced a similar disaster. 
However, there were factors that discouraged states from coordinating their policies: (i) 
national interests; (ii) solidarity with Myanmar - not to push Myanmar too hard; and 
(ii) the lack of capacity in terms of financial contribution and technical expertise. 
National interest was a factor for Malaysia's policy not to push Myanmar as hard as 
Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. Malaysia's ambivalent policy 
towards Myanmar reflected a combination of economic interest and increasing 
domestic political pressures. Economic interests included the state-cwned energy 
company Petronas' investment in the Yatagun gas project while domestic political 
interests pushed the Malaysian government to keep the suspension and expulsion of 
Myanmar from ASEAN off the agenda. 107 For new ASEAN members such as Cambodia, 
Laos and Vietnam, it was more a sense of solidarity that made them respect the 
decision of the Myanmar government not to open up to international assistance. They 
did not support other ASEAN members' suggestion to oust Myanmar from ASEAN, 
even though it had become one of the three official options offered by ASEAN during 
the ASEAN Special Foreign Ministers' Meeting on 19 May 2008 in Singapore. As new 
members, they did not want Myanmar to become a bad precedent if a crisis occurred in 
their own countries. The last factor that discouraged states from coordinating their 
policies was their lack of capacity in terms of technical expertise and financial 
contribution. Cambodia and Laos were not able to render substantial financial 
assistance due to their economy. They also could not offer technical expertise because 
of the limited number of experts on disaster management in their countries. However, 
they participated in the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force and also in the ASEAN 
Volunteer Program. 
107Haacke, 'Comparing ASEAN Countries' Efforts to Influence Political Development in Myanmar: Towards 
a New Regional Approach?'. 
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In short, the analysis shows that the indicator of 'precipitating factors that encourage 
states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies' is 
significant'. The precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each 
other's direction and coordinate their policies were more numerous and substantial 
than the factors that discouraged them from doing so. 
E. Processes of transactions, international organisations and social 
learning 
During the acute period, processes of transactions, international organisations and 
social learning were explicit. These were negotiations between ASEAN member states 
and the Myanmar government. Furthermore, several UN and donor agencies also 
approached ASEAN member states, like Indonesia and Thailand to share their 
experience from the Indian Ocean Tsunami Response. As mentioned above, after the 
Cyclone struck Myanmar, several UN and donor agencies approached Dr Kuntoro 
Mangkusubroto to offer assistance based on his agency's experience in the post-Indian 
Ocean Tsunami operation. 10s 
Dr Noeleen Heyzer, Under-Secretary-General of the UN and Executive Secretary of 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific contacted Dr Pitsuwan and 
met Dr Kuntoro Mangkusubroto. They agreed that ASEAN would have to make a strong 
stand to support the Myanmar government through ASEAN, which by then in close 
contact with Myanmar. After a number of reports, communication and 
recommendations as a part of the ASEAN Standard Operating Procedure for Regional 
Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Response Operations (SASOP), Myanmar accepted a recommendation from the ASEAN 
Secretariat to deploy personnel and assistance, and for the ASEAN -ERA T to conduct an 
initial assessment. Once the government gave the green light, the team was deployed in 
48 hours. 
The transactional process involving ASEAN member states and external powers 
included a call for international pledging. Dr Pitsuwan suggested establishing an 
ASEAN-led 'Coalition of Mercy' to assist the Cyclone Nargis survivors. On 15 May, Dr 
Pitsuwan met with World Bank President Robert Zoellick in the US and pledged his 
support. Robert Zoellick said 'I like it Surin, we are ready to stand behind you. I know 
you need help. I know you need support. You can count us in to be with you' .109 
108 ASEAN, The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action. 
109 ASEAN, The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action, p. 36. 
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The toughest transactions occurred during the ASEAN Special Foreign Ministers 
Meeting on 19 May 2008 when the Foreign Minister of Indonesia made a strong plea 
for ASEAN to play a leading role in the response, as ASEAN would be able to build a 
bridge of trust to encourage Myanmar to work with the outside world in a more 
coherent and coordinated way. 110 Myanmar was given three options: (i) a UN-led 
mechanism for relief and reconstruction effort in Myanmar; (ii) an ASEAN-led 
mechanism for the same purpose in which ASEAN would work with the government to 
provide access for the coalition partners to implement relief and recovery programs in 
the affected areas; and (iii) the 'R2P' would be invoked and Myanmar would stand the 
mounting pressure to open up alone, including the possibility that the international 
community would deliver aid without authorisation. m At this meeting, Myanmar chose 
the second option and agreed for ASEAN to play a bridging role, and therefore, this 
meeting marked the end of the acute period of crisis. 
During the de-escalation period, there was also a transactional process. Any assistance 
needed approval from the Myanmar government. The approval could take a few days, 
but the victims could not wait even one day. Moreover, the assistance and visit were not 
necessarily approved by the junta government. Interestingly, visits were usually 
accompanied by Myanmar officials. Instead of showing the areas that need urgent help, 
the Myanmar officials usually pointed to success stories of government efforts, such as 
the reconstruction of a new village. 112 Therefore, ASEAN member states tried to 
persuade Myanmar to expedite the approval process, which it did. 
The transactional process during the de-escalation period also included efforts by 
ASEAN member states to convene a Pledging Conference on 25 May 2008, at which 
they invited the international community to pledge for Myanmar. ASEAN also 
conducted the second pledging conference on 25 November 2009. When asked to name 
ASEAN's greatest contribution to the post-Nargis effort, Myanmar's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs responded, 'the convening of the Pledging Conference on 25 May 2008, 
the conduct of the Damage and Loss Assessment and Village Tract Assessment in June 
2008, development of the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment and Post-Nargis and Regional 
Partnership Conference on 25 November 2009' . 113 
F. Development of trust and collective identity formation 
The indicator of 'development of trust and collective identity formation ' is significant 
and sheds light on the existence of a security community in Southeast Asia during the 
"
0 Roberts, ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis. 
111 ASEAN, The Story oftheASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action. 
112 Interview with Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, !SEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 16 March 2011. 
113 ASEAN, The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action, p. 7. 
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Cyclone Nargis crisis. Through the AHTF Coordinating Office, ASEAN deployed 40 
ASEAN volunteers from seven ASEAN member states, including Myanmar, to 
implement six community- based early recovery projects in Nargis-affected areas. Most 
of the projects were implemented in partnership with local and international NGOs 
based in Myanmar. The ASEAN Volunteers Programme (A VP) at a certain level 
strengthened the involvement of civil society, developed trust and formed a collective 
identity. The volunteers assisted in carrying out three Community-Based Early 
Recovery (CBER) projects in Bogale, Kungyangon and Pyapon townships from 2008-to 
2009.114 
The A VP in Myanmar had positive outcomes, delivering humanitarian aid, rebuilding 
community livelihoods and strengthening community resilience. The program 
'promoted cultural and knowledge exchange among the volunteers and the 
communities where they worked; increased awareness about ASEAN; and fostered 
capacity building among ASEAN volunteers, villagers and the implementing 
partners'.ns ASEAN volunteers in Myanmar served as young ASEAN Ambassadors at 
the community level, as champions for DRR as well as agents of change and early 
recovery. 
The A VP program indeed served as an agent of change and strengthened the 
involvement of civil society. Interestingly, it also reflected the strengthened people to 
people relationship in general. ASEAN bridged trust not only among ASEAN members, 
but also between Myanmar and the international community, particularly the Western 
democracies. Myanmar's relationship with many Western democracies had been 
strained for close to two decades before the Cyclone struck. It was against this very 
confusing and tense backdrop that ASEAN took the lead in breaking down the 
communication and trust barriers that were preventing the flow of aid and 
international relief workers into the country. 
G. A total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such 
conflicts in the region 
The indicator, a total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such 
conflicts in the region, is rated as insignificant because this indicator was only a 
background factor and was not directly related to the management of the Cyclone 
Nargis crisis. There was no open armed inter-state conflict, but there were some 
disputes. Even though Thailand had problems over its border and Kayin (Karen) 
114 ASEAN, Bringing ASEAN Closer to the People, The Experience of ASEAN Volunteers in Myanmar, 
Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010. 
11s ASEAN, A Humanitarian Call, p. 121 
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refugees with Myanmar, it still gave assistance to Myanmar. As reaffirmed by the Thai 
Army officer interviewed, Thailand wished to maintain a good relationship with 
Myanmar. Moreover, Thailand's amount of assistance was the biggest among ASEAN 
member countries and Thailand was the first country to dispatch assistance to its 
neighbour. Even though there were disputes among ASEAN member states, they put 
aside the problems and concentrated on assisting Myanmar. 
H. A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race involving 
regional actors 
There were increases m military expenditure and arms acquisition, but military 
expenditure was stable, and importantly did not relate to the Cyclone Nargis crisis in 
Myanmar. Therefore the indicator of 'total absence of a competitive military build-up 
arms race' is considered insignificant in this case. One of the indicators of a military 
build up arms race habitually used is the trend in the level of military capability. In 
1993, Desmond Ball analysed regional arms acquisitions and drew an important 
conclusion. His analysis shows that there was an arms build-up (not an arms race) in 
the Asia Pacific region.U6 Was it the same for Southeast Asia? To answer the question, 
this section looks at the current military expenditure and acquisition trend in Southeast 
Asia, the relationship between military strategy and the change in military expenditure, 
and asks how increasing military capabilities can secure peace and stability in the 
region. 
TABLE5.12 
Defence Expenditure of ASEAN member countries in 2007-2010 
Defence Expenditure 
US$m US$ per capita %GDP 
07 08 09 07 08 09 07 08 09 
Brunei 346 36o 332 895 945 892 2.81 2.49 3.18 
Camb 137 255 275 10 18 19 1.59 2.30 2.54 
Indo 4,329 5,108 4,821 18 22 21 1.00 1.00 0.89 
Laos 15 24,182 14 2 500 2 0.36 2.60 0.25 
Mal 4,021 4,370 3,883 162 173 141 2.15 1.97 2.01 
Myn 7,009 n.a n.a. 148 n.a n.a 33.38 n.a n.a. 
Phil 1,130 1A27 1,363 12 15 15 0.78 0.85 0.85 
Sing 7,007 7,662 7,831 1539 1,663 1,570 4 .. 35 4.20 4.29 
Thai 3,333 4,294 4,732 515 65 70 1.36 1.57 1.79 
Viet 3,709 2,907 2,137 43 33 24 5.24 3.19 2.20 
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2008-2011. 
u 6 Desmond Ball, 'Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisition in the Asia Pacific Region,' International 
Security, 18-3, 1993, pp. 78-112. 
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TABLE5.13 
Number of Armed Forces, Reservists and Paramilitary of ASEAN member 
countries in 2007-2010 
Numbers in Armed Estimated Reservists Paramilitary 
Forces 
(ooo) (000) (ooo) 
08 09 10 11 08 09 10 11 08 09 10 
Brun 7 7 7 7 0.7 0.7 1 1 2 2 2 
Cam 124 124 124 124 0 0 0 0 67 67 67 
Indo 302 302 302 302 400 400 400 400 280 280 280 
Laos 29 29 29 29 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 
Mal 109 109 109 109 52 52 52 52 25 25 25 
Myn 406 406 406 406 0 0 0 0 107 107 107 
Phil 106 106 120 125 131 131 131 131 41 41 41 
Sing 73 73 73 73 313 313 313 313 94 94 94 
Thai 306 307 306 306 200 200 200 200 114 114 114 
Viet 455 455 455 455 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 40 40 40 
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2008-2011. 
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Table 5.12 shows that Singapore's growth in military expenditure was ahead of other 
ASEAN member states, followed by Vietnam, in 2007-2009. Between 2007 and 2009, 
the increase in military expenditure was relatively stable among ASEAN member 
countries. There was no dramatic increase and also no extraordinary decrease. In terms 
of numbers of army personnel, paramilitaries, and reservists, there was relatively no 
change, as shown in Table 5.13. 
The acquisition of arms by ASEAN member states was related to a variety of interests. 
These were: (i) Brunei: the protection of offshore resources and assets and the 
enforcement of territorial claims; (ii) Indonesia: internal security; archipelagic control; 
the protection of offshore resources; the enforcement of territorial claims; sea lane 
security; (iii) Malaysia: the protection of offshore resources and assets; the enforcement 
of territorial claims; internal security; and the conventional warfare capabilities; (iv) 
the Philippines: the protection of maritime resources and offshore assets; archipelagic 
control; internal security; and the enforcement of territorial claims; (v) Singapore: sea 
lane security; the forward strategic depth against external threats; and (vi) Thailand: 
the conventional warfare capability; the protection maritime resources; and limited 
blue water and power projection capabilities. 117 However, the growth of military 
expenditure as shown in Tables 5.15 and 5.16 did not reflect a situation that was related 
to the Cyclone Nargis crisis in Myanmar. It reflected more the shifting of national 
security concerns of ASEAN member countries. 
u 7 Amitav Acharya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control, Singapore: 
ISEAS Publishing, 1994. 
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I. Formal or informal institutions and practices 
The indicator of 'formal or informal institutions and practices' is significant due to the 
frequent and substantial institutions, activities and meetings during the crisis, both 
formal and informal. Formal institutions that were established during the Cyclone 
Nargis crisis included the TCG mechanism, ASEAN Volunteers Program, ASEAN ERAT, 
ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force for the victims of Cyclone Nargis crisis, and the UN 
Advisory Group. Informal institutions consisted of, among others, volunteers, NGOs 
from donor countries. The formal activities are set out in Table 5.14. 
Table. 5.14 
Formal Meetings during the Cyclone Nargis crisis 
Date Meetiru?: 
19 May2008 Special AMM, Myanmar accepted aid throum ASEAN. 
21 May2008 The Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with Prime Minister of 
Myanmar in Yangon to convey the messages agreed to in Singapore and 
to discuss the possibility of establishing the TCG (TCG). 
23 May2008 Meeting between UN Chief and ASEAN ERAT. 
25May2008 An ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference on Cyclone Nargis in 
Yangon, attended by representatives from 51 countries. 
AHTF on the same day, convened its first meeting to lay the foundation 
for establishment ofTCG. 
31 May2008 TCG convened its first meeting, agreeing to conduct a Post-Nargis Joint 
Assessment (PONJA) to determine the full scale of the impact of 
Cyclone N argis and requirements for both immediate humanitarian 
assistance needs and medium -to longer term recovery. 
23June2008 A workshop was held in Yangon to elicit feedback from national and 
international medical missions on oost-Nare::is relief and early recovery. 
24-June 2008 AHTF convened the ASEAN Roundtable for Post Nargis Joint 
Assessment for Response, Recovery, and Rehabilitation in Yangon. The 
Roundtable brings together expert from Indonesia, Thailand, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan. 
21July2008 At the meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Singapore, PONJA 
report was launched. 
26 November 2008 A TCG Roundtable was held. 
17 January 2009 AHTF convened the fifth meeting to review the progress of the relief 
and recovery work in the post-Nanris relief effort. 
9 February 2009 TCG launched the Post N argis Recovery and Preparedness Plan. 
27 February 2009 During the 14th ASEAN Summit in Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand, the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers agree to extend the mandate of the AHTF 
and the TCG until July 2010. 
2July2009 AHTF convened its sixth meeting in Jakarta and recommended the 
continuation of the TCG's coordination role in the affected areas. 
17-20 July 2009 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phuket was held and approved the 
AHTF recommendations. 
2 October 2009 A Recovery Forum - a forum to synthesise policy and discuss strategic 
issues concerning the recovery process- was held for the first time. 
17 October 2009 The TCG issued the PONREPP Prioritised Action Plan at a cost of 
US$103 million that set out policies in education, health, livelihoods, 
shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene up to July 2010. 
23-25 October 2009 15th ASEAN Summit was held, and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
approved the Prioritised Action Plan proposed by TCG. 
25 November 2009 A Regional Partnership Conference was held by AHTF at UN 
Conference Centre in Bantlok to raise fund. 
13 January 2010 During the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Da Nang, Viet Nam, 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers confirmed the completion of the mandate of 
AHTF and TCG in July 2010. 
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Date M .. 
8 March2010 AHTF convened its seventh meeting in Ha N oi, Viet Nam to discuss the 
progress of the post-Nargis effort and the completion of the AHTF and 
TCG mandate at the end of July 2010. 
12 March 2010 The Second Recovery Forum was held to exarmne the 
recommendations for a transition strategy and the way forward after 
July 2010 for future recovery in the Cyclone-affected areas. 
7 April 2010 ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed on actions and events towards the 
completion of AHTF mandate in Da Nang, Viet Nam. 
18June 2010 Third Recovery Forum was convened in Nay Pyi Taw to hand over of 
recovery function from the TCG to the MoSWRR. 
31 July2010 Completion of ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism and the TCG in 
Myanmar. 
Source: The ASEAN Secretariat, The Story of the ASEAN-led Coordination in Myanmar, 
Compassion in Action, Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, 2010. 
Table 5.17 shows that many formal meetings convened to manage the crisis. The first 
formal meeting was the Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Singapore on 19 
May 2008. It followed by the meeting between the Secretary-General of ASEAN and 
Prime Minister of Myanmar in Yangon to convey the messages agreed in Singapore and 
to discuss the possibility of establishing the TCG. On 23 May 2012, UN Chief met with 
ASEAN ERAT and the following day, the ASEAN-UN Pledging Conference was held to 
gather aids from donor countries. Subsequent events can be seen in Table 5.17. 
Informal practices/meetings included negotiations among the Secretary-General of 
ASEAN, the TCG members, stakeholders in the field such a,s the victims of the Cyclone, 
businessmen, volunteers, experts, Ambassadors from ASEAN countries and NGOs. 
J. A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a 
peaceful relationship 
The indicator of 'a high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a 
peaceful relationship' is rated as significant. Within the last ten years, ASEAN's 
economy has further consolidated through the ASEAN Plus Three Arrangement, the 
ASEAN Swap Arrangement, the ASEAN Surveillance Process and the ASEAN Economic 
Community and its plans of action and blueprint. These economic endeavours show a 
normative development between the neighbours, which in turn requires a degree of 
transparency and dialogue regarding the domestic policies of the ASEAN member 
states. 118 It further shows that ASEAN develops a better understanding in terms of 
economic integration. 
ASEAN economic integration is demonstrated by three key pillars: a market and 
production base, a competitive economic region and equitable economic development. 
The implementation of these three key pillars is illustrated in Table 5.18. 
us Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism, Cooperation, values and institutionalization, London: 
Routledge, 2012. 
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Table 5.15 Impelementation of ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard under 
Phase I and Phase II (as of December 2011) 
67.5% of targets achieved 
< 
; 
Single· Market and Competitive Equitable Economic Integration with the 
Production Base: Economic Region: Development: 66.7% Global Economy: 
65.9% 67.9% 85.7% 
Liberalisation and Laying the foundation Development of SMEs Entry into force of FfA 
facilitation of free flow for: 
of: - competition 
- goods policy 
- services - consumer 
- capital protection 
- investment - intelectuall 
- skilled labour property rights 
Development of 12 Infrastructure Implementation of 
priority integration development Initiative for ASEAN 
sectors integration 
Strengthening food Development of energy 
security and cooperation and mineral cooperation 
under amculture sector 
Key to ASEAN Economic community: 
- Political will; 
- Coordination and resource mobilisation; 
- Implementation arrangements; 
- Capacity building and institutional strengthening: and 
- Public and private sector consultations. 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Economic Community Score Card, Jakarta: The ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2012, p. 16. 
This chart shows that the development of an ASEAN economic integration has achieved 
67.5% of its target. ASEAN has made considerable progress in integrating its economy. 
By the end of December 2011, it had completed 187 measures out of 277 due for the two 
phases under review (2008-2011). However, some measures due for implementation 
have not been fully implemented because of the delays in ratification of signed 
agreements and their application into national domestic laws and delays in 
implementation of specific initiatives. 119 Table 5.16 and Figure 5.7 summarise the 
indicators of a security community in Southeast Asia during the Cyclone Nargis crisis. 
119 ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Score Card, Jakarta: the ASEAN Secretariat, 2012. 
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Table 5.16 Summary of the Indicators of a Security Community during the Cyclone 
N argis Crisis 
No Indicators Significant Moderate In Note 
A 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
J. 
sitmificant 
-
. Communit:, 
-
A comparability of y Significant during the 
political values among de-escalation period 
decision-makers 
A mutual predictability of ,J Significant during the 
behaviour among de-escalation period 
decision-makers 
A mutual responsiveness ,J Significant, 
of government to actions particularly during the 
and communication of de-escalation period 
other governments 
Precipitating factors that ,J Significant during the 
encourage states to orient acute and de-
themselves lil each escalation of crisis 
other's direction and 
coordinate their oolicies 
Processes of transactions, ,J Significant during the 
international acute and de-
organisations and social escalation period 
learning 
Development of trust and ,J Significant, 
collective identity particularly during the 
formation de-escalation period 
A total absence of armed ,J Insignificant during 
inter-state conflict, or the acute and de-
prospects for such escalation period: 
conflicts in the region irrelevant and only 
bacwound factor 
A total absence of a y Insignificant during 
competitive military the acute and de-
build-up arms race - escalation period: 
involving regional actors irrelevant and only 
backlrround factor 
Formal or informal y Significant during the 
institutions and practices acute and de-
escalation period 
A high degree of y Significant during the 
economic integration as a acute and de-
necessary precondition of escalation period 
a peaceful relationship 
Total 8 0 2 
Source: Compiled by author 
FIGURE 5.7 Indicators of a Security Community in Southeast Asia during the 
Cyclone N argis Crisis 
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Table 5.19 and Figure 5.7 show that there are six significant indicators out of eight 
indicators that indicate the existence of a security community during the de-escalation 
period. Two indicators are insignificant because of their irrelevancy to the management 
of the crisis and there was no moderate indicator. However, since the nature of this 
crisis is a non-traditional crisis, the nature of cooperation was also different. Therefore, 
I argue, that instead of indicating the existence of a security community, the 
cooperation of all ASEAN member states, particularly during the de-escalation period, 
indicated the existence of an embryonic security community. ASEAN's cooperation in 
the crisis brought ASEAN closer to the people in the Cyclone-affected areas, through 
mobilising ASEAN young and professionals to support cross-cultural exchange and 
recovery initiatives. 
5.7. Conclusion 
This chapter shows how ASEAN, in the form of individual member states during the 
acute period and as an organisation during the de-escalation period, played several 
important roles in the Cyclone Nargis crisis. The management of the crisis helps shed 
light on the regional security system in Southeast Asia. 
During the acute period of the crisis, from 2 May to 19 May 2008, regional dominant 
powers, namely Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia played a bigger role than any other 
ASEAN member states. The crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states is 
explained by three significant out of seven indicators associated with a concert of 
powers in the region. The other four indicators are rated as moderate. 
Because four indicators are moderate, a modification of a classical concert of powers is 
again introduced. This is a modified concert of powers because, first, the evidence for 
close cooperation between the three dominant powers -Thailand, Singapore, and 
Indonesia- was limited. Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia indeed played important 
roles compared to the other members of ASEAN during the acute period. However, an 
exclusive cooperation only among those three is difficult to prove. The cooperation 
among the ASEAN six members was more apparent. Second, there was no legitimacy 
for any ASEAN member state to use force during the crisis itself. As a background 
factor, the use of force during the Cyclone Nargis period, between Thailand and 
Cambodia over the Preah Vihear Temple dispute in June 2008, was considered 
irrelevant. 120 Third, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia were not regarded as great 
powers internationally. Therefore, 'regional dominant powers' is used to refer to these 
120 The conceptualisation of a traditional concert of powers allows members of a concert and gives 
legitimacy to declare war. 
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countries.121 Finally, whereas a classical concert of powers was established to manage 
challenges in traditional security issues, the Cyclone Nargis crisis indicated that a 
modification of a concert of powers can also be utilised to manage non traditional 
security issues, such as a natural disaster. 
During the acute period of the crisis, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia played a 
bigger role, while during the de-escalation of the crisis after the dominant powers 
shared the burden of managing the crisis, ASEAN member states shared the 
responsibility. Out of eight indicators of a security community, four indicators are 
significant but only during the de-escalation period, and another four indicators are 
significant during both the acute and the de-escalation periods. Two indicators are 
insignificant because they are not relevant to the management of the Cyclone Nargis 
cns1s. 
The de-escalation period did not demonstrate a balancing system, a concert of powers, 
or a fully-fledged security community. However, the analysis does provide evidence of 
the presence of an embryonic security community, in which all members were 
committed to relatively equal sharing of responsibility and demonstrated a normative 
development. Adler and Barnett argue that the young phase in the development of a 
security community, which they refer to as 'nascent', is marked by common threat 
perceptions, an expectation of mutual benefits and some <legree of shared identity. 122 
ASEAN member countries during the Cyclone Nargis crisis demonstrated common 
threat perceptions, mutual benefits and a developed sharing of identity thus fulfil the 
requirements of a young phase of security community development. 
The management of the Cyclone Nargis crisis demonstrates that there was unequal 
responsibility sharing by ASEAN member states during the acute period. However, 
there was some burden sharing by dominant powers to smaller powers during the de-
escalation period. Smaller countries were willing to assist, but during the acute period, 
it was very difficult to send experts in a very short time, and they also did not have 
many experts to send. Furthermore, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam did not want to 
push Myanmar too hard or question Myanmar's membership of ASEAN themselves 
because they did not want to be expelled from ASEAN if the same thing happened to 
them in the future. The next chapter compares the three case studies examined in 
Chapters 3, 4, and s and presents the main findings of the research. 
121 The notion of traditional concert of powers consists of great powers that ·widely accepted internationally 
as great powers. 
122 Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998. 
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CHAPTER6 
FINDINGS: THE CONNECTION BE1WEEN CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT AND REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
6.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I summarise the evidence presented in the three case studies examined 
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 and show how it supports my preliminary argument, that 
whether or not the three conceptualisations of security systems introduced at the 
beginning of the thesis - balance of power, security community and the classical 
concert of powers - and their variations have explanatory value depends on at least 
two conditions - the phase of the crisis (whether it is an escalating, acute or de-
escalating period) and the nature of the crisis ( whether it is traditional or non-
traditional). 
The evidence from the three case studies also supports my second argument, that the 
regional security system operating in these instances, can, at times, be conceptualised 
as a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' and that the introduction of this 
innovative concept can be theoretically justified because it relates to a strand of 
thinking in the literature about the behaviour of regional powers.1 
To substantiate my argument about the relevance of a 'quasi concert of regional leading 
powers' operating at times during crises (as in at least two of the three case studies) I 
take several steps. First, as mentioned earlier, I show that drawing from the theoretical 
literature, a case can be made that there exists a variation on the classical 
conceptualisation of a concert of powers that supports the notion of a 'quasi concert' 
and that its features can be explained within the scope of the theory. Second, I 
demonstrate that from an examination of past behaviours of ASEAN states there are 
some five leading states that will be introduced in this chapter as 'regional leading 
powers' which have more influence than the other five and furthermore, that within the 
five leading states, three are consistently influential. Thus, in addition to the evidence 
that these three were regional leading powers during two of the crises, there is 
historical material that justifies the concept of a 'quasi concert of regional leading 
powers'. Third, building on the two crises where such a quasi concert was operating, I 
establish several new indicators of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers'. Fourth, 
I compare the three crises investigated in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 to show that some 
1 A partial and (or) an embryonic security community cannot be considered as a novel variation of a 
security community because the two concepts have been widely investigated by scholars with many 
different names. 
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explanatory concepts of regional security system are not applicable to some stages and 
within the particular nature of a crisis. Fifth, I elaborate my findings. In the subsequent 
conclusion of the thesis I argue that my findings contribute to the academic literature 
and have implications for policy directions. 
6.2. Conceptualising a Quasi Concert of Regional Leading Powers 
The existing theories about regional powers are inadequate, and fail to acknowledge 
that the emergence of regional powers is also underpinned by the differential growth 
rates and under similar process that apply to the emergence of great powers. While a 
power transition for a great power in the international system tends to conflict, a power 
transition in a region tend not towards conflict. The last open conflict involving two 
regional leading powers of ASEAN member states was the Confrontation between 
Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1960s. The rise of Singapore as an emerging regional 
leading power did not lead to a conflict or crisis. Furthermore, Indonesia rose to be a 
regional leading power under the leadership of Soeharto and this did not lead to a 
conflict or crisis. 
Douglas Lemke provides a useful explanation of the rise of local dominant powers 
within a regional system. He argues that a local dominant power is a special privileged 
leader of the regional system. The local dominant power establishes and maintains the 
status quo in order to continue its own long-term interests. 2 Aiming at securing more 
net gains and benefits from its interactions, the local dominant power creates self-
serving patterns of interaction that are based on its political and economic resources.3 
In this thesis, given that Southeast Asian countries are hesitant and suspicious about 
the concept of a 'dominant power', I argue that it is more appropriate to refer to 
'regional leading powers'. 
Theories about a concert of powers in regional contexts are limited. The concept of a 
'condominium of great powers' is introduced by Stanley Michalak to describe a concert 
of five great powers in the UNSC.4 Because the two crises investigated point to the 
presence of a variation of the classical concert of powers (the Cambodian and Cyclone 
Nargis crises), I term the new concept 'quasi concert.' The term 'quasi' has been used by 
by Robert Jackson, as well as Hedley Bull and Adam Watson in explaining 'quasi-states', 
to characterise states that possess some of the attributes of 'states' such as sovereignty, 
but lack others, such as established institutions capable of constraining and outlasting 
2 Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
3 Lemke, Regions of War and Peace. 
4 Stanley J. Michalak, A Primer in Power Politic, Washington: A Scholarly Resource Inc, 2001, p. 202. 
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the individuals who occupy their offices. s The Cassell English Dictionary and 
Thesaurus' definition of the term 'quasi ' is, 'partly, not quite, to some degree'. 6 
Meanwhile, as argued in Chapter 2 the term 'concert' has two important tenets, namely 
the formal assertion of unique privileges and responsibilities of the 'great powers ' in the 
maintenance of international order; and the special managerial role of the 'great 
powers'. As also indicated in Chapter 2 , Risto E.J. Pentilla argues that there are two 
types of concert. The first is a temporary concert or a 'concert with a small "c"'.7 It is 
informal and typically set up to seek a solution to a particular crisis. The second form of 
concert is a permanent Concert or a 'concert with a capital "C"'.8 It is a great-power 
coalition which is involved in long-term joint management. As a quasi concert in 
Southeast Asia is informal, it can be appropriately referred to as a 'quasi concert of 
regional leading powers' with a small 'c'. 
From these definitions, I define a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' as a concert 
of powers which takes unique responsibilities for the maintenance of regional order, 
but exercises only those institutions capable of ordering informally the relationship 
between the powers themselves. It is also referred to as 'quasi' because it does not fulfil 
some of the criteria of a traditional concert of powers: as the Cassell's dictionary 
indicates it is partly, but not quite, a classical concert of powers. 
6.3. Justifying the Idea of of Regional Leading Powers in Southeast Asia 
This thesis argues that ASEAN's crisis management indicates that in two of the three 
crises that have been investigated in this thesis, the acute periods of the Cambodian 
crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis, ASEAN member states have functioned more as a 
'quasi concert of regional leading powers', rather than as a security community or a 
balancing system. In managing these crises, the ASEAN members did not really play 
equal roles. There is a group within ASEAN comprising Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, 
Malaysia and the Philippines, whose members exert more influence and play greater 
roles than the other members outside the group. This group can be referred to as 
'regional leading powers'. However, these five leading powers in Southeast Asia are not 
necessarily always active in every crisis. Among the five powers, Indonesia, Singapore, 
and Thailand have consistently played discernable roles in the three crises investigated 
in the thesis. As Figure 6.1 shows, they were in the first circle of regional leading powers 
in Southeast Asia. 
5 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 22. The term 'quasi-state' is also used by Hedley Bull and Adam 
Watson, eds, The Expansion of International Society, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 430. Also see 
Robert H. Jackson, 'Quasi-states, dual regimes and neoclassical theory', International Organization, 41 , 
1987, pp. 519-549. 
6 Betty Kir:kpatrick, The Cassell English Dictionary and Thesaurus, London: Orion, 1998. 
7 Risto E.J. Pentilla, 'The GS as a Concert of Powers', Adelphi Papers, 43:355, 2003, pp. 17-32, p. 18. 
8 Pentilla, The GB as a Concert of Powers, p. 18. 
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FIGURE6.t 
Regional Leading Powers in Southeast Asia 
Source: Compiled by author 
First Circle: Thailand 
Indonesia Singapore 
Second: Malaysia 
The Pbitiwines 
Third: Vietnam, Brunei 
Cambodia, Lao Myanmar 
As Figure 6.1 illustrates, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand are within the first circle 
of regional leading powers in Southeast Asia. They have played important roles in all 
three crises investigated in this thesis, the Cambodian crisis (1978-1991), the East 
Timor crisis (1999-2002) and the Cyclone Nargis crisis (2008-2010). Over the whole 
period, their roles have been significant. Malaysia and the Philippines are within the 
second circle. Malaysia was a key player during the Cambodian crisis and the East 
Timor crisis while the Philippines was one of the most active players during the East 
Timor crisis. The thin dashed line between the first circle and the second circle of 
Figure 6.1 indicates that members of both groups are still recognised as regional 
leading powers while the thick dashed line between the second and the third circle 
means these groups are quite separate even though all are ASEAN member states. 
In this section, I present evidence to show that Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines are regional leading powers in Southeast Asia. Besides 
identifying the role of regional leading powers during three crises (as I did in Chapters 
3, 4, and 5), I will also show that these powers have a long and complex history of being 
recognised as regional leading powers. The role of Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, 
Malaysia and the Philippines in proposing ideas, and mediating disputes, from 
ASEAN's establishment up to 2012, can be seen in Table 6.1. 
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TABLE6.1 
The Role of Regional Leading Powers in Southeast Asia 
Issues Members of a 'Concert of R.etrlonal Leadinx Powers' 
Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand The 
Philinnines 
Cold War 
Crisis The The The Cambodian The Cambodian -
Cambodian Cambodian crisis .. South cns1s, 
crisis, the crisis, the China Sea 
South China South China 
Sea Sea 
Ideas TAC, Cocktail The 'Proximity 
Meeting that Talks' and the 
was 'Five-plus-Two' 
transformed Formula (in 
into JIM 1 and relation to the 
JIM2 in Cambodian 
relation to the crisis 
Cambodian 
Crisis 
Post Cold War 
Crises South China sea South China Active role in Active role 1D The East Timor 
workshops, Sea, the East the East Timor the East Timor crisis 
Pressure Timor . . crisis, active crisis and the on cnsis, 
Myanmar on Cyclone Nargis, role 1D the Cyclone Nargis 
Cyclone Nargis and pollution Cyclone Nargis cns1s 
issue, Thai- haze. crisis, Haze 
Cambodia Pollution 
border dispute 
Ideas APEC,APSC, East Asia AFTA (with the FleXIble ASEAN Charter 
ASEAN Human Caucus, EAS, Philippines), Engagement, 
Rights Body Constructive APEC, ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN Human 
(with the Intervention Economic Connectivity, Rights Body 
Philippines), Community, the Lower Mekong (with 
ASEAN role of ASEAN Initiative Indonesia) 
Institute for Secretary-
Peace and General as ASEAN Free 
Reconciliation Secretary- Trade Area 
General of (with 
ASEAN, not Singapore) 
that of ASEAN 
Secretariat 
Source: Adapted from the literature and interviews and compiled by author 
The contribution of each regional leading power is elaborated below: 
First Circle 
Indonesia 
Most academics and officials in Southeast Asia interviewed for this research suggested 
that Indonesia is the natural leader of ASEAN. In particular, President Soeharto from 
the establishment of ASEAN to his fall in 1998 was perceived as 'leader' of ASEAN's 
leaders. The Indonesian presidents after the Soeharto era were not really perceived as 
'leaders' of ASEAN. They mostly focused on domestic issues as the country was in 
transition. Some scholars argue that the current Indonesian President, Soesilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) does not seem enthusiastic about being invo]ved in foreign 
policy. For example, Ralf Emmers argues that 'SBY is not really keen on foreign policy. 
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Maybe it is more in his second term, but not in his first term'.9 However, this does not 
mean that after Soeharto stepped down, Indonesia had not shown leadership in ASEAN. 
Indonesia has always been very active in crises. In the three crises examined, Indonesia 
has been in the first circle of regional leading powers in terms of its role, as discussed in 
the three previous chapters. Its other contributions are elaborated below. 
Since the early establishment of ASEAN, Indonesia has been very active in proposing 
ideas. The changes in Indochina in the 1970s led Indonesia to come up with the idea of 
the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the TAC. It was during the first summit in Bali 
in February 1976, that all ASEAN leaders signed the documents. Both documents 
provided ASEAN with a political identity, a shared approach to security and a code of 
conduct for regulating intra-mural relations. The TAC reflected a collective joint effort 
to regulate the regional order, with its aim of applying a code of conduct to the whole 
Southeast Asia. 10 
Moreover, even though Indonesia is not a claimant country in the South China Sea 
issue, it has been active in promoting negotiation between China and ASEAN as a whole, 
and convened workshops on the issues. Since 1990, the Indonesian Foreign Affairs 
Ministry has initiated track-two informal workshops and technical meetings on 
managing the conflicts in the South China Sea, which have been attended by 
government officials in a private capacity, academics from affected countries and 
outside observers. These meetings have allowed for discussions on 'practical' 
cooperation such as search and rescue operations and marine scientific research. The 
founder of the workshops, Ambassador Hashim Djalal of Indonesia, contends that 
informal discussions will gradually build a feeling of comfort among those involved in 
the dispute, and perhaps eventually even lead to an agreement. 11 
The Thai-Cambodia border dispute in 2011 also involved 'leadership' by Indonesia. 
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa did shuttle diplomacy right after the incident in 
early 2011. He went to Thailand and Cambodia to meet with the Thai and Cambodian 
Foreign Ministers and offered to act as a mediator. He and the other two Foreign 
Ministers also went to the UNSC for advice. It was the decision of the UNSC that this 
problem should be brought into the ASEAN mechanism. It was also the Indonesian 
Foreign Minister's initiative that an ASEAN Informal Foreign Ministerial Meeting be 
held on 22 February 2011 in Jakarta. In this meeting, the two parties, agreed to accept 
9 Interview with Dr. Ralf Emmers, Assosiate Professor, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 March 2011. 
10 Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 
11 Evan A. Laksmana, 'Jakarta Eyes South China Sea' available at http: //the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-
blog/2011/02/23/jakarta-eyes-south-china-sea/ (accessed on 5 June 2012). 
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an Indonesian military observer on the border. Indonesia was also chairman of ASEAN 
when the dispute erupted in 2011, but this does not mean that Indonesia is only active 
when it holds chairmanship. A high level official of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry 
commented that: 
'Indonesia has been very active in almost all crises in ASEAN, if not all, both 
during its chairmanship or other country's chairmanship. Therefore, Indonesia 
believes that it will still play an important role after the chairmanship is handled 
over to Cambodia in 2012 and then from Cambodia to Brunei Darussalam in 
2013'.12 
This senior officer also reported 'a lot of examples of Indonesia's initiatives created 
during other country's chairmanship. For example, when the Philippines held ASEAN's 
Chairmanship, Indonesia was active and initiated an ASEAN Declaration on Migrant 
Workers'.13 
Indonesia's purpose m being so active is also related to its effort in elevating its 
international prestige. Tang Siew Mun, Director of Foreign Policy and Security Studies 
of ISIS-Malaysia argues that 'in mediating the current Thai-Cambodia conflict, 
Indonesia actually is not only active because it holds the chairmanship. It actually 
wants to boost its international profile'. 14 This argument was echoed by Emmers who 
points out that 'It is not surprising that Indonesia wanted to boost its international 
profile. It has done it several times'. 1s 
-
Nowadays, many perceive Indonesia as a rising power. White, for example, argues that 
Australia should be embarrassed for giving development assistance to Indonesia as the 
country is predicted to be the fourth largest economy and will exceed Australia's 
economy in a few decades.16 Laksmana argues that Indonesia can be regarded as a 
rising power because it is one of Southeast Asia's key leaders and also an active player 
in Asia's emerging regional security architecture. 17 Indonesia, according to Laksmana, 
possesses growing economic and political power and has the potential as well as 
aspiration to challenge the legitimacy of the post-Second World War order. 18 Most 
recently, the country has been asserting its prominent role by proposing original ideas, 
creating new images of democracy and gradually supporting 'controllable change' in the 
regional and global environment. Indonesia seeks to promote a 'dynamic equilibrium' 
12 Interview "vith senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1, Jakarta , 16 February 
2011. 
13 Interview "vith senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1, Jakarta , 16 February 
2011. 
14 Interview 'tvith Tang Siew Mun, Director of Foreign Policy and Security Studies at the ISIS Malaysia, 
Kuala Lumpur, 4 March 2011. 
15 Interview mth Dr. RalfEmmers, Associate Professor, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 March 2011. 
16 Hugh White, 'A Great Power on Our Doorstep', Speech at the Australian National UniYersity, 21 May 
2012. 
17 Evan Laksmana, 'Indonesia's Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size Really Matter', 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33: 2 , 2001. 
18 Laksmana, 'Indonesia's Rising Regional and Global Profile'. 
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among regional and global powers to the benefit of all - a core principle in the so-called 
'Natalegawa Doctrine'.19 
Singapore 
Singapore also can be considered as one of the regional leading powers. Economically, 
it ranked first in GDP per capita and total trade in 201020 • Also in the same year, it 
ranked second in terms of FDI. Singapore was also numbered one in terms of defence 
expenditure, defence expenditure per capita and defence expenditure per cent of GDP 
in 2008-20102 1• 
Even though it is small in size, its ideas to advance ASEAN, particularly on economic 
issues, are widely acknowledged. Officials in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and 
Singapore interviewed for this research emphasised the importance of Singapore's role 
in enhancing economic cooperation among ASEAN member countries. A high level 
officer of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry declared that 'While Indonesia plays an 
important role in promoting an APSC Singapore plays a significant role in promoting 
an AEC'. 22 Emmers also argues that 'Indonesia and Singapore are within the inner 
circle of the core group '.2 3 Other officials also indicated in interviews that while others 
were not comfortable about enhancing their economic cooperation within ASEAN, 
Singapore proposed an AFTA. 2 4 
Thailand 
Thailand is a regional leading power for economic, political, and initiative reasons. 
Thailand, in terms of GDP ranked second after Indonesia,2s and is second to Singapore 
in terms of total trade in 2010. 26 Its paramilitary was number two and in terms of 
number of armed force personnel, ranked number three in 2012. 27 An officer from the 
Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that Thailand has contributed many ideas to 
ASEAN, for example the proposal of 'ASEAN Connectivity'. Even though the ASEAN 
Connectivity was announced during the Summit in Hanoi in October 2011, it was 
Thailand which initiated it.28 Thailand also contributed ideas to enhance cooperation 
19 Laksmana, 'Indonesia 's Rising Regional and Global Profile', p. 159. 
20 ASEAN: ASEAN Community in Figures, 2011 , Jakarta: the ASEAN Secretariat, 2012, p. 1 and p. 9. 
2 1 International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Country Comparions-Commitments, Force Levels and 
Economics', The Military Balance, London: Routledge, 112:1, 2012, pp. 463-476, p. 469. 
22 Inteniew ,vith senior ]eye] officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1, Jakarta , 16 February 
2011. 
23 Inteniew with Dr. Ralf Emmers, Associate Professor, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 March 2011. 
24 Inteniew with a senior ]eye] officer at the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta , 16 February 2011; Inteniew ,dth 
Senior Level Officers of the Indonesian Minist ry of Foreign Affairs 2 and 3 , Jakarta, 16 February 2011 , 
Interview with Tan Sri Ajit Singh, former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur, 10 March 2011. 
25 ASEAN: ASEAN Community in Figures 2011, p. 1. 
26 ASEAN Community in Figures 2011. 
27 
'Country Comparions-Commitments, Force Levels and Economics', The Military Balance 2012. 
28 Interview with a senior level officer of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 23 February 2011. 
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within ASEAN, with the principle of 'flexible engagement' among its initiatives. The 
principle was coined by the former Thai Foreign Minister, Pitsuwan, who is currently 
Secretary-General of ASEAN. The principle of 'flexible engagement' involves publicly 
commenting on and collectively discussing fellow members' domestic policies when 
these have either regional implications or adversely affect the disposition of other 
ASEAN members. 29 The proposal was officially presented as a non-paper at the Thirty 
First of ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila in 1998.3° Even though the meeting 
decided to reject Thailand's proposal, it agreed on a formula that affirmed member 
state's freedom to purse 'enhanced interaction' vis-a-vis one another. This can be 
perceived as progress towards a forward-looking ASEAN. 
With its domestic issues and current border conflict with Cambodia, Thailand is often 
considered as a 'spoiler', but it somehow still contributes to regional issues. Dewi 
Fortuna Anwar suggests that 'the current Cambodia-Thailand border dispute was a 
setback to the community building process. It was the first time ASEAN member 
countries fired live bullets at each other in 44 years'.31 Melly Caballero-Anthony holds a 
similar opinion. She argues that 'if you observe statements of officials of the ASEAN 
member countries, the current conflict between Thailand and Cambodia is a stumbling 
block of a security community process building'. 32 This was also echoed by Ralf 
Emmers who sees Thailand recently as a spoiler instead of leading powers.33 However, I 
argue that even though it has been challenged by domestic issues, of which the 
Cambodia-Thailand dispute in 2011 was related to domestic political challenges, 34 
Thailand still demonstrates its leadership regionally, for example, by taking a lead in 
the Cyclone N argis crisis. 
Second Circle 
Malaysia 
Malaysia lies within the second circle of the concert. In terms of economic development, 
in 2010 Malaysia sits at number one in its ability to attract FDI.3s Its Gross Domestic 
Product per Capita in 2010 was number three (after Singapore and Brunei 
Darussalam).36 Its total trade in the same year was also number three after Singapore 
29 Jurgen Haacke, 'The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interaction: 
Intramural Challenges to the ASEAN Way', The Pacific Review, 12:4, 1999, pp. 581-611. 
3° Haacke, 'The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interation'. 
3, Interview ·with Dr. Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to the Vice President, 
Secretariat of the Vice President oflndonesia, Jakarta , 29 March 2011. 
32 Interview with Dr. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Director of External Relations, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 
25 March 2011. 
33 Interview with Dr. Ralf Emmers, Associate Professor, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 March 2011. 
34 My argument was supported by Ambassador Tan Seng Chye: Interview with Ambassador Tan Seng Chye, 
RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 February 2011. 
35 ASEAN: ASEAN Community in Figures 2011. 
36 ASEAN: ASEAN Community in Figures 2011. 
271 
and Thailand. In terms of military capabilities, Malaysia ranks the 3rd in its defence 
expenditure (after Singapore and Indonesia) and defence expenditure per capita (after 
Singapore and Brunei Darussalam) in 2008-2010.37 
The famous principle of 'flexible engagement' by Thailand was actually triggered by an 
initiative by Malaysia's then Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. He suggested in 
July 1997 that ASEAN adopt a policy of 'constructive intervention' to deal with 
domestic issues that may impact on regional security. The idea was that ASEAN 
members should invite each others' services to boost each others' civil society, human 
development, education and national economy to avoid the kind of political crises 
experienced by Cambodia after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords up to 1997.38 
However, Anwar Ibrahim's proposal of constructive intervention did not imply or lead 
to a reversal of Malaysia's official stand on the issue of non-interference. The principle 
itself was supported by the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand which later came up 
with the principle of 'flexible engagement'. 
Many officials in Southeast Asia argue that Malaysia is among the region's leading 
powers. Former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Tan Sri Ajith Singh, for example, argues, 
'To me, the key pillars in ASEAN are still Indonesia and Malaysia. They were the 
countries which started the ASEAN, rising out of Konfrontasi. Right throughout, 
. 
ASEAN is sustained by the strong support of Indonesia and Malaysia'.39 In terms of 
ideas, there has always been competition between Indonesia and Malaysia. For example, 
the idea raised by former Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammad about an 
East Asia Caucus, created friction between Indonesia and Malaysia. According to Singh 
'It was about face, Indonesia thought: why Malaysia came up with a big project without 
first consulting with Indonesia'.4° A high level senior officer of the Malaysian Foreign 
Ministry who used to deal with ASEAN issues is also of the same opinion. The officer 
argues that 'there has been competition between Indonesia and Malaysia in terms of 
ideas. However, competition is not always bad. Sometimes, competition is good for an 
organisation'.41 This official sees Malaysia as a role model for ASEAN member countries 
in its economic transition, from a developing country to a developed country. Malaysia 
therefore has always provided insights and inputs and has played important roles in 
ASEAN's economic cooperation.42 
37 International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Country Comparisons-Commitments, Force Levels and 
Economics', p. 469. 
38 Haacke, 'The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interaction'. 
39 Interview with Tan Sri Ajit Singh, former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur, 10 March 2011. 
40 Interview with Tan Sri Ajit Singh, former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur, 10 March 2011. 
41 Interview with a senior level officer of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, Putrajaya, 11 March 2011. 
42 Interview with a senior level officer of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, Putrajaya, 11 March 2011. 
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The Philippines 
The Philippines falls into the second circle of Figure 6.1. It was not very active during 
the Cambodian crisis and went along with the ASEAN consensus, apparently without 
having tried to shape that consensus or create diplomatic on political initiatives of its 
own. This may be partly explained by its sense of relative political and strategic 
remoteness from the crisis, both geographically and in light of its American security 
linkages. 43 The Cambodian crisis also coincided with an economic downturn in the 
Philippines and the rise of political opposition to Marcos. Increasingly preoccupied 
with internal affairs in the 1980s, the Marcos government had little political 
contribution to make to ASEAN. However, The Philippines played a very important 
role in the East Timor crisis. The East Timorese put great trust in the Philippines, 
perhaps because they shared Roman Catholicism. 
Manila, alongside Singapore, was among the first countries to seek to move towards 
freer intra-ASEAN trade. The Philippines government has consistently been supportive 
of moving ASEAN in genuinely integrative directions. With Indonesia, it was one of the 
strongest supporters of the establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Body. Manila 
and Jakarta High Level Task Force members struggled to put forward articles for the 
establishment of ASEAN Human Rights Body, and the following finally was stipulated 
in the ASEAN Charter, Article 14: 
In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter 
relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body.44 
And further: 
This ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms 
of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.4s 
Rodolfo Severino contends that the ASEAN Charter was initially proposed by the 
Philippines. 46 He claims that the Philippines also spearheaded the idea of regional 
economic integration. 47 Severino further argues that the Philippines was at times 
occupied with its own domestic issues, but his proposals for enhancing the organisation 
were valuable.48 
43 Donald E. Weatherbee, 'The Philippines and ASEAN: Options for Aquino', Asian Survey, 27:12, 1987, pp. 
1223-1239. 
44 ASEAN, The ASEAN Charter, Jakarta: the ASEAN Secretariat, 2007, p. 19. 
4s ASEAN, The ASEAN Charter, p. 19. 
46 Interview with Ambassador Rodolfo Severino, !SEAS-Singapore, Singapore, 16 March 2011. 
47 Interview with Ambassador Rodolfo Severino, !SEAS- Singapore, Singapore, 16 March 2011. 
48 Interview with Ambassador Rodolfo Severino, !SEAS-Singapore, Singapore, 16 March 2011. 
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Even though scholars such as Emmers, Tim Huxley and Frost express different views 
on who should be referred to as 'regional leading powers, I argue that on the basis of 
economic and military powers, their role in managing the three crises investigated in 
Chapter 3, 4, 5, and the ideas they contributed to the ASEAN organisation, the 
Philippines and Thailand are part of the 'regional leading powers'. Emmers, for 
example, regards Vietnam as replacing Thailand after the uncertain domestic political 
situation in the country.49 Tim Huxley also argues that historically, Vietnam is one of 
'dominant powers' in Southeast Asia.so Similarly, Frank Frost claims that Vietnam, 
rather than the Philippines, should be referred to as a regional leading power. si 
However, I argue that the ideas by the Philippines contributed to ASEAN and the role 
as crisis manager outnumber those of Vietnam. Vietnam's role has been rising in the 
last five years; nevertheless its role in many crises in Southeast Asia, including the three 
crises investigated in tnis thesis is hardly visible. 
6.4. Indicators of a Quasi Concert of Regional Leading Powers 
Having established the validity of my term 'regional leading powers', in this section, I 
establish the indicators of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' in order to justify 
its inclusion as an explanatory concept. To do this, I draw on the two case studies where 
none of the original explanatory concepts seem applicable and the quasi concert may 
apply. During the acute periods of the Cambodian crisis a_nd the Cyclone Nargis crisis, 
there were several developments that support the concept. In contrast to a classical 
concert of powers, a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' in Southeast Asia has 
some unique characteristics. First, whereas a classical concert of powers concept is 
usually associated with the notion of great powers, the concert in Southeast Asia 
involved regional leading powers: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the 
Philippines. Building on Lemke's theory of dominant powers (see Section 2.5), it is 
appropriate to use this term in the context of smaller regions like Southeast Asia where 
there are regional leading powers rather than great powers. 
Second, unlike the classical concert of powers which has fixed members, a 'quasi 
concert of regional leading powers' in Southeast Asia does not have permanent 
members. The members of this concert are not always the five countries discussed here. 
Nonetheless, there is an inner core group within the concert comprising Indonesia, 
Singapore, and Thailand which was consistently active in the three crises investigated. 
Malaysia and the Philippines are in the second circle of regio11<l1 leading powers. 
49 Interview with Dr. Ralf Emmers, Associate Professor, ~IS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 March 2 011 . 
50 Interview with Dr. Tim Huxley, IISS-Singapore, Singapore, 18 March 2011. 
5
' Interview with Dr. Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Researcher, Canberra, 16 and 2 4 August 2011. 
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Third, the classical concert of powers includes the option of using military force to 
restore order in the region. However, for a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' in 
Southeast Asia, the use of force to restore order or stability in the region is considered 
unthinkable by ASEAN member states. Diplomatic means are the main mechanism 
used by the concert. Members of the quasi concert support this principle in the TAC, 
which prevents them from exercising force. On rare occasions, members of the concert, 
for example Thailand, during the 2011 border dispute with Cambodia, have used 
limited force. 
Fourth, unlike a classical concert of powers, the 'spheres of influence' factor is also not 
applicable to Southeast Asia. The three crises investigated in the thesis demonstrate 
that 'regional leading powers' did not really have spheres of influence in the region. 
They do have influence, but the influence is targeted towards the entire membership of 
ASEAN rather than specific members or spheres. 
Finally, while a classical concert of powers reqmres a high level of cooperation 
accompanied by institutionalised summit diplomacy and supportive mechanisms, in 'a 
quasi concert of regional leading powers', the cooperation between members of the 
concert does not include formal institutionalised summit diplomacy. Rather, informal 
summit diplomacy is conducted, either by phone, or in the corridors of meetings. 
-
Furthermore, in keeping with Southeast Asia multilateral norms, the effort to develop 
relationships that supports informal interactions is central to the cooperation. 
The five unique indicators of a quasi concert of regional powers elaborated above 
suggest the concept can be added to the other explanatory concepts of security systems, 
namely a balance of power, a security community and a traditional concert of powers. 
The concept of concert of powers in Southeast Asia has not been applied before as an 
explanatory concept. Yet, the new concept of a 'quasi concert of regional powers' 
implies that a modified concert of powers in Southeast Asia is plausible from the 
analysis of the three case studies. Having shown the relevance of a 'quasi concert of 
regional leading powers' for explaining the type of security systems that operate in 
Southeast Asia during the three crises, I now add the indicators of this arrangement to 
those of the other security concepts that have been used to examine the three case 
studies. Then I use these indicators to briefly summarise the type of security system 
that appeared to operate during the three crises examined. 
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TABLE6.2 
Indicators of Regional Security System in Southeast Asia 
Regional Security Indicators 
Systems in Southeast 
Asia 
Security Comm.unity A comparability of political values among decision-makers 
A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers 
A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and 
communication of other governments 
Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in 
the others' direction and coordinate their POlicies 
Processes of transactions, international organisations and social 
learning 
Development of trust and collective identity formation 
A total absence of armed inter-state conflicts or prospects for such 
conflicts in the region 
A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race 
involving regional actors 
Formal or informal institutions and practices 
A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of 
a peaceful relationship 
Balancing System Balance of Power among ASEAN Members 
Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors 
Intention of some states to expand 
Alliances on the basis of short-run interests 
War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft 
Balance of External Great Power Influence 
Deoendencv on external great powers as security providers 
Alignment with external great powers 
Militarv cooperation with external great powers 
Distribution of external great oowers' armed forces 
Economic dependence on external great powers 
Concert of Powers A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order 
A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant 
powers 
A pattern of cooperative behaviour 
An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group 
of all dominant powers 
Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative 
mechanisms 
A joint aooroach to regional issues 
A need for system stability and international order 
Quasi Concert of A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order 
Regional Leading Regional leading powers as members 
Powers Certain level of cooperation among regional leading powers 
Flexible membership of croup of regional leading powers 
The use of force to restore the region's order or stability is 
unthinkable 
A pattern of cooperative behaviour 
Informal summit diplomacy and supPQrting consultative mechanism 
A flexible joint approach to regional issues 
A need for system stability and international order 
Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author. The author established indicators 
for a quasi concert of regional leading powers. 
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6.5. Characteristics of the Crises 
In this section I explain that the nature and phase of a crisis determines the regional 
security system that will operate. These differences have implications for which of the 
four regional security systems was operating. I also elaborate other characteristics of 
the three crises. I further argue that when characterising each regional security system 
operating during each phase of a crisis, it is necessary to make several qualifications. 
A 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' was indicated in the acute periods of the 
Cambodian crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis. A security community was indicated 
during the de-escalation period of the East Timor crisis and Cyclone Nargis crisis. 
However, the security community during the de-escalation period of the East Timor 
crisis was only operating among the regional leading powers, while the security 
community that was indicated in the de-escalation period of the Cyclone N argis crisis 
was among all ASEAN member states. A balance of external great power influence was 
indicated in the acute period of the Cambodian crisis. In the East Timor situation, great 
power influence was an important factor for ASEAN member states in managing the 
crisis. Neither a balance of powers among ASEAN member states nor a classical concert 
of powers was indicated in any stages of the three crises investigated in this thesis. 
Table 6.3 sets out the characteristics of each crisis. 
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Cue 
Studies 
Cambodian 
Crisis 
East Timor 
Crisis 
Cyclone 
Nargis 
crisis 
Nature of 
Crisis 
Traditional 
Crisis 
Traditional 
crisis 
Non 
traditional 
crisis 
TABLE6.3 
Comparison of the Cambodian, East Timor and Cyclone N argis Crisis in Myanmar 
Key Actors I Regional Legal · 1 ASEAN- Other 'onal Securi S tem 
Leading Documents Mechanism Mechani Balancing Security Concert Quasi Concert 
Powers sm System Community of of Regional 
•ASEAN 
member 
states during 
the acute 
period 
• Great Powers 
during the de-
escalation 
period 
• Great and 
external 
powers 
during the 
acute period 
• Regional 
leading 
powers 
during the de-
escalation 
period 
• Regional 
leading 
powers 
during the 
acute period 
•ASEAN 
member 
states during 
the de-
escalation 
period 
• Thailand 
• Indonesia 
• Malaysia 
• Singapore 
• Indonesia 
• Thailand 
•The 
Philippines 
• Malaysia 
• Singapore 
• Thailand 
• Singapore 
• Indonesia 
• Bangkok 
Declaration 
•TAC 
• Bangkok 
Declaration 
• ASEAN Concord 
• Hanoi Action Plan 
•TAC 
• Bangkok 
Declaration 
•TAC 
• ASEAN Concord 
• Bali Concord II 
• Vientiane Action 
Programme 
• Hanoi Plan of 
Action 
• ASEAN Charter 
• APSC Blueprint 
•High 
Council was 
not utilised 
and not 
relevant 
•High 
Council was 
not utilised 
and not 
relevant 
•High 
Council was 
not utilised 
and not 
relevant 
•ASEAN 
Humanitari 
an Task 
Force 
•Adhoc by 
regional 
leading 
powers 
•UN 
mechani 
sm 
•TCG 
• Balance of 
external 
great 
power 
influence' 
during the 
de-
escalation 
period 
•No 
(Great-
power 
influence 
without the 
notion of 
balance) 
• Back-
ground 
factor 
Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author 
•No 
• An partial 
security 
community 
during the 
de-
escalation 
period 
•An 
embryonic 
security 
community 
during the 
de-
escalation 
period 
Powers Leading 
•No 
•No 
•No 
Powers 
•There was a 
quasi concert of 
powers 
consisting of 
Thailand, 
Indonesia, 
Malaysia and 
Singapore 
during the acute 
period 
•No 
• There was a 
'quasi concert of 
regional leading 
powers' 
consisting of 
Thailand, 
Singapore and 
Indonesia 
during the acute 
period. 
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Comparison of all Crises 
The three crises are compared in this section to demonstrate that each crisis has its own 
characteristics and that the regional security systems indicated have distinguishing 
characteristics in each crisis and during different phases of each crisis. 
Similarities 
Similarities and differences of the three crises can be drawn. The similarities are: first, 
in all three crises, the type of regional security system changed during the different 
phases of each crisis. During the Cambodian crisis, the system in operation changed 
from a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' to a balance of external great power 
influence. During the East Timor crisis, after being influenced by both great and 
external powers in the acute period, the regional security system that was operating in 
the de-escalation period was a partial security community. During the Cyclone Nargis 
crisis, it evolved from a quasi concert of powers to an embryonic security community. 
Second, the High Council was not really applicable in the three crises investigated in 
this thesis. The High Council can only be invoked by members of ASEAN states. During 
the Cambodian crisis, Cambodia and Vietnam were not members of ASEAN. In the East 
Timor crisis, before Timor Leste gained its independence, Indonesia was the sole actor 
in the crisis. Furthermore, after Timor Leste voted to establish itself as a new nation, it 
could not invoke the High Council as Timor Leste was not a member of ASEAN. 
Indonesia, on the other hand, looked for the assistance of ASEAN member states, but 
again the High Council was not really relevant for the issue. In the Cyclone N argis crisis, 
the High Council was again not relevant because of the non-traditional nature of the 
crisis. Generally, there were no 'disputant parties' in the crisis, even though it can be 
argued that during the acute period ASEAN and the UN can be regarded as one party, 
and Myanmar as the other party. 
Third, among all the key actors that played important roles during the three crises, the 
regional leading powers were actually always consistently active. During the acute 
period the Cambodian crisis, they formed a quasi concert of regional leading powers. 
During the de-escalation period of the East Timor crisis, the regional leading powers 
acted as a partial security community, while during the acute period of the Cyclone 
Nargis crisis, they served as a quasi concert of regional leading powers; they formed an 
an embryonic security community only during the de-escalation period. 
Fourth, despite the signing of more documents, most recently the ASEAN Charter, 
ASEAN's crisis management mechanisms have not been developing. The ASEAN 
Charter provides a limited basis for the settlement of disputes, but despite the 
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provisions for the settlement of disputes in six articles of the Chapter, namely article 22, 
23, 24, 25, 26, and 27 of Chapter VIII 'Settlement of Disputes', the substance of the 
settlement of disputes provision is weak. The ASEAN Charter did not establish a new 
dispute settlement mechanism. This is again referred to the TAC. What is new is the 
provision of the role of Secretary-General of ASEAN who, the Charter states 'shall 
monitor the compliance with the findings, recommendations or decisions resulting 
from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, and submit a report to the ASEAN 
Summit'.s2 The Charter also highlights the enhanced role of the ASEAN Chair: 'the 
ASEAN Chair and the Secretary-General can be requested to provide good offices, 
conciliation or mediation in a dispute'.s3 Nevertheless, the provision only calls for an 
intermediary role since unresolved disputes must be referred to the ASEAN Summit for 
decision. Questions arise about how the ASEAN leaders will resolve disputes when the 
common practice for decision-making processes is through consensus.54 
Finally, UN mechanisms assisted and played a role in all three crises. In the Cambodian 
crisis, the UN played the most important role after the Paris Agreements in 1991. In the 
East Timor crisis, the UN played a role from the beginning of the crisis and even in the 
pre-crisis. In the Cyclone Nargis crisis, the UN exercised a discernable role within the 
framework of the TCG. 
Dif.f erences 
The differences among the three crises lie at the level of the development of trust and 
collective identity, which was increasing and strengthening over the period. The sense 
of 'we-ness' was also different over the period. This sense has continued to develop 
since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. ASEAN also developed itself in terms of 
intervention in internal affairs. While in the early years of its establishment, ASEAN 
adhered strictly to the principle of 'non intervention' in each others' domestic affairs, 
the case of the Cyclone Nargis to some extent demonstrated a change in this rule. 
The three crises occurred in different periods, from when ASEAN was still a nascent 
organisation (the Cambodian crisis) up to when it became a legal entity (the Cyclone 
Nargis crisis). When the Cambodian crisis started, ASEAN was only 11 years old and 
was governed only by the Bangkok Declaration, the ASEAN Concord (Bali Concord I) 
and the TAC principles. By the time Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, ASEAN had adopted 
several new principles such as the Bali Concord II (the basis for the establishment of 
the ASEAN Community), the Hanoi Plan of Action, and the Vientiane Action 
52 ASEAN, The ASEAN Charter, p. 25. 
53 ASEAN, The ASEAN Charter, p. 25. 
54 Mely Caballero-Anthony, 'The ASEAN Charter: An opportunity missed or one that cannot be 
missed' ,Southeast Asian Affairs, 2008, pp. 71-85. 
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Programme.ss In addition, the ASEAN Charter was adopted in November 2007 and 
entered into force in July 2008 just a few months after the Cyclone. Nevertheless, the 
development of more principles did not really give rise to better crisis management. 
The only dispute settlement mechanism governed by the organisation is the High 
Council, which has never been invoked. The comparison between the crises is 
elaborated below. 
Comparison between the Cambodian and the East Timor crises 
This comparison is made to demonstrate how the nature and the phase of each crisis 
can point to different regional security systems. 
Similarities 
There were some similarities between the Cambodian and East Timor crises. First, both 
the Cambodia and East Timor crises were 'traditional' crises. They involved the use of 
force between the disputant parties.s6 Second, in both crises, regional leading powers 
played an active role. Third, in both crises, ASEAN had no legal basis and therefore 
must be considered as a non legal entity. ASEAN had only adopted the Bangkok 
Declaration, the Bali Concord I and the TAC by that time. ASEAN had not yet 
considered creating a Charter. The idea of an ASEAN Charter was initially proposed by 
Malaysia but only in 2004.s? Fourth, the High Council was not applicable in both crises 
for the reasons explained above. Fifth, the UN also played important roles in both crises. 
Differences 
There are also some differences between the two crises. First, the Cambodian crisis 
occurred in the Cold War era while the East Timor crisis arose in the post Cold War era. 
It could be argued that the end of the Cold War reduced the balancing efforts by the 
world's great powers. Second, the members of ASEAN were also different. At the 
beginning of the Cambodian crisis, ASEAN only consisted of five members, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. In the middle of the crisis in 1984, 
Brunei Darussalam joined the organisation. During the East Timor crisis, ASEAN 
consisted of ten members after Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam joined. Fourth, 
the regional leading powers during the Cambodian crisis consisted of Thailand, 
Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. In the East Timor crisis these countries also played 
55 The Hanoi Plan of Action was established in 1998 and created a range of economic initiatives to boost 
investment in Southeast Asia. The Vientiane Action Programmes was initiated in November 2004 to realise 
the objectives of Bali Concord II. See Alan Collins, 'Forming a security community: lessons from ASEAN', 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, T2, 2007, pp. 203-225. 
56 Vietnam and Cambodia were not members of ASEAN during the Cambodian crisis while East Timor was 
not yet member of ASEAN. 
57 Ilango Karuppannan, 'The ASEAN Community and ASEAN Charter: Toward a New ASEAN', Journal 
Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, No. 8, 2005. 
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the active role with the addition of the Philippines. Finally, during the Cambodian crisis, 
ASEAN still only had only limited integration in economy and politics. 
Comparison between the East Timor and the Cyclone Nargis crises 
Similarities 
There are some similarities between these two crises. First, both crises demonstrated a 
change in the regional security system during the crisis. The East Timor crisis saw a 
change from the importance of external great powers with an absence of the 'balance' 
notion, to a partial security community. The Cyclone Nargis crisis showed a change 
from a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' to an embryonic security community. 
Second, both crises occurred in the Post Cold War era. This might have impacted on the 
relevance of the notion of 'balance' between external great powers. Third, in both crises, 
ASEAN already had ten members. Fourth, regional leading powers were important, 
even though they were in a different form. Regional leading powers served as a partial 
security community during the East Timor crisis while serving as a 'quasi concert of 
regional leading powers' during the acute period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis. Fifth, 
Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore were part of the regional leading powers in both 
crises. Sixth, the High Council was not applicable and was not invoked during either 
crisis. Seventh, the UN played a very important role in both the East Timor and Cyclone 
Nargis crises. On the issue of East Timor, the UN played a significant role even before 
the crisis. During the de-escalation period of the Cylone N argis crisis, the UN together 
with ASEAN worked under the TCG mechanism. Finally, both crises indicated the 
existence of some form of a security community during their de-escalation periods. 
Differences 
Despite these similarities, there are also some differences between the two crises. First, 
the issue of East Timor was a traditional one that involved the use of force while 
Cyclone Nargis was a non traditional crisis. Second, in the East Timor crisis, ASEAN 
had only adopted the Bangkok Declaration, the ASEAN Concord (Bali Concord II) and 
the TAC as their main principles of resolving the crisis. When Cyclone Nargis hit 
Myanmar, ASEAN had adopted the ASEAN Charter which finally entered into force in 
July 2008. There was a need to test the power of the new legal organisation during the 
Cyclone N argis crisis. Finally, even though both crises indicated the existence of a 
security community, there was a difference in terms of the members of the security 
community. Thus, the security community indicated during the de-escalation period of 
the East Timor crisis only consisted of the regional leading powers while the security 
community indicated during the de-escalation period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis 
comprised of all the ASEAN states who were members at that time. 
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Comparison between the Cambodian crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis 
Similarities 
Some similarities between the Cambodian and Cyclone Nargis crises have been 
elaborated above such as the role of the UN, and regional leading powers, particularly 
Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. The crisis management in the acute period of both 
crises can be characterised by a quasi concert of regional leading powers. 
Differences 
The differences between the two crises include first, that the nature of crisis was 
different. The Cambodian crisis was a traditional crisis and the Cyclone N argis crisis 
was a non traditional crisis. Second, even though they both have features of a 'quasi 
concert of regional leading powers', the nature of each quasi concert was very different. 
The 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' during the Cambodian crisis really 
demonstrated a close and exclusive cooperation among the regional leading powers, 
while the 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' during the Cyclone Nargis that 
consisted of Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia did not really demonstrate an exclusive 
cooperation among themselves. Third, the Cambodian crisis occurred in the Cold War 
era while the Cyclone Nargis crisis occurred in the Post Cold War era. Fourth, at the 
time Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, ASEAN only had five members 
while at the time Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, ASEAN already consisted of ten 
members. Fifth, during the Cambodian crisis, ASEAN was still a non legal organisation 
and adhered only to the basic principles of the Bangkok Declaration, the Bali Concord I 
and the TAC. At the time of the Cyclone Nargis crisis, ASEAN already adopted 
additional principles, such as the Bali Concord II, the Hanoi Action Plan and the 
Vientiane Action Programme. The Bali Concord II is important because it is the 
foundation document for the establishment of an ASEAN Community which is 
comprised of a Security and Political Community, an Economic Community and a 
Socio-Cultural Community. Furthermore, ASEAN adopted the Charter six months 
before the Cyclone and the Charter entered into force in July 2008. Finally, while in the 
Cambodian crisis, actors - the members of the regional leading powers - changed 
their policy hence their behaviours were difficult to predict, while in the Cyclone Nargis 
crisis, actors' policy was relatively consistent, particularly in providing assistance, the 
predictability was clearer during the de-escalation period than the acute period. 
6.6. Crisis Management and Regional Security Systems in Southeast Asia 
In general, this thesis finds that examining the nature of crisis management in the three 
crises in Southeast Asia is helpful in understanding the type of security systems that 
operate in Southeast Asia. Table 6-4 summarises how investigating the three cases of 
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crisis management inform the understanding of security systems in Southeast Asia. 
This summary is then explained in more detail. 
Table 6.4 
ASEAN Member States' Crisis Management and Redonal Security S vstems in SEA 
Nature of Phase of Crisis Important Regional Examples of 
Crisis Players Security Crises 
Svstem 
Escalation Period External Great (Great-power East Timor crisis 
powers influence) 
Acute Period Regional leading Quasi concert of Cambodian crisis 
Traditional powers regional leading 
powers 
Great powers (Great-power East Timor crisis 
influence) 
De-escalation Great powers Balance of Cambodian crisis 
Period external great 
power influence 
Regional leading Partial security East Timor crisis 
powers community 
among regional 
leading powers 
Acute Period Regional leading Quasi concert of Cyclone Nargis 
Non powers regional leading cns1S 
Traditional powers 
De-escalation All ASEAN Embryonic Cyclone Nargis 
Period member states security CrlSlS 
community of all 
ASEAN member 
states 
Source: Compiled by author 
The connection between the management of the crisis conducted by ASEAN member 
states and the regional security systems in Southeast Asia is significant for several 
reasons. First, ASEAN's responses to the three crises depended on the nature and the 
phase of the crisis rather than the provisions of the ASEAN Concord or the Charter. The 
ASEAN Concord contained provisions for the establishment of a High Council that 
would resolve regional disputes. Nevertheless, any disputants must consent to 
arbitration by the 'good offices'. The High Council was not applicable for the three 
crises investigated. The High Council is more pertinent to traditional disputes, such as 
a territorial dispute or border disputes. Nevertheless, the good offices of the High 
Council have never been invoked. The three crises demonstrated change in the regional 
security systems over several phases. An embryonic security community was operating 
only in the one non-traditional crisis not in the two traditional crises. 
Second, the necessity of involving external great powers was different between the one 
non traditional and the two traditional crises. During the acute period of the 
Cambodian crisis and the East Timor crisis, the external great powers played important 
roles although in the latter crisis, the notion of balancing dynamics was not evident. 
External powers, particularly the US, used their leverage to influence Indonesia and 
284 
leading powers in Southeast Asia in managing the East Timor crisis, but its influence 
was not balanced by other external great powers directly nor through ASEAN member 
states. In the one non-traditional crisis, the Cyclone Nargis crisis, the external great 
powers were not key actors, but only part of the background. In contrast, the regional 
leading powers played active roles in all three crises. Only when they were unable to 
cope with the challenges did they look for help from outsiders. Unlike Tobias 
Nischalke's argument that 'in ASEAN's case, it is clear that intra-ASEAN security 
relations are subordinate to those with outsider powers',ss I argue that this situation 
changed to an intra-ASEAN security relationship, moving upwards from a subordinate 
position, during the period in which the three crises occurred. 
Third, during the transition through the phases of the three crises, burden sharing 
occured. The burden was shared by all the regional leading powers to the external great 
powers during the transition from the acute to the de-escalation period of the 
Cambodian crisis because of the change in the behaviour of the external great powers 
towards a settlement. The burden was also transferred by the external great powers to 
the regional leading powers during the transition from the acute period to the de-
escalation period of the East Timor crisis. In the case of the Cyclone Nargis crisis, the 
burden was shared from the regional leading powers to all ASEAN member states 
during the transition from the acute period to the de-escalation period. 
The burden sharing among the members of ASEAN was not equal in most phases of the 
three crises. This further supports my preliminary argument discussed in Chapter 2 
that the responsibility of managing crises was not shared equally between greater and 
smaller countries and that smaller countries were reluctant to take an equal share of 
the responsibilities. In the Cambodian crisis, the burdens were not shared equally by 
the group comprising Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia with the 
Philippines and Brunei Darussalam. The reasons for this were, first, the crisis did not 
directly threaten the latter countries' national interests due to their geographical 
locations. The Philippines and Brunei Darussalam are located far from the conflict area. 
Second, the Philippines' calculation of the cost of action exceeded the cost of inaction, 
and it faced domestic challenges at that time. Third, Brunei did not have the capability 
to contribute. 
In the East Timor crisis, the management of the crises reveals evidence of the presence 
of a partial security community among participating countries. The burdens were not 
shared equally because the crisis did not directly threaten the national interests of 
58 Tobias Nischalke, 'Does ASEAN Measure Up? Post Cold War Diplomacy and the Idea of Regional 
Community', The Pacific Review, 2002, 15:1, pp. 89-117, p. 109. 
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Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Brunei. Furthermore, as argued by some 
interviewees, these countries did not have the capabilities to contribute. s9 The 
management of Cyclone Nargis during the acute period demonstrates the presence of a 
quasi-concert of regional leading powers. During this phase, non-regional leading 
powers did not share the responsibility because their calculation of the cost of action 
exceeded the cost of inaction. Pushing Myanmar too hard to open up to international 
assistance for Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Brunei (particularly for the first three 
countries) could have set a bad precedent for them as new members of ASEAN. During 
the de-escalation period, the burden was shared relatively equally by all members, and 
that is why the management of the crisis provides evidence of the presence of an 
embryonic security community among all members. 
Fourth, this thesis finds that an embryonic security community worked in a non-
traditional crisis. When the crisis was acute, ASEAN member states did not work 
together as a security community. The Cyclone Nargis case demonstrates that ASEAN 
member states could only work as an embryonic security community during the de-
escalation period of this crisis, after the regional leading powers find tangible solutions. 
This finding is actually in line with the arguments of scholars who argue that a security 
community was more likely to arise within the ASEAN six member countries than the 
ASEAN ten. Logically, it was easier for six countries than for ten countries to establish a 
security community. It is easier to establish a common view among six than ten 
members. Some officials and scholars argue that based on Deutsch's definition, ASEAN 
is already in the early stage of a security community. Some claimed that the process of 
establishing a security community is still below 50 per cent of completion. Rizal Sukma 
suggests a precise percentage of 38 per cent. 60 Others say that the process now is 
around 60 per cent.61 However, all share a common view that the most important parts 
or 'the heart of a security community' were not yet established. Allan Chong from 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore argues that ASEAN is now an 
intangible security community in the sense that there is no war occurring in Southeast 
Asia. However, according to him, ASEAN will never be a tangible security community 
because (i) there is no liberal peace across ASEAN and ASEAN members are still 
targeting each other, (ii) there is an absence of significant non-governmental 
involvement, and (iii) ASEAN is not treated as the most important aspect of foreign 
policies of ASEAN countries in the members' national statements/ speeches'. 62 
59 Interview with a Thai Army Officer; Indonesian Official 2; Chinintira Na Thalang; and Thanet 
Aphornsuvan. 
60 Interview with Rizal Sukma, Executive Director of the CSIS-Jakarta, Jakarta, 16 February 2011. 
61 Interview with senior level officers of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1,2,3 and middle level 
officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 1, 2 (See Lists of Interviews). 
62 Interview with Allan Chong, Researcher, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 16 March 2011. 
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Fifth, the security system in Southeast Asia can also reflect a concert dynamic in a non-
traditional crisis. While the traditional notion of a concert of powers only works in a 
traditional type of crisis, the thesis finds that during the acute period of the Cyclone 
N argis crisis, the management of this crisis indicated the existence of a quasi concert of 
regional leading powers. 
Sixth, the members of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' in Southeast Asia 
have varied in the different crises. The Cambodian crisis demonstrated that the 
regional leading powers were Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The East 
Timor crisis showed that the regional leading powers at that time were Indonesia, 
Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore. The Cyclone Nargis crisis showed 
that Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia were the regional leading powers. From the 
three crises, it is seen that Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand were the key actors in 
the regional leading powers followed by the second circle of group consisting Malaysia 
and the Philippines (see Figure 6.1). 
Seventh, among the ASEAN members themselves, the three crises did not demonstrate 
the existence of a balancing system among ASEAN members. The balance of external 
great power influence still exists in ASEAN as some member countries still depend on 
external great powers to ensure their security, and have alignments and military 
cooperation with external great powers. As Emmers argues, 'Great powers will never 
leave the region, however in managing crisis, unless the crisis influences them directly, 
great powers are reluctant to take part'. 63 
Eight, this thesis also finds that the role of the ASEAN Chair is very important, but only 
if one of the regional leading powers holds the chairmanship. The country that holds 
the chairmanship has always been consulted when any crisis arises. If the 
Chairmanship is held by countries like Brunei, Cambodia, Lao PDR or Myanmar, even 
though the chair is still consulted, it will not play such an important role. Meanwhile, 
the role of the Secretary-General of ASEAN cannot be ignored. The role of Pitsuwan, 
during the Cyclone Nargis Crisis for example, is widely recognised as being prominent. 
It is quite understandable why the role or contribution of the previous Secretaries-
General of ASEAN is not widely known. Only after the ASEAN Summit in 1992 in 
Singapore was a Secretary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat given the status of 
Secretary-General of ASEAN. Before the Summit, the position was called Secretary-
General of the ASEAN Secretariat. Hence, Tan Sri Ajit Singh was officially the first 
Secretary-General of ASEAN and his period of leadership was a period of transition. He 
63 Interview with Dr. Ralf Emmers, Associate Professor, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 March 2011 . 
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mostly dealt with AFf A and the enlargement of ASEAN. According to him, there was 
no big crisis during his term. Rodolfo Severino who was Ajit Singh's successor handled 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 1999 East Timor Crisis. However, his role in 
these two crises is not widely publicised. 
Finally, the historical review provides evidence to suggest that a 'collective identity', as 
one of the most important indicators of a security community, emerged slowly during 
the three crises. As ASEAN has become more integrated, the collective identity has 
grown stronger. This has been demonstrated by the fact that ASEAN member states are 
getting ready to work as a security community. The Cambodian crisis, which occurred 
in 1978 just 11 years after ASEAN was established, showed very few significant 
indicators of a security community. ASEAN member states indicated a partial security 
community in the East Timor crisis only among the regional leading powers and only 
during the de-escalation period. During the de-escalation period of the Cyclone N argis, 
even though the nature of this crisis was non-traditional, it worked as an embryonic 
security community. 
6.7. Conclusion 
The thesis finds that m addition to the explanatory concepts of regional security 
systems - a balance of power, a security community and a classical concert of powers 
- there is a variation of the classical conceptualisation of a concert of powers that 
supports my proposal for a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers'. Among the crises 
that were investigated, a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' characterised the 
acute period of the Cambodian crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis. The East Timor 
crisis shows the importance of great and external powers' influence during the acute 
period but the 'balance' notion was absent. A balance of power among ASEAN members 
and a classical concert of powers did not explain any phase of the three crises 
investigated in the thesis. 
The concept of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers', while sharing some 
characteristics of a classical concert of powers, (such as a decisive shock to the stability 
of the prevailing order, a level of cooperation among members, a pattern of cooperative 
behaviour and a need for system stability and international order) has several unique 
characteristics'. First, instead of great powers, the concert in Southeast Asia consists of 
regional leading powers. Second, unlike the concept of a classical concert of powers 
which has fixed members, a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' in Southeast Asia 
does not have permanent members. Third, while the term 'a classical concert of powers' 
includes the possibility of military forces being deployed to restore order in the region, 
within a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' in Southeast Asia, the use of force to 
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restore the region's order or stability is considered to be unlikely. Fourth, unlike the 
classical concept of concert of powers, the grouping of 'regional leading powers' does 
not have spheres of influence. Finally, the form of cooperation does not include 
institutionalised summit diplomacy. Rather, the main type of cooperation is informal 
summit diplomacy conducted by leaders, either by phone, in the corridors of meetings 
and through informal personal relationships and interactions that support the concert 
members. 
With regard to the regional leading powers that comprise the quasi concert, the thesis 
finds that historically during the crises five leading states, Indonesia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines exerted more influence than the other five 
(Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar). Within the five leading 
states, three member states - Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand - are consistently 
influential. 
The concept of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' helps to explain the crisis 
management during the acute periods of both the Cambodian crisis and the Cyclone 
Nargis crisis. Other concepts of security systems that explain other stages of crisis 
include a balance of external great power influence and a security community. The 
management of the de-escalation period of the Cambodian crisis demonstrates that a 
balance of great power influence was operating. The ASEAN member states' crisis 
management during the acute period of the East Timor crisis indicates the importance 
of external great power influence where the concept of balance was not operating. 
During the de-escalation of the crisis, the forming of a security community between 
regional leading powers applied. For the last case study, the crisis management during 
the acute period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis indicated a 'quasi concert of regional 
leading powers' and during the de-escalation period, an embryonic security community. 
A further key finding is that there are connections between crisis management and the 
regional security system in Southeast Asia. The type of security system that operates 
depends on two conditions: the nature and the phase of the crisis. The comparison of 
the three crises demonstrates that the three concepts of a regional security system were 
not applicable in some stages of the crises and type of crisis. The gap was filled by the 
concept of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers'. The Conclusion Chapter 
summarises the case studies and the findings; it also elaborates the thesis contribution 
and suggests appropriate policy directions. 
289 
CHAPTER7 
CONCLUSION 
7.1. Introduction 
The research questions addressed in this study are: first, does an examination of how 
ASEAN member states manage crises provide a way of understanding the type of 
security systems that operate in Southeast Asia? Second, if it does, what type of 
security system are they? The thesis examines a possible connection between crisis 
management conducted by ASEAN member states and the regional security system in 
Southeast Asia. The study focuses on three case studies: the Cambodian crisis in 1978-
1991; the East Timor crisis in 1999-2002; and the Cyclone Nargis crisis in 2008-2010. 
It investigates whether or not an analysis of traditional crises (the Cambodian and East 
Timor crises) and a non traditional crisis (the Cyclone Nargis crisis) helps to explain the 
possible types of regional security systems, namely: a balancing system, a sub-regional 
concert of powers and a security community. 
The thesis was prompted by the long-standing debate about the type of the security 
system in Southeast Asia. The recent systems in Southeast Asia have been stamped with 
many different labels, ranging from an 'imitation community' 1 to a 'security 
community'. 2 Acharya makes a distinction between -different types of security 
community.3 Leifer4 and Emmers s emphasise the balance of power factor in Southeast 
Asia security system. Although Acharya, 6 Shirk,? Wesley, 8 Ay~on9 and Goh 10 investigate 
the possibility of a concert of power in the Asia Pacific region, none of them argue 
considered its application to Southeast Asia. None of the literature considers that the 
security system in Southeast Asia can be understood as a regional concert of powers. 
Furthermore, the literature rarely investigates whether there are connections between 
1 David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, 'ASEAN Imitation Community', Orbis, 46:1, 2002, pp. 93-
109, p. 93. 
2 Estrella Solidum, The Politics of ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asian Regionalism, Singapore: 
Eastern University Press, 2003. 
3 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of 
regional order, 2nd edn, London: Routledge, 2009. 
4 Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, 1989. 
s Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 
6 Amitav Acharya, 'Asia Pacific Security, Community, Concert or What? ' paper for the Pacific Forum CSIS 
Pacnet, 12 March 2010, available at http://m¥\>v.iseas.edu.sg/aseanstudiescentre/ ascdf3_ acharya.pdf 
(accessed on 8 May 2010). 
7 Susan Shirk, 'Asia Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers? ' in David A. Lake 
and Patrick Morgan, eds, Regional Orders: Building and Security in a New World, University Park: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, pp. 262-264. 
8 Michael Wesley, quoted in Acharya, 'A Concert or What? '. 
9 Robert Ayson, 'The Six Party Talks Proces.s: Towards an Asian Concert?' in Ron Huisken ed. , The 
Architecture of Security in Asia Pacific, Canberra: ANU E Press 2009. 
10 Evelyn Goh, 'US Strategic Relations with a Rising China: Trajectories and Impacts on Asia-Pacific 
Security', in Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato, eds, The Rise of China and International Security: 
America and Asia, London: Routledge, 2009. 
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the management of crises and the type of regional security system, that is, if the way 
ASEAN members manage crises is an indicator of the type of regional security system 
that operates in Southeast Asia. 
In response to these contentions and the associated debate, the thesis attempts to 
delineate the regional security system that operated in Southeast Asia between 1978 
and 2010 by scrutinising how ASEAN member states managed their crises. The central 
arguments of this thesis are, first, that the examination of the way ASEAN member 
states manage crises indeed provides a way of understanding the type of security 
system that operates in Southeast Asia. Crises in Southeast Asia have been managed 
according to the nature and the phase of the crisis and therefore have indicated 
different types of regional security system. The nature of the crisis means whether it is 
traditional or non-traditional, while the phase of the cns1s means whether it is 
escalating, acute or de-escalating. The nature of the cns1s also determines the 
involvement of certain types of powers. The three crises investigated in this thesis 
demonstrate that traditional crises have involved either regional leading powers or 
external great powers, while the one non traditional crisis involved either all ASEAN 
member states or only regional leading powers. The particular phase of the crises 
investigated also determines the type of regional security system that is operating. At 
the time when the phase of the crisis was acute, the regional leading powers would take 
the lead in managing the crisis (all three crises), and if the regional leading powers were 
not able to manage, the external great powers would then take on a role (as in the 
Cambodian and the East Timor crises). The types of regional security system evident in 
the Cambodian, East Timor and Cyclone Nargis crises were a quasi concert of regional 
leading powers, a partial and embryonic security community, and a balance of external 
great power influence. 
A partial security community emerged during the de-escalation period of the East 
Timor crisis among the regional leading powers and an embryonic security community 
was evident during the de-escalation period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis which involved 
all member states. An embryonic security community among all the ASEAN states was 
indicated during the Cyclone Nargis crisis due to the non-traditional nature of the crisis. 
During the de-escalation period of the Cambodia crisis, the management of the crisis 
can be characterised by a balance of external great power influence, while during the 
acute period of the East Timor crisis, the crisis response shines a light on the 
importance a great-power influence without the notion of balance being evident. In 
another stage, the crisis management also shows the existence of a 'quasi concert of 
regional leading powers' (the acute period of the Cambodian crisis and the Cyclone 
Nargis crisis). 
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Second, another central argument is that an additional security concept is required to 
explain some aspects of some crises. A variation of the classical conceptualisation of a 
concert of powers has emerged among the ASEAN member states in responding to 
crises. The crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states during the acute 
period of the Cambodian and the Cyclone Nargis is characterised by a 'quasi concert of 
regional leading powers'. 
These findings contribute to the debate about security systems in Southeast Asia. While 
few scholars have investigated crises in Southeast Asia in terms of the phases of the 
crisis, an examination of the three crises shows a change in operation of the regional 
security system over phases in one crisis. The Cambodian crisis saw a change from a 
'quasi concert of regional leading powers' to a balance of external great power influence. 
The management of the East Timor crisis is characterised by a change from the 
importance of external great power influence to a partial security community. Finally, 
the Cyclone Nargis crisis also saw an alteration, from a quasi concert of powers to an 
embryonic security community. 
7.2 Contribution of the Study 
This thesis contributes to the academic literature and can also help in forming ASEAN 
member countries' policy directions. First, the thesis shows that crisis management is 
another way of explaining which regional systems are operating during crises. It 
introduces a new indicator for explaining regional security systems. While historically 
the notion of crisis management has been a useful indicator that sheds light on the 
international system, this thesis provides evidence that the concept is a helpful 
indicator to understand the regional security systems operating in Southeast Asia. 
Second, the thesis introduces two conditions, the nature (traditional or non-traditional) 
and the phase of a crisis (escalating, acute and de-escalating period) in order to 
examine different systems working at different times. Few scholars have looked at the 
phases of a crisis in examining either crisis management or security systems. 
Third, the thesis introduces a new explanatory concept, namely a 'quasi concert of 
regional leading powers'. The conceptualisation of a concert of powers in Southeast 
Asia has rarely been investigated. This thesis demonstrates that some crises, and in a 
particular the phases of crises, indicate a variation of the classical concept of a concert 
of powers, namely a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers'. Unlike the previous 
literature on concerts of powers that has focused on great powers in specific areas of 
potential conflict such as Europe, the US and East Asia, the thesis shows that a 
variation of the traditional concept of concert of powers is also applicable to regional 
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leading powers and is relevant to Southeast Asia. The thesis further contributes to the 
academic literature by creating a set of indicators of a 'quasi concert of regional leading 
powers'. Some indicators share the traditional concept of concert of powers, m 
particular the decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order, the level of 
cooperation among members, a pattern of cooperative behaviour and the need for 
system stability and international order. However, a 'quasi concert of regional leading 
powers' has unique indicators: the concept of regional leading powers; having flexible 
membership; promoting peaceful diplomatic means instead of the use of force; 
conducting informal summit diplomacy and having flexible joint approaches. 
Finally, this thesis also has policy implications for ASEAN member states. The absence 
of the usual formal mechanisms of crisis management has resulted in different types of 
regional security systems arising according to the phase and nature of the crisis. If 
ASEAN member states are committed to establishing the ASEAN Security Community 
in 2015, they have to maximise their efforts in among other things, establishing new 
formal mechanisms and fulfilling the criteria that are elaborated above, based on the 
current ASEAN Charter, or perhaps a revised ASEAN Charter. If new formal 
mechanisms were to be established, they would not necessarily indicate a fully-fledged 
security community as the regional security system operating in Southeast Asia. 
However to establish a security community, a formal mechanism of crisis management 
is essential. 
7.3. Policy Directions 
From the three crises that have been investigated, it can be concluded that ASEAN's 
responses to crises have occurred according to the nature and phase of the crisis and 
this finding has implications for the direction of policy. The first implication is that the 
management of crises in Southeast Asia needs to be reviewed and ways need to be 
found to establish a more robust structure. At the time of writing, ASEAN member 
states have not developed nor exercised any formal mechanisms for crisis management. 
The member states claim that the extensive numbers of meetings held by ASEAN will 
lead to a closer interaction that will smooth the consultation process towards achieving 
consensus. ASEAN member countries until now have been reluctant to utilise such 
formal mechanisms, as the High Council, as mandated in the TAC. This is because there 
is concern over potential violations of the non-interference principle upheld by all 
ASEAN member states. Any intervention in the form of mediation or other third-party 
involvement by any ASEAN member state in another member's affairs is unlikely to be 
welcome since there remains the fear that the mediator will not be neutral. 
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In the three crises investigat~d in this thesis, the regional leading powers of that time 
took the initiative and then shared the burden with all ASEAN member states only 
when the crisis had de-escalated. When regional leading powers did not have the power 
to respond to the crisis, external great powers took the initiative of responding to the 
crisis and then shared the burden with the regional leading powers in Southeast Asia. 
In the future, a permanent dispute settlement mechanism or crisis management 
mechanism would be imperative for ASEAN member states, which are now ruled by the 
ASEAN Charter. There was a high expectation at the time of its promulgation that the 
ASEAN Charter would regulate new principles for a permanent crisis and dispute 
settlement mechanisms. Since it did not, and the provisions of the current ASEAN 
Charter do not cover this, ASEAN member states should review the Charter or establish 
new principles under the Charter framework to regulate dispute settlement or crisis 
mechanism. The current response mechanism which is heavily dependent on the 
regional leading powers, the ASEAN Chair and even the world's great powers, would 
prevent ASEAN from becoming a mature security community. Given the fact that 
between ASEAN member states and the CLMV countries there has been a development 
gap, it is difficult to expect the CLMV countries to take equal responsibility at least in 
terms of material capabilities. Vietnam, however, is gradually taking more 
responsibility. In the current South China Sea dispute, Vietnam played a significant 
role as a balancer vis-a-vis China. The Philippines and Vietnam have been trying to 
guard other ASEAN member states not to be too influenced by China. Vietnam also 
initiated the dispute settlement mechanisms of the ASEAN Charter during its 
chairmanship in 2010. 11 Brunei Darussalam, on the other hand, even though it 
possesses economic capacity, shies away from taking a very active role like the other 
five countries. If this continues, the regional leading powers will remain key actors in 
any crisis in ASEAN, perhaps with help or pressure from the external great powers. 
The response to the Cyclone N argis crisis showed good signs for the establishment of a 
security community, even though this is still embryonic. This could be developed to 
include traditional security issues. However, this would require some prerequisites: (i) 
the development and economic gap between regional leading powers and the rest of 
ASEAN member states be gradually narrowed, (ii) that all members move towards 
democracy, and (iii) that non-regional leading powers are willing to resume equal 
responsibility in a crisis. The first prerequisite is ongoing, but the last two requirements 
still need to be developed. 
11 ASEAN, 'Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms Signed, Ha Noi, 8 April 2010', 
http: //w-vvw.asean.org / ne,vs/item /asean-bulletin-april-2o10#Article-5 (accessed on 1 October 2013) 
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Furthermore, ASEAN member states need to take the initiative in producing a crisis 
and dispute settlement mechanism. At least, they should continue working on the 
establishment of an ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) as called for 
in the follow-up 2009 ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Blueprint. 12 At the 
18th ASEAN Summit in Jakarta Indonesia on 8 May 2011, ASEAN Leaders tasked their 
Foreign Ministers with submitting their recommendations to the 19th ASEAN Summit.13 
The proposal for this institute actually came from Indonesia. Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Natalegawa said that the Institute would comprise think-tanks or second-
track institutions across the Southeast Asian region. According to Natalegawa, 'not all 
issues can be solved at the governmental level. Therefore, the institute will allow a 
process where any conflict can be responded to through non-state mechanisms. The 
institute will not involve a military element and limit participation to institutions from 
ASEAN member states' .14 He added that 'the role of the AIPR would not be perceived as 
challenging the non-interference principle embraced by ASEAN'. 1s 
The idea of establishing the AIPR, while still far from providing an immediate solution 
to managing conflicts among ASEAN members, should be welcomed and supported. 
The establishment of the AIPR would also provide an entry point for engagement and 
participation by non-governmental elements in ASEAN mechanisms. Ideally, the AIPR 
should develop both research and practical and 'direct-result' activities (such as 
mediation and training) due to the high intensity of conflicts in the region. However, 
looking at the evolutionary process which has become common in ASEAN and also 
considering the strict adherence to the non-interference principles, a first step to 
establishing a more research-oriented institution is appreciated. 
Additionally, it is important that the institute be given the authority to collect necessary 
and accurate information related to the conflict. In this regard, the non-interference 
principle should be modified in some respects. While the members of the AIPR would 
be limited to participants from non-governmental institutions in ASEAN member 
states, networking as well as cooperation from outside the region should be welcomed, 
especially to learn from similar but more established and experienced institutions. 
Finally, the issue of funding might be challenging since ASEAN is still struggling with 
its limited budget. ASEAN member states should be willing to contribute funds for the 
institute's operation. 
12 See ASEAN, ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint, Section B2.2, Action (ii), available 
http: //www.aseansec.org/2233z.pdf (accessed on 26 July 2010 ). 
13 ASEAN, 'ASEAN Leaders' Joint Statement on the Establishment of an ASEAN Institute for Peace and 
Reconciliation', available at http://www.asean.org/Joint Statement IPR.pdf (accessed on 14 May 2011). 
14 Lina Alexandra, 'Bringing Peace and Reconciliation to ASEAN', available at 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2o11/o5L31/bringing-peace-and-reconciliation-asean.html 
(accessed on 11 June 2011) 
1s Alexandra, 'Bringing Peace and Reconciliation to ASEAN'. 
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The findings of this thesis suggest that the role of the Secretary-General of ASEAN 
should also be strengthened. A prominent role was played by Pitsuwan during the 
Cyclone Nargis crisis. A Secretary-General in the future should be able to push all 
members of ASEAN to play equitable role. Even though indicating that he played a 
mediator role (see Section 5.5.F), Pitsuwan appeared to shy away from taking a 
prominent role in the 2011 Cambodia and Thai border dispute. There was a possibility 
that Cambodia was reluctant to be facilitated by Pitsuwan given that Pitsuwan is a Thai 
and former Thai Foreign Minister. On the other hand, Pitsuwan might have been 
hesitant to be too vocal in this border dispute or he may simply have concluded that his 
own background disqualified him from being able to mediate effectively in this case. 
Even though Pitsuwan claims that he and the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Natalegawa 
mediated the dispute, his role was barely visible compared to the latter. However, a 
strengthened role of the ASEAN Secretary-General would need also monitoring and 
evaluation in its implementation. 
In addition, with regard to ASEAN member states' relations with their dialogue 
partners, I suggest that dialogue partners, particularly the world's great powers, such as 
the US and China, would be well advised to refrain from intervening in the 
management of crises in Southeast Asia where possible in order for the ASEAN 
member states to remain independent, gain more experience, build expertise and be 
able to create and utilise home-grown robust and effective crisis mechanisms. 
The final policy direction that the findings point to is that there is a need to share the 
burden from the regional leading powers to the other ASEAN member states on 
traditional security issues. Burden-sharing involves the willingness on both sides. The 
regional leading powers should be willing to share the burdens and the other member 
states should be willing to accept this. The non leading powers should be ready to 
assume responsibility to take the initiative to offer good offices for disputant parties. 
7.4. Final Thoughts 
The argument offered in this study is presented with my strong awareness that there is 
much more work to be done to confirm that the findings have any general application 
beyond the three case studies. Indeed, even the bounded argument I present, like all 
arguments, can be improved by others. Rather than going into the many qualifications 
that I could make about my own study my hope is that it will provide a useful set of 
propositions: first, that examining crisis management may well be a way of 
understanding the security systems operating in Southeast Asia; second that crises 
change and therefore so does the security system; and third, that is it possible to 
conceptualise other types of security systems than those commonly offered. My hope is 
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that these propositions will provide scholars with useful avenues of research so that 
policy makers have more options for making Southeast Asia a safe and prosperous 
region for its peoples. 
**** 
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Security Community 
APPENDIX1 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Questions regarding Southeast Asia as a security community 
1. Please describe the security system in Southeast Asia. 
2. Do you think ASEAN is already a security community? If not, is it already in the 
early stage of a security community? When do you think ASEAN will be a fully-
fledged security community? 
3. Do you think ASEAN will be able to establish a fully-fledged security community 
by 2015 as planned by the organisation? Why? 
4. Do you think citizens of Southeast Asian countries already feel that they are part 
of a security community? Why? 
Questions regarding the linkages between the three case studies and 
Southeast Asia as a security community? 
5. Was there any comparability of values among decision-makers m general, 
during the Cambodian crisis? 
6. Was there any mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers 
during the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis? 
7. Was there any mutual responsiveness of government to actions and 
communication of other governments during the Cambodian crisis, the East 
Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis? 
8. Were there any general precipitating factors that encouraged states to orient 
themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies during the 
Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis? 
9. Did trust and collective identity formation develop during the Cambodian crisis, 
the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis? In what ways? 
10. Did formal or informal institutions and practices exist during the Cambodian 
crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis? 
Balance of Power 
Questions regarding a balance of power in Southeast Asia 
1. Is Southeast Asia characterised by the existence of a minimum of two equal 
powers? 
2. Is Southeast Asia characterised by the need of member countries to survive and 
to expand? 
3. Do some countries ally with each other on the basis of short-run interests? 
4. Is Southeast Asia influenced by great powers outside the region? 
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5. Do Southeast Asian countries depend on external great powers as their security 
providers? 
Questions regarding the linkages between the three case studies and 
Southeast Asia as a balance of power 
6. Do you think ASEAN effectively managed the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor 
crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis or do you think it was because of external 
factors that the crises could be solved? How would you describe the role of 
external powers in these crises? 
Concert of Powers 
Questions regarding Southeast Asia as a concert of powers? 
1. Would you define Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand as dominant 
powers in Southeast Asia? If not, who would you define as dominant powers? 
2. Do the dominant powers engage in 'telephone diplomacy'? 
3. If they do, does 'telephone diplomacy' work efficiently in assisting to resolve 
crises? 
4. Are these powers given common rights and responsibilities by other powers in 
the region? 
5. Is there any pattern of cooperative behaviour between 'dominant powers' in 
ASEAN? If not, do you think any confidential summit diplomacy/informal 
summit diplomacy exists among them? 
6. Does ASEAN have a special or unique mechanism in managing crises besides 
what scholars have called the 'ASEAN Way'? 
7. Do you think that how ASEAN manages its crises could be used as an indication 
of the regional security system in Southeast Asia? 
Questions regarding the linkages between the three case studies and a 
concert of powers 
8. Was there any decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order m the 
Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis? 
9. Was there any high and self-conscious level of cooperation among 'dominant 
powers' in general, during the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the 
Cyclone Nargis crisis? 
10. Was there any pattern of cooperative behaviour in general, during the 
Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis? 
11. Was there any effective equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group 
of all 'dominant powers' in general, during the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor 
crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis? 
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12. Was there any joint approach to regional issues in general, during the 
Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis? 
13. Do these dominant powers gather and sit down to solve problems in general 
crises, in the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis 
crisis? 
14. Do you think ASEAN effectively managed these crises or do you think it was 
because of external factors that the crisis could be solved? How would you 
describe the role of external powers in this crisis? How would you describe the 
role of 'dominant powers' in these crises? 
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APPENDIX2 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS IN INDONESIA, THAILAND, 
MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, AUSTRALIA 2011-2012 
Indonesia 
1. Interview with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1 
(requested anonymous), Jakarta, 16 February 2011. 
2. Interview with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2 
(requested anonymous), Jakarta, 16 February 2011. 
3. Interview with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3 
(requested anonymous), Jakarta, 16 February 2011. 
4. Interview with a senior level officer of the ASEAN Secretariat (requested 
anonymous), Jakarta, 25 March 2011. 
5. Interview with Alexandra Retnowulan, Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, Jakarta, 18 February 2011. 
6. Interview with Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy of the Vice Presidencial Office, 
Jakarta, 29 March 2011. 
7. Interview with Evan Laksmana, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
Jakarta, 21 March 2011. 
8. Interview with Evi Fitriani, PhD, Lecturer, University of Indonesia, Jakarta, 14 
February 2011. 
9. Interview with Lina Alexandra, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
Jakarta, 18 February 2011. 
10. Interview with Dr Mely Caballero-Anthony, Research Fellow, the ASEAN 
Secretariat, Jakarta, 25 March 2011. 
11. Interview with Dr Rizal Sukma, Executive Director of the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies-Jakarta, Jakarta, 16 February 2011. 
Thailand 
12. Interview with a senior level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 
(requested anonymous), Bangkok, 21 February 2011. 
13. Interview with middle level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 1 
(requested anonymous), Bangkok, 21 February 2011. 
14. Interview with middle level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 
2 (requested anonymous), Bangkok, 21 February 2011. 
15. Interview with junior level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 1 
(requested anonymous), Bangkok, 21 February 2011. 
16. Interview with junior level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 2 
(requested anonymous), Bangkok, 21 February 2011. 
17. Interview with a Thai army officer in charge of Cyclone Nargis Crisis, Bangkok, 
(requested anonymous) 23 February 2011. 
18 . Interview with a Thai army officer who was sent to East Timor as an ADC of 
Force Commander of UNTAET, (requested anonymous), Bangkok, 23 February 
2011. 
19. Interview with a Thai army officer in charge of the Cambodian-Thai border 
dispute, (requested anonymous), Bangkok, 24 February 2011. 
20. Interview with Alexandra Owens, Australian diplomat based in the Australian 
Embassy in Bangkok, Bangkok, 22 February 2011. 
21. Interview with Chinintira Na Thalang, Thammasat University, Bangkok, 28 
February 2011. 
22. Interview with Sarah Storey, Australian diplomat based in the Australian 
Embassy in Bangkok, Bangkok, 22 February 2011. 
23. Interview with Siripon Wajjwalku, Thammasat University, Bangkok, 25 February 
2011. 
24. Interview with Kavi Chongkittavorn, Journalist of ASEAN issues, Bangkok, 25 
February, 2011. 
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25. Interview with Thanet Aphornsuvan, Distinguished Fellow, Thammasat 
University, Bangkok, 22 February 2011. 
26. Interview with Indonesian diplomat 1 based in the Indonesian Embassy in 
Bangkok (requested anonymous), Bangkok, 1 March 2011. 
27. Interview with Indonesian diplomat 2 (requested anonymous), Bangkok, 1 March 
2011. 
Malaysia 
28. Interview with a senior level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, 
Putrajaya, (requested anonymous), 10 March 2011. 
29. Interview with Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi, a retired senior level official of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia who was a DG of ASEAN Cooperation, Kuala 
Lumpur, 7 March 2011. 
30. Interview with Dr Jatswan Singh, Associate Professor, University of Malaya, 
Kuala Lumpur, 3 March 2011. 
31. Interview with Prof. Dato' Mohamad Abu Bakar, Research Fellow, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 3 March 2011. 
32. Interview with Shariman Lockman, Researcher, ISIS-Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 4 
March 2011. 
33. Interview with Tan Sri Ajith Singh, former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Kuala 
Lumpur, 10 March 2011. 
34. Interview with Dr Tang Siew Mun, ISIS-Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 4 March 2011. 
35. Interview with an Indonesian diplomat (requested anonymous), Kuala Lumpur, 7 
March 2011. 
Singapore 
36. Interview with Dr Alan Chong Chia Siong, S. Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies (RSIS), Singapore, 14 March 2011. 
37. Interview with Ambassador Barry Desker, RSIS, Singapore, 15 March 2011 
38. Interview with Daljit Singh, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 
Singapore, 17 March 2011. 
39. Interview with Moe Thuzar, ISEAS, Singapore, 16 March 2011. 
40. Interview with Dr Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ISEAS, Singapore, 16 March 2011. 
41. Interview with Dr Ralf Emmers, Associate Proffesor, RSIS, Singapore, 15 March 
2011. 
42. Interview with Ambassador Rodolfo Severino, ISEAS, Singapore, 16 March 2011. 
43. Interview with Dr Tim Huxley, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
Singapore, 18 March 2011. 
44. Interview with Ambassador Tan Seng Chye, Researcher at RSIS, Singapore, 15 
March 2011. 
Australia 
45. Interview with Dr Christopher Roberts, Lecturer, National Security College, ANU, 
Canberra, 27 September and 21 December 2011. 
46. Interview with Dr Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 16 
and 24 August 2011. 
47. Interview with Michael Maley, Special Adviser Electoral Reform and 
International Services, Australian Electoral Commission, Canberra, 8 August 
2011. 
48 . Interview with an Indonesian diplomat 1, Canberra, 17 November 2011 
(requested anonymous) 
49. Interview with an Indonesian diplomat 2, (requested anonymous) , Canberra, 12 
December 2011. 
50. Interview with a Japanese diplomat (requested anonymous) , 16 February 2012. 
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